No Me210 fiasco

[tomo pauk]

Switch from DB601 engine to DB605 engine happened during this time frame.

How much production delay was typical when WWII era aircraft switched engine types? P-51 switch from Allison engine to Packard built Merlin engine might be a good comparison.

NAA built 121 P-51A (ie. last version with V-1710) in April of 1943, then 120 in May (mostly P-51A, some -51B). In June, only 20 P-51 (Bs?) were produced, due to low availability of 2-stage V-1650s - less than 100 of those were produced prior July 1943.
Hence, when NAA received 173 of V-1650s (ie. some time in July 1943), they produced 534 P-51B airframes - the monthly production of airframes actually increased. The NAA in Dallas started production of P-51C in September 1943, they were not involved in production of Allison Mustangs.

 

[Aozora]

Sounds good to me.

How many weeks of production were lost when switching from Spitfire Mk V to Mk IX?

There was no sudden switch from Mk V to Mk IX production; for instance some of the first Mk IXs built were in the BR900 - BS200 range, which was also used for Mk VC production - Mk IXs were converted from VC airframes as Merlin 61s became available: different shadow factories, such as Eastleigh, concentrated more on Mk IX production, while (for example) Chattis Hill built both marks. The result was that very little time, if any, was lost, nor was there any dip in production numbers:

production page 030

production page 031

 

[wiking85]

So I think we've demonstrated that quite a few aircraft were lost, though not all Bf110s. As to the original question, what would the greater number of Me109s and Bf110s have gotten the LW in the period from 1941-43?

 

[OldSkeptic]

What if the Me 210 was properly vetted before being ordered, so was never put into production at all and the Bf110 was not removed from production and development?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Messerschmitt_Me_210
I've seen figures that it cost the LW about 2,000 aircraft that were lose in by taking the Bf110 out of production and trying to phase in the Me210 instead. Supposing that this had not happened and that the LW was able to get about 2,000 extra Bf110's out of the production lines prior to the historical introduction of the Me410, what effect would that have had on the LW's capabilities? I assume that means quite a few fighter-bombers for the Eastern Front in 1941-43, as well as for the Mediterranean theater, where it would serve in many roles. I also imagine that the E-series would appear in 1941 with the introduction of the DB601F, but there would be a lot more of them. There would probably be even more available as night fighters and bomber destroyers in 1941-43 too.

What effect if any would this have had on the war? Even 500 more ground attack aircraft in the East would have been helpful in 1941-43, as would 500-1000 more night fighters in the 1941-44 period. I'm not sure if 500 extra bomber destroyers were really all that necessary in 1941-43, but they couldn't hurt that much. Obviously this isn't going to change the war, but it could have an impact on say the Battles of the Ruhr and Berlin and on the fighting in 1942-43 in the East.

Any thoughts on this?

To be cruel there was only one way that the 210 debacle wasn't going to happen ... shoot Willy. The problems started and finished with him.

 

[stona]

. shoot Willy. The problems started and finished with him.

It wasn't Prof. Messerschmitt who ordered 2,000 Me 210s before a prototype had flown and whilst it was largely still a paper project. That was the RLM.

The question of why the RLM was expecting a sort of upgraded Bf 110 whilst Messerschmitt AG was designing a completely different aeroplane goes to the heart of the problems of the German aviation industry as a whole and is not really within the scope of this topic.

The whole system showed itself time and time again to be dysfunctional, which was lucky for us. When it did work some formidable aeroplanes resulted. When it didn't enormous means and resources were wasted on fiascos like the Me 210, He 177, Ta 154, all the Mistel projects and various jet and rocket programs. German piston engine development had some problems too, projects that should have been cancelled staggered on for years, again eating up valuable resources with no useful end product. That's by no means an extensive list.

Prof. Messerschmitt was part of that system and must (and did at the time) shoulder some of the responsibility for the fiasco. One man alone could not create a c**k up on this scale, he needed a lot of help.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Juha]

Hello Stona
don't be too hard on RLM, during high international tension/wartime all sides took procurement/development risks, look Botha vs Me 210 or He 177 vs Manchester. Saying nothing on AW Albemarle, Brewster Bermuda, Vought Chesapeake etc.

Juha

 

[tomo pauk]

There was nothing wrong with Vought, it was carrying twice the bomb load of Aichi Val or Blackburn Skua.

 

[stona]

And the Manchester became the Lancaster, the best 'heavy' of the European war.

Even the Albermarle served with distinction in roles other than as a medium bomber, particularly as a glider tug. I can't comment on US aircraft.

Everyone made mistakes, the point is NOT to keep on financing and developing a loser.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Shortround6]

The Albermarle 'served' although I am not sure what distinction you are referring to. It was know for columns of oil smoke drifting skyward from it's engines after landing from a long,hard tow. An indication of marginal cooling in that service? To be fair a number of aircraft had problems in glider towing or target towing as their cooling systems were not not designed for high power output at low air speeds for long periods of time.

The US and British did both order a number of planes off the drawing boards. Things get complicated when requirements change between orders and first production deliveries. The US B-26 had gained 3600lbs in empty weight (and about 5000lb loaded) from the first model (no prototype) to the "B" model which was being delivered in the spring of 1942. The weight gain did nothing to help it's high landing speed problems.

The Vought Vindicator is a popular "target" for criticism but it is often forgotten that the design dated back to 1935 and was being purchased by the French, British and Americans in 1939-41 because nothing else war really available. Production jigs and tooling already existed for it and it could be delivered sooner than "newer" designs so it is sort of Vindicator or NO aircraft for squadrons XXX and YYY for for a number of months.

The US Marine Vindicators used at Midway replaced the Great Lakes BG-1 scout bombers.

And were ordered in 1939 at a time when the Douglas Dauntless was over 6 months from flying and the Northrop BT was just entering service.

Please note however that there was ONE prototype Vindicator built with a larger/ more powerful engine (R-1830 instead of the R-1535 engines used in production models) in 1940 but nobody bought that one in preference to the Dauntless. The Vindicator had seen it's day and everybody knew it, it's day just happened to overlap into the first combats in Europe and the Pacific.

 

[stona]

The US and British did both order a number of planes off the drawing boards.

You have to define 'off the drawing board'. I can't think of a single British aeroplane ordered in the thousands and intended to replace at least two other types, becoming the mainstay of the air force's heavy fighter and ground attack establishment.

Both the Spitfire and Hurricane were backed, at least to the extent of the Air Ministry looking at financing tools and jigs for production runs when neither had flown. Crucially there was a back up plan (Gloster F7/30) and it was recognised that this was a most unusual method. Many knew that a war was on the horizon and that 'unorthodox' methods might just save the day.

Sorley wrote to the DTD.

"I am aware that this is an unorthodox method but with the political situation as it is and the possibility of expansion close upon us we should take steps to produce the latest design in the shortest possible time."

You could argue that the Air Ministry was taking a gamble just like the RLM with the Me 210. Prof. Messerschmitt was a successful designer just like Mitchell and Camm even if he didn't quite have their track record. The successful reputation of the two British designers is a justification expressly given by Sorley for financing the Supermarine and Hawker designs at such an early stage. The difference is that the British did not put all their eggs in one basket. They gambled on two aircraft (both of which proved successful) and had a third in reserve.
The Germans had the already extant Bf 110 and Ju 87 in reserve. They were both very good aeroplanes, at least in 1940, which was just as well because the Me 210 never replaced them.

Cheers

Steve

 

[cimmex]

And the Manchester became the Lancaster, the best 'heavy' of the European war.

And the Me 210 became the Me 410, I don't think that the Lancaster was the best 'heavy' of the European war but in my eyes it was the ugliest.

 

[wiking85]

And the Me 210 became the Me 410, I don't think that the Lancaster was the best 'heavy' of the European war but in my eyes it was the ugliest.

And the Me 410 was still an inadequate and unpleasant to fly airplane. The Lancaster carried the biggest bomb load farthest, I don't know what other characteristics for a heavy bomber there were. The B-29 did not fly over Europe, which would have outclassed the Lancaster, while the B17, though more survivable during the day, was not able to go as far with as heavy a bomb load, which was the point of a heavy bomber.

 

[cimmex]

even at night the Lancaster lost up to 10%

 

[wiking85]

even at night the Lancaster lost up to 10%

Every sortee? No, not even close. Some nights sure, but loss rates don't necessarily have to do with the design, especially at night, but rather with the defenses. I understand that it had the lowest crew bailout rate, but that fact alone doesn't make it the worst design, nor drop it out of contention as the best heavy bomber either.

 

[stona]

even at night the Lancaster lost up to 10%

Which is a credit to the Luftwaffe's defences rather than a strike against the Lancaster.

10% is also very misleading figure.

Percentage losses for the entire war by Group for the Lancaster were MUCH lower than that.

1 Group 2.3%

3 Group 1.4%

5 Group 2.7%

6 (Canadian) Group 1.8%

8 (Pathfinder Force) Group 2.3%

Never let the facts get in the way of a prejudice

Training units had a significantly higher loss rate. Some Heavy Conversion Units (HCUs) flew Lancasters on operations with crews including instructors. They lost 4 aircraft on 36 sorties which gives an unrepresentative and statistically insignificant loss rate of 11.1%. OTUs flying other types had a more representative loss rate (for 4,068 sorties) of 2.9%.

Name a better heavy bomber operating in the European theatre 1939-45.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Juha]

There was nothing wrong with Vought, it was carrying twice the bomb load of Aichi Val or Blackburn Skua.

It was a dive-bomber that couldn't divebomb, IMHO both Val and Skua were definitely better dive-bombers

 

[stona]

I understand that it had the lowest crew bailout rate,

This goes back to an article published in 1979 by Freeman Dyson who served as a civilian scientist in the Operational Research Section at Bomber Command in 1944. He claimed that 25% of Halifax and Stirling crews shot down could expect to survive whereas this fell to 15% for the Lancaster.

Middlebrook and Everitt analysed losses on the Hamburg (4 raids), Nuremburg and Peenemunde raids. 13.2% of Lancaster crews survived being shot down. The figures for the Halifax and Stirling were 21.9% and 24% respectively.
The combined figures for the Halifax and Stirling show a 9% advantage over the Lancaster, very close to Dyson's claim.
It seems that for various reasons the Lancaster was more difficult to escape from, but this must be off set by other statistics which show you were also less likely to be shot down in a Lancaster in the first place.
Cheers
Steve

 

[Juha]

And the Manchester became the Lancaster, the best 'heavy' of the European war.

Even the Albermarle served with distinction in roles other than as a medium bomber, particularly as a glider tug. I can't comment on US aircraft.

Everyone made mistakes, the point is NOT to keep on financing and developing a loser.

Cheers

Steve

Yes, British who were not dive-bombing fanatics resolved the engene problems of Manchester clearly sooner than Germans with He 177 and they didn't take so seriously over-ambitious specs, the other reason why Germans stayed with He 177A so long.

But British built 580 Bothas, which had the first-line use of about one month in one squadron before it was turned over to 2nd line units as totally unsuitable for its designed role as GR plane.

Albemarle was so poor plane that not even Russians wanted them but say thanks but no thanks. So if one had a choice they refused Albemarle but RAF had to try find out something useful tasks for their Albemarles.

 

[tomo pauk]

It was a dive-bomber that couldn't divebomb, IMHO both Val and Skua were definitely better dive-bombers

That it could not dive bomb is a news to me. Care to elaborate a bit about that?

 

[cimmex]

Which is a credit to the Luftwaffe's defences rather than a strike against the Lancaster.

10% is also very misleading figure.

Percentage losses for the entire war by Group for the Lancaster were MUCH lower than that.

1 Group 2.3%

3 Group 1.4%

5 Group 2.7%

6 (Canadian) Group 1.8%

8 (Pathfinder Force) Group 2.3%

Never let the facts get in the way of a prejudice

Training units had a significantly higher loss rate. Some Heavy Conversion Units (HCUs) flew Lancasters on operations with crews including instructors. They lost 4 aircraft on 36 sorties which gives an unrepresentative and statistically insignificant loss rate of 11.1%. OTUs flying other types had a more representative loss rate (for 4,068 sorties) of 2.9%.

Name a better heavy bomber operating in the European theatre 1939-45.

Cheers

Steve

what's about the Nuremberg raid in March 1944?