Amen, brother. That's why the step from TraDevMan 2nd Class to PFC (Proud F___ing Civilian) is a promotion!
Cheers,
Wes
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Amen, brother. That's why the step from TraDevMan 2nd Class to PFC (Proud F___ing Civilian) is a promotion!But in the military you don't have the option of another job of your choice.
The superior you just pissed off is going to make that choice, and you're probably not going to like it.
Vietnam was overseas too. Was there any other function in the US Army that functioned or could adopt OMGUS like functions?The one shining example of military-political planning and action that got it right. But that was overseas, not domestic to the US.
And the heavies were the big army, big bomber kind of guys? At least in WWII, the President was good enough a student of history to understand what had to be done, and could throw his weight around to make it happen.There were many in the service who knew and understood, but they were voices in the wilderness, not to be heard over the roar of the heavies.
I didn't know they were viewed that way. The way I'd have seen it is, war is ugly, sure I guess there's a natural interest in not just killing but wearing spiffy uniforms and looking fabulous (in a non homosexual kind of way) doing it -- and good manners seems to help make killing look better too.Besides, most of those in the know were in the special ops community, the "ugly stepchild", the "snake eaters", the "filthy, nasty, not fit to be seen in polite society" types who were an embarrassment to "civilized" soldiers.
I guess we just assumed we knew better than the ARVN did.Counterinsurgency actually began in Vietnam during the Indochina War (1946-1954). The French created military-civilian teams, which performed civil functions in conjunction with military operations aimed at establishing French control over areas dominated by the communist Viet Minh. These efforts were unfortunately undermined, by French unwillingness to give the non-communist Vietnamese real independence—the prime political goal motivating all Vietnamese.
After the Geneva Accords were signed, Ngo Dinh Diem emerged as the person who finally achieved complete independence, overthrowing Emperor Bao Dai and establishing the Republic of Vietnam. This gained him widespread popular support. In addition a reformed South Vietnamese army had a positive set of civic action–oriented attitudes toward the civilian population. These reforms earned the South popular support while defeating sectarian insurgencies, and began to wean villagers' allegiance away from the Viet Minh.
Once firmly in power, however, Diem became more dictatorial favoring the Catholic minority and alienating the Buddhist majority. Diem's mistakes were compounded by the US decision to take the Vietnamese Army entirely out of the internal security role it had played and convert it into a conventional regular army—trained, organized into corps and divisions, and equipped to confront an overt North Vietnamese invasion along WWII lines.
I assume they either needed the ARVN to do what it did before we got in, or a far tougher guard than they got?A poorly trained, inadequately equipped Civil Guard took over rural security, supported under the U.S. aid program by a Michigan State University contract team consisting mainly of retired U.S. police officials as advisers.
Which alienated us...In 1961, the Kennedy administration decided to take a stand in Vietnam against further communist expansion in Asia. The Kennedy strongly favored counterinsurgency but the military defined this as a traditional military combat approach with an overlay of Special Forces. Whereas Kennedy saw it as an effort to address the security, political and economic sides of the conflict where it mattered most—at the village level. American military advisers were inserted at all Vietnamese army levels down to the provinces. CIA efforts supported irregular defense forces among the mountain tribes. . . . Essentially the war was being fought on two different levels. One was local, through the hamlet program aimed at protecting and winning over the civilian population. At most regular Vietnamese army unit levels, however, the main objective was to win the war by killing Viet Cong (with insufficient concern about the adverse effects of such tactics on the civilian population)
And this had to do with the Vietnamese decisions?Whatever progress was being made came to a crashing halt on Nov. 1, 1963, when President Diem was ousted and killed. The generals leading the coup were opposed to continuing the hamlet program. Almost all province chiefs, good and bad, were replaced; and most paramilitary units providing outside-the-hamlet security were disbanded.
It must have felt like every force in the Universe was getting in our way...When the junta finally agreed to continue the hamlet effort under a different name, another coup occurred.
LBJ was not even a patch on FDR's sleeve. And RMN, "tricky dick", was a snake.At least in WWII, the President was good enough a student of history to understand what had to be done, and could throw his weight around to make it happen.
Yes, somewhere down in the weeds some of them did. But again, it wasn't a matter of expertise, it was a matter of clout. Remember, the Corps is not its own master; it's a subsidiary of the Navy, the most traditional, hidebound service in the US pantheon. We squids used to joke that the jarheads were useful for guarding the gate, taking out the trash, and any other dirty jobs the CO saw fit to assign, like bivouacking out along the perimeter fence to keep the hippies from infiltrating. "Some of them can be nice guys, some of my best friends are jarheads, but you wouldn't want your sister to marry one."Didn't the Marines have COIN expertise?
Indeed as it has been pointed out multiple times the US was THE SuperPower with every lethal whizbang ever invented and were itching to use them in the real world against a real enemy. A bunch of ragtag rice farmers had absolutely NO chance against the awesome power that the US could bring to bear. The US was fighting the Second World War all over again.we knew better than the ARVN did.
From what I remember once a person makes 1 star, there's no minimum interval between promotions. So, while the President would have to give the order: You could take any General that knows his shit, bump him up over all the others and put him in charge, in theory.Replace Westmoreland, who?? And with whom ??
I don't think you realize how far up in the chain of command Westmoreland was.
Well, snakes are actually quite effective sometimes. They are often difficult to detect, under the radar; they rarely strike unless they can assure victory and; their bite usually kills.LBJ was not even a patch on FDR's sleeve. And RMN, "tricky dick", was a snake.
Actually the USAF might have been the most rigid when it came to doctrine. The USN was more traditional when it came to that shellback thing with crossing the equator, and some silly superstitious stuff, but they have proven able to adapt better than the USAF in many cases (no offense to anybody who served in the USAF, and if you served in the USAAF, don't worry -- you were part of the Army back then).Yes, somewhere down in the weeds some of them did. But again, it wasn't a matter of expertise, it was a matter of clout. Remember, the Corps is not its own master; it's a subsidiary of the Navy, the most traditional, hidebound service in the US pantheon.
So, it was a matter of complete hubris on the part of our country?Indeed
And yet, we lost to a bunch of ragtag rice farmers. Back in the 1770's the British probably felt the same way about us, and we won through a combination of proper battles, dirty fighting, and a bit of both at times.US was THE SuperPower with every lethal whizbang ever invented and were itching to use them in the real world against a real enemy.
Yeah but counter-insurgency that includes jets, bombs, rockets, and artillery does bring some flash and panache (j/k).Counterinsurgency just does not have the flash and panache that Jets, bombs, rockets, arty, etc. have. Victory, if it comes is slow and totally non-spectacular
Geo Wash fought the British in almost exactly the same way as the VC/NVA fought us. Geo knew that he did not have to beat the British he just had to survive. Only after 1778 when he had French Military and Naval support did he actually seek decisive battles with the British. His defeat of Cornwallis at Yorktown was only possible because the Continental Army had been bolstered by 7800 French troops and the French Fleet had attacked and driven off the British fleetSo, it was a matter of complete hubris on the part of our country?
And yet, we lost to a bunch of ragtag rice farmers. Back in the 1770's the British probably felt the same way about us, and we won through a combination of proper battles, dirty fighting, and a bit of both at times.
Yeah but counter-insurgency that includes jets, bombs, rockets, and artillery does bring some flash and panache (j/k).
The Navy of today is not the Navy of Vietnam days.The USN was more traditional when it came to that shellback thing with crossing the equator, and some silly superstitious stuff, but they have proven able to adapt better than the USAF in many cases
I was talking about the Vietnam era USNThe Navy of today is not the Navy of Vietnam days.
That's why I began having doubts about a favorable outcome in Vietnam right after the Tonkin Gulf incident and the influx of large numbers of US conventional troops, though I was still in high school.the American way of war generally has been to substitute firepower for manpower
the Navy, the most traditional, hidebound service in the US pantheon.
they have proven able to adapt better than the USAF in many cases.
The Navy of today is not the Navy of Vietnam days.
Well I was in the Vietnam era USN, and I can tell you it needed to adapt a lot more than it actually did.I was talking about the Vietnam era USN
Probably true, but compared to the USAF, they were adapting at a considerable rate -- the USAF was quite sluggish.Well I was in the Vietnam era USN, and I can tell you it needed to adapt a lot more than it actually did.
How could LBJ, who DIDN'T know his shit, hope to recognize a general who did? This counter insurgency shit was like rocket science: who knew? Well, there's always those mealy mouth, egg head academics who claim to know, but they're all half commie, so how can you believe them? Guess I'll just have to trust my generals. They're convincing my man Bobby Mac that there's progress, and he's the expert, so who am I to doubt it?Would LBJ finding any General (1-star or more) who knew his shit, and use his executive power to boost him to General (the President can do this) have been politically dangerous at the time?
Would LBJ finding any General (1-star or more) who knew his shit, and use his executive power to boost him to General (the President can do this) have been politically dangerous at the time?
I have a couple thoughts/ impressions on Vietnam to throw out there for comment by those obviously alot more knowledgeable on the subject than I.
One, durring the Easter offensive in I believe 73 after we had mostly pulled out the North invaded the South and the South prevailed with only some air cover from us in pretty short order. Only after most all aid to the South had been cut off by Congress was the North able to prevail in 75. This seems to suggest that the South was militarily viable from 73 on at at least had the aid and aircover been continued which if true would be a real tragedy as it would mean that the war had for all practical purposes been won and and we just threw it away for whatever political reasons and all those lives were just wasted.
Also, it seems like an all out bombing campaign of the North, not a measured on and off one would have gone a long way to convince the North to sit down at the negotiations for real and discontinue their aggression and aid to the VC.
Thoughts anyone?
That's a good point -- he didn't seem very good at that sort of thing. He also seemed to lack advisors he trusted who would be able to tell him such things.How could LBJ, who DIDN'T know his shit, hope to recognize a general who did?
I think there was also a distrust in some of the Generals, particularly those in the US Air Force: Some might have been seen as dangerously unhinged, and almost eager to take the situation to full blown total war and expand the war right into China and possibly the USSR.This counter insurgency shit was like rocket science: who knew? Well, there's always those mealy mouth, egg head academics who claim to know, but they're all half commie, so how can you believe them? Guess I'll just have to trust my generals. They're convincing my man Bobby Mac that there's progress, and he's the expert, so who am I to doubt it?
YepHave you ever worked for any company with more than 10 people?
That's not a very precise analogy, most BG's would have been in the service at least 25 years, so they'd probably be quite experienced.Like taking the new bag boy in a grocery store, and suddenly putting him over people who've worked there for 10 years.
And the war became unpopular around 1968. I'm guessing his "chosen sources" told him just what he wanted to hear, right?Why would Johnson see the need to replace Westmoreland? Until the Tet of 68, Johnson thought the war was going fine, he believed most of the reports coming from his chosen sources
Like set all the cities in NVN on fire?Also, it seems like an all out bombing campaign of the North, not a measured on and off one would have gone a long way to convince the North to sit down at the negotiations for real and discontinue their aggression and aid to the VC.
That is something interesting...Evidence from Soviet Communist Party archives suggests that, until 1974, Soviet military intelligence analysts and diplomats never believed that the North Vietnamese would be victorious on the battlefield.