Operational Differences: RAF Bomber Command & SAC

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Zipper730 said:
Really? I would have thought that would have been solely the USN or US Army's responsibility...
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The policy of who controlled the weapons was under constant review and change. But as SAC had extensive facilities for safe and secure storage they tended to handle weapons for all branches. Mostly overseas, but even here in the states. Not all weapons of course, as some were always forward deployed. It was and is US policy to not ever acknowledge if a weapon is forward deployed or not. Has caused issues with port visits by US vessels that are capable of deploying special weapons.
 
Zipper I would be interested in what procedures you felt US crews were undertrained in or where we failed to "mix it up". The number and type of scenarios that were routinely trained for was pretty extensive as I recall, especially for flight line crews and air crews. Missile crews were rather more constrained as the mission there was fairly well defined, at least the strategic side, the tactical side of course also had an extensive play list to consider that was a lot more variable.
 
Agreed, not to mention in the timeframe Zipper was questioning the B-58 Hustler was active. But I truly do not understand what basis he was using for comparison? Each Air Force had different planes, and in most cases different mission criteria. An aircraft attacking the USSR from the US would be configured very differently than even the same aircraft flying from the UK.
 
The two forces operated entirely different systems, mainly due to geography. If we could establish the hours for which aircraft of the two forces had flown carrying nuclear weapons, the UK number would be vanishingly small compared to that for the US

As far as accidents go, and this is not really my field, I am unaware of the British government ever admitting to an accident involving a nuclear weapon, whether in the hands of the RAF or Navy. The US has had thousands of operational nuclear devices in it's arsenal at a given time, the British probably less than 200 (and that number may be a bit high), so statistically we are far less likely to have encountered problems.

Cheers

Steve
 
stona said:
In the case of the RAF the information is probably locked away marked 'Secret' for the next 100 years at least. Freedom of information here isn't quite what it is in the US
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I had a hunch that was the case, though I figured it was around 60-70 years.
The two forces operated entirely different systems, mainly due to geography.
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When you say different systems, I assume you mean the way things were done?
If we could establish the hours for which aircraft of the two forces had flown carrying nuclear weapons, the UK number would be vanishingly small compared to that for the US
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Makes sense, especially prior to 1968...

Robert Porter said:
The policy of who controlled the weapons was under constant review and change. But as SAC had extensive facilities for safe and secure storage they tended to handle weapons for all branches. Mostly overseas, but even here in the states.
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Fascinating
Has caused issues with port visits by US vessels that are capable of deploying special weapons.
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Like that case where a nuke fell off an A-4 in Japanese waters.
Zipper I would be interested in what procedures you felt US crews were undertrained in or where we failed to "mix it up".
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It seemed tactics were dictated from the top. Not from the squadron or wing level.

tyrodtom said:
Comparing the maneuvers the 200,000 lb. Vulcan could do with what the 488,000 lbs. B-52 could manage would fit into my definition of a apples to oranges comparison.
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That wasn't the point, the Vulcan was way more nimble. What I was getting at was the crews seemed to have more latitude to create and implement tactics.
 
As far as disputed port calls went, at various times New Zealand and Japan among others demanded to know if Navy vessels coming to their ports carried nuclear weapons aboard. The US refused to confirm or deny the presence of such weapons on any vessel in accordance with policy. It resulted in certain countries/ports being out of bounds for port calls now and then.

As far as tactics being developed from the top, yes they are. However like any other first rate service suggestions from any valid source were taken into consideration and sometimes incorporated. But no nuclear capable country would want "loose canon's" deciding on the spur of the moment how to implement tactics with such weapons. At the same time each aircraft commander was of course given considerable latitude on how to achieve their mission once committed. So I again fail to understand what you were referring to.

The US is usually known among foreign services as the service with the most latitude in even day to day operations. RAF and RN forces when touring American counterparts often remarked on the lack of strict discipline and protocol etc. Conversely American staff, especially Navy, were often surprised at the rigor with which British vessels were run, not to mention the availability of alcohol for crew onboard.
 
I would note that aircraft in the 1950s and 60s were much more complex and often operating closer to the edge in even "routine flying"
than most WW II aircraft. Really low level high speed flight can shorten an airframes life expectancy by a factor of 10. Most Squadron or wing pilots/officers don't have access to the factory engineering studies and the culture had progressed well beyond the flog it until it breaks in squadron service , way too many planes and pilots had been lost in the late 40s and early 50s for that type of nonsense to continue. Squadron pilots are not test pilots.

Flying low level at 600mph is a lot more dangerous than flying at 350-400mph at the same altitudes simply due to obstacles showing up much quicker.

Innovations in tactics (maneuver limits, speed at altitude/mach limits) need to be checked with the manufacturers and national test agencies rather than adopted by individual squadrons. Jets tend not to dead stick land very well so blowing up engines was also frowned upon.
F-84 from the other thread had a landing speed/approach speed of 160mph compared to a Mustangs 120mph. later jets got even worse.
Big bombers are expensive, and it is shear coincidence/good luck that the B-52 was adaptable to low level flying. The wing flex allowed for low level flight at a G level in cockpit that some other bombers could not match although at the cost of high airframe fatigue. Some bombers with stiffer wings had a much rougher ride in the cockpit on the same mission and the crews would suffer too much from fatigue to reliably complete the mission.
 
Further to SRs excellent post I would add that the issues of fatigue on airframes was relatively new. Ultrasonic testing, dye penetrant testing of new and in service parts was being developed as was cyclical testing of materials. The people designing the aircraft were finding out what they could do and how long they could last. The terminology used by SR is post war, I have not read about wing flex and its effects on Lancaster aircrews, The Americans and British ran into these problems in less time than many have been contributing to this forum.
 
Shortround6 said:
I would note that aircraft in the 1950s and 60s were much more complex and often operating closer to the edge in even "routine flying" than most WW II aircraft.
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They were often more difficult to fly...
Innovations in tactics (maneuver limits, speed at altitude/mach limits) need to be checked with the manufacturers and national test agencies rather than adopted by individual squadrons.
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Yes, but provided the pilots are provided with the known limits, they can create tactics within them...
 
Where do you get the information that tactics were decided at the squadron, or wing level by the RAF ? Even during WW2 ?

Tactics might be suggested at squadron, or wing level, but are decided at higher, probably the highest level, British or American.

When you've got a lot of targets, and a lot of aircraft to control, coming from a lot of different locations, you have to have a centralized command, otherwise you'll have some hitting the same target, or flight paths to and from interfering .
Then with modern aircraft you got the added complication of aerial refueling, to and from the target, by tanker aircraft stationed maybe at other bases other than the aircraft themselves.

One B-52 could carry 70,000 lbs of conventional bombs, in other words just one 3 plane cell of B-52s drops over 100 tons of bombs. Do you think a squadron commander can just call up San Francisco, and order another ship load of bombs ?

I remember how hard we worked just keeping up with what a A1, and A-26s could go through at NKP, 50 truck convoys to unload and store every week when things were busy. I hate to think what the guys at Guam and Sattahip were going through to keep those B-52s supplied.
 
Zipper730 said:
They were often more difficult to fly...
Yes, but provided the pilots are provided with the known limits, they can create tactics within them...
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They were provided with known (or approved) limits. they are in the flight manuals. what was unknown was the fatigue problems with low level flight on airframe life. The Bumpy ride at low level showed up real quick and high wing load aircraft were much smoother at low level as a generalization. The B-52s flexible wing did help smooth things out better than a large delta wing. B-58 was small compared to Avro Vulcan. It took awhile for the idea that could NOT evade missiles by flying a little faster and little higher to really sink in and low level attacks to become the preferred method.
 
Zipper I have to say you are leaving me baffled. What makes you think pilots don't innovate tactics within their envelopes? An aircraft commander on a war mission would of course innovate as necessary to accomplish his assigned mission. This has been true as long as man has flown. American pilots were not under some kind of constraint system other than get it done. If that meant flying upside down at street level they would. Silly example I know but I truly am not understanding where or even what you are alluding to?
 
Also please keep in mind, nuclear strikes were not done in formation. It was a very different mission than those over Vietnam or earlier in WW2 or Korea. Nuclear strikes were often single or at most two ship strikes at a specific series of targets. The attacking aircraft dispersed to hit multiple targets. Also tactics were constantly changing as perceived threats changed. High level was largely abandoned in favor of low level nape of the earth attacks. Especially after Colman's U2 was shot down.
 
There are tactics, there are techniques and there are procedures. The handling of nuclear weapons fell entirely into the latter category for entirely logical safety reasons - you want the handling of such weapons to be entirely repeatable and auditable. Tactics are an entirely different issue and the operational delivery of such weapons falls firmly into that category. Please let's not mix apples and oranges...or if we are, can we add strawberries and make a nice fruit salad?
 
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