No Me210 fiasco

[stona]

But British built 580 Bothas, which had the first-line use of about one month in one squadron before it was turned over to 2nd line units as totally unsuitable for its designed role as GR plane.

I said everyone made mistakes. 580 Bothas is not quite the same as ordering several thousand aircraft off the drawing board and reducing output of one of the aircraft it was supposed to replace. The Botha was known to have problems, not least being underpowered, before the war. When war came it simply wasn't up to the job, any job. Many of the Bothas built were stored and subsequently used for spares and then scrapped, never having been inflicted on the RAF.

There really is no comparison between something like the Blackburn Botha or the RAF's flirtation with turret fighters and the Me 210 fiasco

The British did not persist with the Botha, trying to put it right for six years (1938-43 for the Me210/410).

Cheers

Steve

 

[Juha]

That it could not dive bomb is a news to me. Care to elaborate a bit about that?

IIRC I first read that from an old AE decades ago but you can check that easier from here: Attack against Kido butai off Ceylon - take 2
Mark E Horan Re: Attack against Kido butai off Ceylon - take 2 « Reply #48 on: December 28, 2013, 01:14:52 am

Juha

 

[stona]

what's about the Nuremberg raid in March 1944?

What about it?

This was the heaviest Bomber Command loss of the war.

Of the total attacking force the percentage loss was 10.1%. For the Main Force bombers it was 11.9%.

You can't cherry pick the raid on which Bomber Command suffered the heaviest losses of the entire war, representing a mere 950 sorties of the 389,809 flown by Bomber Command during the war, as representative.
I could quote you dozens of operations when no losses at all were sustained, but they are not representative either.

Throughout the war the Lancaster flew 156,192 sorties for an overall loss rate of 2.2% and that is a representative statistic for losses for the type's entire wartime service.

Again, name a better heavy bomber operating in the European theatre 1939-45.

Cheers

Steve

 

[tomo pauk]

IIRC I first read that from an old AE decades ago but you can check that easier from here: Attack against Kido butai off Ceylon - take 2
Mark E Horan Re: Attack against Kido butai off Ceylon - take 2 « Reply #48 on: December 28, 2013, 01:14:52 am

Juha

Thanks for the link. It goes without saying that I'd love to read more about the SB2U's capabilities limitations.

 

[Juha]

IIRC some 400+ Bothas was ordered straight from the drawing board, the first production a/c was then used as a test plane and in spite of the problems more was ordered until it was absolutely clear that the plane, even with mods was uncureable and then part of the order was cancelled. But even then British produced 580 in practice useless twins when it had a desperate need for good GR planes. Same time Saro Lerwick was also found to be a failure and Beaufort ran into rather bad problems. So CC was rather lame early in the war.

So Botha cost to RAF at least 580 1st line planes so IMHO somewhat similar case than Me 210 to LW.

 

[Juha]

Thanks for the link. It goes without saying that I'd love to read more about the SB2U's capabilities limitations.

I visited my attic and yes, in AE 8 Oct 1978 - Jan 1979 there is a good article on Vindicator

 

[stona]

So Botha cost to RAF at least 580 1st line planes so IMHO somewhat similar case than Me 210 to LW.

Not similar at all. The Me 210 fiasco cost Messerschmitt a large number of Bf 109s and Bf 110s, types they desperately needed. What was Blackburn Aircraft making that the RAF desperately needed in 1940? If the Botha was being built by Supermarine or Hawker (and at a stretch Bristol) it might be relevant.

The plants at Brough and Dumbarton, where the Botha was built, are not comparable to the Messerschmitt plants at Augsburg or Regensburg in terms of impact on British production. The Botha did not cost a single Spitfire, Hurricane, Defiant or Blenheim.

Only two types of Botha were built, both versions of the Mk I. Time effort and money was not wasted on developing it. The original contract was honoured because the RAF was also desperate for second line aircraft and it was thought that the Botha was useful in that role. With hindsight it wasn't a great idea to build the number that were completed, but it's very few in terms of WW2 aircraft production when successful types were often built in thousands and tens of thousands, not a few hundred.

Cheers

Steve

 

[gjs238]

I dont see how these numbers stack up either. Total Me 210 production amounted to 619 airframes, including 267 licence built Hungarian "C" models, which were quite successful

In Hungarian service the Me 210 C did well and were very popular. The Duna works delivered 267 aircraft before switching to the Bf 109 G in March 1944, and the Hungarians used the speedy twin intensively on the Eastern Front.
Designated Me 210 C-1 these were generally similar to the A series but with DB 605B engines and improved handling characteristics resulting from the introduction of a redesigned, deeper rear fuselage and automatic leadingedge slots on the outer wings. These modifications were then applied retrospectively to some existing Me 210A-1s, which in August 1942 became operational with 16./KG 6 in Holland and later with III./ZG I in Sicily and other units in the Mediterranean area.

So to that 2000 claimed additrional airframes must be deleted about 500 airframes of the basic Me 210 configuration, that were eventually made very competitive and operational. also, though a different type, the me 410 owed much to the 210, and roughly 1200 were built.

So, in total the Germans would forego 1700 much improved Me 210s and Me 410s in exchange, allegedly, for 2000 indifferent Me 110s. I think they would have been worse off with that option

So often we hear the opposite about US aircraft, about why P-38 or P-40 production could not be interrupted to correct issues, implement upgrades, switch to P-51's, etc.

 

[Denniss]

Yes, British who were not dive-bombing fanatics resolved the engene problems of Manchester clearly sooner than Germans with He 177 and they didn't take so seriously over-ambitious specs, the other reason why Germans stayed with He 177A so long.

The Manchester had an engine problem they and RR couldn't solve but they may have had the 4-engine version as alternative plan somewhere so they redesigned the aircraft using 4 standard engines.
The He 177 had an engine installation problem they could solve but they had to doctor around it for a long time with the dive bombing requirement held up by the RLM.

 

[Juha]

Not similar at all. The Me 210 fiasco cost Messerschmitt a large number of Bf 109s and Bf 110s, types they desperately needed. What was Blackburn Aircraft making that the RAF desperately needed in 1940? If the Botha was being built by Supermarine or Hawker (and at a stretch Bristol) it might be relevant.

The plants at Brough and Dumbarton, where the Botha was built, are not comparable to the Messerschmitt plants at Augsburg or Regensburg in terms of impact on British production. The Botha did not cost a single Spitfire, Hurricane, Defiant or Blenheim.

Only two types of Botha were built, both versions of the Mk I. Time effort and money was not wasted on developing it. The original contract was honoured because the RAF was also desperate for second line aircraft and it was thought that the Botha was useful in that role. With hindsight it wasn't a great idea to build the number that were completed, but it's very few in terms of WW2 aircraft production when successful types were often built in thousands and tens of thousands, not a few hundred.

Cheers

Steve

If Blackburn's factories had not produced Bothas they would have been producing something else RAF or FAA urgently needed. Better GR plane or a fighter type (Hurri or Spit) or the firstly 500 single engine or 250 twin engine plane and then switched to produce e.g. Beaufighters.

 

[davebender]

Henschel Ju-88 plant was retooled and expanded with intention of building 400 Me-410s per month. Plant conversion halted about 80% complete.

Without this fiasco Luftwaffe might have an additional 1,000 or more Ju-88A light bombers powered by readily available Jumo 211 engines available to blunt Soviet Operation Bagration during summer of 1944. Should have a much greater impact on war then loss of a few hundred Me-110 night fighter aircraft.

 

[Aozora]

If Blackburn's factories had not produced Bothas they would have been producing something else RAF or FAA urgently needed. Better GR plane or a fighter type (Hurri or Spit) or the firstly 500 single engine or 250 twin engine plane and then switched to produce e.g. Beaufighters.

In theory, maybe but the reality was that Blackburn was one of those companies that refused to do much work outside of designing and building its own aircraft types; because of this attitude Blackburn's only sub-contract was for Fairey Swordfish IIIs (nicknamed Blackfish). Blackburn Aircraft List As it was the only GR alternative being built in the same timeline as the Botha was the Beaufort, which could not be built in larger numbers because there weren't enough Taurus engines available...Once Botha production was stopped the only aircraft Blackburn bothered to sub-contract for was the Blackfish plus some sub assemblies for other manufacturers.

Stona is right, the Botha had very little impact on the production of more useful aircraft.

 

[wiking85]

Henschel Ju-88 plant was retooled and expanded with intention of building 400 Me-410s per month. Plant conversion halted about 80% complete.

Without this fiasco Luftwaffe might have an additional 1,000 or more Ju-88A light bombers powered by readily available Jumo 211 engines available to blunt Soviet Operation Bagration during summer of 1944. Should have a much greater impact on war then loss of a few hundred Me-110 night fighter aircraft.

Now we've come full circle. Apparently 2,000 aircraft was undercounting the lost production by potentially 1,000 aircraft or more. Kind of undercuts Tooze's argument that the German economy was producing at maximum capacity.
It also makes the "No Room For Miracles" paper by Budrass seem like half the story. I suppose if we factor in the production wasted on the He177 we could add in at least 2,000 medium bombers on top of all this (probably He111s or Ju88s).

Still, the loss of night fighters was a significant issue, but it does make one wonder where the extra pilots and fuel were going to come from. However Germany's allies could have made use of them. Having the Romanians and Hungarians with Ju88s and He111s (and Bf110s) would be helpful to German in 1941-44, especially if she didn't have to provide the fuel, lubricants, and trained pilots.
Frankly the Hungarians having the extra Ju88s not lost by switching to Me410 production would have been more useful than the Me210s they got historically.

 

[Denniss]

Henschel Ju-88 plant was retooled and expanded with intention of building 400 Me-410s per month. Plant conversion halted about 80% complete.

Without this fiasco Luftwaffe might have an additional 1,000 or more Ju-88A light bombers powered by readily available Jumo 211 engines available to blunt Soviet Operation Bagration during summer of 1944. Should have a much greater impact on war then loss of a few hundred Me-110 night fighter aircraft.

They could have ordered Dornier to continue Do 217 poduction instead of converting to and producing 259 Me 410.
Henschel did never stop to produce Ju 88. In 43 they produced ~70 per month, december 10 less. Early 44 it's 50, 45 and 44 in the first 3 months, then 63, 35, 75, 99, 75 and 15 in 9/44. Assuming there was no bomb damage the reduction was in 12/43 to 3/44, back to standard in 4/44 then switch to Ju 88S until 9/44, then switch to Fw 190.
ATG almost completely stopped Ju 88 production after 1/44, Siebel ran it on low pace until May 44. Both occupied with switching to Ju 188 production.

 

[davebender]

He-177 program had no direct effect on Me-110, Me-210, Me-410 or Ju-88 production. However there's a direct connection between production of Ju-88s and Me-410s at Henschel during 1943 to 1945.

Henschel was supposed to build 400 Me-410s per month during 1944. Presumably this involved construction of a new production facility much larger then existing Ju-88 assembly line.

 

[wiking85]

He-177 program had no direct effect on Me-110, Me-210, Me-410 or Ju-88 production. However there's a direct connection between production of Ju-88s and Me-410s at Henschel during 1943 to 1945.

Henschel was supposed to build 400 Me-410s per month during 1944. Presumably this involved construction of a new production facility much larger then existing Ju-88 assembly line.

I understand; I'm suggesting that producing any He177s was a total waste. Rather if the Germans had not produce it at all and instead used those facilities for producing other aircraft they could have had about double the number of He177s produced historically, which IIRC was about 1200.

 

[Juha]

In theory, maybe but the reality was that Blackburn was one of those companies that refused to do much work outside of designing and building its own aircraft types; because of this attitude Blackburn's only sub-contract was for Fairey Swordfish IIIs (nicknamed Blackfish). Blackburn Aircraft List As it was the only GR alternative being built in the same timeline as the Botha was the Beaufort, which could not be built in larger numbers because there weren't enough Taurus engines available...Once Botha production was stopped the only aircraft Blackburn bothered to sub-contract for was the Blackfish plus some sub assemblies for other manufacturers.

Stona is right, the Botha had very little impact on the production of more useful aircraft.

One minute Google search found that the list is not complete, Dumbarton produced besides Blackburn planes at least Sunderlands, some 260 of them, see http://www.secretscotland.org.uk/index.php/Secrets/BlackburnAircraftFactory

 

[davebender]

I wouldn't go quite that far. He-177 program was hardly a model of efficiency but it did provide 1944 Germany with arguably the best heavy bomber in the world and proved very useful for maritime recon.

 

[wiking85]

I wouldn't go quite that far. He-177 program was hardly a model of efficiency but it did provide 1944 Germany with arguably the best heavy bomber in the world and proved very useful for maritime recon.

AFAIK it wasn't combat operational until 1943 and was still having problems by 1944, so really wasn't ever truly functional, minor service aside. The B-29 was certainly better than the He177 and I would argue that the Lancaster was far better given it better operational ratings and large payload. Not only that, but the Ju290 was a far better option for maritime recon, due to the lack of reliability of the He177. So yeah, I'd say that the He177 as it historically was was a waste of resources and time and there were other options for what minor roles it did play. As to the potential of the four engine He177B version, I would agree it would have been just about as good as the Lancaster and a good investment, but it never came about. So the historical model was a waste and should never have been built. Period.
Junkers Ju 290 and Ju 390 - Technical pages - German U-boats of WWII - Kriegsmarine - uboat.net


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinkel_He_177#Operational_history

Although the He 177 entered service in 1942 it was far from operational. In an assessment of the aircraft on 9 April 1942, the newly activated Erprobungsstaffel 177 reported that the Greif had good flying characteristics, but had unacceptable engine troubles and deficits with the airframe strength. As an emergency measure it was used to supply the encircled 6th Armee at Stalingrad where it was found to be unsuited for the transport role, carrying a little more cargo than the smaller, more reliable Heinkel He 111, and was useless for the evacuation of wounded. As a result the He 177s reverted to bombing and flak-suppression missions near Stalingrad. Only 13 missions were flown and seven He 177s were lost to fire without any action attributable to the enemy.

As the war progressed, He 177 operations became increasingly desultory. Fuel and personnel shortages presented difficulties, and He 177s were sitting on airfields all over Europe awaiting new engines or engine related modifications. During Operation Steinbock, of the 14 He 177 sent out, one suffered a burst tire, eight returned with overheating or burning engines and of the four that reached London one was lost to night fighters. These aircraft were brand new, delivered a week before the operation and not fully flown in, as the air unit had moved to a new airfield the day before and lacked sufficie

So it barely participated in the war and yet was built to the tune of 1200 models that some a handful of combat ops and often were lost in combat to engine fires and structural issues. AFAIK it never did any maritime work at all. The Ju290 however did.

So I'd rather have the 2-4,000 He111s and Ju88s over 1,200 non-operational He177s any day.

 

[Juha]

Blackburn also produced 700 Fairey Barracudas, so I'd say that clear majority of the combat planes produced by Blackburn during the WWII were designed by other manufactures. So it was entirely possible that B could have produced more and earlier Sunderlands if Botha contract had been cancelled earlier nad also some other planes e.g. Beaufighter during and after BoB.

Juha