P38 vs P47 vs 109 and 190 (1 Viewer)

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As for the P-38 vs. P-47, Me-109, and FW-190, I would go with the P-38. It could turn with or out-turn all 3 ships; it could out climb the P-47 with ease and hold its own against the 2 German fighters, and once dive flaps were installed, could dive with all 3. The Lightning also had the speed to hold its own with the other 3 fighters. Assuming the engines worked fine (and that seemed to be only a problem with the 8th AF groups), the only disadvantage the P-38 had was its silhouette, odds are, when the P-38 was engaged, it would be at a disadvantage.

I base my comments on the following:
According to Oliver Taylor commander of the 14th Fighter Group:

"Generally we found that the 38 could out-maneuver anything, friend or foe, between 18,000 and 31,000 feet (5490-9450 meters). Below 18,000 it was sort of a toss-up except that very near the ground we could run (the Axis) right into the dirt, since he apparently couldn't get quite such a fast pull-out response as we could. "

Roger Freeman, in his book "The Mighty Eighth War Manual", stated that the P-38J was "equal in speed to most, and better than some Luftwaffe single seat fighters at medium altitudes, as also was its rate of climb….Without them(drop tanks)it could turn with and often out turn both the Me-109 and FW-190. Its particularly good stall characteristics allowed very tight turns without danger of spinning, whereas the FW-190 in particular could not follow without stalling out."

"…the P-38 was faster on entering a dive than the Me-109 and FW-190." Of course it could not keep up with the Me-109 and FW-190 until dive flaps were installed. It was also a very stable gun platform.

Again from Freeman:

The P-47 "At low altitude it exhibited poor acceleration and rate of climb and could be out-turned by both German types unless a high speed was maintained. With increases in altitude, above 15,000 feet performance gradually improved and at heights at which the US bombers operated, the P-47 was faster than its adversaries in level flight and was far superior in dives. Its acceleration and rate of climb remained poor by comparisons." Further Freeman states "the P-47 could out-dive both the Me-109 and FW-190, in the initial stages of the dive its acceleration was much slower than that of the German fighters", and "Below 15,000 feet the P-47 had a distinct performance disadvantages to both the Me-109 and FW-190 and a prudent plot did not attempt to engage in a turning fight. At the end of 1943 P-47s were modified to receive water injection and wide-blade propellers. These greatly benefited sprint performance and it was then possible for the Thunderbolt to out-turn enemy fighters at low altitude if high speed was involved."

As for the P-47 "breaking the back of the Luftwaffe", in Adolf Galland's book, "The First and the Last", it is indicated that the decline of the Luftwaffe's fighter arm occurred in the winter of 1943 to the spring of 1944. It seems to me that there were plenty of P-38's, P-47.s and P-51's to accomplish the job. I don't think it is fair to say that one fighter played a bigger role in taking down the Luftwaffe than another.

Just my thoughts.

May God fly your wing always..

Eagledad
 

If you look at the scores credited to the Mustang from December 1943 through May 1944 you will see a huge impact by the Mustang - simply because the P-38 was easy to see and avoid, it had the dive issues, and engines kept blowing up in cold ETO winter skies. This P-38F and J did not have the boosted ailerons or dive flaps and did not match well with 109 at altitudes.

The P-47 was restricted to covering inbound to German border, and outbound from German border but the Mustangs and Lightnings were doing the target escort where the big battles were being fought over central and eastern/southern Germany.

The Pioneer Mustang Group had more LW credits (250+) from beginning of Ops on December 1, 1943 through April than the 20th, 55th and 364th FG (all P-38's) combined (88, 103 and 37 respectively) That is 5, 7 and 2 months of combined ops for the P-38s to 5 months for the 354th FG P-51s.

In other words the P-38s flew 14 months of sorties vs 5 months of one P-51 Group's sorties and scored fewer victories... with nearly 3x sorties

The addition, the 357th, 355th, and 4th FG which came on board with Mustangs from mid February, 1944 all had more scores individually by the end of April 1944 than the 55th FG (top ETO P-38 GP with 103 credits) who had started ops in Oct 1943 to the end of April.

All of the P-47 Groups had better scoring than the top P-38 group in the same period except for 356th FG.

So, it is clear that the P-38 was not a candidate for 'breaking the back of the LW' in the ETO..

Great airplane that didn't come into full potential until the Battle of Germany was over.
 
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When it comes to the Luftwaffe ... if you look at the fighter losses you will see a gradual increase in losses during 1943 and reaching a top around April 1944. Though February 1944 and Big Week are often portrayed as the turning point or breaking point, the figures definitely do not support this. One can see a sudden increase in November/December 1943 though. When you go for Luftwaffe losses, it seems that's when the first big hits were received!

Kris
 

My perspective about Big Week/February 1944 is simply the first time the 8th AF had both the reserves and will to go 'deep' after the August through October beat downs by the Luftwaffe. It also had at that point 4 Fighter Groups capable of performing Target escort with three more due in late February to mid March.

The Luftwaffe suffered more losses in November/December (IMO) simply because the Fighter Groups that became operational in Sept/Oct were gaining experience enough to compete along with the old timers (4th, 56th, 78th and 353rd).. so the 352nd, 355th, 55th, 356th plus several 9th AF P-47 groups were gaining similiar experience.

So the 8th AF escort to western Germany effectively doubled in November... but still only the 55th available to escort all the way to any one target.
 
I see. It is however surprising that the heavy bombardments didn't start until April 1944 (in terms of bombs dropped). The number of bomber available at the end of 1943 was still limited. To see how the LW losses started to mount and get out of control months before this and also weeks before Big Week is very interesting.

So that is before the numerous deep penetrations occured and before the Mustang became the main fighter.

Kris
 

So, Kris - what were the LW losses on Kanalfront in November 1943 before the first Mustang group was operational on Dec 1 1943 - and how does that compare March 1944 when the first 3 mustang Groups were operational for target escort against LuftFlotte Reich?

How do yo define 'heavy bombardments' ?? Number of 8th AF BG bombing past Frankfurt or some other definition?

All of the February through April, 1944 strikes were with 30-35+ BG of 8th BC ranging from 600 to 900 B-17s and B-24s
 
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Hey man, I don't have the figures with me at the moment so I am going by what I remember. I have seen graphs of number of allied heavy bombers available and of the number of bombs (in tons) dropped on German targets. Then I compare them with the Luftwaffe loss figures which seem to be in constant rise from mid 1943 to mid 1944. But a first remarkable peak occurs at the end of 1943. Maximum losses seem to occur around April 1944 though it still increases afterwards but that may be less significant as the production also increased and many were destroyed on the ground or abandoned. I suppose these would also be considered to be combat losses but are not listed seperately from air combat losses.

Anyway to come back to your question. In early 1943 the losses on the Kanalfront was still sustainable but after that they started to rise. And not only that, by the end of 1943 the loss-kill rato had gone from 1:3 to 3:1. It seems clear that the Luftwaffe was first blown away in France and everywhere west of Germany before the actual assault on Germany itself could start. This was repeated soon afterwards with the P-47: the Luftwaffe virtually retreated east of the Ruhr where the P-47 could not follow the heavy bombers. When the Lightning and especially the Mustang appeared the Luftwaffe had nowhere left to hide!
So in essence, the downfall was already obvious to all by mid 1943 but the Mustang finalized it. Not because of its fighting qualities per se - the other 2 American fighters were good enough - but because of its range.

Kris
 
Quite right Dave. Pilot training had declined since the end of 1942 but the results took a bit longer to be felt.

Same thing but then in the other direction happened with the RAF. Though they had increased their training programs after the BoB it took until 1942 before the average pilot quality was good enough.

Kris
 
Erich Hartmann took his first military flight 5 March 1941. Flight training continued until 21 August 1942, the day he was posted to Ergänzungs-Jagdgruppe Ost. 17 months! It appears to me Germany ran short of fuel for flight training as soon as they invaded the Soviet Union.
 

Kris - my point was simply this. There were few losses per se in Luftwaffenbefehlshaber Mitte (Germany) until the escorts started taking the bombers beyond the range of the P-47s and Spits.. The LW tactics were to wait until the P-47s turned back and then pile on with s/e and t/e fighters - exactly what happened on August 17, October 10, October 14th missions.

Back to Kanalfront - yes JG 2 and JG 26 losses began to rise significabtly in mid to late 1943 simply because the 8th and 9th FC P-47 groups and pilots were a.) gaining experience, b.) adding to RAF strength and c.) had the range to engage the JG 2 and JG 26 throughout Their range. If they had to attack the bombers, they had to engage the US fighters. This loss pattern had nothing to do with strikes into deep Germany. All of the summer and fall disasters for 8th BC were well out of range of P-47s

It was in fall of 1943 that LW started the really heavy migration of skilled pilots and aircraft from west and south into Germany and Luftwaffenbefehlshaber Mitte was re-roganized to LuftFlotteReich. Mitte only had elements of JG1, JG3, JG11 and JG27 mid year 1943 and they weren't having the same losses as LufFlotte 3... until after the Mustangs and Lightnings were going all the way in increasing strength.
 
The gig was up for the Luftwaffe once the Western Allies could escort their massive bomber streams to targets deep into Germany and back. (Mustang was instrumental in making this possible, but in reality any long range fighter with good overall attributes (P-38/P-47/P-51 etc) could have done the job.)

Doolittle's shift in strategy assured this. The Target became the Luftwaffe itself and in the end, the Luftwaffe couldn't win the mass war of attrition facing both large #'s of heavy bombers guarded by swarms of escort fighters that would hunt them to exhaustion all the way down to the deck if necessary. Attrition war's are messy for both sides. He with the most toys at the end wins. Western Allies had the most toys.

Add to that targeting oil and it spirals ever downward. No one plane was responsible. All contributed but the Mustang probably deserves special mention because of what it enabled the Allies to do.

If one is going to talk seeds of the Luftwaffe's downfall, it would be unfair not to mention the Eastern Front. While the Experten might have run up their scores to massive effect in the kill rosters, this air war, one even larger than either BC's war, ultimately played a key part in grinding down the Luftwaffe and accounted for a good number of expert pilots. The Russian pilots were incredibly brave and resolute in the face of adversity, never giving up and losing morale as a whole.
 

agreed
 
Hello Drgondog
Also RAF got better during 1943 and made its contribution to overall Jagdwaffe downturn. Also RAF pilots had learned from past errors, they got Spitfire IX with Merlin 63s and 66s which were better than those with Merlin 61s and more and more reliable Typhoons for lower altitude combats. Also during early part of 43 RAF got new, longer range radars for fighter control over France which meant better situation awareness to RAF formation leaders over France.

Juha
 
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Juha - also agreed. The key part of this discussion is that basically all the battles over France and Holland in 1943 were LuftFlotte 3 with JG26 and JG2 plus elements of JG3 against the growing strength of 8th and 9th AF plus RAF.

LuftReich was formed from Mitte plus major reinforcements from Sud and Ost - which formed the primary resistance to 8th AF BC and 8th FC long range escorts. A far larger force of s/e and t/e fighters than LuftFlotte 3.
 
I disagree somewhat. Of course a large part of the Luftwaffe was fighting on the Eastern Front but the end result would have been the same. The western allies would have defeated the Luftwaffe even if it had been twice the size. You see, the problems were still the same: the western allies had better pilots and to a lesser extent better high altitude fighters.



Kris
 
Another point that should be brought up is the philosophy of the Western Pilots Vs that of the Luftwaffe (and Soviet as well).

Western pilots were, especially the long range American fighter Pilots, assigned for a tour of duty. It generally was 200 hours but could be extended. They were then returned back to the continental US for re-assignment (or is some cases went back to their units for another 200 hours). As such, their opportunities were fewer than that of the Luftwaffe pilots and tended to attack whenever the opportuntity arose as there were only so many chances they would get.

The Luftwaffe pilots were not relieved from active flying operations (in general). They flew through the war, accumulating extensive hours in some cases, but getting far more opportunities than their American counterparts but with no real prospect of extensive relief. As such, their tactics and perspective was more that of the proffessional solider, attacking when the odds were best and taking all advantage of all opportunities to increase their odds of survival. If the sitiuation didn't look favorable, there was generally not a problem with going home and trying it again tomorrow. That is not to say they did not attack in unfavorable situations (outnumber, ect). But they tended not to simply because they would have another shot at it later (either in the day, week or month) and the odds would/could be more in their favor then.

Pitted against each other, you had the American pilot who had to make the most of every chance he got against a Luftwaffe pilot who had to maximize his chances of success AND survival. It was the product of different strategies and should be considered when thinking about the efficiency and effectiveness of each sides pilots.
 
Kris - look at the steep rise of fighter losses for single engine day fighters from sep-Dec 1943 versus Jan-May 1944 when comparing Reich Defense to West losses... the Reich Defense has 2x fighter losses to West losses in Jan-May 1944.

Jun-Dec 1944 had closer ratios but remember how much of LuftFlotte Reich was transferred to France and Holland during Normandy campaign - putting them at more risk to RAF and shorter range P-47s of 8th AF and all of 9th AF fighters - but still Reich Defense had the far higher losses reflecting again the Mustang impact.
 
D, i have problems understanding what exactly you are trying to say. Are you agreeing or disagreeing with me? If I read your post I agree with you but it comes across as if you are disagreeing with what I'm saying . I am confused.

And exactly how much of LF Reich was transferred to France after D-Day?

Kris
 
Kris - I was pointing out that LF Reich had nearly as many day fighter losses as West, Balkans and East combined in Jan-May and Jun-oct 1944... which pointed back to my thesis that the long range escort was the fatal blow to the LW. It was a grinder for replacement pilots from East and Balkans coming into the Battle of Germany.

I am wholly in support that while the East and VVS took its toll it was west losses (West and Reich) that overshadowed the Russian front losses.

I'll have to look it up but approximately 5 Gruppen moved from Munich to central Germany to central/west LF Reich and into the Normandy campaign starting on June 7.
 
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