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Probably the most important test and study to come out of the Cold War era...
U.S. Explodes Atomic Bombs Near Beers To See If They Are Safe To Drink
Understood.Mutually Assured Destruction, or MAD, does not exclude the use of "tactical" nukes outside of built up areas. Examples that it might pass as a tactical weapon might be at sea in conjunction with ASW defences, like ASROC, but there is no rule book as such as to when conflict passes from being a tactical or "limited" war, and when it becomes a "strategic" or 'total' war.
That was generally my assumption short of air-defenses...Having said that it is generally accepted that any use of nukes in any capacity could be seen as an act of total war.
That's interesting...March 1940, the Frisch Peierls memorandum anticipated deterrence as the principal means of combating an enemy with nuclear weapons.
Actually it was John Dulles, in 1954. However, as I said, this was changed in 1957 specifying certain circumstances which could include limited conflict (if what your saying is correct, it would not rule out the use of nuclear weapons).The official nuclear policy of the United States became one of "massive retaliation", as coined by President Eisenhower which called for massive attack against the Soviet Union if they were to invade Europe, regardless of whether it was a conventional or a nuclear attack.
Of course, you'd basically render humanity extinct except the politicians and powerful people able to afford bunkers (ironically the people who set the war off get to live).Herman Kahn believed that although MAD was useful as a metaphor, when pushed to its logical conclusion it became absurd.
What was this? A huge series of salted H-bombs bombs detonating in such a way as to drape the world in persistent radiation?He used the concept of the "Doomsday Machine" as an "idealized (almost caricaturized) device" to illustrate the danger of taking MAD to its extreme.
The system could be automated or semi-automated. The former scares me the most as it would be most likely to malfunction!Sometime in the 1980s, a second, but real, doomsday device, called The Dead Hand, entered the picture in the Soviet Union. Unlike Kahn's device, it was not based on radioactive cobalt, but it was self-activated
I'm curious if SAC's almost hyper-centralized planning was based on the fact that it used supercomputers for target selection.
The target lists also seem to suggests that the plans largely relied upon using up all the weapons rather than considering the desired effects or strategic outcomes..SAC obtained almost independent target selection by 1955. The Air Force often used target lists to justify greater weapons production, then greater spending on delivery systems for the additional weapons. Although other services opposed such "bootstrapping", they did not have the IBM 704 computer that SAC used to analyze target priorities so could not offer competing selection lists. Its Basic War Plan of March 1954 planned for up to 735 bombers to simultaneously and massively attack all targets, military and urban, in the USSR.
Actually, all that happened in 1954 was to put a name to the game. The concept of nuclear retaliation went back to the recognition of the iron curtain, Stalin's unveiling of his TU-4 strategic bombing force, and the first Soviet nuclear test. The total blackout of intelligence info from behind the curtain combined with these displays of Soviet capability led to a near panic and huge expenditures for interceptors, radars, long range jet bombers and even civil defense. In 1953 I was crawling under my first grade desk whenever the fire station put their siren into that chilling slow warble.Actually it was John Dulles, in 1954
Quite a game, where winning means losing and losing means being eradicated...Actually, all that happened in 1954 was to put a name to the game.
The Tu-4 was unveiled in 1947 or 1948? The first nuclear bomb was 1949, with an aerial delivery in 1950...The concept of nuclear retaliation went back to the recognition of the iron curtain, Stalin's unveiling of his TU-4 strategic bombing force, and the first Soviet nuclear test.
I think it was kind of just a panic!The total blackout of intelligence info from behind the curtain combined with these displays of Soviet capability led to a near panic
Hogwash! The Iron Curtain was so impenetrable, and the KGB so much more effective than the CIA, that in the pre-U2 days we had almost no credible hard intelligence about true Soviet capabilities. We had electronic sniffers prowling the perimeters of the Eastbloc, but they didn't learn much of true strategic value, and a lot of them got shot down. We never learned until after the cold war that Stalin's TU4 fleet was no where near the threat we thought it was at the time. Not until the advent of the TU95 Bear did their bomber force reach the threat level we had been fearing. By then we had a formidable B52 fleet, and Bomarc and Nike and the DEW line, SAGE, and a hornet's nest of interceptors, not to mention bombs in the megaton range.The fact that the data we were getting back was guided by former Nazi's who were inclined to save their butts more than anything else, and provided all sorts of erroneous data to keep the Cold War cold so they wouldn't face the heat didn't help
Hogwash! The Iron Curtain was so impenetrable, and the KGB so much more effective than the CIA, that in the pre-U2 days we had almost no credible hard intelligence about true Soviet capabilities. We had electronic sniffers prowling the perimeters of the Eastbloc, but they didn't learn much of true strategic value, and a lot of them got shot down. We never learned until after the cold war that Stalin's TU4 fleet was no where near the threat we thought it was at the time. Not until the advent of the TU95 Bear did their bomber force reach the threat level we had been fearing. By then we had a formidable B52 fleet, and Bomarc and Nike and the DEW line, SAGE, and a hornet's nest of interceptors, not to mention bombs in the megaton range.
Cheers,
Wes
Ah, but there WERE reds under(and in) every bed, cleverly disguised as liberals, beatniks, intellectuals, moviemakers, academics, journalists, members of co-ops and credit unions, Jews, blacks, homosexuals, and even the occaisonal Democrat! All intent on seducing unwary, but patriotic Americans! Just ask "Uncle Joe". No, not Stalin! The other "Uncle Joe".I think the real answer is more complex than either of the previous two posts, and complicated by a nearly hysterical overestimate of Soviet capabilities and by ideologues imagining reds under every bedk
Bullcrap!! He destroyed many more innocent victims than he deterred actual threats. But if we're going to get into a debate over "pinkos", "dupes", and "fellow travelers", and definitions of "Americanism", this thread is going to go right down the politic-hole.archived Soviet documents released pretty much confirmed all that Senator McCarthy feared. As it turns out, he was right all along--except that it was worse than he thought.
Am I the only one who thinks of Supercomputers in those days as more than a little amusing.I'm curious if SAC's almost hyper-centralized planning was based on the fact that it used supercomputers for target selection.
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That archived documents said what the Soviet Leadership wanted them to say I can go along with. That what those documents said as being accurate and true I significantly doubt and that is also supported by facts. It was a braver person than me who would tell the powers that be, any bad news.I cannot recall the name of the documents right now, but after the fall of the USSR, archived Soviet documents released pretty much confirmed all that Senator McCarthy feared. As it turns out, he was right all along--except that it was worse than he thought.
You've never read about Reinhard Gehlen have you? You are right about the KGB (and GRU) being far more effective than the CIA (it seems they were ineffective because of the Nazi's they recruited who had little interest in telling the truth unless it was convenient, and the requirements were often overcomplicated -- see, we wanted to look like we were the good guys, the Russians didn't care if they looked like ogres)Hogwash!
How many did we think they had?We never learned until after the cold war that Stalin's TU4 fleet was no where near the threat we thought it was at the time.
It is ironic how paranoid we looked in hindsight.Ah, but there WERE reds under(and in) every bed, cleverly disguised as liberals, beatniks, intellectuals, moviemakers, academics, journalists, members of co-ops and credit unions, Jews, blacks, homosexuals, and even the occaisonal Democrat! All intent on seducing unwary, but patriotic Americans!
So basically, it was a matter of having no information; then just assuming the worst and letting our imaginations run wild.I think the real answer is more complex than either of the previous two posts, and complicated by a nearly hysterical overestimate of Soviet capabilities and by ideologues imagining reds under every bedk
I cannot recall the name of the documents right now, but after the fall of the USSR, archived Soviet documents released pretty much confirmed all that Senator McCarthy feared. As it turns out, he was right all along--except that it was worse than he thought.
Yeah, plus he actually got the idea from a priest to use communism as a way to boost his political campaign. Even if he had a kernel of truth in his assertions, it was basically through dumb luck, not sincerity.Bullcrap!! He destroyed many more innocent victims than he deterred actual threats.
Who knows?That archived documents said what the Soviet Leadership wanted them to say I can go along with.
Very trueIt was a braver person than me who would tell the powers that be, any bad news.
I would be willing to place a considerable bet that the Soviet Status reports in Jan 1988 said that everything was pretty much satisfactory, just before the Warsaw Pact imploded.