Number of aircraft in a squadron?

drgondog said:

That is about right for 184 gal internal (all wing) and 2x 75gal external. With 85gal fuse tank, they could have gone to Prague or Posnan.

Do you have a search ID to find at NARA?

Click to expand...

No I don't have a search ID for NARA in the USA.

I am registered with The National Archives at Kew in London. From there some documents including the RAF squadron Operational Record Books can be downloaded for free. registration page:-

Link to the ORBs - scan down page

EwenS said:

As for the CVE supporting the main carrier task forces, they broke down into 3 groups:-

1. Those required for CAP and ASW support of the tankers and supply ships. These carried a normal VC type squadrons / CVEGs.
2. Those required to supply replacement aircraft, and return duds, from/to forward supply bases. They still required to operate the aircraft they carried but did not have a formal squadron aboard.
3. Those shipping aircraft from the USA to forward bases. These carried as many aircraft as could be put aboard in the hangar or on the flight deck, including larger flying boats or land based aircraft or indeed USAAF aircraft.

So, for example, in July/Aug 1945 the Chenango (with CVEG-33) and Gilbert Islands (with MCVG-2) provided protection while Thetis Bay, Hollandia, Rio & Munda supplied replacement aircraft.

The CVE under 2 & 3 were formally part of Carrier Transport Squadron Pacific, an organisation to which the RN contributed about 5 of its CVE to for periods in the first 6 or 7 months of 1945.

Edit - RN escort carriers with the USN Carrier Transport Squadron Pacific in 1945

Tracker: Jan-June 1945
Patroller: Jan-April 1945
Rajah: Jan-July 1945
Ranee: Feb-April 1945
Atheling - Jan-July 1945

Click to expand...

As far as Escort Carriers with the Royal Navy's British Pacific Fleet, apart from their employment as aircraft transports, the BPF did attempt to employ its multi-deck approach to carrier operations in the Pacific during the campaign for Okinawa--the BPF was part of the forces charged with suppressing Formosa--but it proved impracticable when facing the sustained, determined, operations of Japanese forces. Even the larger Light Fleet Carriers were marginal to demands.

Still free? It took me almost 3 years to download all the RCAF fighter squadron ORBs. I'm now working on RCAF bomber squadron ORBs here....

kah said:

As far as Escort Carriers with the Royal Navy's British Pacific Fleet, apart from their employment as aircraft transports, the BPF did attempt to employ its multi-deck approach to carrier operations in the Pacific during the campaign for Okinawa--the BPF was part of the forces charged with suppressing Formosa--but it proved impracticable when facing the sustained, determined, operations of Japanese forces. Even the larger Light Fleet Carriers were marginal to demands.

Click to expand...

I've been studying the activities of the Eastern Fleet / East Indies Fleet and the British Pacific Fleet in 1944/45 for nearly 50 years.

The task given to the BPF in the shape of it carrier task force element, Task Force 57, for Operation Iceberg was the neutralisation of the Japanese airfields in the Sakishima Gunto island group, a chain of islands lying between Okinawa and Formosa. (principally, from east to west, on Miyako Shima, Ishigaki Shima each with 3 airfields and Iriomote Shima), The Japanese intended to use these airfields not only as a base for aircraft on them but as a refuelling point for aircraft coming across from Formosa if required. The Japanese pilots flying from Formosa were generally better trained than those coming down from Kyushu and could skip the Sakishima Gunto without difficulty if necessary. Being the equivalent strength of a single US fast carrier Task Group, it shared the duty with USN CVE Groups when it needed to withdraw every few days to replenish.

Neutralising the airfields on Formosa had been a task allocated to the US 5th Air Force flying from the Philippines. They had several B-24 and B-25 Bomb Groups allocated to the task. But it wasn't enough. So the BPF were requested to lend some assistance. So after replenishing on 8/9th April TF57 moved westwards towards Formosa on the 10th. Bad weather forced a delay in starting the planned operations until the 12th April. The principal targets on the 12 & 13 April were Matsuyama and Shinchiku airfields. After refuelling on the 14/15 April TF57 extended its planned time on station for another two rounds of strikes on the Sakishima Gunto on 16/17th and then 20th April before withdrawing for a rest and replenishment period at Leyte.

Neither TF57 operating to the west of Okinawa nor the much larger USN TF58 (with 3/4 individual Task Groups each the size of TF57) or the shore based units landed on Okinawa or based in the Philippines were able to completely prevent Kamikazies penetrating the screen around Okinawa right to the end of the campaign.

The CVE that I referred to in my last post were not part of the BPF. They were allocated by the Admiralty in London to join the USN Carrier Transport Squadron in the Pacific. When their duties with that unit ended they returned to Britain and other duties.

Like the USN the BPF operated a Fleet Train with a number of escort carriers involved in ferrying aircraft to /from TF57/37 while in the forward area. You can read about their operations here.


As for the RN light fleet carriers of 11ACS, they never got a chance to become involved in the campaign in the Pacific because the BPF Fleet Train was inadequate to support two fast carrier groups until late Aug/Sept 1945. So having completed Dec 1944-April 1945, they were destined to spend an extended time in training as they meandered their way from Britain until they arrived in Australia in July/Aug. They were all ready to proceed north as planned to join the USN in strikes in the East China Sea at the end of August. Instead they provided support for various reoccupation forces. Had the war gone on the BPF intended to field two carrier groups to participate in Operation Olympic, the invasion of Kyushu, scheduled for 1 Nov 1945.

As you will note, my answer did not actually refer to your list of Escort Carriers, but to the efforts of the BPF to employ the multi-deck carrier approach employed successfully in European waters in the Far East. It was a general comment, not a specific request for you to repeat the well-known history of the operations of the British Pacific Fleet.

It seems curious you should have missed the point, as a serious, 50+ year student of the times--the failure of the attempt to employ massed Escort Carriers in place of Fleet Carriers was an important lesson learned by the RN and the USN, both, and effected dispositions as well as planning.

Also, since we're going so far afield, you note that the BPF Fleet Train was "inadequate to support two '[fast] carrier groups'" until late in the war. But as you doubtless know, the Royal Navy proved unable to support its own operations in the Pacific full stop. Materiel, stores, spares, munitions, fuel--nothing was sufficient beyond the actual ships and their crews. That was an almost inevitable consequence of decisions the Royal Navy and HM Government made during the Interwar period--my area of speciality, as it happens.

It was the determination of HM Government and the the American political establishment--the Presidents of the United States, as I understand it--to have Great Britain involved in the end of operations in the Pacific that enabled the British Pacific Fleet to participate, not the passage of time--although I agree with you by implication, that time was of great benefit to the BPF, and that Great Britain's contribution to a Pacific War would have continued to grow steadily during late 1945 and into 1946. As it was, and indeed, as it could only be, the Americans provided the needed assistance to get the BPF into the fight and keep it there. It was largey a political decision, not an operational one.

KAH

kah said:

As you will note, my answer did not actually refer to your list of Escort Carriers, but to the efforts of the BPF to employ the multi-deck carrier approach employed successfully in European waters in the Far East. It was a general comment, not a specific request for you to repeat the well-known history of the operations of the British Pacific Fleet.

It seems curious you should have missed the point, as a serious, 50+ year student of the times--the failure of the attempt to employ massed Escort Carriers in place of Fleet Carriers was an important lesson learned by the RN and the USN, both, and effected dispositions as well as planning.

Also, since we're going so far afield, you note that the BPF Fleet Train was "inadequate to support two '[fast] carrier groups'" until late in the war. But as you doubtless know, the Royal Navy proved unable to support its own operations in the Pacific full stop. Materiel, stores, spares, munitions, fuel--nothing was sufficient beyond the actual ships and their crews. That was an almost inevitable consequence of decisions the Royal Navy and HM Government made during the Interwar period--my area of speciality, as it happens.

It was the determination of HM Government and the the American political establishment--the Presidents of the United States, as I understand it--to have Great Britain involved in the end of operations in the Pacific that enabled the British Pacific Fleet to participate, not the passage of time--although I agree with you by implication, that time was of great benefit to the BPF, and that Great Britain's contribution to a Pacific War would have continued to grow steadily during late 1945 and into 1946. As it was, and indeed, as it could only be, the Americans provided the needed assistance to get the BPF into the fight and keep it there. It was largey a political decision, not an operational one.

KAH

Click to expand...

The ability of the BPF to support itself in the Pacific has been debated many times on various sites over the years. And It is usually those from the US who chose to point out the assistance given to it. However they also choose to ignore the great assistance given to US forces in the Pacific and other theatres, by all the Commonwealth nations.

A particular subject that comes up is oil. The BPF drew its oil from the oil supplies the Allies had agreed to pool. So US ships in Europe and the Med drew oil from British stocks just as Britain drew from US stocks in the Pacific. But it hauled virtually all its oil to the fleet itself in its own ships. There were only a couple of occasions in July/Aug when US fleet oilers helped out. And new British tankers arriving in the Pacific in July/Aug were arriving loaded with oil from refineries in the West Indies.

The truth is that WW2 was a cooperative effort by all participating nations in all theatres. Yes the US provided much under Lend Lease. But much was supplied to the USA by way of reverse Lend Lease.

Edit:- while I remember about oil, and to reinforce the joint effort required, virtually all the fuel to power the war effort in the CBI after early 1942 came from the British refinery at Abadan in the Persian Gulf, with much of it being hauled in big US T2 tankers to Calcutta.

MIflyer said:

For Overlord did the RAF transfer fighters from the MTO to the ETO? That would perhaps explain why the RAF could not help cover the early stages of a 15th AF mission.

Click to expand...

Rome officially fell on 4 June 1944.

There does not seem to be many examples of RAF escorting USAAF heavies in the Mediterranean at all.

Apart from the RAF redeployment from the Mediterranean the RCAF sent 6 squadrons to Britain in late 1943/early 1944, forming a Typhoon and a Spitfire wing, the squadrons became numbers 438 to 443, ex 118, 123, 111, 125, 14, and 127 RCAF.

EwanS,

The points I made are not revisionist or radical, nor Ameri-centric, as you seem to infer. All are widely-accepted and, more to the point, supported by primary source documents held in the Public Records Office (now the National Archive)--not deriving from web sites on the internet. They are not "debatable", they are accepted. The same is true with respect to the amount and degree of materiel assistance provided by the United States to Great Britain--not to mention other members of the United Nations. As with my other criticisms of your points, you have employed a great deal of tangential exposition, as if the volume of your answer, and not its topicality, were the point. Now you are trying to draw a discussion about establishment strengths of aircraft squadrons into a discourse on how Lease/Lend--as it was known in Great Britain--actually improved the materiel readiness of the American Armed Forces by "reverse Lend-Lease". A preposterous assertion no one with 50+ years of actual study on the Second World War would ever assert.

This discussion has gone decidedly off the topic of this thread, so far as I can see. If you would like to discuss any of the tangents you employed in your answers in more detail, let's do so in dedicated threads. As to your long-ago question about doctrine, if you are actually interested, I'll be happy to answer, so long as we can remain on-topic; no good comes of hijacking the thread.

KAH

kah said:

EwanS,
As with my other criticisms of your points, you have employed a great deal of tangential exposition, as if the volume of your answer, and not its topicality, were the point. Now you are trying to draw a discussion about establishment strengths of aircraft squadrons into a discourse on how Lease/Lend--as it was known in Great Britain--actually improved the materiel readiness of the American Armed Forces by "reverse Lend-Lease". A preposterous assertion no one with 50+ years of actual study on the Second World War would ever assert.

KAH

Click to expand...

Is your point that Lease-Lend did not improve materiel readiness of American Armed Forces? or,
Reverse -Lend Lease did not mprove the materiel readiness of American Armed Forces?

In my mind both concepts worked quite well to strengthen US Military.

Foe Lease-Lend programs, particularly in the airframe business, the Brits fundamentally funded increased combat readiness for aircraft that were also utilized by AAF/USN. For example, BPC purchases of P-40E and Subsequent mandated self sealing tanks and other airframe features US government had not agreed with contractor - yet installed on production aircraft going to US forces as well. The Lease-Lend purchase of the NAA Mustang IA under AC-140 in mid 1941 enabled the production of a battlefield superiority fighter when funding for FY 41 Fighters had expired - but gave Army time to frab 58 of the 150 destined for RAF and create a better TAC Recon ship better than P-40 and P-39. The same concept applied for seaborn assets where the sold articles embodied lessons learned by RN and applied to US purchases. In the case of the famous 50 creaky destroyers we fobbed off on RN, it paid for more than a few state of art DDs.

We turned over our inventory of sad, out of favor, near obsolete DB-7, P-39s, Curtiss Hawks, PV-1s, etc to make room for the new stuff.

As to Reverse Lend-Lease, I'm having difficulty comprehending 8th AF bombing campaign initiating ops from eastern seaboard US. Ditto in lieu of mid Atlantic staging fields for Europe/Africa air travel, or Anti sub bases in Brazil.

Last but not least, what we sent USSR was a major factor for surviving 1941- 1943 and not having +2M more battle tested infantry in Italy and France on June 6 1944. That also had major influence on Japan's strategy in China - ever fearful of USSR.

Don't know whether the finger four formation most closely originated - the progenitor LW or RAF after BoB, but we quickly adopted


Perhaps I misunderstood your point?

If you look at the US supply histories the USAAF in England sourced 49% of its supplies from British sources until July 1943, plus obtained other British supplies through the Quartermaster system. In the period June 1942 to June 1944 the British supplied to US forces in England 63% of Quartermaster, 58% of engineer, 49% of medical, 25% of Chemical Warfare, 22% of signal corps and 21% of Air Force supplies, the total came to some 6.8 million measurement tons of supplies January 1942 to June 1944. Add things like base construction, air sea rescue services and reconnaissance sorties

The reverse lend lease aid from Australia and New Zealand was very important to the South West Pacific Area fighting in 1942/43, New Zealand is as reported ending with a Lend Lease surplus, while the Australian deficit is reported to be comparable to the aid Canada provided Australia, mostly paying for aircrew training in Canada but also some supplies.

The orders from Britain and France helped start the expansion of the US defence industries before US money was forthcoming with for example the first 320 Mustangs on BR-250 and then 300 on BR-1493 before the 150 on Lend Lease order DA-140. Feedback on the strengths and weaknesses of US equipment was also important in the 1940 to 1942 period.

The Royal Navy could have sent more warships to the Pacific in 1945 but lacked the fleet train to support them, partially a result of the early war decision for the British to concentrate on warships and leave expansion of merchant ship construction to the US. Admiral King was quite determined to keep the British to the promise of a fully self supporting fleet, US supply people in the Pacific were more flexible but it did mean the RN needed to source most of its supplies and move them to the fleet, and yes, part of the supplies were lend lease delivered to various locations.

In April 1945 everyone agreed the RN was not yet up to USN carrier operations standard, which was the professional reason why the RN wanted to participate, to learn how to do it in a combat situation, so they were assigned a mission to suppress airfields the Japanese could use to reinforce Okinawa, plus some strikes on Formosa. It was the reverse of 1917 when the USN with its peace time ideas of naval warfare was exposed to the RN's wartime experiences.

While the RN used its escort carriers in the Indian Ocean for combat operations, it did not in the Pacific, they were too necessary for the supply system during 1945 to do anything more than fly protection sorties when the fleet reprovisioned.

Despite the intention that the BPF should have a high priority for shipping in 1945, some of the allocations to the theatre start to look distinctly odd. First time I saw this pointed out was by Willmott in "Grave of a Dozen Schemes - British Naval Planning and the War Against Japan 1943-45" back in 1996.

Merchant shipping - Oceans and Sams (Liberty types)
By Aug 1945, 7 Ocean and no less than 18 Sam ships plus a number of war built Empires had been allocated to the EIF to support Operation Zipper. Having a number of these for the Fleet Train in 1945, able to ship standardised loads, would have helped immensely.

Tankers
When it comes to tankers Britain built a group of 21 large 15 knot tankers. The first was laid down in Nov 1942 and completed in Feb 1944 with 8 more by the end of the year and another 3 up to May 1945 to finish the wartime completions. Postwar 20 of the 21 served with the Royal Fleet Auxiliary forming the core of the tanker fleet through to the early 1960s.

But while these made excellent fleet oilers when the BPF arrived in Australia in Feb 1945 only 2 were made available to it (Wave King & Wave Monarch), which were being joined by Wave Emperor (completed Dec 1944) at the end of May and Wave Governor (completed March 1945) in July, with more 5 more scheduled to join before 1945 was out. Prior to their intended service in the Pacific these ships were being used to haul oil across the Atlantic from the West Indies & USA to Britain under control of the MOWT.

So the conclusion has to be that hauling oil across the Atlantic to support the war effort in Europe had a higher priority than giving the BPF the best British built tankers available (the US retained all the large T2 tankers for its own use in WW2).

drgondog said:

Don't know whether the finger four formation most closely originated - the progenitor LW or RAF after BoB, but we quickly adopted

Click to expand...

Interestingly enough in one book about USAAF P-51's flying out of Italy, the author, a combat pilot there, described the old hands who had been flying Spitfires before the Mustang and had been trained by the RAF still used the "vic" of three aircraft but used them as a vic of twos. So they used the basic element of the finger four, two ship flights, but used them in a vic made up of six airplanes instead of three. As the new guys arrived from the US they transitioned to the finger four, which was the US standard. I think it remarkable that some in the RAF were still clinging to the old vic, modified by using two plane elements while the US had either copied the new approach used by some in the RAF or the German finger four.

There is a book, "How America Saved the World" about the US providing equipment and supplies before we entered the war as well as after Dec 1941 and how that really pulled everyone's fat out of the fire. Note that while the British developed the VHF set we called the SCR-522 and airborne microwave radar, even the sets used by the RAF were mainly built by the US. In fact for a while the British even quit building microwave radars and just used the vastly greater US production until they realized they needed to keep their hand in so to be a leader in the field and went back to building some.

MIflyer said:

Interestingly enough in one book about USAAF P-51's flying out of Italy, the author, a combat pilot there, described the old hands who had been flying Spitfires before the Mustang and had been trained by the RAF still used the "vic" of three aircraft but used them as a vic of twos. So they used the basic element of the finger four, two ship flights, but used them in a vic made up of six airplanes instead of three. As the new guys arrived from the US they transitioned to the finger four, which was the US standard. I think it remarkable that some in the RAF were still clinging to the old vic, modified by using two plane elements while the US had either copied the new approach used by some in the RAF or the German finger four.

There is a book, "How America Saved the World" about the US providing equipment and supplies before we entered the war as well as after Dec 1941 and how that really pulled everyone's fat out of the fire. Note that while the British developed the VHF set we called the SCR-522 and airborne microwave radar, even the sets used by the RAF were mainly built by the US. In fact for a while the British even quit building microwave radars and just used the vastly greater US production until they realized they needed to keep their hand in so to be a leader in the field and went back to building some.

Click to expand...

Interesting. Both the 31st and 52nd went operational under RAF guidance late August 1942 but I am surprised at the notion of two 'six ship/3 element' sections, when the US doctrine of two 8 ship sections was superior - and brings up the question "12 ship squadron" in AAF 12th AF MTO?

Perhaps remaining under senior operational control of North African Air Force for a year? Only AAF FG's in MTO with Spits?

The Eagle Squadrons immediately transitioned to AAF doctrine if they were still flying Vic's while under RAF control.

The name of the book is 'Woodbine Red Leader" by George Loving, and the unit is the 31 FG 309th FG. When he got there they had Spit V and were converting to Spit IX, later going to P-51B. The pilot had flown the P-51A quite a bit in training. P-51A -Spit V - Spit IX - P-51B probably was just about the optimum training path.

MIflyer said:

The name of the book is 'Woodbine Red Leader" by George Loving, and the unit is the 31 FG 309th FG. When he got there they had Spit V and were converting to Spit IX, later going to P-51B. The pilot had flown the P-51A quite a bit in training. P-51A -Spit V - Spit IX - P-51B probably was just about the optimum training path.

Click to expand...

My father knew Loving at the Pentagon, but I never met him. He got all five in the air in a P-51B.

MIflyer said:

Interestingly enough in one book about USAAF P-51's flying out of Italy, the author, a combat pilot there, described the old hands who had been flying Spitfires before the Mustang and had been trained by the RAF still used the "vic" of three aircraft but used them as a vic of twos. So they used the basic element of the finger four, two ship flights, but used them in a vic made up of six airplanes instead of three. As the new guys arrived from the US they transitioned to the finger four, which was the US standard. I think it remarkable that some in the RAF were still clinging to the old vic, modified by using two plane elements while the US had either copied the new approach used by some in the RAF or the German finger four.

There is a book, "How America Saved the World" about the US providing equipment and supplies before we entered the war as well as after Dec 1941 and how that really pulled everyone's fat out of the fire. Note that while the British developed the VHF set we called the SCR-522 and airborne microwave radar, even the sets used by the RAF were mainly built by the US. In fact for a while the British even quit building microwave radars and just used the vastly greater US production until they realized they needed to keep their hand in so to be a leader in the field and went back to building some.

Click to expand...

Perhaps the adoption of a vic of 3 pairs was due to the mix of Spitfire variants being flown during 1943.

When the 31st & 52nd FG went out to Algeria in Nov 1942 they were given brand new Spitfire Vc assembled at Gibraltar. As with RAF squadrons in the theatre, when Spitfire IX and VIII started to become available in 1943 many units were flying a mix of Marks initially. Mixed Marks within formations would have been problematic. Could explain that odd formation depending on the numbers available at any particular point in time.

There is this old thread on USAAF Spits

I think the RAF "vic" was based on the idea of putting the maximum number of guns toward enemy bomber formations. Of course, the RAF had standard fighter attacks designed to do that but all that seems pretty much to have fallen apart in the face of actual battles.

Mixing Vc and IX in the same formation certainly would have caused problems, especially for high altitude bomber escort. But I don't see how the 'Vic of Rottes" would have helped that problem. I think it was more a way of combining the new and old formations so that everyone was satisfied. The Vic of Rottes broke up into Rottes when combat was joined but I do not think that happened with the Finger Four unless the need to actually fend off attacking aircraft drove it. I have read of fighter leads going after enemy aircraft that dove away and pulling out 20,000 ft lower to find the other thee guys in the flight still right there.

Supposedly, the Finger Four was invented by the Luftwaffe in Spain because they had so few BF-109's that they often could not put together two vics and did not want to leave aircraft on the ground just because they did not fit into a standard formation. If the Luftwaffe had enough 109's in Spain you wonder when the Finger Four would have been invented. According to Alan Deere the Finger Four was first tried by the RAF at his suggestion on the day he had a mid-air with the Luftwaffe pilot that invented it, as illustrated by the Revell box top.