No Me210 fiasco

[vikingBerserker]

Some of He 177's maritime work from He 177 Greif by Smith and Creek:
Nov 21, 1943: II/KG 40 - 25 He 177 attack convoy SL 139/MKS. Due to poor weather (base of around 1,150 ft.) attacked 2 stragglers (1 sunk and 1 damaged) and 2 frigates (no hits).
Nov 26, 1943: 21 from same group attacked convoy KMF 26 and sank the troopship Rohn with a loss of 1,000 American troops. The convoy was defended by Spitfires, P-39 and Beaufighters. the group also claimed a destroyer and 10 allied aircraft (which the book does not confirm).

 

[wiking85]

Some of He 177's maritime work from He 177 Greif by Smith and Creek:
Nov 21, 1943: II/KG 40 - 25 He 177 attack convoy SL 139/MKS. Due to poor weather (base of around 1,150 ft.) attacked 2 stragglers (1 sunk and 1 damaged) and 2 frigates (no hits).
Nov 26, 1943: 21 from same group attacked convoy KMF 26 and sank the troopship Rohn with a loss of 1,000 American troops. The convoy was defended by Spitfires, P-39 and Beaufighters. the group also claimed a destroyer and 10 allied aircraft (which the book does not confirm).

Doesn't really bolster the argument for the the investment of resources in the He 177; I'm sure the Ju290 could have done the same job.

 

[Shortround6]

You have to define 'off the drawing board'. I can't think of a single British aeroplane ordered in the thousands and intended to replace at least two other types, becoming the mainstay of the air force's heavy fighter and ground attack establishment.

"Off the drawing board" is pretty much as it sounds. Production contract is placed (signed) before a prototype aircraft flies. How long a time before the first prototype flies varied.

Not only was the Botha ordered off the drawing board so was the Beaufort ( at lower risk since it was based of the Blenheim). The Manchester was ordered off the drawing board, and so was the Albemarle.

Granted the initial production orders were NOT for 2000 aircraft but in every case a production order for at least several hundred aircraft was placed before an example flew. A full scale mock-up may or may not exist at the time of the production contract but there is absolutely no way to verify either performance estimates or handling characteristics before the production order is placed.

Among American examples you have the Curtiss Helldiver. First flight 18 December 1940 but " Large-scale production had already been ordered on 29 November 1940" and we know how that one turned out

 

[GregP]

The Helldiver turned out OK.

It flew 21,163 action sorties and dropped 12,184 tons of bombs. It had a better kill ratio versus enemy aircraft than the Dauntless (2.39 to 1.75), but not as good if you count all losses on action sorties (.20 to .08). There were 153 Dauntlesses lost to AAA and 271 Helldivers. This was no doubt due to the selected targets that the Helldiver was sent against since it was speedier than the Dauntless by a wide margin. It also had more operational losses than the Dauntless (222 versus 109) in only about 40% of the action sorties.

Perhaps this was due to some aircraft system? There was nothing wrong with the Wright R-2600. It powered the B-25, the TBF / TBM and others with good reliability.

I discount losses due to AAA since no aircraft can dodge AAA successfully. If it gets you, it gets you.

The Helldiver went from a seeming mistake to a pretty decent combat record, but it should NOT have been ordered "off the drawing board." If should have been either cancelled or ordered after flight testing and correction of any problems.

 

[vikingBerserker]

Doesn't really bolster the argument for the the investment of resources in the He 177; I'm sure the Ju290 could have done the same job.

It was in response to you stating you were not aware they were ever used. I was merely showing they were indeed used.

Insofar of the Ju-290 being used in place of the He 177 and perhaps this is a simplistic way of looking at it; if an empty Ju 290 weighs 73k and an empty He 177 weight 37k, it would take twice as much material to build a Ju 290.

The He 177 was faster and could fly higher (Data from German Aircraft of the Second World War by Smith Kay. Yes they probably could have been used instead, but you would have had half the aircraft and probably would have lost more.

 

[wiking85]

It was in response to you stating you were not aware they were ever used. I was merely showing they were indeed used.

Insofar of the Ju-290 being used in place of the He 177 and perhaps this is a simplistic way of looking at it; if an empty Ju 290 weighs 73k and an empty He 177 weight 37k, it would take twice as much material to build a Ju 290.

The He 177 was faster and could fly higher (Data from German Aircraft of the Second World War by Smith Kay. Yes they probably could have been used instead, but you would have had half the aircraft and probably would have lost more.

Misquote there, the Ju290 was 33,000kg to the 37,000kg of the He177, so it was actually lighter. I think you accidentally took the weight in lbs as the kg weight. The 290 also had longer range, which is much more important than height for maritime recon work.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junkers_Ju_290#Specifications_.28Ju_290_A-5.29
Thanks for the quote though about maritime action, though it seems still very minor.

 

[vikingBerserker]

Misquote there, the Ju290 was 33,000kg to the 37,000kg of the He177, so it was actually lighter. I think you accidentally took the weight in lbs as the kg weight. The 290 also had longer range, which is much more important than height for maritime recon work.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junkers_Ju_290#Specifications_.28Ju_290_A-5.29
Thanks for the quote though about maritime action, though it seems still very minor.

I just checked and it was not a misquote. Empty weight of the He 177 was 37,038 lbs or 16,900 kg. I double checked the same thing in He 177 Greif by Smith and Creek and that shows the A model with an empty weight of 35,935 lbs or 16,300 kg.

I never take Wiki as the gospel but the Ju 290 link you posted agreed with the empty weight I listed for that aircraft.

 

[Shortround6]

The Helldiver turned out OK.

"Turned out" being the important part here in two ways. First flight of prototype was 35 months before combat debut. One of the longest such periods in WW II.

From Wiki, take it for what you think it is worth

"The litany of faults that the Helldiver bore included the fact that it was underpowered, had a shorter range than the SBD, was equipped with an unreliable electrical system and was often poorly manufactured. The Curtiss-Electric propeller and the complex hydraulic system had frequent maintenance problems.[16] One of the faults remaining with the aircraft through its operational life was poor longitudinal stability, resulting from a fuselage that was too short by necessity of the SB2C to fit on aircraft carrier elevators.[7] The Helldiver's aileron response was also poor and handling suffered greatly under 90 kn (100 mph; 170 km/h) airspeed; since the speed of approach to land on a carrier was supposed to be 85 kn (98 mph; 157 km/h), this proved problematic.[7] The 880 changes demanded by the Navy and modification of the aircraft to its combat role resulted in a 42% weight increase, explaining much of the problem."

The low speed handling problems may explain the operational losses. More crashes per 1000 missions.

That is the trouble with ordering "off the Drawing Board", not only don't you know what you are getting but sometimes you are committed to making the thing work. How much time and money is invested in production tooling and long lead items and even engine production schedules when flight tests of the first "production" (actual prototypes)aircraft revel major problems.

Sometimes ordering "off the Drawing Board" works. P-51 and P-47 were both ordered before prototypes flew. Perhaps provisionally?

 

[Juha]

IMHO with the late production run SB2C-3s with perforated dive-brakes Helldiver at last became a good and effective combat plane. Was that late44. So it took time.

 

[stona]

Blackburn also produced 700 Fairey Barracudas, so I'd say that clear majority of the combat planes produced by Blackburn during the WWII were designed by other manufactures. So it was entirely possible that B could have produced more and earlier Sunderlands if Botha contract had been cancelled earlier nad also some other planes e.g. Beaufighter during and after BoB.

Juha

This has still got no relationship to the Me 210 fiasco. Blackburn was not producing an aircraft that would be axed (literally in some cases) then reprieved then axed again and finally reprieved, leading to chaos at Messerschmitt AG's largest and newest production facility. Part completed aircraft, components, tools and jigs were not trained around the UK. Final assembly lines were not erected, dismantled, moved and re-erected at the cost of production of the RAF's premier fighter.
At no time were 4-5,000 workers standing around with nothing to do.
Blackburn were building an aircraft in the Botha which proved unsatisfactory in it's intended role but the RAF still wanted it in a secondary role which is why the contract was never cancelled. The RAF was desperate for aircraft to fulfil these secondary roles at the time, just as it was desperate for front line fighters.
Whether Blackburn could have built some other aircraft for the FAA or Coastal Command is not the point. It was building aircraft which the RAF thought it wanted. We have seventy years of hindsight, at the time they didn't.
I wonder if some here understand the chaos that reigned at Messerschmitt during this period.
Cheers
Steve

 

[Shortround6]

The trouble with a lot of the "off the drawing board" programs was that you had dozens of air-frames under construction and parts for dozens more (if not hundreds) on order or already sitting in parts bins next to the production lines, by the time flight tests revel problems.
Lots of prototypes crashed for various reasons, sometimes due to no fault of aircraft in question, so figuring out that a particular design has a serious flaw or flaws can take a number of months in some cases while production examples are rolling out the door in increasing numbers. The Botha's main problem was that it was under powered, which is rather different than gross instability. It can take 6-18 months for a factory to work up to full production so just switching to a different type isn't as easy as it sounds. 676 Bothas were canceled in addition to the 580 that were built so while the British were desperate in 1939-40 the desperation passed and the Botha also passed from even school and target towing service by late 1942 and early 1943 except for scattered examples.

Many successful aircraft required modification to the initial design which could also delay things from Prototype first flight to service use. "off the drawing board" designs often needed to have early production examples rebuilt to bring them up to service standards. It was a gamble that sometimes paid off and sometimes didn't.

The German problem is that they faced 3 of the 4 largest aircraft producers at the same time and could not afford to make mistakes that the Americans, British and Russians could and since NO nation was perfect in planning the results should not be a surprise.

The 210 was a fiasco.

 

[stona]

The Botha's main problem was that it was under powered, which is rather different than gross instability.

If I remember correctly it didn't get the intended engines for one reason or another.

Off the drawing board contracts, at least from the British Air Ministry, were conditional. They could be, and were, cancelled if a type was not up to expectation or unwanted. For example the Westland Whirlwind was cancelled and only gained a limited reprieve because many parts and engines would otherwise have gone to waste. It only saw limited use and Dowding, who seems to have had a low opinion of Westland generally, was keen to keep it out of harm's way

If the Air Ministry persisted with the Botha it can only be because at the time there was a perceived use for it. Again this bears no relationship to the Me 210 fiasco at all.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Juha]

Hello Steve

This has still got no relationship to the Me 210 fiasco. Blackburn was not producing an aircraft that would be axed (literally in some cases) then reprieved then axed again and finally reprieved, leading to chaos at Messerschmitt AG's largest and newest production facility. Part completed aircraft, components, tools and jigs were not trained around the UK. Final assembly lines were not erected, dismantled, moved and re-erected at the cost of production of the RAF's premier fighter.

I still think that the Botha debacle was similar but smaller scale fiasco as Me 210. IIRC many Bothas were delivered to MUs were they stayed until soced, IMHO worse case than piling partly completed a/c and components. I agree that Germans made IIRC more production schelude errors than British, Me 210 case wasn't the only one, there were others where a factory stopped its production, tooled-up for new type only to be ordered to retool. But Botha was a very important plane to the CC, which definitely needed a longer range GR plane which could carry at least a single effective A/S weapon (Faithful Annie couldn't, its biggest bomb 100lb A/S bomb wasn't effective). And the need was urgent and important for the same reason why the BoAtlantic was so important.

At no time were 4-5,000 workers standing around with nothing to do.

I don't have info on the size of the workforce allocated to Botha production, definitely smaller but surely still significant.

Blackburn were building an aircraft in the Botha which proved unsatisfactory in it's intended role but the RAF still wanted it in a secondary role which is why the contract was never cancelled. The RAF was desperate for aircraft to fulfil these secondary roles at the time, just as it was desperate for front line fighters.
Whether Blackburn could have built some other aircraft for the FAA or Coastal Command is not the point. It was building aircraft which the RAF thought it wanted. We have seventy years of hindsight, at the time they didn't.

Now it is difficult to believe that decisively underpowered Botha which also had longitudinal stability problems was the best twin that GB could produce in 1940 for training and target-towing.

I wonder if some here understand the chaos that reigned at Messerschmitt during this period.

IMHO I understand the scale of Me 210 fiasco but I have difficulties to think Botha as a good training a/c or a good target-tower.


Juha

 

[Juha]

If I remember correctly it didn't get the intended engines for one reason or another...

Hello Steve
It got its intended engines but because of the weight growth they were not powerful enough for the end product. Later production Bothas got a slightly more powerful but heavier version of Perseus, which in the end didn't help. IIRC Taurus was also offered to Blackburn but it turned the offer down. Now Taurus had more than its fair share of teething troubles but Perseus didn't produce enough power.

 

[stona]

The Botha wasn't a good training aircraft but it was available. It was an adequate target tug and reports in 1940 and later in late 1941 or early 1942 (I'd have to check) both highlighted a lack of target tugs as a contributing factor in the low standard of the RAF's air to air gunnery.

Nobody, least of all me, is claiming that the Botha was anything other than a poor aeroplane which didn't fulfil it's intended roles. What other twins were available in 1940 for the secondary roles that the Botha did fulfil rather badly?

Having thousands of workers idle at a major aircraft plant like Regensburg is not the same as having a few hundreds building a not very good aircraft. The Air Ministry could have cancelled the contract any time it wanted to. Maybe it should have.
An equivalent would be having thousands of workers standing idle at Castle Bromwich whilst it retooled for, say, the Whirlwind and producing no Spitfires. There actually was discussion about producing the Whirlwind at CB but the idea was abandoned precisely because it might impact Spitfire production.

Cheers

Steve

 

[parsifal]

They are very good points to make Steve. if Me 210 production baulked 109 production in some way, then unquestionably it was a first order mistake. But that wasnt the original supposition made for this thread. The original claim was that it would have been better to have retained Me110 production over Me 210 (and from that me 410) production. If my leaky memory serves me, i think there was a claim that the me 210 cost 2000 Me 110 airframes.

This I think does not stack up. But if the disruption to the production spills over to more essential production, i dont think ther can be any argument, it was a first order disaster, and yet more evidence of the german attrocious production management capabilities pre-Speer.

 

[iron man]

Ignore the airframe issues (though they were significant) and focus on the issue of availability of aero engines. This is the crux of the biscuit; IMO.

 

[stona]

There would have been engines for the Me 210. Production of the Bf 110 would have been cancelled (it actually was, theoretically, on at least two occasions). Ju 87 production would also have been finished, though where those engines would go is anybody's guess.

The Me 410 was eventually a better aircraft than the much maligned Bf 110. First hand accounts from experienced pilots who did fly the Me 210 tell us that they were very disappointed to go into the Russian campaign having reverted to the Bf 110, but it was one of the best aircraft produced by anybody during the entire war.

The real crux of the issue is why the RLM thought it was getting an upgraded Bf 110, thereby avoiding lengthy development issues, and Messerschmitt sold them a completely new aeroplane with all those issues and some. It is a murky area and surviving records don't explain what exactly happened but there was a level of mutual self delusion at Messerschmitt and the RLM.

Cheers

Steve

 

[GregP]

Haven't we bludgeoned this to death yet?

No doubt the Me 210 was a flaop and the Me 410 was not all THAT great either, but who is going to change what happened and how? The people you'd have to convince would be a LARGE obstacle. The RLM was pretty dictatorial when it came to aircraft orders unless I read things quite wrongly ...

 

[wiking85]

Haven't we bludgeoned this to death yet?

No doubt the Me 210 was a flaop and the Me 410 was not all THAT great either, but who is going to change what happened and how? The people you'd have to convince would be a LARGE obstacle. The RLM was pretty dictatorial when it came to aircraft orders unless I read things quite wrongly ...

Its just that the RLM would hold off the order for the aircraft until it proved it was flyable, i.e. the prototype had flown; it would end up in development hell at that point, because like the He177 it was a disaster early on.