Northrop Being Screwed by the US Government

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Greg I mean the XB-49 needed a flight control computer to completely eliminate its handling and stability problems across its flight envelope.
 
The B-36B made its first flight just two months after the only YB-35 to fly. This was not some prototype but a fully combat capable production machine. How is comparing the B-36B to the YB-35 and YB-49 not an apples to apples comparison?

It is not unreasonable to compare the YB-35 to the B-36B, however, it must be remembered that the B-36B had been upengined whereas the YB-35 was not. It is not reasonable to compare the XB-35 to the B-36B. A better comparison in this case would be the XB-36 to the XB-35. It is unreasonable to compare the YB-49 to the B-36B since the YB-49 was jet powered.


A word on estimated range. The B-36 was originally estimated to have a range of about 10,000 miles. Over time this fell to 6,500 miles Xb-36 actually acheeved. Production models did exceed this but did so with a much greater fuel load than originally anticipated. The B-35 originally was expected to have a range of 7,600 miles. Based of the manual it dropped about the same percentage as the B-36.

The original B-36 10,000 mile range was manufacturer's estimate which was the same as the original manufacturer's estimate for the B-35 (per Wagner), which makes sense as that was the procurement requirement. So the starting point was the same.


In late '43, a devastating, unsigned memo was received by Hap Arnold stating that flight test data of the N9M indicated that the original data submitted by Northrop, based on a 19' Langley NACA wind tunnel, was in error and that there was a correction of 11% which they determined reduced range by 1600 miles and top speed of 24 mph. Arnold requested clarification but only received the opinion was that the wind tunnel test were in error and expounded on the problems with Martin. There is no indication of a review of the flight test procedures or instrumentation. This was very instrumental, along with problems with Martin, in the eventual cancellation of the B-35 production program in May, 1944. However, in a December, "44, a report from the Moffet Field 40'x60' wind tunnel testing of the full size N9M, by the B-35 project engineer (AAF), challenged the flight test results and reported the following (as photocopied in "Goodbye Beautiful Wing" by Terrence O'Neill):

"…it now appears possible that some instrumentation error may have been responsible for the high drag reported in the N9M flight test....the XB-35 has regained this 11% in range" under lining was in the original report.

It must be noted that the final analysis of the test has not been found and is probably lost as the B-35 program was already cancelled. This report certainly cast a shadow of doubt about the accuracy of the flight test data (which is far more difficult to gather than wind tunnel data). The seriousness of this faulty data warranted a detail evaluation of the validity of both data gathering methods, which apparently did not occur. Had this been done, it is likely that the original data would have been validated and the cancellation of the B-35 program would not have occurred.

Without a doubt, the B-35 was much cleaner aerodynamically than the B-36 since it was 13% faster (50 mph faster) with 66% of the available power, both compared at 35,000 ft. In addition, if the B-35 engine power is reduced to the speed of the B-36, power levels would be much less than the 13% speed difference. This translates into much better miles per pound of fuel. In fact, at any given airspeed, the B-35 should use less than 66%, maybe half?, the fuel consumption of the B-36. So, if the B-36 used 20,000 gallons to fly a 10,000 mile mission while carrying 10,000 lbs half way, then theoretically, the B-35 would use 10,000 to 13200 gallons to do the same mission. Little wonder Jack Northrop had such faith in the planes ultimate performance.


The the main fuel system of the flying wings was only 5000 gallons. The auxiliary fuel system of the YB-49 add an additional 7752 gallons. The auxiliary fuel system for the YB-35 looks to be less than this (6000-6500 gallons?) per the parts catalog but I don't know for sure how much less. The bomb bay tanks were 895 gallons. The first YB-35 and the two XB-35s did not have the auxiliary fuel system nor did any of the B-35s have bomb-bay tanks.

I think it is reasonable for Northrop to have plans to carry enough fuel to perform the specified mission and that is not just 5000 gallons. That number is for the XB-35, I'm sure the production B-35 was proposed to carry the appropriate amount of fuel. If the B-35 gets the efficiency noted above, it should need no more than 10,000 gallons of fuel, certainly no more than 13,200 gallons. Something that is reasonable for the design.

On power plant reliability.

Both the B-35 and B-36 had the same vibration problem. Just of significantly different magnitudes. The problem was wing-propeller interference. The B-36 team lessened this problem by beefing up the trailing edge. The position and orientation of the propellers in addition to the greater trailing edge sweep made the problem much worse for the B-35.

I've not heard of this being a problem. However, here is the list of modifications to the B-36 during this period

1. Modifying the landing gear from a single wheel to a multi-bogie set up. A major re-design the XB-35 did not have to do.
2. Very early in the program, the entire tail was redesigned from twin to a single vertical stabilizer, and a different horizontal tail. Another major redesign not required by the B-35.
3. The entire B-36 wing had to be reengineered to change a 65 series to a 63 series due to NACA recommendation. Major redesign
4. More wing redesign required to alleviate possible flutter problems.
5. Cockpit redesign requiring modification to the entire front end. The AAF was also not happy with the XB-35 cockpit due to the fact that the copilot was mounted in wing, not under a bubble canopy like the pilot, limiting view. Modifying the XB-35 would have been much simpler

I think the issues with the B-36 seems substantially more than the B-35 issues.

Still the mission reliability of the B-36 must have been very poor with six big reciprocating engines running for 20 hrs (time to fly 5000 mi). The B-35 would be much better since it had only four engines.

The duel rotation gearbox used a spur gear to drive the inner shaft/aft propeller with a bevel gear train to reverse the rotation and drive the outer shaft/ forward propeller. It was most likely the spur gear that was causing the mechanical failures. If the spur gear was replaced by the planetary gear train of the normal nose case, reliability may be improved enough to allow contra-propellers again. This will do nothing for the propellers though or the pitch change system. Felt vibration with the single propellers was actually worse than the contra-propellers.

I'll bet the AAF leadership had a debrief at least every week on the status of the B-36. I'll also bet that when a problem arose they would personally attend a design review and have a stand up technical discussion on who's gonna solve the problem. And that problem would be addressed at the risk of losing a job. I can assure you there was no finger pointing as there was on the B-35 issue with rotational gear box and drive line vibration. And, if they weren't there, all the participants knew that they did not want them to come! I'll also bet they never applied that kind of pressure and attention to the B-35 project and if you don't believe that makes things happen you have not participated in any military procurement programs.

I believe Northrop designed a correction for the drive line vibration, which shouldn't have been difficult. In any event, while ordered, there is no indication that the engine drive shaft/ gear box was tested prior to shipment to Northrop and the failure of this component was the most serious threat to the aircraft to meet its design potential.

On Bombs loads.

I do not know exact dimensions of the bomb bays on the B-35, but they were sized to carry 10 500lb GP bombs each. Six forward and four aft. The bomb bays were to narrow to carry a nuclear weapon. The bomb bay partitions were major ribs so there would need to be a major redesign to accommodate a nuclear weapon. Northrop's proposal was to modify the bombs to be slung semi-submerged in the bomb bay. The Air Force was not keen on the idea.

The conventional bomb load was not particularly great as compared to the B-36. It looks like bomb bays four and five could not carry 4000lb bombs or fuel tanks. Nor does it appear they could carry any thing larger than the 500lb GP bomb on their inboard racks. This means the B-35 had a maximum bomb load of 28 1600lb AP bombs plus 10 500lb GP bombs.

I don't really have much of an argument here except that I am sure the B-35 could be modified to carry nukes (the B-36 weapons bay was later redesigned). And I also can't argue that it would not be more difficult to do so for the B-35. Flying wings do have large internal areas (the roughly same size B-2 can carry 40000 lbs of bombs, including the largest we have (excluding the MOAB) and 23,857 gallons of fuel (it does, however, have a massive increase in power and load lifting.)
 
Continued.

On stealth.

The story goes that a YB-49 flew towards a radar station and went undetected until it was "over head". Detection range decreases with the 4th root of RCS. So a 90% reduction in RCS yield only a 44% reduction in detection range. A 99.9% reduction yields an 82% reduction. The idea that the YB-49 achieved such a reduction with out RAM or purpose shaping of any kind is just ludicrous. The much smaller Ho 229 could not achieve this level of reduction and it was made of less reflective wood with primitive RAM in its glue. There is certainly a grain of truth to the story but the idea that Northrop managed to make a stealth aircraft by pure luck is just absurd. Radar of the time was to some extent open to operator interpretation. They likely mistook the YB-49 for something else.

Because of the propellers on the B-35, low radar detectability probably did not apply to it. However, it is not unreasonable to believe that the B-49 did indeed have significant reduced returns within a 25 degree cone about centerline. Twenty six degrees was the wing sweep and since these generate a perpendicular return spike these would not be visible in the cone. Relative to typical bombers the cross sectional area was quite reduced, which is why this design is favored with latest stealth aircraft. An examination of the engine inlet design reveals that the very thin slit design and buried engine would significantly limit any radiation from directly impinging on the compressor blades, a significant source of strong returns. This is quite a bit different than the Ho 229, which has these wonderful rotating radar reflectors mounted right at the front of the inlet which is right at the front of the aircraft. From the front, the YB-49 itself has very few vertical surfaces and angular joints which would reflect a signal back to the transmitter/receiver. On the negative side, the cockpit does provide a source of return in the forward direction and would allow a certain level of detectability. Also, the intensive care taken on gaps and surface smoothness associated with modern stealth aircraft was none existent, but then, again, the radars of that era had nowhere near the sensitivity of today's radar that has, so far, been defeated by modern stealth technology. Throw in a 40,000 ft high approach (about seven miles), and I think it is not unreasonable for early GCI (Ground Controlled Intercept) to miss the target until it got very close.

On Van Zandt's "information".

It is reasonable to understand that nobody wants to attack his customer. Also, LeMay wanted the B-36 and could and did intimidate government and manufactures, including U.S. Presidents. I think there is no doubt he wanted the B-36 over any competing weapon system, including aircraft, nor would he allow anything to get in the way. It would not be surprising that these men, in facing Symington and LeMay, could perjure themselves.

The only big lawsuit I know of against the government that went past negotiations was the McDonald Douglas/Lockheed Martin lawsuit, which they won, on the cancellation of the ATA for the Navy. There may be others.


On C/G and stability.


Let me correct myself. In oder for a flying wing -or any tailless aircraft for that matter- to really capitalize on their theoretical drag advantage their c/g must be rather far aft for the type. This is actually pretty far forward compared to a conventionally configured aircraft. I am not going into any more detail on this subject as there is plenty of information out there on both tailless aircraft and advanced flight control systems and the considerable difficulty encountered with them. I will say that from my understanding that the XB-49 probably needed a proactive system to completely eliminate its problems.

It was not a difficult aircraft to fly, but it was difficult to maintain adequate precision in the yaw and pitch axis for weapon delivery. However, it appears the yaw problem was solved prior to program cancellation. Since pitch dampening uses the same implementation as yaw, I don't think solving that issue would have been difficult. While the B-35 had some large technical difficulties I do not think they were worse than those of the B-36 and more probably less, but, I think the B-36 had more political horse power behind its ability to survive the issues.

The various N9Ms was flow quiet often during XB-35 development without a large degree safety issues, one being flown over many years. The one fatal accident was determined to be a large effort needed to move the control surface down into high pressure air under the wing due to a stall effectively locking the control and preventing recovery. Pilot waited too long to exit. Accident pointed to the need for powered control in XB-35.

He did not quote the Time magazine artical he quoted Bill Gunston's book on the Northrop flying wings which quotes the Time article. I don't see anything wrong with the quote.
No matter how the quote was transmitted the original quote is from a technically non-professional and including such a quote degrades the professionalism of all documents in which the quote was recorded. In this forum we have had to deal with multiple sources that aped incorrect data.
The fact that there is an N-9M flying does not prove much at all. There are Sopwith Camel replicas flying as are examples of other aircraft with poor handling characteristics in flying collections.
Yes, but Greg reported that the pilots stated the N-9M flew quite well and was easy to fly. Do you think the pilots of the Camel would say the same or would they kiss the ground?
 
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Actually he does mention the delays. He also points out that the decision to build more than the original contracted number of B-36s did not occur untill after the much improved B-36D was proposed. It is true that he does not go in to detail but such detail is not germane to the issue. The simple fact is the B-36 saw a dramatic improvement in performance in a little over two years.
There was no "D" version of the B-35. Had as much attention and money been spent on the B-35, the performance advantages of the B-35 over the B-36 could indeed been incorporated in a "B-35D". And with the upgraded engines, could have had even more impressive performance, certainly with a top speed well over 400 mph. We know the design was quite at home above 500 mph.

Being cleaner with better wing loading and significantly better power loading means that the B-35 should perform much better than the B-36, flying higher and faster.

The distance record was set by the B-29. The fact that Northrop wanted to brake this record doesn't prove anything.
It proves that Northrop had confidence in his aircraft. A record is still a record. It would have provided good AAF publicity of an advanced bomber, which the AAF typically wanted and needed in this time of limited resources but apparently didn't want in the B-35 case, which I find interesting. Did they not want attention pulled away from the B-36?


To my knowledge the Air Force and Northrop never really had an official position on the crash. Northrop's position in their official history seems more like a dismissal rather than an explanation. It is by no means uncommon for a company to gloss over their failures. The circumstantial evidence supports the stall hypothesis. According to Cardenas he tumbled the first YB-49 after stalling it. Near the end of WWII the NACA free fall wind tunnel tested a scale model of the N-9M with the same results.
Any plane, at low enough speed, can tumble. I have watched a video of F-5 stall test where the aircraft was in a head over heels tumble. Any aircraft with a CG ahead of the CL should right itself as airspeed increases (stable). I have not seen data showing the distance between the CG and CL of the B-49, or how it compares with other aircraft, but there is no doubt it is there and that it has level of stability in the pitch axis.
They do know some things. The airplane pulled 4.8 gs (design absolute g limit was 4.5) when wings fell off, in order to pull that many gs it must have been doing 290 mph at max lift angle. It was not tumbling. Most likely the pilot let the aircraft get too nose low or maybe a double stall (some theory) caused to much nose low attitude. The XB-49 was reported to accelerate quickly (flying wings are extremely clean and will accelerate quickly and don't like to slow down. Something pilots in the B-2 must adapt to.) in a nose down attitude. Once it started accelerating things happened fast and the plane was over stressed with the pilot applying too many gs on pull out (the plane did not have a g meter) and the wings came off. This is when the fuselage began to tumble, landing inverted. It must also be noted here that the YB-49 stall test were successfully completed after the accident. Although finding a pilot was tough, with Northrop pilots complaining about AAF procedures were incorrect for a flying wing because CG limits were not accurate due to the span wise loading of fuel and weapons. AAF pilots were leery of flying the plane in stall conditions.

I don't have any details on program cost for the two aircraft, but what I have seen is not out of line considering the different scales of the two programs. The two contracts that cover the B-35s and the YB-49s ended up at just over 66 million dollars by the end of FY1948. This was just enough money complete the remaining 10 aircraft "as is". The first two B-36 contracts -which covered the two prototypes and the first 95 production machines and the cost to modify them into Ds and Es- had a value about ten times that of the B-35/B-49 contracts. Most of the money for both aircraft was spent on actually building aircraft. For the money spent Northrop had five incomplete flying examples and ten incomplete non flying examples and the four N-9Ms. Convair had 96 flying examples and the YB-36A that was used for static testing. 73 of these were fully armed and nuclear capable aircraft.

Per Wikipedia referencing David Donald's book "Encyclopedia of World Aircraft"

"the Air Force seemed to have greater confidence that its more conventional design and "teething" problems could be overcome, when compared to those of the more radical Flying Wing. While the YB-49 had well-documented performance and design issues, the B-36 program needed more development money.[9] At one time, it appeared the B-36 program might be canceled as well. But the Air Force and the Texas Congressional delegation desired to have a production program for their large Fort Worth aircraft production factory, and Convair had much more effective lobbyists in Washington DC."

From the earlier list of changes to the B-36 I think this is obvious.

The B-35 was actually the preferred aircraft during WW2. It had less range but was expected to cost less to build and maintain than the B-36. Martin was brought on board to speed things up and to build the 200 production machines on order. By early 1944 it was clear that the B-35 -which was all ready behind schedule and over cost- would not make any contribution to the war effort.
As was the B-36. Part of the delay was due to Martin's unhappiness with building a plane they did not design, as proven by as AAF investigation.

This is when any chance of producing the B-35 died. The only way the B-35 would have been revived is if it demonstrated outstanding performance to justify the considerable cost necessary to cover the cancellation of the B-36 and the extensive modification needed to make the B-35 nuclear capable and fix the many problems that were never addressed.

Since the government failed to correct the problems with the gear box, Northrop was unable to attempt to demonstrate the superiority of the flying wing compared to conventional aircraft, something we know today.

I disagree with this. The primary problem was the vibration associated with the drive shaft and failure of the gearbox. These are strictly mechanical engineering problems that were reasonably understood and which was the responsibility of the US government. I am sure this could have been solved with less effort than it took to redesign the B-36 to adapt a new landing gear design (and at less weight increase).
 
but no better range and could not practically carry bombs l
The bottom line is the B-35 had more technical problems and of greater severity than the B-36,
arger than 4000lbs. The only "evidence" of any wrong doing that has ever been presented is the falsified Worth paper and the claims of a very old Jack Northrop.
Range we talked about.
There were a lot of careers on the line.
Richard W. Millar, chairman of the board was also at the meeting between Symington and Northrop and corroborated Northrop's story.

"We were in effect directed to negotiate or work out a merger with Northrop and Convair. Jack Northrop asked the question, "What if we don't merge?" and
Mr. Symington was quick to reply that we'd "be damned sorry if we didn't." We were told to get together with Mr. Odlum to work out a basis for the merger. I might say parenthetically that when Mr. Symington said in effect that we must do it, and we'd be sorry if we didn't, General McNarney spoke up and he said, as I recall, "Mr.
Symington, you don't mean that, do you?" and Mr. Symington said in effect that, "Yes, you're damned right I do." (KCET-TV, 1980)"


I am very leery of explanations that revolve around someone or group being corrupt, biased, incompetent, or what ever. These explanations are usually just a convenient way to dismiss contrary evidence. The whole Symington corruption explanation reeks of this.

Actually, you should be very leery, per Eisenhower, of the military industrial complex. Take Board of Directors capable of doing anything to get a contract (see Northrop and Boeing quote below), military and civilian workers willing to convert their position into financial benefits (see Boeing quote below, also many high ranking military personnel have been hired after retirement primarily for their influence), and powerful politicians eager to get work in their districts (not unreasonable), stir in multi-billion dollar contracts and you have a mixture ripe for corruption. A few been caught but how many have not?
Boeing and Government workers caught
"NSU
Huizenga School of Business
Law and Ethics Classes
Case Study: Boeing – Air Force Ethics Scandal
(Prepared by Prof. F. Cavico)

In late November 2003, Boeing Company fired its top financial executive for unethical conduct, saying he negotiated the hiring of a missile defense expert while she worked for the U.S. government and was in a position to influence Boeing's contracts. The former Air Force official, Darleen Druyun, was dismissed - together with CFO Mike Sears – 10 months after she was hired as vice president and deputy general manager of Boeing's Missile Defense Systems unit."

Northrop CEO Tom Jones regarding South Korean bribery scandal per Wikipedia.

"He retired as chief executive of Northrop in 1989 after being reprimanded by the board of directors for his role in a bribery scandal surrounding the marketing the F-20 fighter to South Korea."

To repeat GregP earlier post
We have had Bob Cardenas speak at the planes of Fame on several occasions. He was a primary part of the Flying Wing bomber program and says both the XB-35 and the YB-49 dlew quite well. He said it had some yaw damping issues, just like we see with the N9M-B, but that it could have been a good bomber platform.

He says the B-47 was probably a better conventional bomber as both were flown at the time, but that there was nothing preventing the YB-49 from being a good, if a bit slower, bomber. He says he might have preferred the slightly slower YB-49 and the lower radar return to the slightly faster B-47 but more easily seen B-47, but that decision was made well above his pay grade.

He DID say the main issues with the XB-35 were the contra-props that were GFE (Government Furnished Equipment) to Northrop.

Like all technologies that push the envelope a bit from past normal levels, both the YB-49 and the B-47 had some issues that had to be worked out in early service use ... but he saw nothing that could not have been rather easily fixed and made ready for service use. He is convinced that the YB-49 died from politics rather than from being unworthy or unfixable.
This is the guy whose misquoted comments about the B-49 are often used to denigrate its handling.

The flying wing offered all the advantages aircraft designer struggle with, low drag, good wing loading, and great power loading, all affecting speed, range, gross weight, take-off distance etc. Had Hap Arnold had investigated the questionable unsigned, unnamed document degrading the range of the XB-35 (the important variable), and continued with aggressive development including fixing the drive system, which may have added weight but would certainly be worth it, and continue until reasonable yaw and pitch dampeners could be implemented, then I think by 1948/49, a B-35D, with upgraded 4360 engines like the B-35B, the AF would have had an aircraft faster than a B-36D (with jet engines!), higher flying , and longer range (10k bomb load), before the B-36D was operational. It would have better penetrating ability including better RCS.

My post #103 still represents my feelings.

Sorry for the long posts

Note some data above may be from "Goodbye Beautiful Wing" by Terrence O'Neill which I might not have referenced properly, mostly the crash reports.
 
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Actually, you should be very leery, per Eisenhower, of the military industrial complex. Take Board of Directors capable of doing anything to get a contract (see Northrop and Boeing quote below), military and civilian workers willing to convert their position into financial benefits (see Boeing quote below, also many high ranking military personnel have been hired after retirement primarily for their influence), and powerful politicians eager to get work in their districts (not unreasonable), stir in multi-billion dollar contracts and you have a mixture ripe for corruption. A few been caught but how many have not?

Excellent! Many people are quick to throw the "MIC" acronym out there but few realize that there really isn't an "MIC" in the context of a Howard Hughes or Tony Stark. Sometimes the most wasteful and corrupt segments of the DoD lies within the government, many times the contractor is just giving "the customer" what they ask for - like $800 toilet seats (which were actually covers for the whole unit made from a fire proof plastic)
 
I am very leery of explanations that revolve around someone or group being corrupt, biased, incompetent, or what ever. These explanations are usually just a convenient way to dismiss contrary evidence. The whole Symington corruption explanation reeks of this.

I very much agree with David's comment above re. this. Government agencies all around the world are very much prone to incompetence corruption, and unfortunately the politicians rarely end up in prison for their misdoings. We bagged a former prime-minister, however :)
The most known case in US ww2 history is the infamous torpedo scandal, nobody was punished for this.
 
They caught this guy...

060303cunningham200.jpg


SignOnSanDiego.com > News > Politics > Randy 'Duke' Cunningham -- 'Duke' gets 8 years, 4 months in prison
 
Excellent! Many people are quick to throw the "MIC" acronym out there but few realize that there really isn't an "MIC" in the context of a Howard Hughes or Tony Stark. Sometimes the most wasteful and corrupt segments of the DoD lies within the government, many times the contractor is just giving "the customer" what they ask for - like $800 toilet seats (which were actually covers for the whole unit made from a fire proof plastic)

AND, I believe they were replacement parts (molded fiberglass?) and the Government ordered a small quantity (-3-4?). Molds had to be taken from storage, cleaned, set up, the parts made and molds put back in storage.
 
AND, I believe they were replacement parts (molded fiberglass?) and the Government ordered a small quantity (-3-4?). Molds had to be taken from storage, cleaned, set up, the parts made and molds put back in storage.
They were a molded fiberglass about the size of a corvette fender. I believe they were actually around $600 and around 50 were ordered as spares. Lockheed refunded money back to the government but I have always felt they were bullied in doing so. These covers went on the P-3.
 
every once in awhile someone in the purchasing dept of government get a wild hair and sets a price for something that is far below the market value. for instance they may decide they are only going to pay $20 for brake pads that cost the supplier $30. the supplier will end up selling them the brake pads for $20 but will make up the price difference on another item.
 
think there was a discussion about missle use and iirc Biff15 gave some insights and someone posted a youtube video about him talking about a dogfight he had. for the life of me i cannot find it here...
 

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