No Strategic Bombing?

[Dimlee]

Not helped by the British, French, Americans and others taking part in the Russian civil war from 1919 to 1922 to a greater or lesser extent. Always on the anti-Soviet side (restore the czar!). Some soviet officers that had survived the purges had fought against western troops 20 years earlier.

Not to restore the czar - Bolsheviks didn't fight the monarchy that was already abolished before their coup.
And not always on the anti-Soviet side. There was cooperation in 1918 until World War I was over, and neutrality (US) in the Far East. Even active assistance, such as the arrest of Admiral Kolchak.
As for the officers, future high-ranking figures such as Voroshilov and Budyonny were involved in cooperation with the Allies in 1918. So, experience and memories varied.

 

[Dimlee]

About Operation Frantic and Allied-Soviet relationships. This book is interesting:

Forgotten Bastards of the Eastern Front: An Untold Stor…

'Many books claim to tell an "unknown" story of the Sec…

www.goodreads.com

 

[Alan Stevens]

Hi
I presume this is ignoring the English Channel which is off the French coast, 350 miles long, 21 miles wide at its narrowest point and 150 miles wide at its widest. So there would be a 'number' of British ships 30-60 miles off the French coast!

Mike

Yes, U‑boats could operate in the English Channel — but it was extremely dangerous, tactically unwise, and generally avoided after 1939. They did go in, but only rarely, and losses were high.

It wasn't just too shallow — it was shallow, mined, patrolled, and strategically pointless.
U‑boats could go there.
They just usually didn't come back.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Remember air forces and navies are equipment heavy, rather than manpower. Whether one or both sides would take advantage of the changes or not is an open question. Do the Germans become complacent or the shocks in the east are enough to go to a full war economy that does not take damage from air attack and becomes more efficient than historical? If there are almost no day sorties being flown over Germany does that mean the Luftwaffe makes more effort to shoot down the reconnaissance machines?

An offensive air or submarine doctrine sets you up for many casualties, the operations are deep enough in enemy areas damage is much more likely to be fatal, the best to usually hope for is crews are captured. The U-boat operations were the big German offensive, for much of the war the Luftwaffe stayed over friendly territory or made shallow penetrations into enemy airspace.

Do the allies use the freed airpower for anti submarine operations, escorting convoys as far out as possible plus mounting barrier patrols around the U-boat bases? Does the navy respond so the better mid war escort tactics come in earlier? Without the bomber war do the better radars and navigation aids turn up sooner or later? The worry about radio transmissions made it hard for aircraft and convoy to find each other, made easier when the aircraft had radar. A big one is whether air cover is put in place in the western Atlantic and Caribbean in early 1942. Saving merchant ships in the 1939 to 1942 period is a good way to shorten the war.

On 21 June 1941 the Luftwaffe night fighter strength was 263 aircraft, still around that a year later but ending 1942 at over 400, reaching 585 end June 1943, that force is mostly available for redeployment. The day campaign takes until sometime in 1943 before it has an effect on Luftwaffe day fighter strength and deployments, the force peaked at 1,477 on 1 June 1940, rebuilt to that level a year later, run down again, to under 1,400 in mid 1942, built up again to 1,514 end October, passed 1,600 in May 1943, 1,849 on 30 June, run down again before the increases in 1944. The late 1943 into 1944 decision to cut bomber in favour of day fighter production would not be as severe.

Fighter altitude performance would probably remain the same, given Luftwaffe tactics, the Germans were not that worried about bombing France etc. until the allies obviously had an invasion force, the fighting in the MTO was episodic making most air fighting duelling air forces until at least end 1942 and possibly to the invasion of Italy, with an interlude around Tunisia in early 1943.

German resources freed to end 1943: most of the night fighter force from 1940, the increase in AA guns from 1940, the extra raid tracking personnel, the work to repair air raid damage, the loss of production due to damage and air raid alerts. Deployments and some of the numbers of the day fighter force in the second half of 1943. It is actually not a lot in the overall war situation and the size of the German economy and this can be directly related to how end weighted the strategic bombing was, meaning it was 1944 before it firstly hurt the Luftwaffe and secondly made obvious impacts on the German war economy. The 1943 area bombing did a lot of damage but the effects on the war economy were less, the Germans could make adjustments to effectively deflect at least some of the damage to less important areas.

In terms of sizeable amphibious operations first there was Dieppe, where the WWI lesson of strong naval gunfire support was relearned and that amphibious assaults into urban areas is combining the two hardest ground operations, do not do it. Then came Guadalcanal, which confirmed amphibious operations where you do not have command of the sea and sky are a very bad move. Next was Torch where the landings on the Atlantic coast lost some 25% of the landing craft, confirming the sort of anticipated loss rates. Then came Sicily, where some of the invaders were met with heavy weapons in the form of armoured attacks, and proved naval gunfire support was a good thing but it would have been best to ensure more army heavy weapons were ashore, equals more LSTs and LCTs (A Boise class cruiser makes a great anti tank battery, 6 inch guns, high velocity, flat trajectory, tons of fire control, crew trained to hit moving targets but really needs the enemy tanks near the beach to see them). Sicily also showed the US the standard amphibious supply technique was only geared to small forces on small landings. If an Army was coming ashore and they were going to move large distances it was imperative a proper Army logistics system was put in place, not just a large number of beachhead supply and control units. Ignoring the various landings in the Solomon Islands since they were against lightly defended beaches on isolated islands we come to Salerno. This was the first time the opponent had major mobile reserves, including tanks, and the chance to deploy them. The result was the beachhead roped off and for a time in peril of being destroyed. It could be argued it was held by the air and naval power but only freed by the threat from the arrival of ground troops from another landing, partly because there were no follow up troops. Then came Tarawa with the Dieppe like lesson of how many casualties would be taken assaulting a defended coast, especially if fire support is not available as the troops touch down and, if possible, while they try and cross the beach. Such fire support had to be delivered close inshore which meant largely from converted landing craft. Anzio once again showed how hard it was to break out of a beachhead but also how hard it was to destroy one as long as the ships could support and the invader had good control of the air. The assaults on the Marshall islands in February 1944 showed better techniques could cut the casualties for opposed landings.

From experience in the Mediterranean the allies knew beaches did not "cut up" over time, that minor ports could be given useful boosts in capacity and that DUKWs were very useful. This experience did not stop the infantrymen on Omaha being overloaded, at least 68 pounds each, but that was down from the 132 pounds per man at Torch. Also it is unlikely the D-Day landings devoted assault cargo space to athletic equipment, barracks bags and administrative records like Husky did. Other things learnt included using trucks on beaches was a bad idea thanks to effects of sand and salt water. Send lots of food (or tighter controls) since assault troops have a habit of hoarding food, at Torch 12 days supply of food was gone in less than 4 days, causing shortages, this also happened in Sicily but to a lesser extent. Also good beach and cargo control was needed otherwise cargo on the beach was either someone else's problem or unguarded cargo a golden opportunity to (over) stock up, just in case.

The invasion of Sicily had shown amphibious shipping losses were much lower than expected, well down on the 25% figure for the craft used in the Atlantic Ocean beach landings in Torch. This was good, but the down side was the shipping was needed for a much longer period afterward than planned to supply the troops, indeed some of the shipping was still being used for Sicily when the allies invaded Italy. This was bad as the landing craft in particular had not been designed for prolonged use, after all if you were going to lose so many each invasion why make them that durable? The result was a long repair bill at the end of the operation and less shipping for follow up assaults than had been expected.

The world did not have the number LSTs used in Overlord until the end of June 1943, assuming every LST made was serviceable and sent to Normandy, and it took around another 4 months to train the crews properly. The US started 1940 with a nominal 7 divisions, up to 23 by end year, 39 by end 1941, 76 by end 1942, 94 by end 1943, each new division could be considered to make at least one existing division non battle worthy by providing cadres to the new formation. Of the 76 divisions end 1942 11 were in the Pacific, up to 17 by end 1943.

As has been pointed out there were simply not the trained troops, amphibious shipping, merchant shipping and airpower to mount Overlord in 1943 and it would be against better defences, the forces historically used at Kursk, which would have more mobility than in 1944 as allied airpower is less, also less paratroop lift. Expect the allies to make the same sort of mistakes they made attacking Sicily and Salerno if those operations had not been done. The Mediterranean would still be closed.

When it comes to Japan the B-29 raids caused less damage to industry than the effects of dispersal to avoid the damage. As noted the mining campaign was quite effective along with wrecking the inter island ferry system. According to the USSBS Japan lost 210 merchant ships to mines, of which 25 were to end 1944, another 16 in Q1/45 then by month April to August 1945 it was 16, 66, 45, 34, 8. Also from April 1945 another 143 ships damaged but not repaired by the surrender.

Early figures for China suggested about 10 million dead but later figures indicate twice that, which works out to around 100,000 to 200,000 deaths per month on average. Trouble is there was conflict before and after the Japanese invasion. Many civilians starved thanks to things like the rice offensives where the Japanese advanced into an area just after the rice harvest, took the food and left. The lack of air raid warnings and shelters meant a high death toll despite relatively low numbers of air attacks. Indo-China had a famine in 1945 that killed 700,000 to 2,000,000 people, rice rations in Malaya in 1945 1/5 that of 1942, if people could obtain them, food deliveries to people in Manila effectively stopped in June 1944 (Guerrilla warfare played a part in this one). See the book Food Supplies and the Japanese Occupation of South East Asia

Given Japan was beginning to starve and the government was going to cut rations to women and children first many Japanese would die in addition to the deaths throughout the rest of the war zones. Historically there were starvation deaths in Japan in 1945/46. In the period mid 1946 to mid 1947 the US shipped some 800,000 tons of food aid to Japan.

Leading to the opinion pieces about what was the least human life cost way to end the Pacific War.

 

[ThomasP]

Not disagreeing with anyone here, just fleshing out the planned possible use of gas effects and some of the justification for its potential use at the time and since, for those not already familiar with the subject.

After Kevin J. and Fubar57 pointed out Operation Downfall to me a while back I sat down and did some research on the subject.

The overall reasoning for Operational Downfall was summarized quite accurately by the chief of the Army's Chemical Warfare Service - General Porter:

"The initiative in gas warfare is of the greatest importance. We have an overwhelming advantage [over the Japanese] in the use of gas. Properly used gas could shorten the war in the Pacific and prevent loss of many American lives."

Since then many people (mainly American apologists attempting to make it not seem so bad) have corrupted Porter's statement to hint or otherwise vaguely imply that the US High Command was significantly concerned about saving Japanese lives as well, as if going through with such a plan was somehow morally better than not - primarily in order to save American lives, which is perfectly understandable, but also to save the imagined masses of Japanese citizenry that would fanatically die to the last man. woman, and child, in order to serve the Emperor.

The plan involved massively gassing at least 25 major cities, with an additional 25 major cities as alternate and/or follow-up targets, then any targets of opportunity that cropped up if deemed necessary. The impact, as estimated in the final report submitted a month-or-so before the decision was taken to instead continue with conventional bombing/fire-bombing and use the A-bomb when available, was summarized as follows:

"Gas attacks of the size and intensity recommended on these 250 square miles of urban population ... might easily kill 5,000,000 people and injure that many more." [Note: After looking at maps of the time I believe the 250 square miles figure was only for the initial 25 major cities/metropolitan areas, but I am not sure.]

I should also note that the 5,000,000 number appears to be only the "immediate" death toll, which included the casualties that would die of various effects from the gas within the first 4 weeks after being exposed. There was no number in the report that included those that wold die over 6 months to a year after exposure, due to increased deaths by common diseases being magnified from the debilitating effects of the gas. WWI and studies performed by various Nations after WWI, indicated that another 50% deaths could be expected - at a minimum. This assumes that medical care equivalent to what was available at the time of WWI would be available, but if the full scale of the attack plan was carried out there would have been virtually no coherent medical treatment system remaining in Japan. Assuming these numbers were correct, the gas attacks would have killed about 10% of the Japanese mainland population - at a minimum.

Tactical and grand tactical use of gas specifically against Japanese troops was also planned for - after US troops began landing on the Japanese mainland - via the use of 4.2" chemical mortars, 105mm & 155mm artillery, and bombing by medium bombers and fighter bombers.

There is a very good (somewhat general in some areas and quite detailed in others) write-up of the plan on the US Naval Institute (of which I have been a lifelong member since the late-1980s) website here:

"https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1998/january/most-deadly-plan"

The article should be free to read for non-members as well, but if you have a problem let me know.

Bleh

 

[EwenS]

Not disagreeing with anyone here, just fleshing out the planned possible use of gas effects and some of the justification for its potential use at the time and since, for those not already familiar with the subject.

After Kevin J. and Fubar57 pointed out Operation Downfall to me a while back I sat down and did some research on the subject.

The overall reasoning for Operational Downfall was summarized quite accurately by the chief of the Army's Chemical Warfare Service - General Porter:

"The initiative in gas warfare is of the greatest importance. We have an overwhelming advantage [over the Japanese] in the use of gas. Properly used gas could shorten the war in the Pacific and prevent loss of many American lives."

Since then many people (mainly American apologists attempting to make it not seem so bad) have corrupted Porter's statement to hint or otherwise vaguely imply that the US High Command was significantly concerned about saving Japanese lives as well, as if going through with such a plan was somehow morally better than not - primarily in order to save American lives, which is perfectly understandable, but also to save the imagined masses of Japanese citizenry that would fanatically die to the last man. woman, and child, in order to serve the Emperor.

The plan involved massively gassing at least 25 major cities, with an additional 25 major cities as alternate and/or follow-up targets, then any targets of opportunity that cropped up if deemed necessary. The impact, as estimated in the final report submitted a month-or-so before the decision was taken to instead continue with conventional bombing/fire-bombing and use the A-bomb when available, was summarized as follows:

"Gas attacks of the size and intensity recommended on these 250 square miles of urban population ... might easily kill 5,000,000 people and injure that many more." [Note: After looking at maps of the time I believe the 250 square miles figure was only for the initial 25 major cities/metropolitan areas, but I am not sure.]

I should also noted that the 5,000,000 number appears to be only the "immediate" death toll, which included the casualties that would die of various effects from the gas within the first 4 weeks after being exposed. There was no number in the report that included those that wold die over 6 months to a year after exposure, due to increased deaths by common diseases being magnified from the debilitating effects of the gas. WWI and studies performed by various Nations after WWI, indicated that another 50% deaths could be expected - at a minimum. This assumes that medical care equivalent to what was available at the time of WWI would be available, but if the full scale of the attack plan was carried out there would have been virtually no coherent medical treatment system remaining in Japan. Assuming these numbers were correct, the gas attacks would have killed about 10% of the Japanese mainland population - at a minimum.

Tactical and grand tactical use of gas specifically against Japanese troops was also planned for - after US troops began landing on the Japanese mainland - via the use of 4.2" chemical mortars, 105mm & 155mm artillery, and bombing by medium bombers and fighter bombers.

There is a very good (somewhat general in some ares and quite detailed in others) write-up of the plan on the US Naval Institute (of which I have been a lifelong member since the late-1980s) website here:

"https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1998/january/most-deadly-plan"

The article should be free to read for non-members as well, but if you have a problem let me know.

Bleh

A political advantage the USA had about using chemical weapons in WW2 was that, while it had signed the 1925 Geneva Protocols on the use of such weapons, Congress refused to ratify it at the time. That did not happen until 1975.

Geneva Protocol - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Japan was also a signatory but again didn't ratify it inter-war. They did of course use chemical and biological weapons in China with a degree of secrecy and had a development programme based in Manchuria with Unit 731.

Unit 731 - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

France, Germany, Italy and Britain all ratified the Geneva Protocols between 1925 & 1930. Of course all these nations continued to develop chemical weapons for "defensive purposes" and produce them through WW2 and deployed them in their rear areas i.e. to be used in retaliation.

I note the article references "Codename Downfall" by Allen & Polmar. However I would rate "Hell to Pay" by DM Giangreco as a better text on the subject of Operation Downfall as it delves a bit more deeply into the second phase of the operation, Operation Coronet, planned for March 1946.

 

[MikeMeech]

Hi
At the end of the war in the Far East, US Troops transhipped train loads of chemical weapons out of the docks at Chittagong, where my father was working, here is an extract from his memoirs that is an account of this:

I hope that is of interest.

Mike

 

[ThomasP]

re "Hell to Pay" by DM Giangreco

i agree that it is more comprehensive ( I would hope so as it is a 362 pg book) and covers a significantly more broad area of the end of war timeline. But it is only available to purchase (the Naval Institute Press is the publisher) but can be purchased from other sources such as Amazon in printed or Kindle format, or Barnes & Noble in printed or Nook format..

"https://www.usni.org/press/books/hell-pay-1"

 

[EwenS]

Hi
At the end of the war in the Far East, US Troops transhipped train loads of chemical weapons out of the docks at Chittagong, where my father was working, here is an extract from his memoirs that is an account of this:
View attachment 880517
View attachment 880518
I hope that is of interest.

Mike

Gas could in fact be used in the jungle. There were special formulations of Mustard Gas to cope with the conditions.

Info here on chemical weapons units in India.

https://ww2talk.com/index.php?threads/chemical-warfare-establishment-ne-india-ww2.75190/

There were also chemical weapon establishments in the tropical NE Australia

 

[GrauGeist]

The U.S. had chemical weapons available in Europe during WWII in case the Germans deployed them.

In a case of absolute irony, the Germans accidently unleashed American chemical weapons when the Luftwaffe attacked Bari in December '43 and sank the USS John Harvey.

 

[Canaus]

The original premise of this thread:"Strategic bombing was a controversial strategy during World War II. Most of the victims were (fairly) innocent civilians. The campaign used up massive allied lives and resources."

As viewed through today's eyes, yes, it is very unfortunate about civilian casualties in the Allied bombing campaign. An impossible task to try and guess if it could have been done a different way without those civilian casualties. The challenge is to determine if it was possible, in the European Theatre Operations, to use those resources in a different manner. The factories in the US were at full tilt production, producing what they were contracted to do, the best guess based on the knowledge at the time. In the timeline of WW2 it would have been difficult to change production priorities without slowing the whole process down. Much of what was produced in the war was organized before the war or in the very early months of the war. Not just building guns, tanks or aircraft but building the factories, allocating raw material and manpower.

In reevaluating what happened in the closing months of the war in Europe any delay would have caused more of Western Europe to be no longer in the west but behind what was to become the Iron Curtain. Then the question would become- would another war have been more inevitable if the Iron Current was 1000km west of the real one in 1945.

In the pod cast series "we have ways of making you talk" a series was done on the pre war and post war decisions made by the allies and FD Roosevelt. Before the US entered the war decisions were made to use air power and organise might to do so. This was based on the decision to fight a mechanised, using airpower and naval forces rather than relying on primarily a large standing army, The podcast has 6 parts, and I have forgotten which part discusses the FDR decision on this subject.


View: https://podcasts.apple.com/au/podcast/ww2-pod-we-have-ways-of-making-you-talk/id1457552694?i=1000762003137

 

[Shortround6]

In an alternate history, the western allies do not do strategic bombing. They are just as determined to win the war, They need to keep the Russians happy somehow.

What is the new strategy? Resources committed to strategic bombing can be transferred to tactical airpower, and to the forces on the ground. More and better tanks anyone? Is there any chance of moving D-Day ahead? Was Italy really the Axis' soft underbelly? Could they land in southern France in 1943? Is there any chance of directly supporting Russia?

We can get into arguments about what is strategic and what is tactical.
What is bombing rail lines and trains and rail "infrastructure" for example?
Where are the dividing lines?
Train bringing reinforcements/supplies to a front (South France invasion beach?) is tactical? how far from the front? 20km or 100km? How far from the "front" is a bridge tactical or strategic? If "rail" is a tactical target are railroad stations (loading areas) and are rail yards?

Rail yards are large and fairly visible to aircraft. They are often close to cities or in the outskirts. US hit a number of them but the number of misses (or near misses) was very large.
Is it "correct" to not destroy houses but OK to destroy transportation so the people cannot get food or fuel to heat thier homes in the winter?

More and better armies (tanks/Artillery, etc) need more transport (ships) to get them ashore and to supply them once they are ashore. And this takes time to build and organize.

Anybody who knew Italy (or could read topographic maps) knew that Italy was not the easy route some thought it was. Neither was southern France. The Rhone river valley gets rather narrow around 100km from the coast. Setting up a 2nd front that is only going to be around 100km wide, triangular and needs supply by sea (2000 miles from Plymouth) when the axis can supply by rail is not setting a viable 2nd front.

When figuring out why Torch worked and why Husky worked, figure out supply lines. If the Allies do not do Husky and try the invasion of South France instead there is no tactical air support from North Africa. Ferrying even stocks of material stocking in NA is going to take longer and in 1943 the Germans can supply troops in southern France easier than they can support/supply troops in Sicily or southern Italy.

 

[GrauGeist]

In a recent conversation, I was told that "strategic bombing could have been done with Mosquitos and Medium bombers more efficiently" (sounds oddly familiar) and I explained that those types were used better used for Tactical (surgical) strikes and not practical for area (saturation) bombing.

 

[Howard Gibson]

In a recent conversation, I was told that "strategic bombing could have been done with Mosquitos and Medium bombers more efficiently" (sounds oddly familiar) and I explained that those types were used better used for Tactical (surgical) strikes and not practical for area (saturation) bombing.

Mosquitos BXVIs with 4000lb "cookies" flew in significant numbers in 1945. If they had flown in daylight with fighter escort, they would have been able to fly above the effective altitude of the defending German fighters. If German production and the war had continued, Bf109s and Ta152s with two-stage superchargers were starting to appear. 30,000ft would have ceased to be the relatively safe, happy place for allied aircraft. Where does a 4000lb cookie dropped from 30,000ft land, relative to its intended target.

Greg's Airplanes and Automobiles: Could the Mosquito Really Replace the B-17?

If you bomb supply depots and railheads close to the front, you have ground forces available to take advantage of the chaos. It is a lot easier to escort smaller, faster bombers, and bombing from low altitude ought to be more accurate.

 

[GrauGeist]

It is a lot easier to escort smaller, faster bombers, and bombing from low altitude ought to be more accurate.

And the Luftwaffe's AA would be in full effect as well as the fighters - the Fw190A's optimum performance envelope was low to medium altitude.

The high altitude formations had roughly three AA threats: the 8.8, 10.5 and 12.8 - at low/mid height, the AA types available increases considerably.

In regards to Greg...well, no comment.

 

[Shortround6]

Mosquitos BXVIs with 4000lb "cookies" flew in significant numbers in 1945.

And that helps in 1942, 1943 and 1944 how?

Greg's Airplanes and Automobiles: Could the Mosquito Really Replace the B-17?

I think this has been debunked in several threads on this site over the years.

If you bomb supply depots and railheads close to the front,

And the supply depots and railheads are in populated areas close to the front. Does it matter if you kill civilians 20-40km behind the front or 200-400km behind the front?
The rail lines and roads are where they are because that is where the commercial traffic was, in populated areas. Nobody was building rail line/ road interchanges (motor or wagon) out in the boonies that would raise transportation costs.
In most European cities, factory workers walked, bicycled to work. Some took trams/trollies/buses. Near misses on factories did not hit parking lots, they hit housing.
Yes the allies targeted the workers housing, after they found that their bombing accuracy was nowhere near what they thought it was going to be.

 

[Howard Gibson]

And that helps in 1942, 1943 and 1944 how?

I think this has been debunked in several threads on this site over the years.

And the supply depots and railheads are in populated areas close to the front. Does it matter if you kill civilians 20-40km behind the front or 200-400km behind the front?
The rail lines and roads are where they are because that is where the commercial traffic was, in populated areas. Nobody was building rail line/ road interchanges (motor or wagon) out in the boonies that would raise transportation costs.
In most European cities, factory workers walked, bicycled to work. Some took trams/trollies/buses. Near misses on factories did not hit parking lots, they hit housing.
Yes the allies targeted the workers housing, after they found that their bombing accuracy was nowhere near what they thought it was going to be.

The question was whether or not the Mosquitos could take over strategic bombing. Clearly, they were not available with 4000lb bombs in 1942-1944. Greg argued that the Mosquitos were not replacements for B17s. I agree.

Strategic bombing of German cities went on for four years. Tactical bombing would last the length of the battle.

Tactical bombing after D-Day was dangerous. The P47s and Typhoons took heavy losses flying these missions. In the absence of strategic bombing, there would a lot more tactical bombers over the battlefields, a lot more medium bombers attacking communications and supply depots, and a lot more fighters doing air superiority. There could be a lot more tanks and artillery on the ground. As I noted above, you are trying just as hard to win the war.

 

[Engineman]

Strategic bombing in the European theatre of WW2 was always one aim of the Luftwaffe and the RAF. The aim was to strategically damage the enemies ability to wage war. ie, to damage his basic resources, infrastructure, manufacturing, products and factories. This quickly became a British night bombing strategy when the early attempts a long range day bombing were simply shot out of the skies and the Luftwaffe demonstrated through the Night Blitz that night bombing in 1940 was virtually immune to night air-to-air interception. The Luftwaffe had radio beams for accurate night bombing of almost pin-point targets, but the British were incapable of this and the British night bombing campaign began with a false claim of night pin point accuracy. Although the inaccuracy of British night bombing in the early years of WW2 was slowly understood, the political value of claiming that night bombing of German strategic targets in large towns was effective continued to be a declared pin point targeting ability, despite the reality that the only thing that might possibly be hit was large towns!

Eng

 

[Shortround6]

The question was whether or not the Mosquitos could take over strategic bombing. Clearly, they were not available with 4000lb bombs in 1942-1944.

The HUGE problem is that the both the US and British had tooled up factories starting in 1939 for the British (Stirling, Halifax, and Manchester) and in 1940 for the US to make large numbers of 4 engine bombers. For the US by the end of 1940 they had contracts in place with Buick, Chevrolet, and Studebaker to build engines for B-24s and B-17s. Brand new factories using managers and workers from the Auto plants. They started getting the engines in the Spring of 1942. In July 1942 Studebaker built 600 engines, in Dec 42, 1051 engines, in July 1943 2160 engines. Buick built 750 in July 1942, 1200 in Dec 1942 and 2100 in July 1943. Chevrolet built 325 in July 42, 812 in Dec 42 and 2107 in July 1943. Production continued to increase.
In the Spring of 1942 the Mosquito was being tested with Merlin 21 engines using 12lbs of boost and flame dampening exhausts. They are fast but using two Merlins to deliver 2000lbs of bombs is not going to go over well in either the RAF or the USAAC. Certainly not well enough to cancel production plans and retool factories and delaying the war by 6 months (unlikely) to year (more likely) or more.

Tactical bombing after D-Day was dangerous. The P47s and Typhoons took heavy losses flying these missions. In the absence of strategic bombing, there would a lot more tactical bombers over the battlefields, a lot more medium bombers attacking communications and supply depots, and a lot more fighters doing air superiority. There could be a lot more tanks and artillery on the ground. As I noted above, you are trying just as hard to win the war.

As has been said before, if strategic bombing is much reduced The Germans can allocate their resources differently with fewer heavy AA guns and more Artillery and light AA.
The whole idea of strategic bombing was to avoid a modernized version of frontline combat of WW I.

 

[Shortround6]

Strategic bombing in the European theatre of WW2 was always one aim of the Luftwaffe and the RAF. The aim was to strategically damage the enemies ability to wage war. ie, to damage his basic resources, infrastructure, manufacturing, products and factories. This quickly became a British night bombing strategy when the early attempts a long range day bombing were simply shot out of the skies and the Luftwaffe demonstrated through the Night Blitz that night bombing in 1940 was virtually immune to night air-to-air interception. The Luftwaffe had radio beams for accurate night bombing of almost pin-point targets, but the British were incapable of this and the British night bombing campaign began with a false claim of night pin point accuracy. Although the inaccuracy of British night bombing in the early years of WW2 was slowly understood, the political value of claiming that night bombing of German strategic targets in large towns was effective continued to be a declared pin point targeting ability, despite the reality that the only thing that might possibly be hit was large towns!

Eng

I agree but I will note that the Germans better accuracy relied on radio beams that would not work at England to Germany distances and also relied on good crews and small formations or streams. Also called for electronics that was more than the British could make in 1940 in quantity. British (and American) electronics got a lot better quickly.
If you want pinpoint accuracy the bombers have to fly over the target pretty much in single file, not in formation. Flying formation at night is dangerous and formations spread out.
Flying in long lines really allows the AA guns an easy night's work.