P-61 alternatives

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Because there were no aircraft or other US forces on or around the Aleutian Islands, and Germany had several different kind of aircraft that could fly the 2,600 mile stretch while carrying useful cargo, and there were absolutely no allied forces in the Mediterranean or India/Burma regions, so it could work.
But, why bother? The Germans could have just used their transporter and beamed everything to Japan.
Funny why they never did any of that. Seems so obvious.
 

I should have known. There would be Brad Pitts stationed in the Aleutians. They can intercept anything. Ive seen them dodge shrapnel from 81mm mortars bursting 2 yards away by crouching with an M1 Sherman BAR and running in a cool uniform as has been accurately documented by Stephenie Spiegelbergerman. (Also Fact Checked) Once training and romance has been completed they would be equipped in 1942 to fly Pratt and Whitney R4360 Corsairs carrying AN/APG F15 Eagle Radar with Mighy Mo Phoeinix 050 Browning missiles there can be no escape for the huns. No radar gaps, no strategies. There would be but one causality: the nice guy in the rear cockpit, nicknamed "Goose" might die tragically at the hands of the Germans but that just makes us feel more emotion and that is a good thing. If you need any more WW2 history like this go to your video library.
 
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The Japanese did hold the western-most portion of the Aleutians until '43, so the route proposed *may* have been viable, as patrols by the U.S., Canada and the Soviet Union were sparse north of the islands.
The main concern would be the violent weather that can develop in the Bering Straights region.
That area is known to spawn storms that can reach as far south as Southern California.
 
As likely to happen as Germans flying over the North Pole in planes they didn't have to give the Japanese military gear Germany produced an excess of.
Or Germany using aerial refueling to bomb the US in 1940 using planes that were immune to interception and first flew in December 1942 then were abandoned after a few flights.
 

Exploring the P61's capacity to counter attacks by the Me 264 has been informative. I can see how US planners wanted to create an aircraft that could patrol far from American shores using an aircraft with the capability of carrying an excellent radar. In doing so they compromised its performance as an interceptor. The Turbosupercharger version would seem to have have the ability to intercept at a high speed and higher altitude than the intruding Me 264 and then dive to intercept but did not get built till late 1945. Yes I concede that the P38M would be able to intercept but that the 1944 and 1945 versions of the Me 264 would be faster as well.

The B-29 flew in October 1942 after seemingly getting the go ahead in 1938.

The Me 264 was on a tighter schedule. Formal work started in January 1941 after an formal order for 6 prototypes and 30 bombers had been placed in the preceding year.

(Early 1940 was the year the Roosevelt Administration gave port facilities and ship repair facilities (before the Battle of Britain) to the British and shortly thereafter signed the Lend Lease Act effectively funding 40% of the UK war effort and this triggered the Me 264 program)

However Messerschmitt had already done much advanced preliminary work in Project P1061 and he promised a first flight in May 1942. He was late by 7 months (December 1942).

Had Messerschmitt achieved his target date of May 1942 I think we would have seen the Me 264 in service. Major Petersen of the Luftwaffe Reichlin Test Facility reported it should be ready by Autumn 1943 for operations against the United States.

I'm still reading Fredrick Forsysth's excellent book. It seems the Me 264 failed because
1 The men in charge of its development and Luftwaffe procurement Ernst Udet and his replacement (after Udets suicide) Erhardt Milch not only did not support 4 engine bombers but both opposed them.
2 Milch did not like Messerschmitt due to supposed insensitivity after one of Milch's friends died flying one of Messerschmitt's aircraft which had experimental spoilerons (like the P-61)
3 Milch wanted resources to go to the Me 262 jet instead.
4 In 1941/42 the Me 210 fiasco occurred where handling difficulties arose in the Me 210 preventing a ramp up in production just as Me 110 and He 111 was to ramp down. Its said Messerschmitt had personally intervened in the design to reduce tail length. The RLM and Messerschmitt also constructed hundreds of jigs for the flawed tail. No measure to solve handling worked without the lengthened tail. Messerschmitt got blamed.

All these difficulties compounded. I Messerschmitt made a mistake, he made very few, and more people are to blame for gambling so much on this aircraft. Had he not have made this mistake I believe resources would have been available for the Me 264.

More fascinating is the Me 264/6m, a minor 6 engine 4.5m stretch of the 4 engine Me 264, which when upgraded from Jumo 211 with with 6 x Jumo 213 was expected to have a range of 18000km with bombs and 22,000km without.

That is more than enough for any scenario.

If the Me 264 was produced at 100/month as had been planed for the He 177 I suspect the Luftwaffe might have kept 400-600 Me 264 operational at any one time.

I cant see that being enough to effect US industry. However treble production to 300 month and get the Japanese involved it becomes a threat. Obviously the Reich lacked recourses to do this.
 
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Does anybody have any data about the refuelling system they used?

Unfortunately I cant find my copy of Manfred Grieh's Luftwaffe over Amerika which has sketches, otherwise id send scans.

It involved a hose but I believe the tanker flew behind the receiver and pumped up to it in the 1941 experiments. Sort of a reverse hose and drogue but they tried a version in which the hose and drogue was on an extension arm that could be called a boom. This would have cleared the downwash of the aircraft and made hook-up easier.

There are several original sketches of the various German experiments conducted with small 2 engine aircraft (ABOUT 10 seaters) in 1940 as well as some photographs of the hose reel and its attachment. These were reproduced in Manfred Griehls "The Luftwaffe over Amerika". This book also refers to the experiments conducted over what was then the Sudetenland and is now the Czech Republic between Ju 252 and Ju 290, the flight logs confirm this. In several of the minutes of meeting conducted around the progress of the Me 264 the Luftwaffe's project manager for the Me 264 (who also had responsibilities regarding long range maritime reconnaissance, who had been keeping an eye on these in flight refuelling tests referred to them as having produced quite good results and that a buddy to buddy refuelling should extend range by at least 1/3rd. The risk of a refueler and receiver not rendezvousing could be managed by having them leave in formation together. This was by way of a meeting with Milch and Goering present with a stenographer that clearly could keep up with their sarcastic banter.

Refuelling kits were ordered for the He 177A1 recon but fell of production when that aircraft encountered its problems.

Basically one system from the 1940 tests the aircraft trailed a drogue with a drag producing ball or funnel. The aircraft behind (the tanker) had a Y-fork on about a 2m extensions coming veristically out behind the cockpit. The fork had a crook that closed and snagged the ball which was then drawn in to the aircraft and attached to the fuel system. Another system connected at a nose probe.

These were the 1940 experiments. Obviously by 1943 things had progressed. The Ju 252/353/290/390 of course had a trappoklappe rear loading ramp to simplify the installation.

From what I can see the receiver would only require a hose reel and a drogue.

Griehl was a prolific writer on books regarding German aviation but he clearly wasn't an aviation professional or engineer or historian. Nevertheless the material he collects is sometimes unique.


After 1943 the Me 264 prototypes had been destroyed however the Ju 290/390 could still use it and the theoretical paper Me 264, Ta 400 and the various jets sometimes referred to it being included.
 
I have the book and got it out because of this and other threads. It looks like a very delicate operation in Atlantic weather.
 
I have the book and got it out because of this and other threads. It looks like a very delicate operation in Atlantic weather.

I think the versions used for the Ju 290 tests would have been much larger, robust than the 1940s version. The Ju 390 could plausibly just reach the US eastern seaboard on a return mission with one in flight refuelling. Probably not reliable due to bad weather often found at 20000ft.
 
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I think the big problem with the P61 was not that it was a bad aircraft, but that it arrived late through over engineering.

A forward firing 2 man aircraft could have been delivered in large numbers by mid 1943. This is early enough to make it an offensive aircraft against German nightfighters and aerodromes.

This could have made a big difference to the night assault on Germany and thus it is a big shame that Northrup went for technical perfection rather than practicality. Normally this stupidity would be on the German side, but here the allies are guilty too.
 
I think the big problem with the P61 was not that it was a bad aircraft, but that it arrived late through over engineering.
In what way was it over-engineered? The turret was a problem, but it was part of the specifications.
 

Combat changed a lot between project conception and squadron service. The P-61 was designed to shoot down night bombers like the AVRO Lancaster, not dogfight enemy day fighters.
P-61s were the only thing flying at certain points during the Battle of the Bulge.

 
In what way was it over-engineered? The turret was a problem, but it was part of the specifications.
Ok the spec may have been wrong, a bit like the Defiant.

The P61 was based on a British spec - at the time the Defiant was being used as a nightfighter.

Getting rid of the gunner means no twin boom and additional weight/complexity. With the R2800s you have a plane with great performance.
 
They First flew an A-26 in the summer of 1942, there may have been a night fighter version of it on paper.

In 1940-4-42 the P-38 needed radar that didn't exist yet. That or the P-38 would have needed a new fuselage/nacelle to hold the radar and operator.
 
The P-61 was found to be inadequate to intercept Japanese bombers hitting Saipan because they could not climb to altitude fast enough and were replaced by Hellcat night fighters. The P-70 was not a high altitude airplane and would have been even less adequate.

They compared the P-38M night fighter to the P-61 in the Pacific and found the P-61 to be superior. Among other things, the RO was so cramped that he could not help the pilot scan for targets visually.

The A-26A was the night fighter version. They built one. It was not a high altitude airplane either.

Hey, for a real What If, they should have told Fisher to forget that abortion called the P-75 and built the P-82 under NAA's direction instead. Everything you need and a 3000 mile range, too.
 
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The USAAF had the P-70, too.


My impetus for developing a NF version of the -38 would be 1) a moderate addition of speed (~10%?); 2) better climb than either of these alternatives, enabling more useful response times. And yes, I'd think a nacelle redesign would be necessary, but I'd think a 1943 operational date would be doable. For the radar itself, I don't doubt the UK would help with their experience at AI units.

I'd think the biggest problems encountered in such a modification would be C/G issues (which perhaps could be handled entirely by adding some length to the nose to counterbalance a larger RIO station), and relocating the guns to the underside to reduce flash-blindness for the pilot. I don't see either of those problems as insuperable, but I'm no engineer.
 

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