Opinions On This Article I Found About The Zero

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The Zero design brought nothing new to the table, the reason it had excellent performance at the start of the war was simply because it wasn't a war plane, what I mean by that is it had no armor protection or self sealing tanks, no pilot protection, no comms gear and weak guns, all the things a war plane needs...

Honda Minoru, a very successful IJNAF fighter pilot, agrees. In an interview he stated the Zero was designed for aerobatics and wasn't a true warplane. Pertaining to the lack of armor he said "No one goes to war in a bathing suit!"
 
I disagree with many of his statements.

1) Armament: The thought of using the MG to fire and , when hits were observed, switch to cannons, is malarkey. The two guns did NOT have anywhere near similar ballistics. At anything more than very short ranges, if the MG was hitting, the cannons would miss. The sheer number of Allied planes the Zero shot down early in the war shows this is simply not true.

2) Horikoshi didn't leave out self-sealing tanks because he thought nobody would put bullets into the airplane. He left them out because the IJN specified a particular performance and you can't GET that performance with what is essentially a 1,000 hp engine without being very light. Also, it was expected that the IJN would have air superiority and, at least early-on up to maybe halfway through the war, they did. The A6M5 Model 52 Zero has less than 1,200 HP but performs much better than that.

3) The paragraph about thin elevator cables that stretched a bit and flexible torque tube are entertaining, but the cables are standard control cables. The Planes of Fame flies one (A6M5 Model 52) and that is simply not true. Flexibility in a control system, DOES result in flutter.

4) Tactics that included a kind of sideways loop with square turns baffled American pilots? Really? Bunk. Our planes simply could not turn as tightly as a Zero at low to medium airspeeds and we had to develop our own tactics to combat the Zero's low - medium speed maneuverability. At high speed, our planes out-turned the Zero.

5) The thought that the Zero "can't finish" is laughable. Go look at the 1944 Fighter Conference report. They tested some 29 airplanes and the Zero was the ONLY one that didn't break down the entire conference in over 160 flying hours. Did the Zero get superceeded? Yes. Almost every 1939 airplane did. Was it still good in 1945. Yes.

I'd say this article has good writing style but wanders into false claims about design, features, and employment. The main issues were related to insufficient pilot training during the war, lack of good radios, and armament limitations. By the end of the war, the average Zero pilot was a rookie, still had few cannon rounds (125 instead of 60), and had an extra 13.7 mm MG in each wing and one in the nose. But the ballistics of the MG and cannon were still not the same. So, the initial weaknesses remained, though not as great. But, the 1945 Zero was still deadly in capable hands. Unfortunately for Japan, there weren't that many veteran Zero pilots available in 1945.
 
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LOL! Something weird is going on with the internet in my area.

Hey Shortround6 and GrauGeist,

None of the aircraft that the combatants designed in the late-1930s (and/or mid-1930s) were designed with armour or SSFT (I think). And none of them were fitted with armour or SSFT until after the start of hostilities in the Spring of 1940 (I think). The F4F-3 and SBD(-2?) were still not equipped with SSFT (I think) a year and a half later on 7 December 1941 - I know neither were DESIGNED with armour or SSFT. The Buffalo also was not DESIGNED with armour or SSFT - did they have either when they first entered service?

Did the Me109s have pilot armour or SSFT at the start of the BoF?

The Me109 and Spitfire were significantly faster, and this is really the only significant DESIGN advantage that the other combatants had over the Zero when they were designed, unless you consider some to have more growth potential (maybe?).

The Japanese could have added armour and SSFT to the A6M2 if they had chosen to, and had time and manufacturing capacity. The main effects would have been to reduce max ROA by about 20%, and speed by a few mph - maneuverability and climb would have been reduced to about that of the Spitfire (II?).

I believe that if you follow the process I outlined above you will find that, although a few of the other DESIGNs were ahead of the A6M in a couple of areas, none were particularly superior in any overall sense at the start of hostilities.

Hi

I think a rough 'timeline' of first flight dates will give a general picture of 'design' date:

P36 (Model 75) - April 1935.
Bf 109 - Sept 1935.
Hurricane - Nov. 1935.
Spitfire - March 1936.
F4F Wildcat - Sept. 1937.
Buffalo - Dec. 1937.
P 40 - Oct. 1938.
Ki-43 - January 1939.
P-38 - Feb. 1939.
A6M Zero - April 1939.
P-39 - April 1939.
FW 190 - June 1939.

For example the A6M was a 'newer' design by 3 years than the Spitfire, that was a long period in the 1930s.
On 'armour' for aircraft it depends on what is meant, for example the British Deputy Director of Aircraft Production reported on 26th July 1939 that: "To date 189 Hurricanes are fully fitted [Front] armoured at Units [Squadrons]."

Front armour was thought necessary as they were to attack bomber formations when defending Britain, not 'dog fight', and needed protection from the bomber's defensive armament. When it was decided to send an expeditionary force to France (in 1939) the Hurricanes for that force were given priority for rear armour, a RAF report of 29 August 1939 after a visit to Hawker Aircraft at Kingston states:

"...the firm most helpful and promptly sent over a draughtsman to Brooklands with us. Before tea we had cardboard templates cut out and a very reasonable scheme approved."

Getting armour plate produced and delivered in the amount needed was a problem. (see 'Knights of the Skies' by Michael C. Fox, for details). This does mean that armour plate was proposed prior to the war starting.

Mike
 
Hey MikeMeech,

Interesting about the Hurricane. Do you have any further info on just what armour was fitted to the Hurricanes for front protection? I would assume it includes a bullet resistant windshield panel, but I have not run across any other info to date. I would be interested to know (placement, weight, if/when actually installed, etc.).

As far as I know (and I realize that this could be wrong) the Hurricanes initially sent to France for the BOF started out with no rear pilot armour, but it began to be added shortly after hostilities began in earnest (I know, another fuzzy definition).

Hey MikeMeech, Shortround6, GrauGeist, and others,

I agree it is a rough timeline, but I do not think this changes the validity of my statement to any serious degree.

IMO the design of the A6M compares well in capabilities to most of the other mid- to late-1930s designs. The Japanese 'simply' did not manage to incorporate improvements into the design quickly enough. If the Japanese had the industrial resources and 130 grade fuel the Sakae xx could have been putting out 1300 BHP (or more) by mid-1942. This would have allowed a Vmax of about 350 mph. The addition of comparable armour (150-200 lbs) would have cost less than 1 lb/ft2 increase in wing loading. The actual cost in weight for SSFT is debatable (depending on the type and level of protection) but there is no reason for it to cost any more than about 1 lb/ft2 increase in wing loading. While the 1.5-2 lb/ft2 increase in wing loading would have affected the maneuverability of the A6M, it still would have handily out maneuvered its opponents at lower speeds. IMO the inability to roll quickly at higher speeds would have been the most difficult design problem to overcome, but even that was relatively easily doable if the time and resources had been available.

The overall small size was also a problem, as it limited room for growth, but I do not know how serious this would have been. I would welcome any input on this, if not in this thread then another?
 
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Armament: The thought of using the MG to fire and , when hits were observed, switch to cannons, is malarkey. The two guns did NOT have anywhere near similar ballistics. AT anything more than very short ranges, if the MG was hitting, the cannons would miss. The sheer number of Allied planes the Zero shot down early in the war shows this is simply not true.

During the battle of Midway the carriers decks were kept clear so CAP A6M's could land, rearm with cannon ammunition and rejoin the fight as quickly as possible, such was the pilots opinion of the effectiveness of the two MG's. As per Shattered Sword, the ''remarkable design'' of the Zero dictated the IJN's carrier tactics, I will have to read up on it but from what I remember it was to the negative, not positive.
 
5) The thought that the Zero "can't finish" is laughable. Go look at the 1944 Fighter Conference report. They tested some 29 airplanes and the Zero was the ONLY one that didn't break down the entire conference in over 160 flying hours

A 1980 vehicle if built in 2020 would be more reliable than a 2020 vehicle built today, the reason is the 2020 vehicle has ten times the performance, and that performance comes at a price. By Western/European standards the A6M was a very basic airplane.
 
Interesting about the Hurricane. Do you have any further info on just what armour was fitted to the Hurricanes for front protection? I would assume it includes a bullet resistant windshield panel, but I have not run across any other info to date. I would be interested to know (placement, weight, if/when actually installed, etc.).

As far as I know (and I realize that this could be wrong) the Hurricanes initially sent to France for the BOF started out with no rear pilot armour, but it began to be added shortly after hostilities began in earnest (I know, another fuzzy definition).

Front armour protection in the Hurricane was fitted on all production aircraft from mid August 1939 onward. Kits fitted to existing aircraft were being produced about a month before that. The protection consisted of:
  • a 1.5-inch armoured glass windscreen
  • a 10-swg duraluminium sheet over the fuselage petrol tank
  • a 4-mm armoured bulkhead forward of the fuselage petrol tank

Rear armour protection was fitted on all production aircraft from late February 1940 onward. Kits were produced to fit to existing Hurricanes in November 1939. This protection consisted of:
  • a 9-mm armour plate behind the pilot's head
  • three 4.5-mm amour plates behind the pilot's seat (not overlapping)

By the time the Germans invaded in May 1940 all Hurricanes in France had been fitted with front and rear armour for some time.
 
Front armour protection in the Hurricane was fitted on all production aircraft from mid August 1939 onward. Kits fitted to existing aircraft were being produced about a month before that. The protection consisted of:
  • a 1.5-inch armoured glass windscreen
  • a 10-swg duraluminium sheet over the fuselage petrol tank
  • a 4-mm armoured bulkhead forward of the fuselage petrol tank

Rear armour protection was fitted on all production aircraft from late February 1940 onward. Kits were produced to fit to existing Hurricanes in November 1939. This protection consisted of:
  • a 9-mm armour plate behind the pilot's head
  • three 4.5-mm amour plates behind the pilot's seat (not overlapping)

By the time the Germans invaded in May 1940 all Hurricanes in France had been fitted with front and rear armour for some time.

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And all Me 109 got armor before the BoB
 
Hey Pat303,

The Zero had fire bottles behind the pilot to flood the wings should the tanks get holed. It had a switch on the throttle to change among cannons, MG, or both, it had trim for all flying surfaces and a constant-speed propeller. The engine was reliable and the gunsight was as good as any when the Zero came out. The gear was retractable and fully enclosed, unlike the Spitfire and Bf 109, and it climbed better than most European fighters of the time, had WAY better range, and was MUCH more maneuverable at low and medium speeds.

In what way would you call it "basic?" It has everything the best in the world had, including a radio, and beat the tar out of everything, including Spitfires, early in the war. Once the veteran pilots started began to dwindle and the new, green pilots started showing up, the Zero lost a lot of mystique when confronting veteran Allied pilots in later airplanes ... but not when a veteran pilot was driving the Zero. In August of 1945, you'd still get shot down if you took it lightly. The same can be said of the Bf 109, which was even more basic than the A6M Zero in many aspects. The Bf 109 didn't even have rudder trim, and you could see forward out of a Zero one heck of a lot better than out of a Bf 109.

The Planes of Fame has both and the Messerschmitt (actually Ha.11121 Buchon) is soon to be back flying. I've seen both up close, personal and inside, including helping repair / restore both, and the Zero stands up very well against a Bf 109 for workmanship and features.

But, that is just my opinion. Your mileage may vary, and that's OK. Cheers.
 
A 1980 vehicle if built in 2020 would be more reliable than a 2020 vehicle built today, the reason is the 2020 vehicle has ten times the performance, and that performance comes at a price.

I'm not so sure that is true. While there have been huge leaps in performance, there have also been huge leaps in reliability. I don't think this is a zero sum situation...

Is a modern 700HP auto engine that much less reliable than an modern 70HP auto engine?

Just a thought.
 
And all Me 109 got armor before the BoB

It would be interesting to get data on this from the German side. According to crash surveys of 109s in Britain they were definitely not all armoured before the battle began. Broadly looking at the period of July-November 1940 the usual protection seen on the 109 was the 8-mm bulkhead 5-ft behind the pilot seat and the 8-mm piece behind the pilot's head. Sometimes fitted was the additional curved piece of pilot armour and/or the 2.5-inch armoured glass. Rarely seen was a self-sealing fuel tank.

I don't think the British note an armoured seat in a 109 until the F.
 
A well tuned '79 BMW 320i will carve up a canyon road just as well as any 2020 sports car if it's in the hands of the right driver.

Plenty of cases presented so far, of Japanese aces handing Allied pilots their ass late in the war flying the A6M.

As stated before, Lt. Nichizawa (nicknamed the "Devil") would engage and down F6F Hellcats with his A6M5.
There is no question that the A6M's design was long in the tooth by 1944, but it was still a very capable aircraft in the hands of a veteran pilot.
 
It would be interesting to get data on this from the German side. According to crash surveys of 109s in Britain they were definitely not all armoured before the battle began

All E-4's, the front line model in the BoB were fitted with seat and back armor as well as armored windscreens, the unarmored models found in your survey could have been second tier squadron E-1 or E-3' s?.
 
Our opinions have made for a good discussion.
Honestly, I was a little worried a flame war was going to break out after reading some of the comments here 😂 But honestly I think I walked away with some cool new knowledge on the Reisen and its contemporaries. Thanks all :)
 
The writing of a USN ace, with two A6Ms to his credit, who actually flew both the A6M2 and the A6M5, this written in response to a 1980s inquiry from a fellow retired admiral:

21 Feb 1981

Dear Jim,

Hope all these pages will not be discouraging and that they will satisfy some of your interest in the Japanese Zero Model 21 about which you wrote me in your letter of 14 Feb. It's a subject near and dear to me, for there was a time when I considered that Zero "my airplane" with only John Crommelin (on occasion) to say nay. So, if this reply is prolix, you can blame it on unbridled sentiment.

After the Zero's demise I was able to corral a few surviving pieces, such as:

Left wing tip, the folding part complete with locking device, wiring, port running light
Pedestal mounting longitudinal and lateral trim wheels
Manifold pressure gauge – units in centimeters, q at sea level pressure, low reading –40, hi reading +25
Airspeed gauge – units in knots. Non linear scale is stretched in the low speed range – excellent for landing approach
Few pictures of the beauty in Hangar 40, North Island.

All the above remain with me except the pedestal, which remains, unlocated since moving out of quarters. Search continues. All will probably go to a worthy museum in due course; I'm not finished with them yet. {My note: All parts were donated to the US Navy Museum at Anacostia NAS circa 1985. Wish he had asked me first, but at least I have the pictures.}

There was a 2-day delay in getting started on this reply waiting while the Naval Safety Center searched for data on the Zero mishap. It was a futile wait. I am informed with impressive finality that the mishap was not reported or recorded in any surviving format the Safety Center possesses. That means we shall have to do with my recollections – or those of J.G. Crommelin if you care to pursue it farther.

I, too, saw this Zero as a pile of salvage at NAS San Diego – in the balloon barn. The A & R did a beautiful job of restoration. At that time, I was freshly back form Midway as a CV-5 survivor. I left for Pearl & SW Pac in Oct '42 so couldn't follow developments as it was being rebuilt. By the time I returned from SW Pac in July 1943, the Zero had been long gone to the east coast. It went to Tactical Air Intelligence Center (TAIC) and base at Anacostia. After F.M. Trapnell and a number of other worthies such as "Boogie" H. {My note: This would be Melvin Carl Hoffman, a pre-war NAP, commissioned in 1942 and retired, I believe, a captain.} tested, compared, & evaluated it, the Army put it through similar paces.

From Aug 1943 to 4 Nov 1944 I was VF training officer staff ComFltAir West Coast and assistant to Jim Flatley through most of that time until he went to work for Marc Mitscher in TF-58. He was relieved by John Crommelin. While working for Flatley I learned that the Zero still at Anacostia was flyable but in a state of disuse. We got some pressure up (you remember J. H. Flatley, Jr.!) and got the machine ferried out to Hangar 40 North Island, our office and general hangout. The Zero was in dire need of attention and care and got it.

All this took time and I'm not sure the plane could be flown before Jim went out to the Fast Carriers. My log shows what must have been one of the earliest flights in our custody – 14 Sep 1944. Several hops later my log show 21 Oct – "Flight with J.G. Crommelin – he in FM-2 – pretty even." My last hop in this Zero was 25 Oct 44. On 4 Nov., as a result of the long reach of J. Thach, I was flying to Ulithi to go to work for him on J.S. McCain's TF-38 staff. Sometime during my absence, the Zero received strike damage because when I returned to Coronado for a few weeks in Feb 1945 the wreckage of the Koga Zero was piled up in Hangar 40. My guess is that the mishap occurred in Jan or Feb 1945. Grief over this was short lived – we got a beautiful low-time Zero, model 52, captured on Guam and I got some mightily interesting flights in this bird, but that's another story.

As to the Zero 21, I believe most of my information comes from John Crommelin concerning its loss. Since his brother, Richard, was involved he had more than casual interest in the mishap. Dick, a friend, classmate from USNA, classmate Pensacola, room mate almost a year while we were in VF-42, Yorktown, was headed West with his squadron, VF-88, and they were in San Diego for transportation. As C.O., but also with John seeing to Dick's education, it was logical he should get a Zero hop. On taxiing out for this hop, Dick was overtaken by an airplane, SB2C-4, which has miserable vision ahead when in the 3-point attitude. The "Beast" just sawed its way through the Zero from tail to cockpit stopping just short of Dick. Truly, it as a tragedy for the machine, but a miracle for Dick. Pity we later lost him over Hokkaido on one of our last TF-38 strikes of the war.

As to the Zero 21, it was a mighty sweet machine even in its superannuated state. As you noted, the refined aerodynamic design was not compromised by mass production. Fit and finish of all plates, rivets, the close and accurate fit of fairings, engine cowl, access plates, canopy and wheel doors was most faithfully executed. The propeller spinner faired into a cowling that smoothed the contours of the reduction gear housing of the engine. The interior and dynamics of the engine cowling permitted the adequate cooling of the 2-row 14-cylinder engine with a remarkably small intake area. Contrast that with the intake area in an F4F-3/4, which originally came with a spinner but had to sacrifice it to cure engine over-heat problems. The Sakai engine looked and sounded like our 1830. It ran smoothly and cool. Displacement was somewhat less than the P&W 1830, but its 1130 HP was smooth and adequate. It was not supercharged as extremely as the R-1830-86/86 and at very high altitude (>30,000) compared very poorly with the P&W, but we hardly ever encountered Zeroes above 10,000 feet with our F4F-3/4 so we were carrying supercharger hardware as extra baggage. The F4F-5, which became the FM-2, was re-engined with the Wright 1820 with about the same power as the R-1830, but much less supercharger. This was a better machine to fight Zeroes, but we didn't get it in squadrons until 1944 and by that time the Zero was not the problem it had been in the beginning.

By the time I was flying the Zero 21 it may have had some automatic systems disabled. An example is the automatic altitude compensation of carburetor mixture. First time I went for altitude it began to cut up disgracefully above 5000 feet. Pretty much worried the engine was giving up, I tried one or two things. Mixture came to mind. On this machine full rich was is a rearward position of the mixture control, manual lean comes by easing this control forward. On gingerly doing this the engine smoothed up beautifully and the machine jumped ahead with about 500 more horses.

Prop was auto hydraulic cum Hamilton – no mysteries. We ran the engine as though it as an 1830, but did not let RPM go above 2600.

The case of the manifold pressure gauge has been cracked in the crash on Akutan and leaked. It was left in the instrument panel but we used a standard AN type attacked to a bracket nearby. I later repaired the original gauge and used it for automotive tuning; I now keep it sheltered with other keepsakes but it's a good gauge once you are accustomed to its readings. {My note: at one time in my misspent youth I drove a 1966 GTO which had this manifold pressure gauge mounted in it.}

The throttle sat in the quadrant outboard of the mixture control. It was shaped like the handle of a knife – complete with wood side plates for contour. It was about 5 inches long and on the top had a switch to be operated by the left thumb. This switch was for cutting in or out your 20 mm cannon. Zero carried many rounds of 7.7 mm for the two fixed fuselage guns and only 80-100 for each of the 20 mm wing guns. Ergo, sight in with 7.7 then cut in the 2 20's for telling shots. I dimly remember there was a trigger lever you could pull back up and squeeze on the front edge of the throttle. If you were not in combat, this lever would drop down where inadvertent firing was precluded (remember we had sad events because our trigger in the stick was easily squeezed in excitement).

Cockpit was not so tidy as the F4F but easily as tidy as the early F4U and earlier Vought birds. Instruments were much like ours but metric for pressure, temperatures, altitude. As I mentioned, airspeed was in knots. It had an inner and outer scale as the needle needed to go around about 1½ circles to get to the high end of the scale. In the Zero-52 there was an exhaust temperature gauge as well as the usual cylinder head temp. My guess us that it was a refinement to fine tune the mixture to get the remarkable endurance and range the Zero was famous for. Gyro horizon had a sky blue upper half like some German WWII instruments I have seen. To the envy of every F4F pilot, the landing gear was hydraulic actuated! Tail wheel fully retracted behind tight doors. Tail hook faired into a recess along the keel. The hook was hinged on the end of its strut; catched in the snatch position to catch the wire then dumped so the Zero could taxi forward over other wires unimpeded. Understand we toyed with this idea but gave it up because of worries it might misbehave and cause unarrested landings. Brakes were hydraulic – weak. The wide tread and relatively low landing speed favored weak brakes, so you might say they were adequate. Rudder bar was center pivoted with stirrups for each foot. Brakes were actuated by a hand lever; rudder angle determined which wheel received the braking action.

The canopy gave a beautiful view of the outside world, noticeably good to the rear in contrast to our VF. The enclosure was made up of many panes of plexi, some contoured. Wind noise was moderate. Some of the enclosure had been destroyed and was remade by A & R. The windscreen section was original, for it bore deep craters from the corrosion that took place during its dip into the marsh of Akutan. These cavities would have a way of coming into focus when air speeds built up. I often wondered why they had not been replaced by A & R. In VF-42 we had had some nasty experiences with the original F4F windscreens blowing in on us when Vi > 300 kt. Grumman corrected it with a beef up that robbed us of valuable forward vision, but it ended the problem. Zero had no such heavy structure in the first place so it was a source of uneasiness.

We encountered a serious problem just before our first flights from North Island, in Sep. 1944. Someone had blabbed and J. H. Flatley and I found ourselves invited to an audience with CFWC {My note: Commander Fleet Air West Coast}, RAdm W. K. Harrill. Seems he was dealing with an Army type who claimed that flying a Zero around San Diego would wreck the integrity of the West Coast Air Defense. His solution: ban flights now and forever. As a fall back: permit flights, but only on prior notice as to times and location and always in formation with another VF. For this contretemps W. K. Harrill was superb (so was the counsel of J. H. Flatley, Jr.!). He directed Zero flights only in the immediate vicinity of North Is., and if not reported after a few flights, then loosen the tether. Upshot was that there were no reports and we ended flying this machine when – where – and as we wished.

Zero 21 had no primer for engine starting. The carburetor had a large capacity acceleration pump you could feel when you moved the throttle. To start, you had the mech wind up the inertial starter as you wobbled up fuel pressure and worked the throttle 2-3 times to spray in the discharge of the acceleration pump. On contact the engine rolled over readily, caught, and picked up to run without complaint. The carburetor barrel had an oil hacker through which circulated lube oil to combat any tendency to form ice. I'm not sure whether it was always in action or selectable from the cockpit. We never touched it, as I remember, seems to be a tidy way to handle ice and cool oil.

Well Jim, I hope all these words have not dampened your interest. The account applies mostly to Koga's Zero Model 21. In Feb-March 1945 I had a dandy low time, fresh caught (Guam) Zero 52 to fly. It was much like the 21, but heavier because of 2 more 20 mm guns. It had a hundred or so more horses, ejection type exhaust stacks, but flew essentially like the model 21, very sweet. On 5 Apr 45 I had to return to the wars in W.Pac with J. Thach, McCain & Co and so ended my Zero flying.

These machines had ersatz Bureau Numbers, arbitrary, I believe:

Zero 21 = 4593 Jap designation A6M2 or Zero Model 21
Zero 52 = 5357 " " A6M5 " " " 52


There is the usual story that I believe: John Crommelin, on first take-off in Z 21, slow rolled climbing out wheels coming up – just to make sure it realized the old master was in charge.

Well, Admiral, your trust that I have been behaving as befits a retired naval aviator is well placed. It's quite a change, but bearable – happily busy with it.

We have no complaints. Children are great. We plan to make a career of this.

END

There was another write up he did for Jim Rearden's "Koga's Zero - The Fighter that Changed World War II," later republished with the less golly-gee-whiz title of "Cracking the Zero Mystery," which I've around here somewhere, I'll see if I can find it. My version is the rough draft of what he wrote for Rearden, so it is slightly different from what one might find in the book, and as I recall, repeats a lot of the above. He also made some comments on the A6M2 as a development design, but without the document I won't put words in his mouth.

Rich
 
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The writing of a USN ace, with two A6Ms to his credit, who actually flew both the A6M2 and the A6M5, this written in response to a 1980s inquiry from a fellow retired admiral:

21 Feb 1981

Dear Jim,

Hope all these pages will not be discouraging and that they will satisfy some of your interest in the Japanese Zero Model 21 about which you wrote me in your letter of 14 Feb. It's a subject near and dear to me, for there was a time when I considered that Zero "my airplane" with only John Crommelin (on occasion) to say nay. So, if this reply is prolix, you can blame it on unbridled sentiment.

After the Zero's demise I was able to corral a few surviving pieces, such as:

Left wing tip, the folding part complete with locking device, wiring, port running light
Pedestal mounting longitudinal and lateral trim wheels
Manifold pressure gauge – units in centimeters, q at sea level pressure, low reading –40, hi reading +25
Airspeed gauge – units in knots. Non linear scale is stretched in the low speed range – excellent for landing approach
Few pictures of the beauty in Hangar 40, North Island.

All the above remain with me except the pedestal, which remains, unlocated since moving out of quarters. Search continues. All will probably go to a worthy museum in due course; I'm not finished with them yet. {My note: All parts were donated to the US Navy Museum at Anacostia NAS circa 1985. Wish he had asked me first, but at least I have the pictures.}

There was a 2-day delay in getting started on this reply waiting while the Naval Safety Center searched for data on the Zero mishap. It was a futile wait. I am informed with impressive finality that the mishap was not reported or recorded in any surviving format the Safety Center possesses. That means we shall have to do with my recollections – or those of J.G. Crommelin if you care to pursue it farther.

I, too, saw this Zero as a pile of salvage at NAS San Diego – in the balloon barn. The A & R did a beautiful job of restoration. At that time, I was freshly back form Midway as a CV-5 survivor. I left for Pearl & SW Pac in Oct '42 so couldn't follow developments as it was being rebuilt. By the time I returned from SW Pac in July 1943, the Zero had been long gone to the east coast. It went to Tactical Air Intelligence Center (TAIC) and base at Anacostia. After F.M. Trapnell and a number of other worthies such as "Boogie" H. {My note: This would be Melvin Carl Hoffman, a pre-war NAP, commissioned in 1942 and retired, I believe, a captain.} tested, compared, & evaluated it, the Army put it through similar paces.

From Aug 1943 to 4 Nov 1944 I was VF training officer staff ComFltAir West Coast and assistant to Jim Flatley through most of that time until he went to work for Marc Mitscher in TF-58. He was relieved by John Crommelin. While working for Flatley I learned that the Zero still at Anacostia was flyable but in a state of disuse. We got some pressure up (you remember J. H. Flatley, Jr.!) and got the machine ferried out to Hangar 40 North Island, our office and general hangout. The Zero was in dire need of attention and care and got it.

All this took time and I'm not sure the plane could be flown before Jim went out to the Fast Carriers. My log shows what must have been one of the earliest flights in our custody – 14 Sep 1944. Several hops later my log show 21 Oct – "Flight with J.G. Crommelin – he in FM-2 – pretty even." My last hop in this Zero was 25 Oct 44. On 4 Nov., as a result of the long reach of J. Thach, I was flying to Ulithi to go to work for him on J.S. McCain's TF-38 staff. Sometime during my absence, the Zero received strike damage because when I returned to Coronado for a few weeks in Feb 1945 the wreckage of the Koga Zero was piled up in Hangar 40. My guess is that the mishap occurred in Jan or Feb 1945. Grief over this was short lived – we got a beautiful low-time Zero, model 52, captured on Guam and I got some mightily interesting flights in this bird, but that's another story.

As to the Zero 21, I believe most of my information comes from John Crommelin concerning its loss. Since his brother, Richard, was involved he had more than casual interest in the mishap. Dick, a friend, classmate from USNA, classmate Pensacola, room mate almost a year while we were in VF-42, Yorktown, was headed West with his squadron, VF-88, and they were in San Diego for transportation. As C.O., but also with John seeing to Dick's education, it was logical he should get a Zero hop. On taxiing out for this hop, Dick was overtaken by an airplane, SB2C-4, which has miserable vision ahead when in the 3-point attitude. The "Beast" just sawed its way through the Zero from tail to cockpit stopping just short of Dick. Truly, it as a tragedy for the machine, but a miracle for Dick. Pity we later lost him over Hokkaido on one of our last TF-38 strikes of the war.

As to the Zero 21, it was a mighty sweet machine even in its superannuated state. As you noted, the refined aerodynamic design was not compromised by mass production. Fit and finish of all plates, rivets, the close and accurate fit of fairings, engine cowl, access plates, canopy and wheel doors was most faithfully executed. The propeller spinner faired into a cowling that smoothed the contours of the reduction gear housing of the engine. The interior and dynamics of the engine cowling permitted the adequate cooling of the 2-row 14-cylinder engine with a remarkably small intake area. Contrast that with the intake area in an F4F-3/4, which originally came with a spinner but had to sacrifice it to cure engine over-heat problems. The Sakai engine looked and sounded like our 1830. It ran smoothly and cool. Displacement was somewhat less than the P&W 1830, but its 1130 HP was smooth and adequate. It was not supercharged as extremely as the R-1830-86/86 and at very high altitude (>30,000) compared very poorly with the P&W, but we hardly ever encountered Zeroes above 10,000 feet with our F4F-3/4 so we were carrying supercharger hardware as extra baggage. The F4F-5, which became the FM-2, was re-engined with the Wright 1820 with about the same power as the R-1830, but much less supercharger. This was a better machine to fight Zeroes, but we didn't get it in squadrons until 1944 and by that time the Zero was not the problem it had been in the beginning.

By the time I was flying the Zero 21 it may have had some automatic systems disabled. An example is the automatic altitude compensation of carburetor mixture. First time I went for altitude it began to cut up disgracefully above 5000 feet. Pretty much worried the engine was giving up, I tried one or two things. Mixture came to mind. On this machine full rich was is a rearward position of the mixture control, manual lean comes by easing this control forward. On gingerly doing this the engine smoothed up beautifully and the machine jumped ahead with about 500 more horses.

Prop was auto hydraulic cum Hamilton – no mysteries. We ran the engine as though it as an 1830, but did not let RPM go above 2600.

The case of the manifold pressure gauge has been cracked in the crash on Akutan and leaked. It was left in the instrument panel but we used a standard AN type attacked to a bracket nearby. I later repaired the original gauge and used it for automotive tuning; I now keep it sheltered with other keepsakes but it's a good gauge once you are accustomed to its readings. {My note: at one time in my misspent youth I drove a 1966 GTO which had this manifold pressure gauge mounted in it.}

The throttle sat in the quadrant outboard of the mixture control. It was shaped like the handle of a knife – complete with wood side plates for contour. It was about 5 inches long and on the top had a switch to be operated by the left thumb. This switch was for cutting in or out your 20 mm cannon. Zero carried many rounds of 7.7 mm for the two fixed fuselage guns and only 80-100 for each of the 20 mm wing guns. Ergo, sight in with 7.7 then cut in the 2 20's for telling shots. I dimly remember there was a trigger lever you could pull back up and squeeze on the front edge of the throttle. If you were not in combat, this lever would drop down where inadvertent firing was precluded (remember we had sad events because our trigger in the stick was easily squeezed in excitement).

Cockpit was not so tidy as the F4F but easily as tidy as the early F4U and earlier Vought birds. Instruments were much like ours but metric for pressure, temperatures, altitude. As I mentioned, airspeed was in knots. It had an inner and outer scale as the needle needed to go around about 1½ circles to get to the high end of the scale. In the Zero-52 there was an exhaust temperature gauge as well as the usual cylinder head temp. My guess us that it was a refinement to fine tune the mixture to get the remarkable endurance and range the Zero was famous for. Gyro horizon had a sky blue upper half like some German WWII instruments I have seen. To the envy of every F4F pilot, the landing gear was hydraulic actuated! Tail wheel fully retracted behind tight doors. Tail hook faired into a recess along the keel. The hook was hinged on the end of its strut; catched in the snatch position to catch the wire then dumped so the Zero could taxi forward over other wires unimpeded. Understand we toyed with this idea but gave it up because of worries it might misbehave and cause unarrested landings. Brakes were hydraulic – weak. The wide tread and relatively low landing speed favored weak brakes, so you might say they were adequate. Rudder bar was center pivoted with stirrups for each foot. Brakes were actuated by a hand lever; rudder angle determined which wheel received the braking action.

The canopy gave a beautiful view of the outside world, noticeably good to the rear in contrast to our VF. The enclosure was made up of many panes of plexi, some contoured. Wind noise was moderate. Some of the enclosure had been destroyed and was remade by A & R. The windscreen section was original, for it bore deep craters from the corrosion that took place during its dip into the marsh of Akutan. These cavities would have a way of coming into focus when air speeds built up. I often wondered why they had not been replaced by A & R. In VF-42 we had had some nasty experiences with the original F4F windscreens blowing in on us when Vi > 300 kt. Grumman corrected it with a beef up that robbed us of valuable forward vision, but it ended the problem. Zero had no such heavy structure in the first place so it was a source of uneasiness.

We encountered a serious problem just before our first flights from North Island, in Sep. 1944. Someone had blabbed and J. H. Flatley and I found ourselves invited to an audience with CFWC {My note: Commander Fleet Air West Coast}, RAdm W. K. Harrill. Seems he was dealing with an Army type who claimed that flying a Zero around San Diego would wreck the integrity of the West Coast Air Defense. His solution: ban flights now and forever. As a fall back: permit flights, but only on prior notice as to times and location and always in formation with another VF. For this contretemps W. K. Harrill was superb (so was the counsel of J. H. Flatley, Jr.!). He directed Zero flights only in the immediate vicinity of North Is., and if not reported after a few flights, then loosen the tether. Upshot was that there were no reports and we ended flying this machine when – where – and as we wished.

Zero 21 had no primer for engine starting. The carburetor had a large capacity acceleration pump you could feel when you moved the throttle. To start, you had the mech wind up the inertial starter as you wobbled up fuel pressure and worked the throttle 2-3 times to spray in the discharge of the acceleration pump. On contact the engine rolled over readily, caught, and picked up to run without complaint. The carburetor barrel had an oil hacker through which circulated lube oil to combat any tendency to form ice. I'm not sure whether it was always in action or selectable from the cockpit. We never touched it, as I remember, seems to be a tidy way to handle ice and cool oil.

Well Jim, I hope all these words have not dampened your interest. The account applies mostly to Koga's Zero Model 21. In Feb-March 1945 I had a dandy low time, fresh caught (Guam) Zero 52 to fly. It was much like the 21, but heavier because of 2 more 20 mm guns. It had a hundred or so more horses, ejection type exhaust stacks, but flew essentially like the model 21, very sweet. On 5 Apr 45 I had to return to the wars in W.Pac with J. Thach, McCain & Co and so ended my Zero flying.

These machines had ersatz Bureau Numbers, arbitrary, I believe:

Zero 21 = 4593 Jap designation A6M2 or Zero Model 21
Zero 52 = 5357 " " A6M5 " " " 52


There is the usual story that I believe: John Crommelin, on first take-off in Z 21, slow rolled climbing out wheels coming up – just to make sure it realized the old master was in charge.

Well, Admiral, your trust that I have been behaving as befits a retired naval aviator is well placed. It's quite a change, but bearable – happily busy with it.

We have no complaints. Children are great. We plan to make a career of this.

END

There was another write up he did for Jim Rearden's "Koga's Zero - The Fighter that Changed World War II," later republished with the less golly-gee-whiz title of "Cracking the Zero Mystery," which I've around here somewhere, I'll see if I can find it. My version is the rough draft of what he wrote for Rearden, so it is slightly different from what one might find in the book, and as I recall, repeats a lot of the above. He also made some comments on the A6M2 as a development design, but without the document I won't put words in his mouth.

Rich
Thank you for sharing this with us :)
 

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