Operational Differences: RAF Bomber Command & SAC

[Reegor]

Zipper SAC was constantly innovating and changing. For one thing it was and is well known that "settled" tactics don't work mostly due to the ability of our potential enemies to observe and prepare counters. Secondly technology, especially military technology, does not stand still. As new technologies develop including ECM, Radar and Guidance, stand off weapons systems like cruise missiles and on and on, tactics needed to be adjusted or entirely scrapped. And they were. SAC was an organic beastie that grew and changed frequently. It's ineffective use was not inherent in SAC but rather the political bosses that dictated uses.

I researched this recently for a book. My conclusions FWIW was that SAC was very innovative, but it was all centralized. (in the 50s) In the VN war, the SAC generals were promoted to run the entire USAF, and they continued with their centralized command style in managing the USAF fighter pilots who were the ones bombing N. Vietnam. This caused considerable friction and complaints, increased casualties, and reduced effectiveness. (Senior leadership did not agree, which is why they kept doing it.)
Even during the B-52 Christmas (?) bombings, there were complaints from the B-52 crews that poor tactics were being forced on them from Omaha, such as all AC ingressing and exiting the target on the same vectors. See Flying from the Black Hole: The B-52 Navigator-Bombardiers of Vietnam for this analysis.

 

[Robert Porter]

Hence why my comment about the fact SAC was ill used in the Vietnam era, the organization by definition was Strategic not Tactical, and Vietnam was certainly a tactical engagement. It was military politics at its worse, mostly fostered by the Johnson administration. That President was the worst sitting President in terms of War policy in modern times. Some of the decisions made at Johnson's desk haunted military policy for decades. However that was policy, not innovation. Innovation in all military branches is a necessity or we are doomed as the British so often learned, to fight the last war all over again.

 

[Zipper730]

no, the british 9and presumably its air force has been engaged in near continuous warfare since 1945.

So because of the recurrent conflict, they never adopted that whole "safety is paramount to complete the mission" crap and focused on "this is what you gotta do in combat to live"?

As far as the USAAF command mentality, especially within SAC, the very nature of SAC was a weapon of last resort.

As a nuclear-deterrent from 1946 on?

Because in those days not all bombers could even carry nuclear-bombs (B-29's, B-36's, B-47's and B-50's could; the B-45's couldn't), and there were a number of non-nuclear bombs ready for use on the bomber force ranging from ordinary sized bombs, to the tallboy, and grand slam, as well as the cloud-maker.

SAC was meant as a deterrent, part of the nuclear triad

The nuclear-triad didn't seem to apply until either the late 1950's or early 1960's...

Again these were political decisions not military ones.

Bombers are useful for both conventional and nuclear missions, and truthfully there are interdiction missions that bombers seem adequately suited for.

So yes it was meant to deliver an overwhelming strike in retaliation during a nuclear exchange.

Which is more similar to Global Strike command of modern day: The problem is that bombers could be farmed out to other organizations, such as theater commands for a variety of different uses.

I am sure you understand the inherent thoughts around the MAD policy.

Mutual extinction...

When I was in we knew that if the missiles launched we had less than 10 minutes to live. There is nowhere safe to go to in 10 minutes.

Yeah...

Because of this, it was the fervent desire of every member of SAC that I worked with or for that we would never be called upon to actually perform the duties we had been designed and trained for.

That's good!

Second your contention that SAC was a top down tactics organization is also false on its face. There were constant seminars and other methods for innovation to be brought forward to command

So it was possible for tactics to be submitted up the line from squadron, to wing, to air-division, to numbered air force unit, to command HQ?

I researched this recently for a book. My conclusions FWIW was that SAC was very innovative, but it was all centralized. (in the 50s)

That's the vibe I got: When did this change?

the SAC generals were promoted to run the entire USAF, and they continued with their centralized command style in managing the USAF fighter pilots who were the ones bombing N. Vietnam.

Also known as "SACumcizing"

Even during the B-52 Christmas (?) bombings, there were complaints from the B-52 crews that poor tactics were being forced on them from Omaha, such as all AC ingressing and exiting the target on the same vectors.

Yeah, that might have cost the bulk of the losses...

 

[fubar57]

LMAO!!!!!!

 

[pbehn]

LMAO!!!!!!

You are laughing, my eyes hurt.

 

[parsifal]

My comment was in response to the assumption that the british have not been in combat much since 1945, and therefore the operational pressures on their forces are less, and hence a reduced amount of risk taking. The british may be more averse to taking risks, but not because they have had less exposure to warfare than the Americans....

 

[Zipper730]

While this post is old, I'm curious if I was right about the RAF's Bomber Command Groups (i.e. 5 Group) having a degree of autonomy in implementing tactics and plans as in WWII? Or was everything dictated from Bomber Command as in the USAF's Strategic Air Command?

 

[Zipper730]

Just to be clear, I'm not asking about specific tactics, specific weapons, even specific routes, simply the degree of autonomy that was allowed at the RAF Group Level, or if everything was controlled at Bomber Command's level only?

 

[Zipper730]

A Admiral Beez , G Glider

 

[swampyankee]

My comment was in response to the assumption that the british have not been in combat much since 1945, and therefore the operational pressures on their forces are less, and hence a reduced amount of risk taking. The british may be more averse to taking risks, but not because they have had less exposure to warfare than the Americans....

When you leave out Suez, Malaya, rebellions in East Africa, peacekeeping during the Trobles, and the Falklands campaign, there's not much left

 

[Glider]

The Autonomy of the different groups was normally limited apart from where they had a specific specialised role. A good example being No 2 Group which was always separate from the rest of bomber command. Pathfinder units were grouped in No 8 Group which you could say were different but invariably operated in conjunction with the Main Force.
To a degree this was counterbalanced by flexibility to change tactics for specific actions where separate squadrons had a lot of autonomy. Examples being 617 and the often overlooked 9 Squadron. The tactics used by these units were very different and were combined in No 5 Group which effectively had two roles, the normal night raids and the specialised units.

The second question is British Forces being risk adverse. Again you could say that the main Army was risk adverse but our manpower was limited and the horrors of WW1 were still in everyone's mind. Again this was often counterbalanced by experimental tactics/units. LRDG, Chindits, SAS, Commando's, the tactical use of snipers are but a few and no doubt members could give more examples.

In todays armed forces they are so small you simply cannot afford to take outrageous risks, but again the special forces are considered as good as the best. There are other exceptions in particular the Nuclear Attack Submarines. RN captains are generally recognised as being the best anywhere. The Perisher course they have to pass is fearsome and the tasks they have to undertake are the stuff of folklore. Personal favourite was an exercise where the had to find and track a USN boomer sub. At the end of the exercise the captain of the RN Boat presented the USN captain a photo of his submarine outlined against the surface. Naturally this came as a big surprise as they had believed that they were undetected.

 

[Zipper730]

The Autonomy of the different groups was normally limited apart from where they had a specific specialised role. A good example being No 2 Group which was always separate from the rest of bomber command. Pathfinder units were grouped in No 8 Group which you could say were different but invariably operated in conjunction with the Main Force.

Yes, but that was in WWII. I'm curious what the policies were during the Cold War times, particularly from 1948 to 1972.