Nuclear War: Cold War

[Zipper730]

From what I remember the idea of overwhelming response started in 1954, then the policy was changed in 1957 to a policy that included some form of limited conflict.

I'm curious as to the following

• Did limited conflict still mean nuclear weapons?
• When did the thought of brush-fire war come into existence?

I'm also curious what the general consensus the politicians had regarding the start of WWIII versus what the military had from the following periods.

• 1954-1957
• 1957-1960
• 1960-1962

 

[fubar57]

Probably the most important test and study to come out of the Cold War era...

U.S. Explodes Atomic Bombs Near Beers To See If They Are Safe To Drink

 

[parsifal]

Mutually Assured Destruction, or MAD, does not exclude the use of "tactical" nukes outside of built up areas. Examples that it might pass as a tactical weapon might be at sea in conjunction with ASW defences, like ASROC , but there is no rule book as such as to when conflict passes from being a tactical or "limited" war, and when it becomes a "strategic" or 'total' war. Nobody knows when that line is crossed, and up to now nobody has been willing to test the theory. Having said that it is generally accepted that any use of nukes in any capacity could be seen as an act of total war.

Of greater significance to these demarkations are direct conflicts between the major powers. Since 1945, there has been only one direct confrontation between the superpowers, in Korea. Every other one of the flashpoint conflicts, like Vietnam, Cuba, the berlin wall even today in Syria, there has been a careful avoidance of direct confrontation between the big powers. Until now that is. Current posturing by both sides in places like the South China Sea, Korea, Syria and Eastern Europe show a lack of concern as to whether direct warfar is likely to arise, and from that, whether such conflict might escalate.

Your assumptions about when the references to mutually assured destruction are in error. The concept has been existence for a lot longer than the 1950's.

One of the earliest references to the concept comes from the English author Wilkie Collins, writing in 1870: "I begin to believe in only one civilizing influence—the discovery one of these days of a destructive agent so terrible that War shall mean annihilation and men's fears will force them to keep the peace."

After his 1867 invention of dynamite, Alfred Nobel stated that "The day when two army corps can annihilate each other in one second, all civilized nations, it is to be hoped, will recoil from war and discharge their troops."

Jan Gotlieb in his book "The Future of War" published in 1898, argued that the state could not fight a war "under modern conditions with any prospect of being able to carry that war to a conclusion by defeating its adversary by force of arms on the battlefield. No decisive war is possible that will not entail even upon the victorious power, the destruction of its resources and the breakup of society. War has therefore become impossible, except at the price of suicide."

In 1937, Tesla published The Art of Projecting Concentrated Non-dispersive Energy through the Natural Media, a treatise concerning charged particle beam weapons. Tesla described his device as a "superweapon that would put an end to all war."

In March 1940, the Frisch Peierls memorandum anticipated deterrence as the principal means of combating an enemy with nuclear weapons.

In August 1945, the United States accepted the surrender of Japan after the nuclear attacks on hiroshima and nagasaki.. Four years later, on August 29, 1949, the Soviet Union detonated its own nuclear device. At the time, both sides lacked the means to effectively use nuclear devices against each other. However, with the development of aircraft like the B-36 and the Tu-95, both sides were gaining a greater ability to deliver nuclear weapons into the interior of the opposing country. The official nuclear policy of the United States became one of "massive retaliation", as coined by President Eisenhower which called for massive attack against the Soviet Union if they were to invade Europe, regardless of whether it was a conventional or a nuclear attack.

By the time of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, both the United States and the Soviet Union had developed the capability of launching a nuclear-tipped missile from a submerged submarine, which completed the third leg of the nuclear triad weapons strategy necessary to fully implement the MAD doctrine. Having a three-branched nuclear capability eliminated the possibility that an enemy could destroy all of a nation's nuclear forces in a first strike attack; this, in turn, ensured the credible threat of a devastating retaliatory strike against the aggressor, increasing a nation's nuclear deterrence.

Herman Kahn believed that although MAD was useful as a metaphor, when pushed to its logical conclusion it became absurd. In his 1960 book On thermonuclear war, he advocated a more reasoned approach to nuclear warfare and was understood by some of his critics to be a nuclear war hawk in his writings. (He did however hold a profound belief in the possibility of success in the event of a nuclear war.) He used the concept of the "Doomsday Machine" as an "idealized (almost caricaturized) device" to illustrate the danger of taking MAD to its extreme. He writes, "I used to be wary of discussing the concept for fear that some colonel would get out a General Operating Requirement or Development Planning Objective for the device". The term, "mutual assured destruction", was coined by Donald Brennan, a strategist working in Kahn's Hudson Institute in 1962.

The 1964 film Dr Strangelove parodies some of Kahn's work, and the titular character makes parodic references to Kahn's research, as in this quote from the film (after the United States mistakenly launched a nuclear attack on the USSR): "Under the authority granted me as director of weapons research and development, I commissioned last year a study of this project of a doomsday machine by the Bland Corporation. Based on the findings of the report, my conclusion was that this idea was not a practical deterrent, for reasons which, at this moment, must be all too obvious."

Sometime in the 1980s, a second, but real, doomsday device, called The Dead Hand, entered the picture in the Soviet Union. Unlike Kahn's device, it was not based on radioactive cobalt, but it was self-activated

 

[Snowman]

Probably the most important test and study to come out of the Cold War era...

U.S. Explodes Atomic Bombs Near Beers To See If They Are Safe To Drink

At least now I learned to stop worrying and love the Bomb!

 

[Graeme]

Interesting book that gives a good chronological summary of SIOP (Single Integrated Operational Plan) from 1960 to 2003 based around the story of the Damascus accident...

Single Integrated Operational Plan - Wikipedia

 

[Zipper730]

Mutually Assured Destruction, or MAD, does not exclude the use of "tactical" nukes outside of built up areas. Examples that it might pass as a tactical weapon might be at sea in conjunction with ASW defences, like ASROC, but there is no rule book as such as to when conflict passes from being a tactical or "limited" war, and when it becomes a "strategic" or 'total' war.

Understood.

Having said that it is generally accepted that any use of nukes in any capacity could be seen as an act of total war.

That was generally my assumption short of air-defenses...

March 1940, the Frisch Peierls memorandum anticipated deterrence as the principal means of combating an enemy with nuclear weapons.

That's interesting...

The official nuclear policy of the United States became one of "massive retaliation", as coined by President Eisenhower which called for massive attack against the Soviet Union if they were to invade Europe, regardless of whether it was a conventional or a nuclear attack.

Actually it was John Dulles, in 1954. However, as I said, this was changed in 1957 specifying certain circumstances which could include limited conflict (if what your saying is correct, it would not rule out the use of nuclear weapons).

Herman Kahn believed that although MAD was useful as a metaphor, when pushed to its logical conclusion it became absurd.

Of course, you'd basically render humanity extinct except the politicians and powerful people able to afford bunkers (ironically the people who set the war off get to live).

He used the concept of the "Doomsday Machine" as an "idealized (almost caricaturized) device" to illustrate the danger of taking MAD to its extreme.

What was this? A huge series of salted H-bombs bombs detonating in such a way as to drape the world in persistent radiation?

Sometime in the 1980s, a second, but real, doomsday device, called The Dead Hand, entered the picture in the Soviet Union. Unlike Kahn's device, it was not based on radioactive cobalt, but it was self-activated

The system could be automated or semi-automated. The former scares me the most as it would be most likely to malfunction!

 

[Zipper730]

Single Integrated Operational Plan

I'm curious if SAC's almost hyper-centralized planning was based on the fact that it used supercomputers for target selection.

In the link above

SAC obtained almost independent target selection by 1955. The Air Force often used target lists to justify greater weapons production, then greater spending on delivery systems for the additional weapons. Although other services opposed such "bootstrapping", they did not have the IBM 704 computer that SAC used to analyze target priorities so could not offer competing selection lists. Its Basic War Plan of March 1954 planned for up to 735 bombers to simultaneously and massively attack all targets, military and urban, in the USSR.

The target lists also seem to suggests that the plans largely relied upon using up all the weapons rather than considering the desired effects or strategic outcomes..

 

[XBe02Drvr]

Actually it was John Dulles, in 1954

Actually, all that happened in 1954 was to put a name to the game. The concept of nuclear retaliation went back to the recognition of the iron curtain, Stalin's unveiling of his TU-4 strategic bombing force, and the first Soviet nuclear test. The total blackout of intelligence info from behind the curtain combined with these displays of Soviet capability led to a near panic and huge expenditures for interceptors, radars, long range jet bombers and even civil defense. In 1953 I was crawling under my first grade desk whenever the fire station put their siren into that chilling slow warble.
Cheers,
Wes

 

[Zipper730]

Actually, all that happened in 1954 was to put a name to the game.

Quite a game, where winning means losing and losing means being eradicated...

The concept of nuclear retaliation went back to the recognition of the iron curtain, Stalin's unveiling of his TU-4 strategic bombing force, and the first Soviet nuclear test.

The Tu-4 was unveiled in 1947 or 1948? The first nuclear bomb was 1949, with an aerial delivery in 1950...

The total blackout of intelligence info from behind the curtain combined with these displays of Soviet capability led to a near panic

I think it was kind of just a panic!

The fact that the data we were getting back was guided by former Nazi's who were inclined to save their butts more than anything else, and provided all sorts of erroneous data to keep the Cold War cold so they wouldn't face the heat didn't help

 

[XBe02Drvr]

The fact that the data we were getting back was guided by former Nazi's who were inclined to save their butts more than anything else, and provided all sorts of erroneous data to keep the Cold War cold so they wouldn't face the heat didn't help

Hogwash! The Iron Curtain was so impenetrable, and the KGB so much more effective than the CIA, that in the pre-U2 days we had almost no credible hard intelligence about true Soviet capabilities. We had electronic sniffers prowling the perimeters of the Eastbloc, but they didn't learn much of true strategic value, and a lot of them got shot down. We never learned until after the cold war that Stalin's TU4 fleet was no where near the threat we thought it was at the time. Not until the advent of the TU95 Bear did their bomber force reach the threat level we had been fearing. By then we had a formidable B52 fleet, and Bomarc and Nike and the DEW line, SAGE, and a hornet's nest of interceptors, not to mention bombs in the megaton range.
Cheers,
Wes

 

[swampyankee]

Hogwash! The Iron Curtain was so impenetrable, and the KGB so much more effective than the CIA, that in the pre-U2 days we had almost no credible hard intelligence about true Soviet capabilities. We had electronic sniffers prowling the perimeters of the Eastbloc, but they didn't learn much of true strategic value, and a lot of them got shot down. We never learned until after the cold war that Stalin's TU4 fleet was no where near the threat we thought it was at the time. Not until the advent of the TU95 Bear did their bomber force reach the threat level we had been fearing. By then we had a formidable B52 fleet, and Bomarc and Nike and the DEW line, SAGE, and a hornet's nest of interceptors, not to mention bombs in the megaton range.
Cheers,
Wes

I think the real answer is more complex than either of the previous two posts, and complicated by a nearly hysterical overestimate of Soviet capabilities and by ideologues imagining reds under every bedk

 

[XBe02Drvr]

I think the real answer is more complex than either of the previous two posts, and complicated by a nearly hysterical overestimate of Soviet capabilities and by ideologues imagining reds under every bedk

Ah, but there WERE reds under(and in) every bed, cleverly disguised as liberals, beatniks, intellectuals, moviemakers, academics, journalists, members of co-ops and credit unions, Jews, blacks, homosexuals, and even the occaisonal Democrat! All intent on seducing unwary, but patriotic Americans! Just ask "Uncle Joe". No, not Stalin! The other "Uncle Joe".
Cheers,
Wes

 

[soulezoo]

I cannot recall the name of the documents right now, but after the fall of the USSR, archived Soviet documents released pretty much confirmed all that Senator McCarthy feared. As it turns out, he was right all along--except that it was worse than he thought.

ETA: they are referred to as the Venona papers. The Venona project (US) collected Soviet transmissions but many were never decoded until after the fall of the Soviet Union and their records were released in the 90's.
A short article worth the read: Setting the Record on Joe McCarthy Straight

 

[XBe02Drvr]

archived Soviet documents released pretty much confirmed all that Senator McCarthy feared. As it turns out, he was right all along--except that it was worse than he thought.

Bullcrap!! He destroyed many more innocent victims than he deterred actual threats. But if we're going to get into a debate over "pinkos", "dupes", and "fellow travelers", and definitions of "Americanism", this thread is going to go right down the politic-hole.
Cheers,
Wes

 

[soulezoo]

No, I am not trying to instigate anything or pass out foil hats or try to convince anyone of anything. Nor will I debate the point.
But having read through the Soviet documents myself, I have my own opinion- and am entitled to it.

 

[pbehn]

I worked with a few ex army guys and sons/daughters of ex army "brass" in Germany. As they explained it the Soviet army was so much bigger than the NATO forces in Europe that to stop them would take tactical nuclear weapons at least. From what they said, life expectancy was three days, whether there was a full blown nuclear war or a cease fire.

 

[Glider]

I'm curious if SAC's almost hyper-centralized planning was based on the fact that it used supercomputers for target selection.

..

Am I the only one who thinks of Supercomputers in those days as more than a little amusing.

 

[michaelmaltby]

"... more than a little amusing."
But the Nerds persisted ... and there's nothing amusing about computing today

 

[Glider]

I cannot recall the name of the documents right now, but after the fall of the USSR, archived Soviet documents released pretty much confirmed all that Senator McCarthy feared. As it turns out, he was right all along--except that it was worse than he thought.

That archived documents said what the Soviet Leadership wanted them to say I can go along with. That what those documents said as being accurate and true I significantly doubt and that is also supported by facts. It was a braver person than me who would tell the powers that be, any bad news.
I would be willing to place a considerable bet that the Soviet Status reports in Jan 1988 said that everything was pretty much satisfactory, just before the Warsaw Pact imploded.

 

[Zipper730]

Hogwash!

You've never read about Reinhard Gehlen have you? You are right about the KGB (and GRU) being far more effective than the CIA (it seems they were ineffective because of the Nazi's they recruited who had little interest in telling the truth unless it was convenient, and the requirements were often overcomplicated -- see, we wanted to look like we were the good guys, the Russians didn't care if they looked like ogres)

We never learned until after the cold war that Stalin's TU4 fleet was no where near the threat we thought it was at the time.

How many did we think they had?

Ah, but there WERE reds under(and in) every bed, cleverly disguised as liberals, beatniks, intellectuals, moviemakers, academics, journalists, members of co-ops and credit unions, Jews, blacks, homosexuals, and even the occaisonal Democrat! All intent on seducing unwary, but patriotic Americans!

It is ironic how paranoid we looked in hindsight.

I think the real answer is more complex than either of the previous two posts, and complicated by a nearly hysterical overestimate of Soviet capabilities and by ideologues imagining reds under every bedk

So basically, it was a matter of having no information; then just assuming the worst and letting our imaginations run wild.

I cannot recall the name of the documents right now, but after the fall of the USSR, archived Soviet documents released pretty much confirmed all that Senator McCarthy feared. As it turns out, he was right all along--except that it was worse than he thought.

Bullcrap!! He destroyed many more innocent victims than he deterred actual threats.

Yeah, plus he actually got the idea from a priest to use communism as a way to boost his political campaign. Even if he had a kernel of truth in his assertions, it was basically through dumb luck, not sincerity.

He was a sociopath who was trying to gain political points and use fear-mongering, and paranoia to do it (highly effective with certain political views). I agree it's best to avoid going into this too much.

That archived documents said what the Soviet Leadership wanted them to say I can go along with.

Who knows?

It was a braver person than me who would tell the powers that be, any bad news.

Very true

I would be willing to place a considerable bet that the Soviet Status reports in Jan 1988 said that everything was pretty much satisfactory, just before the Warsaw Pact imploded.