To each their own - but in my opinion, one of the most beautiful looking jet aircraft ever built.
Nuclear War: Cold War
- Thread starter Zipper730
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To each their own - but in my opinion, one of the most beautiful looking jet aircraft ever built.
- Thread starter
- #62
Really, do you have a quote. I had a hunch there was such intent.
soulezoo
Senior Airman
No I don't. You'd have to read the book to understand and I read it decades ago. It's not just a quote but a story line in a chapter. Cronkite was trying to position himself to make a run at President and was using his on air opinions to leverage this aspiration. Again, he wrote this in his autobiography. So it's not just an opinion of another author doing a biography. These are Cronkite's own words.
If you mean the book, " A Reporters Life " it been quite a while since I read it too, but I certainly don't remember anything along that line of thought.
That's the only book out there that might be considered a autobiography by Cronkite .
Guess I'll have to check it out of the library and check that out.
Can't entirely disagree, Graeme. It's a beauty, makes up for all those flying outhouses the French built before World War Two! Here's some more Mirage IV goodness; the only one in existence that's not in France.
soulezoo
Senior Airman
Yes, that's the one. It's been about 30 years since I read it, but that was my big takeaway. Of course, old guys and memories and all that.
- Thread starter
- #67
I remember there was a creative strategy the USAF would do when it came to jacking up it's budgets: For starters, they would often try and assign as many targets as they could, so as to increase the number of nuclear weapons which they would require. Since nuclear weapons don't just deliver themselves, each nuclear weapon built would therefore, require a weapon system (aircraft, missile, etc.) to deliver it. Since their budgetary allotment was based on the amount they got the year before, they had no inclination to reduce budgets.
While trying to avoid the reduction of expenditures, to avoid future budget cuts, as well as using nearly every opportunity to jack up expenditures is not new, or unique to any branch of the military (or pretty much any government organization, who's budgets seem to be often set the same way), and neither is boot-strapping, the USAF seemed to take it to an entirely new level. While nuclear weapons cost a lot pound-per-pound to conventional weapons, I'm not sure if that drove up the costs as the amount of aircraft or weapons systems to deliver the weapon, as the enormous destructive capability would often offset the cost of the weapon.
As far as I know the USAF was generally the worst offender when it came to military expenditures, something that's quite impressive (depending on how you look at it), considering that.
The USN, for example, specifically objected to this boot-strapping practice: The USAF countered with the argument that it had a supercomputer that allowed targeting to be done scientifically and with great precision. I'm not sure if, in those days, anybody in Congress realized that computers aren't magic, and only do what they are programmed to do (i.e. so if you program it to perform stupid functions, it does what it was told to), or knew anybody they could ask that was outside the USAF.
It also appeared that the USAF seemed resistant to allowing civilian policy makers to have any decision making in the target selection process (far as I know, I'm not sure if there was even a say in criteria), and appeared to have tried to keep it secret from the President when possible (they definitely tried to keep it secret from Kennedy, anyway).
From what was said over the years, even if one was to consider that striking several targets 2-4 times was acceptable (the rationale, from what I remember was to cover technical failures in the aircraft and warhead, and aircraft losses), it appears that one could have done the job with a fraction of the nuclear weapons required during the time period.
Since I'm not an expert on things (and yes, I've read the book "Command & Control"): I'm tagging a bunch of people who might have more information (to within the extent that it is not classified or confidential).
fubar57
,
G
Glider
,
Graeme
,
P
pbehn
,
swampyankee
,
T
tyrodtom
,
X
XBe02Drvr
, and
Dimlee
since you were on the other side, and could lend historical perspective.
While trying to avoid the reduction of expenditures, to avoid future budget cuts, as well as using nearly every opportunity to jack up expenditures is not new, or unique to any branch of the military (or pretty much any government organization, who's budgets seem to be often set the same way), and neither is boot-strapping, the USAF seemed to take it to an entirely new level. While nuclear weapons cost a lot pound-per-pound to conventional weapons, I'm not sure if that drove up the costs as the amount of aircraft or weapons systems to deliver the weapon, as the enormous destructive capability would often offset the cost of the weapon.
As far as I know the USAF was generally the worst offender when it came to military expenditures, something that's quite impressive (depending on how you look at it), considering that.
- The USAF's mission is basically aerial warfare and is kept large in even in peacetime for the purpose of deterrence
- The USN's mission, also kept large in peacetime, included
- Aerial warfare
- Surface Warfare
- Submarine Warfare
- And with the USMC being under the Department of the Navy, you have
- Infantry & artillery warfare
- Cavalry operations
- Another aerial-warfare arm
- Amphibious warfare is generally viewed as a matter of the USMC, but the two almost certainly work together to make this one work.
The USN, for example, specifically objected to this boot-strapping practice: The USAF countered with the argument that it had a supercomputer that allowed targeting to be done scientifically and with great precision. I'm not sure if, in those days, anybody in Congress realized that computers aren't magic, and only do what they are programmed to do (i.e. so if you program it to perform stupid functions, it does what it was told to), or knew anybody they could ask that was outside the USAF.
It also appeared that the USAF seemed resistant to allowing civilian policy makers to have any decision making in the target selection process (far as I know, I'm not sure if there was even a say in criteria), and appeared to have tried to keep it secret from the President when possible (they definitely tried to keep it secret from Kennedy, anyway).
From what was said over the years, even if one was to consider that striking several targets 2-4 times was acceptable (the rationale, from what I remember was to cover technical failures in the aircraft and warhead, and aircraft losses), it appears that one could have done the job with a fraction of the nuclear weapons required during the time period.
Since I'm not an expert on things (and yes, I've read the book "Command & Control"): I'm tagging a bunch of people who might have more information (to within the extent that it is not classified or confidential).
fubar57
,
G
Glider
,
Graeme
,
P
pbehn
,
swampyankee
,
T
tyrodtom
,
X
XBe02Drvr
, and
Dimlee
since you were on the other side, and could lend historical perspective.
Last edited:
I remember there was a creative strategy the USAF would do when it came to jacking up it's budgets: For starters, they would often try and assign as many targets as they could, so as to increase the number of nuclear weapons which they would require. Since nuclear weapons don't just deliver themselves, each nuclear weapon built would therefore, require a weapon system (aircraft, missile, etc.) to deliver it. Since their budgetary allotment was based on the amount they got the year before, they had no inclination to reduce budgets.
While trying to avoid the reduction of expenditures, to avoid future budget cuts, as well as using nearly every opportunity to jack up expenditures is not new, or unique to any branch of the military (or pretty much any government organization, who's budgets seem to be often set the same way), and neither is boot-strapping, the USAF seemed to take it to an entirely new level. While nuclear weapons cost a lot pound-per-pound to conventional weapons, I'm not sure if that drove up the costs as the amount of aircraft or weapons systems to deliver the weapon, as the enormous destructive capability would often offset the cost of the weapon.
As far as I know the USAF was generally the worst offender when it came to military expenditures, something that's quite impressive (depending on how you look at it), considering that.
It's certainly no small achievement -- and, while the strategy was kind of shrewd and crafty (and the old-guard of the USAAF days were very good at manipulating the bureaucracy -- sometimes better than actually fighting wars -- were quite expert at this), but not so much so that it was beyond the understanding of the other services.
- The USAF's mission is basically aerial warfare and is kept large in even in peacetime for the purpose of deterrence
- The USN's mission, also kept large in peacetime, included
- Aerial warfare
- Surface Warfare
- Submarine Warfare
- And with the USMC being under the Department of the Navy, you have
- Infantry & artillery warfare
- Cavalry operations
- Another aerial-warfare arm
- Amphibious warfare is generally viewed as a matter of the USMC, but the two almost certainly work together to make this one work.
The USN, for example, specifically objected to this boot-strapping practice: The USAF countered with the argument that it had a supercomputer that allowed targeting to be done scientifically and with great precision. I'm not sure if, in those days, anybody in Congress realized that computers aren't magic, and only do what they are programmed to do (i.e. so if you program it to perform stupid functions, it does what it was told to), or knew anybody they could ask that was outside the USAF.
It also appeared that the USAF seemed resistant to allowing civilian policy makers to have any decision making in the target selection process (far as I know, I'm not sure if there was even a say in criteria), and appeared to have tried to keep it secret from the President when possible (they definitely tried to keep it secret from Kennedy, anyway).
From what was said over the years, even if one was to consider that striking several targets 2-4 times was acceptable (the rationale, from what I remember was to cover technical failures in the aircraft and warhead, and aircraft losses), it appears that one could have done the job with a fraction of the nuclear weapons required during the time period.
Since I'm not an expert on things (and yes, I've read the book "Command & Control"): I'm tagging a bunch of people who might have more information (to within the extent that it is not classified or confidential).
You cant put all post war history in a single post. When discussing "costs" the nuclear deterrent is/was seen as a cheap alternative to a standing army in Europe of millions of men and hundreds of thousands of AFVs and transport vehicles.
- Thread starter
- #69
I wasn't trying to, it had to do with the concept of overwhelming response versus limited conflicts from the start of the 'New Look' policy (in effect as of 1954) to around the time of the Cuban Missile crisis.
While threads have a tendency to meander, and there was some stuff about the nature of computer technology, the perspective of things from the USSR's side, and some discussions as to the actual degree to which they penetrated our government, but quite a bit did remain on nuclear weapons policy.
The cost of an infantry was probably the biggest issue, but even from an aviation standpoint, it also reduced the number of aircraft needed for the job at hand. The thing is, while the nuclear bombs were in a sense low-cost because (while they were actually quite expensive pound-per-pound, and had a massive infrastructure to make them) they could do so much damage per round that it worked out.
Of course, as I said in the above post: It went awry once people realized that by manipulating the targeting criteria, they could assign an ever increasing number of warheads; then boot-strap that to a weapon system needed for their delivery (and as they became more advanced, they became more expensive) and ran the budget into the stratosphere.
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Even with the nuclear deterrent the cost was huge. I remember driving back from France when the build up to "Desert Storm" took place, the sky was full of USA and UK aircraft training before moving on to Saudi Arabia, friends reported the same in Germany. This was obviously what was pre planned for a European war then all people involved were packed off to the middle east when the bases had been readied for them. Maintaining a standing army was always avoided in the UK going back centuries, it is problematic. I caught the tail end of it in the late 1980s and early 1990s. My job was an inspection engineer but I wasn't allowed in some bars and clubs just because I was British (English). They had so many problems with the resident "squaddies" they just wouldnt allow anyone speaking English to go in. One guy in Hamm ( a quality manager) didn't believe I was English because I didn't have any tattoos, which is a weird way of discerning nationality, until you see the behaviour of a bunch of squaddies on a night out. It goes beyond a military issue, apart from the nights of violence in bars and random attacks on women associated with soldiers since the dawn of time 30% of men sent from UK to Germany married a local woman and didn't go back, many just left the army as soon as they could.
- Thread starter
- #71
Yeah, I was kind of modifying my post and you responded too quick
Glider
Captain
First I must say I am touched to be included in your list of members and be aske to comment on this. My knowlege is far from comprehensive on this but the following is my understanding, which could easily be wrong.I remember there was a creative strategy the USAF would do when it came to jacking up it's budgets: For starters, they would often try and assign as many targets as they could, so as to increase the number of nuclear weapons which they would require. Since nuclear weapons don't just deliver themselves, each nuclear weapon built would therefore, require a weapon system (aircraft, missile, etc.) to deliver it. Since their budgetary allotment was based on the amount they got the year before, they had no inclination to reduce budgets.
While trying to avoid the reduction of expenditures, to avoid future budget cuts, as well as using nearly every opportunity to jack up expenditures is not new, or unique to any branch of the military (or pretty much any government organization, who's budgets seem to be often set the same way), and neither is boot-strapping, the USAF seemed to take it to an entirely new level. While nuclear weapons cost a lot pound-per-pound to conventional weapons, I'm not sure if that drove up the costs as the amount of aircraft or weapons systems to deliver the weapon, as the enormous destructive capability would often offset the cost of the weapon.
As far as I know the USAF was generally the worst offender when it came to military expenditures, something that's quite impressive (depending on how you look at it), considering that.
It's certainly no small achievement -- and, while the strategy was kind of shrewd and crafty (and the old-guard of the USAAF days were very good at manipulating the bureaucracy -- sometimes better than actually fighting wars -- were quite expert at this), but not so much so that it was beyond the understanding of the other services.
- The USAF's mission is basically aerial warfare and is kept large in even in peacetime for the purpose of deterrence
- The USN's mission, also kept large in peacetime, included
- Aerial warfare
- Surface Warfare
- Submarine Warfare
- And with the USMC being under the Department of the Navy, you have
- Infantry & artillery warfare
- Cavalry operations
- Another aerial-warfare arm
- Amphibious warfare is generally viewed as a matter of the USMC, but the two almost certainly work together to make this one work.
The USN, for example, specifically objected to this boot-strapping practice: The USAF countered with the argument that it had a supercomputer that allowed targeting to be done scientifically and with great precision. I'm not sure if, in those days, anybody in Congress realized that computers aren't magic, and only do what they are programmed to do (i.e. so if you program it to perform stupid functions, it does what it was told to), or knew anybody they could ask that was outside the USAF.
It also appeared that the USAF seemed resistant to allowing civilian policy makers to have any decision making in the target selection process (far as I know, I'm not sure if there was even a say in criteria), and appeared to have tried to keep it secret from the President when possible (they definitely tried to keep it secret from Kennedy, anyway).
From what was said over the years, even if one was to consider that striking several targets 2-4 times was acceptable (the rationale, from what I remember was to cover technical failures in the aircraft and warhead, and aircraft losses), it appears that one could have done the job with a fraction of the nuclear weapons required during the time period.
Since I'm not an expert on things (and yes, I've read the book "Command & Control"): I'm tagging a bunch of people who might have more information (to within the extent that it is not classified or confidential).
From a British perspective we didn't have the capacity to have any 'overkill' for a specific target. The nearest we came was the first MIRV warheads we had on the ICBM's. The UK didn't initially have true MIRV's as we were not able to target say three different targets from the one missile. What we did was target three smaller warheads to hit three corners of the triangle with the one target in the middle. As result the target would be devastated by the three blasts. I would expect that this initial limitation has been overcome by now.
As for the targeting itself, it's always been my belief that the Prime Minister has the final say as to what the targets are, no doubt advised by the Military authorities.
I do think that you are being unfair picking on the American forces as being 'As far as I know the USAF was generally the worst offender when it came to military expenditures'. Russia and until recently China were in my view the worst offenders by some margin, keeping huge forces equipped with obsolescent equipment. I say recently China as they are spending vast sums of money on reequipping their forces with a lot of modern equipment of all types. Russia economically is very weak and whilst they do have some very good modern equipment the majority of their equipment is very old. Just look at their Airforce and Navy and the numbers of new ships and aircraft.
Russian Navy
No new destroyers since 1999
six frigates since 2010
There are a number of corvette's
Russian Airforce
Might just be getting their first fifth generation aircraft. I say might as this has been announced a number of times and they have been false dawn's
- Thread starter
- #73
No problem
The first Polaris missiles to have multiple warheads had this too.
That is how it's supposed to be done.
I meant of the US branches. Compared to the USN, US Army, and so on...
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Glider
Captain
Apologies, I misunderstoodNo problem
I meant of the US branches. Compared to the USN, US Army, and so on...
Indeed it has in the Trident. Initially though, the British developed, with US assistance the Chevaline programme as a retrofit to the Polaris A3 missile. Chevaline was a warhead carrying vehicle that in practise only carried two warheads, not the three that was intended - the Polaris' limited throw weight meant that because the British designed space vehicle was designed also to deploy decoys, the entire package was weight limited and so only two warheads could be carried. The concept was to launch the warheads and to deploy countermeasures designed to interact with Soviet radars, that would arrive over the target area simultaneous to the warheads, thus confusing the defences in determining which is real and which wasn't.
An extraordinarily complex programme, Chevaline was one the most sophisticated aerospace projects embarked in the UK in the late 60s/early 70s. Here is a picture of the Chevaline capsule as installed aboard a Polaris missile. The black cannister to the right of the warhead shape is a countermeasures launcher.
This is the vehicle body without the upper shroud, note the manoeuvring thrusters on the bottom of the capsule. This one is on display at the Farnborough Air Sciences Trust museum.
