Operational Differences: RAF Bomber Command & SAC

[wuzak]

What exactly do you mean by tactics Zipper730 ?
The speed you approach the target ? Altitude ? Drop height ? Direction you approach from ? Weapon dropped ? Supporting aircraft ? Target selection ? What ?

What music should be played in the cockpit.

I believe the general system was a rotation between the various crew members as to whose turn it was to pick.

 

[Robert Porter]

What music should be played in the cockpit.

I believe the general system was a rotation between the various crew members as to whose turn it was to pick.

Ah yes, well in that case Zipper is correct, the RAF had a much larger selection of inflight music than the USAF. It was not until the late 90's with the release of Pandora that the USAF reached parity with the RAF on that score.

 

[buffnut453]

Ah yes, well in that case Zipper is correct, the RAF had a much larger selection of inflight music than the USAF. It was not until the late 90's with the release of Pandora that the USAF reached parity with the RAF on that score.

Not only a larger selection, but better quality too...Beatles, The Who, Rolling Stones, Bowie.

Also, was there a moratorium within the USAF on SAC crews playing country music? I mean, really, as if dropping nukes wasn't depressing enough...

 

[fubar57]

As long as it wasn't, "♪When Johnny Come Marching Home♫"....that outta keep you guys busy for a while

 

[pbehn]

Bomber command pilots and navigators had a huge degree of latitude up to the meeting point of the mission, after that the protection of all depended on the bomber stream. Some flew and circled in the North sea others flew over Wales their only requirement was to be at a certain place at a certain time and altitude.

 

[Zipper730]

Where do you get the information that tactics were decided at the squadron, or wing level by the RAF?

It seemed that the Group level seemed to decide the tactics and weapons delivery methods in WWII with the RAF (at least Bomber Command). The bombing methods were often quite different.

For example 5 Group would usually use a sector-bombing (at least that's what I think it's called) whereby entire squadrons (and presumably whole formations) would basically use the baseline heading chosen from a reference point and alter their course a certain number of degrees (with the idea that each airplane is about 2 degrees apart from every other) producing a 32 degree wide fan of devastation.

Tactics might be suggested at squadron, or wing level, but are decided at higher, probably the highest level, British or American.

Even if the range of tactics are dictated from the highest levels, SAC didn't appear to be all that receptive to this -- it seemed by in large that LeMay picked people (admittedly those he felt were best) and got them all together in Omaha and had them dictating tactics and plans from there.

While there were certainly people at the numbered AF units that were quite capable and creative, almost everything seemed to come down the line from SAC HQ, and not going up from any of the following levels: Squadron, Air Wing, Air Division, Numbered Air Force.

When you've got a lot of targets, and a lot of aircraft to control, coming from a lot of different locations, you have to have a centralized command, otherwise you'll have some hitting the same target, or flight paths to and from interfering.

Which is useful for basically one type of mission

SIOP: An all out annihilating strike on much of the enemy nation, and possibly several, all at once, or at least within a few hours; then a few more strikes over the next few days to just wipe out whatever is left.

This type of attack would be fine from SAC HQ because of the massive scope of the operations, the need for precise timing, and things of that sort: It would still be foolish to not encourage creativity at the squadron, air-wing, air-division, and numbered AF levels. They are under no obligation to accept the ideas, but it would be foolish to not listen to at least the ideas that have some merit, whether it be a Major or Lieutenant Colonel who commands a squadron, to Colonel in charge of an Air Wing, to a General Officer in charge of a numbered AF.

Even strategic bombing doesn't require that degree: This is generally a theater level operation (say Pacific, South Pacific, Northern Europe), and usually can be controlled at the numbered AF level. A good leader delegates without micromanaging, particularly if he has competent subordinates.

One B-52 could carry 70,000 lbs of conventional bombs, in other words just one 3 plane cell of B-52s drops over 100 tons of bombs.

When did payload increase to 70,000 pounds? The Big Belly allowed 84 x 500 pounds of bombs (42000), and 24 x 750 pounds (18000) of bombs... where did the other 10,000 go?

What exactly do you mean by tactics Zipper730 ?
The speed you approach the target ? Altitude ? Drop height ? Direction you approach from ? Weapon dropped ? Supporting aircraft ? Target selection ? What ?

Mostly the types of maneuvers used: There's almost never one good maneuver because if it's done over and over again, it becomes procedure. Even the D-21 drone could use 1 of 8 different pre-programmed maneuvers if engaged (it would respond when it was locked on to).

They were provided with known (or approved) limits.

Of course, but there should be a degree of ability, depending on mission (some missions have to be flown with extreme exactitude, others depend on flexibility and adaptability) to adapt on the fly.

The problem with approved limits is the degree to which they compare with the actual plane's capability: The RAF for example told the Vulcan crews there was a normal airspeed it was safe to fly at down-low, but there was a "one off" speed, which basically means "we did this at least once before the wings came off, so only do this one if you're going to die anyway because you might if you do it".

what was unknown was the fatigue problems with low level flight on airframe life.

I assume they came up with rules of thumb right?

The Bumpy ride at low level showed up real quick and high wing load aircraft were much smoother at low level as a generalization.

The F-105 and F-104 are great examples of this

It took awhile for the idea that could NOT evade missiles by flying a little faster and little higher to really sink in and low level attacks to become the preferred method.

Truthfully, it's a bit more complicated than that: There seemed to be some people at SAC even in the early 1960's that seemed to be okay with high-level attacks. I'm guessing some felt the SA-2 was the ultimate weapon from which there was no escape, and others felt (or knew) that it had limits of various sorts and that it was possible to use ECM to shake them loose.

I'm not sure exactly who knew what and when, but when it came to secrecy and classification, it was crazy how much usable intelligence they would just sit on: Data that was often available in WWII (we often knew where fighter-planes were forming up, so we sent fighters over to bust them up as they were in the process of forming up) was used more liberally... you don't have to tell people the methods of collection (that would be kind of stupid actually), you just have to tell them what they need to know to execute their mission.

What's the point in collecting all this intelligence if you have no plan to ever use it?

Zipper I have to say you are leaving me baffled. What makes you think pilots don't innovate tactics within their envelopes? An aircraft commander on a war mission would of course innovate as necessary to accomplish his assigned mission.

I guess there are some statements about SAC that aren't entirely flattering. One would hope they would be good at quick adaptation on the fly.

Also please keep in mind, nuclear strikes were not done in formation. It was a very different mission than those over Vietnam or earlier in WW2 or Korea.

That I'm aware of. One major problem with SAC was that they were so geared for nuclear war that they were not equipped for anything else.

Early on, that wasn't as big a deal as nuclear weapons were huge and only a few bomber types could carry them (B-29, B-50, B-36, B-47, and the B-45 was technically supposed to, but couldn't), which was mostly from 1945 to Korea. This meant that conventional bombing was going to be an inevitability to some extent.

During the Korean War era, the bombs got smaller, and it wasn't long that pretty much every single aircraft in the inventory could carry them. This pretty much meant that conventional bombing could be argued as not being important (clearly not entirely accurate), and the USAF operated on the attitude that they'd never fight a conventional war again (even though the guys in TAC were fully expecting to fight conventional and nuclear wars).

The New Look Policy also called for an overwhelming response: Though it would seem that politicians and the USAF top brass saw things differently.

Politicians Saw

• If USSR rolls into Berlin, a massive battle would start, that if not arrested immediately, would turn into a nuclear exchange.
• If the USSR is seen lining up huge amounts of bombers on the air-fields: We either will launch our bombers first to bomb them back to the stone-age, or reserve the right to do so.
• If the enemy does use a nuke on us or any of our allies: We will bomb them back to the stone age

USAF Top Brass Saw

• If the USSR does anything that indicates aggression: We bomb them back to the stone age
• If the USSR does anything aggressive: Regardless of the infraction, we will bomb them back to the stone-age (unless our dumb-ass politicians stop us).

Admittedly, I suppose one could simply accuse the USAF of taking the term "overwhelming response" very very literally: Considering the doctrine that the USAF operated under (which was based on Giulio Douhet, and was heavily predicated on the notion of a first strike -- probably on reason why they failed to realize how effective fighters would be against them), it should not have been a surprise.

Probably important to ensure that you make sure your own guys understand the difference between listed and actual policy (even if you have to tell them in secret meetings in secret locations).

Also tactics were constantly changing as perceived threats changed. High level was largely abandoned in favor of low level nape of the earth attacks.

Actually all the way into 1962, there were tests done to evaluate penetrating up high. The idea involved what was called a "basketweave" attack. If I recall, it involved massive amounts of aircraft using a multitude of dog-legs and course-changes, along with ECM, chaffing (along with the assistance of specialized jammer aircraft), to just overwhelm enemy air-defenses.

It seems that a major flaw in the USAF developments prior to Vietnam was the failure to develop in a practical way, anti-radiation missiles. This is from somebody I know online, though I was provided sources to comb through myself (designation-systems.net)

• The USAF developed an ARM called the GAM-67 Crossbow: It was based on a drone, and was subsonic.
• While the USAF developed a more advanced drone and ARM, the USN developed the ASM-N-8 Corvus
• The Corvus was supersonic, was 950 pounds lighter, 13-inches smaller in diameter, a little over 4 feet shorter in length, and almost 7'8" shorter in span: The weight and dimensions would have made it adaptable to a larger range of aircraft, and while it's range was shorter (175 nm vs 260-300 nm) than the GAM-67, the range is still outside that of the SA-2 (as well as the SA-5 Griffon, an ABM concept, and the SA-5 Gammon, though marginally: The range of both is around 300 km or 161.74 nm).
• The USAF asserted control over long-ranged weapon systems (which it was technically authorized to do); then decided that it didn't need the missile (which was stupid) as the missile was already undergoing testing.

The USAF admittedly did plan to develop more bombers in the form of the XB-68, which never materialized...

 

[tyrodtom]

The B-52, H or G had a 70,000 payload capacity, but not enough room even with external racks for 70,000 lbs of 500 and 750 bombs.

But the rest of that 10,000 lbs could easily been taken up by the racks added for all those small bombs.
But you don't normally drop the racks, unless you've got a hung bomb.

 

[tyrodtom]

Zipper 730 you post as if SAC was one unchanging military organization .
It's older than the USAF. The SAC of the late 40's and early 50's is different from the SAC of later 50's, 60's , 70's and so on.
Curtis Lemay had a heavy influence on SAC, though he was only at it's head from 1948-57, and then USAF COS from 61-65, but his influence probably lasted far beyond that.

You seem to be centering on SAC less than fully successful use in Vietnam, though it's use late in the war almost surely encouraged the North Vietnamese they'd better negotiate a peace with us.
That worked for us, but not so well for the South Vietnamese.

 

[Zipper730]

The B-52, H or G had a 70,000 payload capacity, but not enough room even with external racks for 70,000 lbs of 500 and 750 bombs.

If I recall, the -G's originally had a much smaller load (13,500 internal, 18,000 external): This might have been increased with time. I don't know about the -H. I did make a basic estimate on payload and drop-tanks and got a number over 70,000 for that to work.

Zipper 730 you post as if SAC was one unchanging military organization .

Well, I'm glad somebody got what I was trying to say!

It's older than the USAF.

Correct, it was started in 1946 and was during the final days of the USAAF.

The SAC of the late 40's and early 50's is different from the SAC of later 50's, 60's, 70's and so on.

Well SAC from 1946-1948 was different from SAC of 1948-1972...

Curtis Lemay had a heavy influence on SAC, though he was only at it's head from 1948-57, and then USAF COS from 61-65, but his influence probably lasted far beyond that.

Yes, ironically LeMay's impact on SAC was due to it's lack of functionality from 1946-1948: I'm not sure why it got so dysfunctional, other than General Kenney pushing for the creation of the USAF.

Still, you'd be under the assumption that he'd put his second in command in charge while he was in front of Congress.

You seem to be centering on SAC less than fully successful use in Vietnam

It showed the most obvious problems with SAC. At least in Korea, SAC had to hand over it's bombers to the Far East Air Forces.

though it's use late in the war almost surely encouraged the North Vietnamese they'd better negotiate a peace with us.

Yes it did, but ironically, [url="https://www.commondreams.org/views/2014/08/12/george-will-confirms-nixons-vietnam-treason"]it wasn't necessary[/URL]: He short-circuited a cease-fire negotiation back in 1968 to get into office.

 

[tyrodtom]

It's foolish to imply any organization doesn't change over time.
No group of people working together stays the same.

The USAF changed in the 4 years I was in it from 65-69. The US Army changed even more from 69 -73 .
I've worked with groups of people over 60 years, they all change.

But SAC stayed the same !
Nope, not buying that argument.

 

[Zipper730]

It's foolish to imply any organization doesn't change over time.
No group of people working together stays the same.

Okay, but they didn't change very much.

It seemed the following all changed more

• US Army
• USAF: Tactical Air Command
• US Naval Aviation
• USAF Overseas Commands

 

[parsifal]

The RAF surely had fewer incidents, maybe even none. Not much out there on Bomber Command's almost incidents with nukes . But they were only carrying a fraction of the number that SAC was carrying day after day.
And other than the very short Falklands war, what conventional war did the post WW2 RAF Bomber Command participate in ?

Sounds like a sort of apple to oranges comparison .

no, the british 9and presumably its air force has been engaged in near continuous warfare since 1945.

Greek Civil War (1944-1947)--British forces became involved in the early stages of the Greek Civil War when they liberated Greece from German occupation toward the end of 1944. As the Germans withdrew, competing Greek factions fought for control. The British sided with the re-established Greek government against the Communist rebels. Due to financial pressures and their own need to recover from World War Two, Britain announced a withdrawal of forces in 1947. The Greek Civil War continued until 1949, with the United States taking over the role of protector for the government. British combat involvement primarily took place in 1944 and 1945.

Palestine- (1945-1948)-Following World War Two, Jewish forces in Palestine battled both the British troops occupying Palestine, and the local Palestinian Arab militias for control of the country.

War in Vietnam (1945-1946)- Codenamed Operation Masterdom by the British, and also known as the Southern Resistance War by the Vietnamese. this short, but violent conflict pitted British, Indian, French, and Japanese troops agaisnt the local communist guerrillas who had resisted the Japanese, called the Viet Minh. The Viet Minh resisted the return of their French rulers and the British and Indian troops who protected them. The Japanese troops, who were still in Vietnam waiting to be sent home, were drafted by the Western Allies to help fight the communists. British combat lasted about six months, from when they arrived in Saigon in September, 1945, until they turned things over to French forces and withdrew in March, 1946.

Indonesian Revolution (1945-1946)- Similar to the situation in Vietnam, British troops were tasked with re-occupying Japanese-held Indonesia until the Dutch colonial administration could resume rule. The nationalist Indonesian forces resisted a return to colonial rule, and launched attacks against British, Dutch and Japanese troops (who, like in Vietnam, had been drafted into service by the Allies). British forces withdrew when the Dutch were able to return in force. British involement in this Indonesian war was from late September, 1945, until November, 1946.

Malayan Emergency-(1948-1960)-British forces battled local communist guerrillas in Malaya.

Korean War-(1950-1953)-The UK joined in the American-led UN effort to defend South Korea from North Korea and China.

Anglo-Egyptian War of 1951-1952 (1951-1952)--Egyptian guerrillas, aided by the government carried out a campaign against British forces stationed at the Suez Canal and against other symbols of Britain and the West. On January 25, 1952, British troops retaliated against Egypt by attacking an Egyptian police station, killing 50 and wounding 100. The conflict ended with a change in the Egyptian government and the eventual withdrawal of British troops. This conflict led to Britain's involvment in the 1956 Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt in 1956. (see below)

Mau Mau Insurgency-(1952-1956)-Kenyan guerrilla war against British rule.

Cyprus Emergency--(1955-1959)- Guerrilla war by the Greek Cypriot militant group, the National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA), to force the withdrawal of British from Cyprus. The primary goal of the rebels was to unite Greek-majority Cyprus with Greece. Britain, which had controlled or ruled Cyprus since 1878, granted independence to Cyprus in 1960.

Suez/Sinai War (1956)- This war has never officially ended, though ceasefire agreements are in place and holding

Muscat and Oman Intervention (1957-1959)--British troops aid the goverment of Muscat and Oman (now known simply as Oman), against rebels. British troops withdrew after a successful campaign. This war is also know as the Jebel Akhdar War.

Jordan Intervention (1958)--Britain airlifted troops to Jordan in response to a request for aid from the Jordanian king. King Hussein felt threatened by the recent union of Syria and Egypt, as well as the violent revolution in Iraq in which the Iraq king, a member of Hussein's family, was brutally murdered. After the situation calmed down, British troops left Jordan.

Brunei Revolt-(December, 1962)-Britain had been in negotiations with t Malaya, Singapore, Sabah, and Sarawak to form a new Malaysian Federation as British rule in these areas was ending. Indonesia opposed Brunei (and Sabah and Sarawak--all of whom were in the northern part of Borneo/Kalimantan Island-Indonesia controlled the bulk of the island) from joining this federation, and pro-Indonesian rebels launched a rebellion in Brune in in 1962. British forces defeated the rebels.

Malaysia-Indonesia Confrontation (1963-1966)-Indonesia launched a guerrilla war against Malaysia (the new nation comprised of Malaya, Sabah, and Sarawak) to take control of the northern portion of Borneo. British forces supported the Malaysians. Australia and New Zealand also participated in the war against Indonesia.

Ugandan Army Mutiny (1964)--The army of Uganda, which had recently become independent of Britain, mutinied against the government of President Milton Obote in January of 1964. Unable to control the situation, Obote called for help from British forces who put down the revolt.

Dhofar Rebellion (1962-1976)-Marxist rebels, aided by the new South Yemen government, battled the Omani government forces in the western region of Dhofar. British air and ground forces aided the Omani government defeat the rebels.

Aden Conflict-(1964-1967) -Rebels in the British-ruled part of Yemen known as Aden waged a guerrilla war against the British and associated Yemeni forces. Following the British withdrawal, the new nation of South Yemen was formed.

The Conflict in Northern Ireland (1969-1998) a ceasefire remains and is currently holding but the war has never officially ended

The Falkland Islands War (1982) A substantial armed military presence has remained in this part of the world as the Argentinians remain disgruntled about the outcome

Gulf War (1991)-British, U.S., French, and other Allied nations joined together to end the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. Also known in the West as the First Iraq War.

No-Fly Zone War (1991-2003)-Following the Gulf War of 1991, British and American warplanes enforced a "No-Fly Zone" in both northern and southern Iraq to prevent Iraqi government air strikes against Kurdish and Shiite forces. This resulted in nearly constant air strikes by the Allies against Iraqi military targets. As the launching of the 2003 invasion of Iraq approached, the British and U.S. forces increasingly used the No-Fly Zone status as a means of degrading Iraqi defenses leading up to the invasion.

Bosnian War (1992-1996)- British forces, as part of NATO, engaged in combat operations and peacekeeping operations in Bosnia during the protracted Yugoslav civil wars.

Kosovo War (1999)-British forces, as part of NATO, engaged in combat operations and peacekeeping operations in Kosovo during the protracted Yugoslav civil wars.

British military intervention in the Sierra Leone Civil War (2000-2002)-British forces intervened in the Sierra Leone Civil War and helped government forces end the war. British troops remained in Sierra Leone for several more years to ensure the peacea and train government forces.

Afghanistan War (2001-2014)-British troops were withdrawn from Afghanistan in 2014, though the war there continues.

Iraq War (2003-2009)-British troops were withdrawn from combat in Iraq in 2009, though U.S. troops remained until 2011.

Libyan War (2011)-British air and naval forces joined in a coalition to aid Libyan rebels against the government of Muammar Khadaffy. British special forces played a role on the g

ISIS War (2014-Present)-Upon a request for military assistance, the UK, along with several other Western nations (U.S., France, Canada, etc.) began military operations against the Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL) forces in Iraq.



British forces have not really enjoyed any peace since 1939)

 

[Robert Porter]

Zipper SAC was constantly innovating and changing. For one thing it was and is well known that "settled" tactics don't work mostly due to the ability of our potential enemies to observe and prepare counters. Secondly technology, especially military technology, does not stand still. As new technologies develop including ECM, Radar and Guidance, stand off weapons systems like cruise missiles and on and on, tactics needed to be adjusted or entirely scrapped. And they were. SAC was an organic beastie that grew and changed frequently. It's ineffective use was not inherent in SAC but rather the political bosses that dictated uses.

As far as the USAAF command mentality, especially within SAC, the very nature of SAC was a weapon of last resort. SAC was meant as a deterrent, part of the nuclear triad, it was used for other purposes but not well used. Again these were political decisions not military ones. So yes it was meant to deliver an overwhelming strike in retaliation during a nuclear exchange. I am sure you understand the inherent thoughts around the MAD policy. It was assumed by SAC crews, both bomber and missile, that if we were ever called to use our weapons, there would be no bases to return to and no place to run. When I was in we knew that if the missiles launched we had less than 10 minutes to live. There is nowhere safe to go to in 10 minutes.

Because of this, it was the fervent desire of every member of SAC that I worked with or for that we would never be called upon to actually perform the duties we had been designed and trained for. Truly it was well understood that if we did deploy, then we had failed in our primary duty as a deterrent force. Because of this belief we were constantly evolving and innovating at every level, top down, and bottom to top. So your contention that SAC was somehow static is plainly false, I lived it. Second your contention that SAC was a top down tactics organization is also false on its face. There were constant seminars and other methods for innovation to be brought forward to command as well as constant updates and changes in tactics coming from command.

We also constantly amassed and digested intelligence on potential adversaries and their changing capabilities, these changes and developments triggered responsive changes in our tactics. So I have to ask, are you just baiting us for responses? No one that worked within any military organization would ever claim perfection, but the perception you seem to be putting forward from unnamed sources truly seems to be an outsider looking in with no real day to day operational experience.

 

[tyrodtom]

I thought the subject was SAC and RAF Strike command during the early cold war, not all British aerial components post WW2 to now.

 

[stona]

British forces have not really enjoyed any peace since 1939)

And have suffered about 3,500 fatal casualties to members on active service in those post war conflicts.

Cheers

Steve

 

[parsifal]

I thought the subject was SAC and RAF Strike command during the early cold war, not all British aerial components post WW2 to now.

and I'm sure the debate will centre on that. I was just correcting one of the background issues raised as a possible reason for low accident rates was their non-involvement in conflicts

 

[wuzak]

British forces have not really enjoyed any peace since 1939)

Have US Forces (since 1941) ?

 

[fubar57]

1976-78?

 

[Robert Porter]

1977 - 78, 1976 had some upset in Korea where several servicemen died.

 

[parsifal]

Have US Forces (since 1941) ?

Dunno. probably not. Moreover, some of the conflicts the US got involved in are major affairs ....like Vietnam