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What exactly do you mean by tactics Zipper730 ?
The speed you approach the target ? Altitude ? Drop height ? Direction you approach from ? Weapon dropped ? Supporting aircraft ? Target selection ? What ?
Ah yes, well in that case Zipper is correct, the RAF had a much larger selection of inflight music than the USAF. It was not until the late 90's with the release of Pandora that the USAF reached parity with the RAF on that score.What music should be played in the cockpit.
I believe the general system was a rotation between the various crew members as to whose turn it was to pick.
Ah yes, well in that case Zipper is correct, the RAF had a much larger selection of inflight music than the USAF. It was not until the late 90's with the release of Pandora that the USAF reached parity with the RAF on that score.
It seemed that the Group level seemed to decide the tactics and weapons delivery methods in WWII with the RAF (at least Bomber Command). The bombing methods were often quite different.Where do you get the information that tactics were decided at the squadron, or wing level by the RAF?
Even if the range of tactics are dictated from the highest levels, SAC didn't appear to be all that receptive to this -- it seemed by in large that LeMay picked people (admittedly those he felt were best) and got them all together in Omaha and had them dictating tactics and plans from there.Tactics might be suggested at squadron, or wing level, but are decided at higher, probably the highest level, British or American.
Which is useful for basically one type of missionWhen you've got a lot of targets, and a lot of aircraft to control, coming from a lot of different locations, you have to have a centralized command, otherwise you'll have some hitting the same target, or flight paths to and from interfering.
When did payload increase to 70,000 pounds? The Big Belly allowed 84 x 500 pounds of bombs (42000), and 24 x 750 pounds (18000) of bombs... where did the other 10,000 go?One B-52 could carry 70,000 lbs of conventional bombs, in other words just one 3 plane cell of B-52s drops over 100 tons of bombs.
Mostly the types of maneuvers used: There's almost never one good maneuver because if it's done over and over again, it becomes procedure. Even the D-21 drone could use 1 of 8 different pre-programmed maneuvers if engaged (it would respond when it was locked on to).What exactly do you mean by tactics Zipper730 ?
The speed you approach the target ? Altitude ? Drop height ? Direction you approach from ? Weapon dropped ? Supporting aircraft ? Target selection ? What ?
Of course, but there should be a degree of ability, depending on mission (some missions have to be flown with extreme exactitude, others depend on flexibility and adaptability) to adapt on the fly.They were provided with known (or approved) limits.
I assume they came up with rules of thumb right?what was unknown was the fatigue problems with low level flight on airframe life.
The F-105 and F-104 are great examples of thisThe Bumpy ride at low level showed up real quick and high wing load aircraft were much smoother at low level as a generalization.
Truthfully, it's a bit more complicated than that: There seemed to be some people at SAC even in the early 1960's that seemed to be okay with high-level attacks. I'm guessing some felt the SA-2 was the ultimate weapon from which there was no escape, and others felt (or knew) that it had limits of various sorts and that it was possible to use ECM to shake them loose.It took awhile for the idea that could NOT evade missiles by flying a little faster and little higher to really sink in and low level attacks to become the preferred method.
I guess there are some statements about SAC that aren't entirely flattering. One would hope they would be good at quick adaptation on the fly.Robert Porter said:Zipper I have to say you are leaving me baffled. What makes you think pilots don't innovate tactics within their envelopes? An aircraft commander on a war mission would of course innovate as necessary to accomplish his assigned mission.
That I'm aware of. One major problem with SAC was that they were so geared for nuclear war that they were not equipped for anything else.Also please keep in mind, nuclear strikes were not done in formation. It was a very different mission than those over Vietnam or earlier in WW2 or Korea.
Actually all the way into 1962, there were tests done to evaluate penetrating up high. The idea involved what was called a "basketweave" attack. If I recall, it involved massive amounts of aircraft using a multitude of dog-legs and course-changes, along with ECM, chaffing (along with the assistance of specialized jammer aircraft), to just overwhelm enemy air-defenses.Also tactics were constantly changing as perceived threats changed. High level was largely abandoned in favor of low level nape of the earth attacks.
If I recall, the -G's originally had a much smaller load (13,500 internal, 18,000 external): This might have been increased with time. I don't know about the -H. I did make a basic estimate on payload and drop-tanks and got a number over 70,000 for that to work.The B-52, H or G had a 70,000 payload capacity, but not enough room even with external racks for 70,000 lbs of 500 and 750 bombs.
Well, I'm glad somebody got what I was trying to say!Zipper 730 you post as if SAC was one unchanging military organization .
Correct, it was started in 1946 and was during the final days of the USAAF.It's older than the USAF.
Well SAC from 1946-1948 was different from SAC of 1948-1972...The SAC of the late 40's and early 50's is different from the SAC of later 50's, 60's, 70's and so on.
Yes, ironically LeMay's impact on SAC was due to it's lack of functionality from 1946-1948: I'm not sure why it got so dysfunctional, other than General Kenney pushing for the creation of the USAF.Curtis Lemay had a heavy influence on SAC, though he was only at it's head from 1948-57, and then USAF COS from 61-65, but his influence probably lasted far beyond that.
It showed the most obvious problems with SAC. At least in Korea, SAC had to hand over it's bombers to the Far East Air Forces.You seem to be centering on SAC less than fully successful use in Vietnam
Yes it did, but ironically, [url="https://www.commondreams.org/views/2014/08/12/george-will-confirms-nixons-vietnam-treason"]it wasn't necessary[/URL]: He short-circuited a cease-fire negotiation back in 1968 to get into office.though it's use late in the war almost surely encouraged the North Vietnamese they'd better negotiate a peace with us.
Okay, but they didn't change very much.It's foolish to imply any organization doesn't change over time.
No group of people working together stays the same.
no, the british 9and presumably its air force has been engaged in near continuous warfare since 1945.The RAF surely had fewer incidents, maybe even none. Not much out there on Bomber Command's almost incidents with nukes . But they were only carrying a fraction of the number that SAC was carrying day after day.
And other than the very short Falklands war, what conventional war did the post WW2 RAF Bomber Command participate in ?
Sounds like a sort of apple to oranges comparison .
British forces have not really enjoyed any peace since 1939)
and I'm sure the debate will centre on that. I was just correcting one of the background issues raised as a possible reason for low accident rates was their non-involvement in conflictsI thought the subject was SAC and RAF Strike command during the early cold war, not all British aerial components post WW2 to now.
British forces have not really enjoyed any peace since 1939)
Dunno. probably not. Moreover, some of the conflicts the US got involved in are major affairs ....like VietnamHave US Forces (since 1941) ?