@t-rocket:
Most interesting and this requires a careful answer!
1) Obviously, the planners of the raid were aware of the risk of causing civilian casualties. The standard operating procedure in such cases should (and probably:
must, or
will) have been that the mission shall be aborted if the target is not visible. If the mission profile did not specify this, or if the bomb aimers did not follow this instruction when they discovered that clouds obscured the target, this is indeed a case of inexcusable negligence.
2) Crucially important: this was a
low level raid, by RAF squadrons of 2 Group, a
tactical force. If bomb aimers released their bombs on the cue of the leading aircraft, this was against RAF standard operating procedure. Dropping on the cue of a lead bombardier (instead of individual aiming) was standard operating procedure for
high-level bombing in the USAAF strategic attacks, but in Bomber Command, individual aiming was obligatory. Excellent examples of this practice were seen when Bomber Command switched to tactical (or rather: operational) bombing in preparation of the invasion, e.g. the bombing of the railway centres like Trappes. In other words: even a
strategic bomber force could carry out pinpoint attacks by aiming individually, and this would be even more applicable to a low-level raid by a
tactical force. Therefore: whoever decided to bomb on cue instead of by individual aiming, was very, very wrong especially under these circumstances.
3) As regards the "removal of the rockets from the Haagsche Bosch several weeks before", this is a puzzling issue.
I'm not sure why the V2 rockets should have been "present" in the Haagsche Bosch: by then there was not much left of the forest as a whole portion had been cleared and many trees in the remnant had been cut down. There were no V2 storage bunkers in the woods, so there was no cover against aerial observation and the Germans are not likely to have left V2s out in the open!
But there's more, and I'll discuss the details for those who are not familiar with the procedure of firing V2s (a full German instruction movie has been preserved):
In the case of the V2s launched from The Hague, the rockets and liquid oxygen tanks were transported by rail from Germany. I personally saw such trains on their way to The Hague, covered with tarpaulins, as I lived along the railway line from Germany to The Hague then. The Hague railway station was practically at the edge of the Haagsche Bosch and the later Duindigt launch sites were only a small distance away. The rockets were first loaded onto flatbed trucks for transport to the site. There, they were loaded onto a special vehicle called the Meillerwagen, which moved to the site and erected the rocket on a small pedestal. Any reasonably flat surface was suitable, there was NO special launch tower or any other facility. The tanks were filled from separate vehicles, electrical cables were attached and the rocket was fired from a distance. In other words: the V2s were present at the site for only a very short time, and there was
nothing to bomb if you did not happen to fly over the site during that very short time! "Bombing the V2 sites" was, therefore, a totally pointless activity – remember that the Americans never caught a Scud "launch site" during the Gulf War, and the Scud is a direct descendant from the V2.
But I've found out more that sounds interesting, on a website maintained by The Hague City Archives (so it's not a privately-run site and its ancestry looks reliable). The URL is:
Haagse herinneringen - Het bombardement and I strongly recommend a visit because there is an important contemporary map of The Hague there that clarifies a lot. Here is a translation of some relevant phrases of the Dutch text (my personal comments in Italics) :
On Sept. 8th, 1944 the Germans began to launch V2 rockets from the vicinity of The Hague to London… From Sept. to March 1945 rockets were fired almost daily… British fighter-bombers tried to destroy the launch facilities
(NOTE: this is the usual error, see above) and trains transporting fuel… The British attacks on the launch facilities were not effective and therefore it was decided to use medium bombers… The attack was carried out by 137 Wing and 139 Wing, of 2 Group… Two aiming-points were chosen in the Haagsche Bosch… The
most serious error was made when a young and inexperienced intelligence officer of 137 Wing mixed up the two axes (NOTE: of the coordinates) of one of the aiming-points … one of the two aiming-points thus became the Juliana van Stolbergplein (NOTE: in the heart of the built-up area, on the map it says "fout richtpunt" – wrong aiming-point)… The other wing, 139, did get the correct coordinates. This wing included a Dutch squadron, 320. The squadron commander had relatives living in the Bezuidenhout and at his request was given permission not to join the operation… An Air Ministry official stated that … the standard rules for sparing civilian targets should be observed … Because of cloud cover, most aircraft of 139 Wing released their bombs through the clouds
using radar (NOTE: I find this extremely doubtful. There were only two possible "radar" aids for bombing at that time. The first was H2S, but this was not carried (see the movie!) by B-25s and would have been useless anyway for several reasons, including the swamping of the indicator set screen by the ground returns. The only alternative would have been Oboe, but the B25 crews were totally unqualified for that method, which required ultra-precise flying. I conclude, therefore, that this information is incorrect). They could not see the target but had received the correct coordinates
(NOTE: map coordinates at that time only made sense if you could visually compare the map and the scenery, there being no GPS). The aircraft of 137 Wing could
see their (wrong) target without using radar and bombed the Bezuidenhout… When the British discovered that an intelligence officer had drawn the wrong coordinates they kept it under wraps, although the officer was court-martialled… The relevant records remained classified and inaccessible until 1972.
(END OF TRANSLATED QUOTES).
I think this is interesting and requires consideration, if we disregard the technical ("radar") error.
@t-rocket, re your second message:
Indeed I know the locality of the Z. family's house, passed by it 3 days ago... I've decided not to identify places and names in public because some people I mention (or their relatives) are still alive. As we know each other, I'll send you more detailed data privately.