P-51 against the 109

GregP said:

In WWII "Faggot" meant cigarette.

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A Faggot is a bundle of sticks, Faggots is also a meat dish made of minced pork. Fag in WWII Britain meant and still does mean a cigarette, it was also used in the US to mean cigarette up till about WWI. Fag as in the US meaning is from the Yiddish Faygeleh meaning effeminate or girlish. You would have a job getting a faggot to light

Since the Nazi government is extinct and Messerschmitt is still around, I'd say official documents from Messerschmitt with "Me 109" alongside "Bf 109" make either one as "official" as it gets. Either one is "correct.

The B-1 is "officially" the "Lancer," but NOBODY calls it that. It's a "Bone," which is derived from B-one. The A-10 is the Thunderbolt II, but will be the Warthog forever.

For most people today, including Germans, the 109 is called the Me 109. Most would recognize the Bf 109, but not all ... unless the name Messerschmitt was in front of it. If they're aircraft buffs, as we are, they'd recognize it well enough.

an interesting post i read yesterday. you always hear the claims of the p 51s flooding the skies. here's a story that is quite the opposite.

taken from
69 years ago: Back to Berlin with the 4th and 357th FGs | Flat Spins and Milk Runs

On March 4, 1944

Don Gentile had what he described as a "hairy" day. "I took off with my wingman Johnny Godfrey, and the rest of the flight was to join me, but due to weather we never met," he wrote in an account found on the back of his log book.

They broke overcast at 33,000 feet after flying instruments for an hour. "After being on course for a couple hours still no one joined us, so we decided to continue on alone. When we were approximately 100 miles from the target the weather seemed to clear up as if you would take a knife and cut it. In the distance I spotted approximately 50 Do 217s in formation climbing for altitude and above them were about 100 Fw 190s. They were getting ready to attack the 'Big Boys' head on. I called Johnny and asked him if he wanted to go ahead and attack knowing there were no other friendly fighters in this area. So, as usual, Johnny said 'You're the boss.'"

Gentile went for the Do 217s, hoping to disrupt their formation so the bombers could unload before the German fighters could get reorganized. "I began firing at tail end 'Charlie' and the Do's started diving for the deck. About this time Johnny started screaming that the 100-plus Fw's were coming down on us The Do's were cross-firing on us at the same time. I had one Do smoking badly when I had to break away due to the 100+ coming in on us. Johnny and I met them head on going through the complete German formation; from then on all hell broke loose," said Gentile.

"Planes were going up and down and every which way. I thought this was it. In the midst of twisting and turning I managed to get on an Fw, who overshot me, and was lucky enough to get him. Johnny started to scream (that) 50 more were coming in at 6 o'clock, so I started to aileron roll for the deck. I had to pull up in a vertical climb into the Fw's. At this time I noticed a brightly-painted Fw on my tail blazing away and Johnny screaming for me to break. I broke so hard that my plane started doing snap-rolls; when I got the aircraft under control the Fw was slightly ahead and above with me on his tail diving and twisting, which lasted a good 10 minutes. I managed to get his aircraft on fire and noticed he had it, so I broke away." With their ammunition gone, the two headed for home. "We had to dive for the clouds with them on our tail, skidding at the same time. By the grace of God we reached the cloud bank, and after flying instruments for a while we let down through (the bottom of the cloud deck). During the combat I lost my maps so I didn't know my position, and Johnny didn't know either so we took the general direction home."

Gentile and Godfrey landed at Hurn Airdrome, all but out of gas. "Thank God for a good wingman, or I wouldn't be able to write this today."

RLM was responsible for assigning both manufacturer prefix and model number, without this the Bf 109 would have been something like Messerschmitt M 40 (just like the Bf 108 previously known as BFW M 37). Official usage was - without any question - Bf, common usage by non-officials was mostly Me.

Hah! Now if we really want to confuse the issue, we can start a thread about the Messerschmitt M 40 ...

Is there any truth to the notion the bombers in those last several months before the invasion were used to draw the Luftwaffe to engage the P51s? In other words, the strategy changed from the bombing targets to baiting the Luftwaffe? That had always made sense to me.

Never heard that one before. Why risk 10 - 12 guys that might get killed just to act as a decoy?

Still, it could be, I suppose ...

OK, I looked up the 8th Air Force, and in the chronology, I found it, "Big Week," beginning 20 February 1944. That was one big week for bombing missions! But I think that was also right about when we got the idea we ought to be using these P51s offensively, too. We're only four months out from the invasion and the P51s have really been making a dent. Let's go get this Luftwaffe out of the way, once and for all. Let's step up the bombing missions and lure them out for the P51s. I wouldn't be surprised if we were consciously going on the offensive with those P51s at that time, the stepped-up bombing targets, if they were anything, being secondary to that. It was important we cleared the skies as well as we could for the upcoming invasion, I'm pretty sure of that. So, it kind of makes sense, having the right aircraft for the job, we'd take this opportunity to deviate from our fighter cover strategy and go on the offensive like that. I don't know that's what the thinking was. I'm thinking it was, though. That's why we escalated those missions.

When 8th AF command changed (Doolittle, 6 January 1944) the escorts were not tied to the bombers as tightly and allowed to roam, hunting Luftwaffe a/c in the air and on the ground. The escorts became more offensive, tho they still had to be defensive with regards to the bombers.

The attacks in the winter of 1944 were escorted by P-51's and P-47's and with the appearance of these planes in force a sharp change had been ordered in escort tactics. Previously the escort planes had to protect the bomber force as their primary responsibility. They were now instructed to invite opposition from German fighter forces and to engage them at every opportunity. As a result, German fighter losses mounted sharply. The claimed losses in January were 1,115 German fighters, in February 1,118 and in March 1,217. The losses in planes were accompanied by losses in experienced pilots and disorganization and loss of the combat strength of squadrons and groups. By the spring of 1944 opposition of the Luftwaffe had ceased to be effective.

Eighth Air Force Historial Society

Milosh, thanks. I have just a very generalized understanding but I know before the P51s the Luftwaffe was decorating aces like crazy. Now I guess the question is how many of the bombers were for the most part abandoned to chase down the Luftwaffe in those missions deeper and deeper into Germany attracting the Luftwaffe from their bases in route to the target destination? With that crackerjack aircraft I don't know that we'd have lost so many bombers in those four or five months had the P51s been sticking to just providing them with defensive fighter cover. The P51s veer off to chase down Luftwaffe, the bombers are left defenseless. That's where the offensive strategy conflicts, I'm saying.

VBF, if you put more a/c (ie bombers) in the air there is more to shoot down. The question is: did the loss rate increase?

The bombers weren't abandoned, there was still enough escorts for 'close' escort'.

Just to add a couple of things. I do not think the bombers where exactly abandoned after the 1944 order to "destroy the Luftwaffe".
But every German aircraft destroyed, every German pilot killed or wounded ment one less to go up after the bombers the next day, rather than just chasing them off.
I believe more bomber where saved in this way during 1944/45.

That's the real question, yes. In fact, with the P51s covering throughout, I'd suppose one would expect that rate to decrease, actually. Then again, maybe not, as the Luftwaffe can be expected to be thinning out that cover the deeper into Germany the mission goes.

VBF-13 said:

Is there any truth to the notion the bombers in those last several months before the invasion were used to draw the Luftwaffe to engage the P51s? In other words, the strategy changed from the bombing targets to baiting the Luftwaffe? That had always made sense to me.

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No, it isn't true - other than to reflect that the bombers were going after important targets in large formations starting after January 11, then really massive during Big Week.

The bomber crews were shocked and outraged when Doolittle 'loosed the reins' from close escort with no pursuit - to Pursuit of the Luftwaffe aggressively - some privately labeled Doolittle a 'murderer'. In fact the 8th AF FC adopted strong tactics ranging from Sweeps out in front, to combination 'close' and 'free ranging' in which parcels of the primary Fighter Group (like one squadron) would fly high above the center of mass of their assigned boxes and provide quick reaction to German attacks while the others stayed out of the fight until more German aircraft joined in the fight.

Big Week was a 're-start' for the prime directive of ETO airpower - namely "Destroy the Luftwaffe' so that the Invasion would be uncontested in the air.

drgondog said:

No, it isn't true - other than to reflect that the bombers were going after important targets in large formations starting after January 11, then really massive during Big Week.

The bomber crews were shocked and outraged when Doolittle 'loosed the reins' from close escort with no pursuit - to Pursuit of the Luftwaffe aggressively - some privately labeled Doolittle a 'murderer'. In fact the 8th AF FC adopted strong tactics ranging from Sweeps out in front, to combination 'close' and 'free ranging' in which parcels of the primary Fighter Group (like one squadron) would fly high above the center of mass of their assigned boxes and provide quick reaction to German attacks while the others stayed out of the fight until more German aircraft joined in the fight.

Big Week was a 're-start' for the prime directive of ETO airpower - namely "Destroy the Luftwaffe' so that the Invasion would be uncontested in the air.

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Well then I guess I'm back to my premise of abandonment as I'll bet I could pick anybody off the street who could add two and two together and they could figure out a directive to pursue is a directive to leave uncovered.

This is a tough one, I'll give it that. But I'll just guess a number of these bombers were left to fend for themselves once they drew the Luftwaffe to the fight. And you know they could hardly hit a thing with their guns, so they were pretty much defenseless.

VBF-13 said:

Well then I guess I'm back to my premise of abandonment as I'll bet I could pick anybody off the street who could add two and two together and they could figure out a directive to pursue is a directive to leave uncovered.

This is a tough one, I'll give it that. But I'll just guess a number of these bombers were left to fend for themselves once they drew the Luftwaffe to the fight. And you know they could hardly hit a thing with their guns, so they were pretty much defenseless.

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Substantiate your premise with knowledge about tactics and force deployment?

drgondog said:

Substantiate your premise with knowledge about tactics and force deployment?

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Come on, I read that. But how far in do you think they're going to hold to those tactics and force deployments? 100 miles of Luftwaffe bases in? 200 miles of Luftwaffe bases in? Berlin was 400 miles of Luftwaffe bases in. And then they have to get back. I don't know. But it sure sounds good on paper.

VBF-13 said:

Well then I guess I'm back to my premise of abandonment as I'll bet I could pick anybody off the street who could add two and two together and they could figure out a directive to pursue is a directive to leave uncovered.

This is a tough one, I'll give it that. But I'll just guess a number of these bombers were left to fend for themselves once they drew the Luftwaffe to the fight. And you know they could hardly hit a thing with their guns, so they were pretty much defenseless.

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Totally unfounded: to claim that the fighters "abandoned" the bombers to go chasing after the Luftwaffe is a complete misunderstanding of the function of the escort fighters. The Luftwaffe discovered as early as the Battle of Britain, and the RAF during Circus operations over France and the low countries, that tying fighters to close escort of bomber formations was a waste of effort and resources; the fighters were forced to slow to less than optimum cruising speeds while having to manouvre to stay in sight of the bombers. During the Circus operations the British packed wings of escort fighters around small bomber formations only to discover that the Germans could totally disrupt the escort formations with relatively small numbers of fighters. When bounced the escort fighters had little chance to respond because of the time it took to accelerate to fighting speed, while being hampered by having to get out of the way of other escorting fighters chasing the Luftwaffe aircraft. In addition close escort fighters faced the threat of being shot at by their own bombers.

The Americans realised that job of a fighter escort was to clear the airspace well away from the bomber formations, by attacking and breaking up the German fighter formations before they could attack the bombers in large numbers, while leaving the bombers free to defend the airspace immediately surrounding them. It was also part of that policy to attack and hound the German fighters around their airfields. Overall the American fighter escorts and their policies worked extremely well: the figures found here http://homepage.ntlworld.com/r_m_g.varley/Strategic_Air_Offensive.pdf (pages 48-49) tell the story: in October 1943 the loss rate of USAAF heavy bombers was over 6%: after the introduction of escort fighters the rates dropped to less than 4%. Once the fighters were let loose, loss rates dropped even further - less than 1% in May 1944.

(T)he overall heavy bomber loss rate for the 8 9 USAAF was 1.7%. In 1943 1036 bombers were lost with an average loss rate of 3.8%. A tour of operations was set at 25 missions so that during 1943 the probability of completing a tour of operations was 38%. In October 1943 186 heavy bombers were lost on 2831 sorties, a loss rate of 6.6%. A tour of operations with the 8 9 AAF was at first 25 sorties but in the last year of the war this was increased to 40 sorties. (Page 48 )

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Aozora said:

Totally unfounded: to claim that the fighters "abandoned" the bombers to go chasing after the Luftwaffe is a complete misunderstanding of the function of the escort fighters. The Luftwaffe discovered as early as the Battle of Britain, and the RAF during Circus operations over France and the low countries, that tying fighters to close escort of bomber formations was a waste of effort and resources; the fighters were forced to slow to less than optimum cruising speeds while having to manouvre to stay in sight of the bombers. During the Circus operations the British packed wings of escort fighters around small bomber formations only to discover that the Germans could totally disrupt the escort formations with relatively small numbers of fighters. When bounced the escort fighters had little chance to respond because of the time it took to accelerate to fighting speed, while being hampered by having to get out of the way of other escorting fighters chasing the Luftwaffe aircraft. In addition close escort fighters faced the threat of being shot at by their own bombers.

The Americans realised that job of a fighter escort was to clear the airspace well away from the bomber formations, by attacking and breaking up the German fighter formations before they could attack the bombers in large numbers, while leaving the bombers free to defend the airspace immediately surrounding them. It was also part of that policy to attack and hound the German fighters around their airfields. Overall the American fighter escorts and their policies worked extremely well: the figures found here http://homepage.ntlworld.com/r_m_g.varley/Strategic_Air_Offensive.pdf (pages 48-49) tell the story: in October 1943 the loss rate of USAAF heavy bombers was over 6%: after the introduction of escort fighters the rates dropped to less than 4%. Once the fighters were let loose, loss rates dropped even further - less than 1% in May 1944.

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I think I'm seeing it, here. As a practical matter, a good offense, i.e., taking the fight to the Luftwaffe, is really the best defense. I hadn't grasped that, initially. All said, these missions really were in tough, and one really has to admire the courage and sacrifice of these young men.

Abandoned or protected, the bullets were flying and if you ever get inside a B-17, B-24, Lancaster, etc., you'll see the skin won't stop a BB, much less a bullet, in most places unless it happens to hit some Aluminum armor from a few degrees aft instead of from 60 - 90°. So, yeah ... these young men went through hell. So did a lot of others. 40,000 men served in U-Boats and 30,000 never came back ... roughly the same as bomber crews, but a little more severe.

Either way, they deserve our respect and thanks, whether German or British or American, Japanese, etc. They were certainly a great generation.

They were the first people to have great performance but no avionics. They could run something or someone down ... but mostly didn't know where they were unless they ran into them in the middle of the air. A jet like ... maybe a Macchi 326 is faster, but not by much, but has the advantage of modern avionics and knows where to hit and who is coming at them. The P-47, while 150 mph slower, has no idea where the enemy is unless he reflects in the sun or stumbles into a gaggle, had little idea of exactly where he is on the map except a general idea of the area, and looked for targets based in visual appearance, as opposed to the Macchi that has a GPS, knows where he is and who is up and about ... and where and at what altitude. Maybe also knows with what weapons.

Quite a change in tactics, but only about a third in speed. So the P-47 (P-51, Spitfire, Me 109, Zero, etc.) guy was basically an explorer in the air looking for targets that were mostly along his planned line of flight rather than a Macchi 326 hunter who goes looking for the guys he KNOWS are there and where ... and with what weapons ... mostly.

Quite a different attitude and philosophy, at least in my mind. The premier modern fighters are MUCH better and can use a "God's Eye" view from orbit if they want.

So the difference is manifest and the WWII fighter pilots were valiant beyond what we see today in a very basic way. They fought without prior knowledge of what they were facing, other than a general idea and a willingness to do it. Great soldiers, sailors, pilots, tankers, etc., one and all.

Our collective thanks.