Picture of the Day - Miscellaneous (8 Viewers)

Merry Christmas for all folks!
 
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IJN reserve students training with aircraft.

These Japanese young men born in the 1920s remind me of my father.
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Source: IJN Reserve Students - Fujio Matsugi's Photo Album (1966)
 
Thought this picture of IJN submarines with the IJN carrier Kaga in the background was interesting.
 

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  • I-68 and I-69 at Ariake Bay. IJNS Kaga and light cruiser Kini in the background March 1936.png
    I-68 and I-69 at Ariake Bay. IJNS Kaga and light cruiser Kini in the background March 1936.png
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Little time after that question just came across this vid with Jon Parshall and his point is that no oil wasn't really posible. Interesting:


View: https://www.youtube.com/live/GcIIMGnqAg8?si=Y4NN58Zcx5wj5D7x

Thanks for your information, Escuadrilla Azul.
Frankly, I was not interested in such an unrealistic argument for the operation by historians as why they did not attack the fuel tanks when the operation was done under the limited time. Jon Parshall gets to the point IMO if I may quot from another source -

1.) Fuchida never made a mental earmark to target the tank-farms.

Jon Parshall believes he knows what Fuchida did or didn't think about as he circled Pearl Harbor and looked down at massive fuel storage tanks and finds it unbelievable that Fuchida thought they'd make opportune targets. Parshall believes Fuchida added this only in 1963 in order to make himself appear wiser than he actually was.

What would be truly unbelievable would be if the Imperial Japanese Navy's top pilot didn't have these thoughts and ideas. Of course Fuchida knew the list of target priorities carefully outlined in meetings in Yokosuka and Kyushu,

"The targeting list for Pearl Harbor was very clearly established in Annex 3 of Operation Order No. 1, issued on 1 November 1941 (as cited in H.P. Willmott's Pearl Harbor, p. 64). Targeting priorities were as follows:

1) Airfields
2) Aircraft carriers
3) Battleships
4) Cruisers and other warships
5) Merchant shipping
6) Port facilities
7) Land installations

These targeting priorities are important to our discussion of this incident."


Source: http://www.combinedfleet.com/BennettRebuttal.htm

These targets in order would have been enough to do within the limited time and chances.
Missing the aircraft carriers was thought as the fatal mistake by Japanese side through the Pacific War.
 
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