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But British built 580 Bothas, which had the first-line use of about one month in one squadron before it was turned over to 2nd line units as totally unsuitable for its designed role as GR plane.
That it could not dive bomb is a news to me. Care to elaborate a bit about that?
what's about the Nuremberg raid in March 1944?
IIRC I first read that from an old AE decades ago but you can check that easier from here: Attack against Kido butai off Ceylon - take 2
Mark E Horan Re: Attack against Kido butai off Ceylon - take 2 « Reply #48 on: December 28, 2013, 01:14:52 am
Juha
Thanks for the link. It goes without saying that I'd love to read more about the SB2U's capabilities limitations.
So Botha cost to RAF at least 580 1st line planes so IMHO somewhat similar case than Me 210 to LW.
I dont see how these numbers stack up either. Total Me 210 production amounted to 619 airframes, including 267 licence built Hungarian "C" models, which were quite successful
In Hungarian service the Me 210 C did well and were very popular. The Duna works delivered 267 aircraft before switching to the Bf 109 G in March 1944, and the Hungarians used the speedy twin intensively on the Eastern Front.
Designated Me 210 C-1 these were generally similar to the A series but with DB 605B engines and improved handling characteristics resulting from the introduction of a redesigned, deeper rear fuselage and automatic leadingedge slots on the outer wings. These modifications were then applied retrospectively to some existing Me 210A-1s, which in August 1942 became operational with 16./KG 6 in Holland and later with III./ZG I in Sicily and other units in the Mediterranean area.
So to that 2000 claimed additrional airframes must be deleted about 500 airframes of the basic Me 210 configuration, that were eventually made very competitive and operational. also, though a different type, the me 410 owed much to the 210, and roughly 1200 were built.
So, in total the Germans would forego 1700 much improved Me 210s and Me 410s in exchange, allegedly, for 2000 indifferent Me 110s. I think they would have been worse off with that option
The Manchester had an engine problem they and RR couldn't solve but they may have had the 4-engine version as alternative plan somewhere so they redesigned the aircraft using 4 standard engines.Yes, British who were not dive-bombing fanatics resolved the engene problems of Manchester clearly sooner than Germans with He 177 and they didn't take so seriously over-ambitious specs, the other reason why Germans stayed with He 177A so long.
Not similar at all. The Me 210 fiasco cost Messerschmitt a large number of Bf 109s and Bf 110s, types they desperately needed. What was Blackburn Aircraft making that the RAF desperately needed in 1940? If the Botha was being built by Supermarine or Hawker (and at a stretch Bristol) it might be relevant.
The plants at Brough and Dumbarton, where the Botha was built, are not comparable to the Messerschmitt plants at Augsburg or Regensburg in terms of impact on British production. The Botha did not cost a single Spitfire, Hurricane, Defiant or Blenheim.
Only two types of Botha were built, both versions of the Mk I. Time effort and money was not wasted on developing it. The original contract was honoured because the RAF was also desperate for second line aircraft and it was thought that the Botha was useful in that role. With hindsight it wasn't a great idea to build the number that were completed, but it's very few in terms of WW2 aircraft production when successful types were often built in thousands and tens of thousands, not a few hundred.
Cheers
Steve
If Blackburn's factories had not produced Bothas they would have been producing something else RAF or FAA urgently needed. Better GR plane or a fighter type (Hurri or Spit) or the firstly 500 single engine or 250 twin engine plane and then switched to produce e.g. Beaufighters.
Henschel Ju-88 plant was retooled and expanded with intention of building 400 Me-410s per month. Plant conversion halted about 80% complete.
Without this fiasco Luftwaffe might have an additional 1,000 or more Ju-88A light bombers powered by readily available Jumo 211 engines available to blunt Soviet Operation Bagration during summer of 1944. Should have a much greater impact on war then loss of a few hundred Me-110 night fighter aircraft.
They could have ordered Dornier to continue Do 217 poduction instead of converting to and producing 259 Me 410.Henschel Ju-88 plant was retooled and expanded with intention of building 400 Me-410s per month. Plant conversion halted about 80% complete.
Without this fiasco Luftwaffe might have an additional 1,000 or more Ju-88A light bombers powered by readily available Jumo 211 engines available to blunt Soviet Operation Bagration during summer of 1944. Should have a much greater impact on war then loss of a few hundred Me-110 night fighter aircraft.
He-177 program had no direct effect on Me-110, Me-210, Me-410 or Ju-88 production. However there's a direct connection between production of Ju-88s and Me-410s at Henschel during 1943 to 1945.
Henschel was supposed to build 400 Me-410s per month during 1944. Presumably this involved construction of a new production facility much larger then existing Ju-88 assembly line.
In theory, maybe but the reality was that Blackburn was one of those companies that refused to do much work outside of designing and building its own aircraft types; because of this attitude Blackburn's only sub-contract was for Fairey Swordfish IIIs (nicknamed Blackfish). Blackburn Aircraft List As it was the only GR alternative being built in the same timeline as the Botha was the Beaufort, which could not be built in larger numbers because there weren't enough Taurus engines available...Once Botha production was stopped the only aircraft Blackburn bothered to sub-contract for was the Blackfish plus some sub assemblies for other manufacturers.
Stona is right, the Botha had very little impact on the production of more useful aircraft.
I wouldn't go quite that far. He-177 program was hardly a model of efficiency but it did provide 1944 Germany with arguably the best heavy bomber in the world and proved very useful for maritime recon.
Although the He 177 entered service in 1942 it was far from operational. In an assessment of the aircraft on 9 April 1942, the newly activated Erprobungsstaffel 177 reported that the Greif had good flying characteristics, but had unacceptable engine troubles and deficits with the airframe strength. As an emergency measure it was used to supply the encircled 6th Armee at Stalingrad where it was found to be unsuited for the transport role, carrying a little more cargo than the smaller, more reliable Heinkel He 111, and was useless for the evacuation of wounded. As a result the He 177s reverted to bombing and flak-suppression missions near Stalingrad. Only 13 missions were flown and seven He 177s were lost to fire without any action attributable to the enemy.
As the war progressed, He 177 operations became increasingly desultory. Fuel and personnel shortages presented difficulties, and He 177s were sitting on airfields all over Europe awaiting new engines or engine related modifications. During Operation Steinbock, of the 14 He 177 sent out, one suffered a burst tire, eight returned with overheating or burning engines and of the four that reached London one was lost to night fighters. These aircraft were brand new, delivered a week before the operation and not fully flown in, as the air unit had moved to a new airfield the day before and lacked sufficie