PLEASE OFFER YOUR HONEST OPINIONS...

[pbehn]

One would, wouldn't one? Sales of fraudulent relics is a very lively business. Caveat emptor, in spades.

The Hitler diaries got as far as being serialised in the newspapers before being exposed as a fraud.

 

[Barrett]

In the 1980s the Yamamoto crash site was the tentative goal of a group of US aces engaged in a bitter controversy over who did the deed. Tom Lanphier said he shot off the right wing in a 90-degree deflection shot. Rex Barber fired from astern. Plans were laid to visit the site and resolve the dispute, but by then the site was inaccessible due to a local conflict. (IIRC some Australian miners/etc had been attacked by locals.) One of the aces had been an AF accident investigator who was willing to go along. However, eyewitness and photo evidence prior to then clearly showed the bullet holes from astern--lengthwise rather than circular. Also, the wings had been on the airframe when it hit the trees. (That's separate from the near impossibility of severing a spar from the wingtip end.)

 

[DAI PHAN]

In the 1980s the Yamamoto crash site was the tentative goal of a group of US aces engaged in a bitter controversy over who did the deed. Tom Lanphier said he shot off the right wing in a 90-degree deflection shot. Rex Barber fired from astern. Plans were laid to visit the site and resolve the dispute, but by then the site was inaccessible due to a local conflict. (IIRC some Australian miners/etc had been attacked by locals.) One of the aces had been an AF accident investigator who was willing to go along. However, eyewitness and photo evidence prior to then clearly showed the bullet holes from astern--lengthwise rather than circular. Also, the wings had been on the airframe when it hit the trees. (That's separate from the near impossibility of severing a spar from the wingtip end.)

Rex Barber was given the official person who shot down the plane. DP

 

[mikewint]

Did it leak before the end of the war?

At this point in time Yamamoto was the most hated man in the US, the Osama bin Laden of his time. The Japanese Navy, relied on coded radio transmissions to send many of its most secret messages. American cryptanalysts had broken the latest version of the JN-25 code just in time for the Battle of Midway in June 1942. In early April 1943, Yamamoto planned a one-day inspection trip from Rabaul to bases around the southern tip of Bougainville. In preparation, his staff sent the itinerary to local commanders. Although the staff wanted Yamamoto's schedule hand-delivered to Bougainville, Japan's Eighth Fleet naval headquarters was so confident in the security of the JN-25 code that it sent the message by radio.
The decoded itinerary not only included the date and precise times for Yamamoto's upcoming visits to the bases on Bougainville, but also revealed that he would be flying in a twin-engine bomber escorted by only six fighter planes.

Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, conferred with Commander Edwin T. Layton, his chief intelligence officer. No Marine or Navy fighter aircraft had the range to intercept Yamamoto's flight and a carrier could not get close enough without being detected therefore the only option was P-38 Lightning fighters based on Guadalcanal.
Nimitz knew that if the Japanese thought Yamamoto had been ambushed, they would suspect their code had been broken and change it. He decided the risk was worth it, because the Japanese had no one of comparable stature to replace Yamamoto. To be safe, he and Layton concocted a cover story: that Australian coastwatchers hiding in the jungles of Rabaul had tipped them off.

Nimitz ordered Admiral William F. Halsey, commanding the area of operations that included Guadalcanal, to get Yamamoto. Like Nimitz, Halsey was concerned the mission would endanger their code-breaking secrets. Nimitz said he would assume responsibility for the risk. Halsey's headquarters transmitted the order: "Talleyho. Let's get the bastard."

On April 18 at 7:10 a.m., 18 P-38s took off from the Fighter II airstrip on Guadalcanal. Each twin-boom fighter was fitted with external fuel tanks to extend its range to over 1,000 miles. A flat tire on takeoff and a mechanical failure reduced the flight to 16 planes.
Shortly before 10 a.m. near Empress Augusta Bay on Bougainville, the American pilots spotted two Japanese G4M Betty bombers and their escorting A6M Zero fighters. The P-38s quickly downed both bombers one into the jungle and the second into the sea.

At every stage, planners had stressed the need for secrecy. But even before the P-38s had landed, security was compromised. As the returning planes neared Guadalcanal, Lanphier radioed to the control tower: "That son of a bitch will not be dictating any peace terms in the White House." Lanphier's announcement was shocking to others on the mission. Air-to-ground messages were broadcast in the clear, and the Japanese monitored American aviation frequencies. Lanphier's message left little to the imagination. Bystanders on Guadalcanal, including a young navy officer named John F. Kennedy, watched as Lanphier executed a victory roll over the field before landing. "I got him!" Lanphier announced to the crowd after climbing out of his cockpit. "I got that son of a bitch. I got Yamamoto."

Halsey and Nimitz heard of the success from a secure message. He passed along his congratulations to the "hunters," saying it sounded as though "one of the ducks in their bag was a peacock." Meanwhile, U.S. officials were trying to make it appear as if the attack on Yamamoto had been sheer happenstance. Over the next few weeks, they repeatedly sent P-38s to Balalae to give the impression that the long journey was a regular mission for American fighter patrols. Additionally, American officials made no public statements to suggest they knew that Yamamoto had been killed. Despite their best-laid plans, officials had forgotten to factor in human nature: people talk.

The secret spread quickly on Guadalcanal. Servicemen openly discussed the mission's details, which soon became common knowledge on the island. With men arriving and leaving every day, the truth was impossible to contain. Eventually, the story spread so widely that it became the subject of cocktail party gossip in Washington.
Chatty pilots became the most serious threat to the code-breaking secret. After the successful mission, the two fliers credited with downing Yamamoto—Lanphier and Barber—enjoyed 10 days of leave in New Zealand. The two were golfing with Brigadier General Dean Strother when an Associated Press correspondent, J. Norman Lodge, approached them. The reporter seemed to know a lot about the Yamamoto mission and, using an old reporter's trick, asked the pilots to just clarify some details. Amazingly, Lanphier and Barber talked candidly and freely about the mission. On May 11, 1943, Lodge filed his story with the censors for transmission back home. Although he did not mention the breaking of Japanese codes, he wrote that American "intelligence had trailed Yamamoto for five days" and that American pilots had specifically targeted him. The story included Lanphier's description of the mission and quoted Strother as saying that the U.S. military had known Yamamoto's itinerary.

If Lodge's story had seen the light of day, the JN-25 code might have quickly become a thing of the past. Not only did his story show that the United States knew of Yamamoto's death, which Japan had not announced, but also that the Americans had known Yamamoto's location. No Australian coastwatcher would have known his precise schedule; a compromised JN-25 code was the only explanation.
The censors could not believe what they read. They quickly passed the story up the chain of command. Nimitz immediately ordered Halsey to "secure and seal in safe" Lodge's notes and story. He told Halsey to "initiate immediate corrective measures and take disciplinary action as warranted."

Lanphier, Barber, and Strother returned from leave to find a summons to meet Halsey on his flagship. When they arrived, an irate Halsey refused to return their salutes and simply stared at them. When he finally erupted, As Barger later recounted: he started in on a tirade of profanity the like of which I had never heard before. He accused us of everything he could think of from being traitors to our country to being so stupid that we had no right to wear the American uniform. He said we were horrible examples of pilots of the Army Air Force, that we should be court-martialed, reduced to privates, and jailed for talking to Lodge about the Yamamoto mission.

Halsey eventually reduced their Medal of Honor recommendations to the second-highest valor award, Navy Crosses.

On May 21, 1943, just over a month after the mission, Japan announced that Yamamoto had met a "gallant death on a war plane" while "engaged in combat with the enemy." It was front-page news in the United States.

American officials kept up their façade about not knowing what had happened. The U.S. Office of War Information told reporters it thought Yamamoto had been killed in a passenger plane crash between Bangkok and Singapore on April 7, 1943. Other news accounts claimed he might have taken his own life because of recent Japanese setbacks.
Then, two magazine articles poked holes in the American cover story.
The May 31, 1943, issue of Time magazine included a story on Yamamoto's death. It ended with: "When the name of the man who killed Admiral Yamamoto is released, the U.S. will have a new hero." That was incompatible with an accidental plane crash or suicide. In that same issue, another story described a mission in the South Pacific that mirrored Operation Vengeance. Although the story did not explicitly name Yamamoto, it described Lanphier shooting down a bomber and, on the way home, wondering if he "had nailed some Jap bigwig." The implication was clear: the United States knew its fliers killed Yamamoto.

Loose talk about the mission continued and was so prevalent that General Marshall wanted to make an example of any officer caught talking about it.

The story behind Operation Vengeance became public less than two weeks after Japan's formal surrender. "Yamamoto Death In Air Ambush Result of Breaking Foe's Code," blared a headline in the New York Times on September 10, 1945. The story, written by an Associated Press reporter, credited fellow reporter Lodge as the source for stating that Yamamoto had "met flaming death…because this country broke a Japanese code." American fliers, the Associated Press reported, "knew in advance the course his aerial convoy was to follow and ambushed him." Two years after he initially filed his story with the censors, Lodge finally had his scoop.

 

[mikewint]

All the reports I have read state that the sword was still on him.

Joe, I have another source which states:
Amada Sadayoshi's (maker of the sword) son has explained that the Admiral was hit by bullets. Three hit the sword made by his father...2 on the saya and 1 on the tsuka. The sword was returned to the Navy Headquarters in Tokyo and kept in a safe. The funeral procession carried his Gensui sword presented to him by the Emperor (not Amada's sword). Late in the war the Navy building received a direct hit from a bomb and the safe and the Sadayoshi sword was totally destroyed.

 

[pbehn]

At this point in time Yamamoto was the most hated man in the US, the Osama bin Laden of his time. The Japanese Navy, relied on coded radio transmissions to send many of its most secret messages. American cryptanalysts had broken the latest version of the JN-25 code just in time for the Battle of Midway in June 1942. In early April 1943, Yamamoto planned a one-day inspection trip from Rabaul to bases around the southern tip of Bougainville. In preparation, his staff sent the itinerary to local commanders. Although the staff wanted Yamamoto's schedule hand-delivered to Bougainville, Japan's Eighth Fleet naval headquarters was so confident in the security of the JN-25 code that it sent the message by radio.
The decoded itinerary not only included the date and precise times for Yamamoto's upcoming visits to the bases on Bougainville, but also revealed that he would be flying in a twin-engine bomber escorted by only six fighter planes.

Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, conferred with Commander Edwin T. Layton, his chief intelligence officer. No Marine or Navy fighter aircraft had the range to intercept Yamamoto's flight and a carrier could not get close enough without being detected therefore the only option was P-38 Lightning fighters based on Guadalcanal.
Nimitz knew that if the Japanese thought Yamamoto had been ambushed, they would suspect their code had been broken and change it. He decided the risk was worth it, because the Japanese had no one of comparable stature to replace Yamamoto. To be safe, he and Layton concocted a cover story: that Australian coastwatchers hiding in the jungles of Rabaul had tipped them off.

Nimitz ordered Admiral William F. Halsey, commanding the area of operations that included Guadalcanal, to get Yamamoto. Like Nimitz, Halsey was concerned the mission would endanger their code-breaking secrets. Nimitz said he would assume responsibility for the risk. Halsey's headquarters transmitted the order: "Talleyho. Let's get the bastard."

On April 18 at 7:10 a.m., 18 P-38s took off from the Fighter II airstrip on Guadalcanal. Each twin-boom fighter was fitted with external fuel tanks to extend its range to over 1,000 miles. A flat tire on takeoff and a mechanical failure reduced the flight to 16 planes.
Shortly before 10 a.m. near Empress Augusta Bay on Bougainville, the American pilots spotted two Japanese G4M Betty bombers and their escorting A6M Zero fighters. The P-38s quickly downed both bombers one into the jungle and the second into the sea.

At every stage, planners had stressed the need for secrecy. But even before the P-38s had landed, security was compromised. As the returning planes neared Guadalcanal, Lanphier radioed to the control tower: "That son of a bitch will not be dictating any peace terms in the White House." Lanphier's announcement was shocking to others on the mission. Air-to-ground messages were broadcast in the clear, and the Japanese monitored American aviation frequencies. Lanphier's message left little to the imagination. Bystanders on Guadalcanal, including a young navy officer named John F. Kennedy, watched as Lanphier executed a victory roll over the field before landing. "I got him!" Lanphier announced to the crowd after climbing out of his cockpit. "I got that son of a bitch. I got Yamamoto."

Halsey and Nimitz heard of the success from a secure message. He passed along his congratulations to the "hunters," saying it sounded as though "one of the ducks in their bag was a peacock." Meanwhile, U.S. officials were trying to make it appear as if the attack on Yamamoto had been sheer happenstance. Over the next few weeks, they repeatedly sent P-38s to Balalae to give the impression that the long journey was a regular mission for American fighter patrols. Additionally, American officials made no public statements to suggest they knew that Yamamoto had been killed. Despite their best-laid plans, officials had forgotten to factor in human nature: people talk.

The secret spread quickly on Guadalcanal. Servicemen openly discussed the mission's details, which soon became common knowledge on the island. With men arriving and leaving every day, the truth was impossible to contain. Eventually, the story spread so widely that it became the subject of cocktail party gossip in Washington.
Chatty pilots became the most serious threat to the code-breaking secret. After the successful mission, the two fliers credited with downing Yamamoto—Lanphier and Barber—enjoyed 10 days of leave in New Zealand. The two were golfing with Brigadier General Dean Strother when an Associated Press correspondent, J. Norman Lodge, approached them. The reporter seemed to know a lot about the Yamamoto mission and, using an old reporter's trick, asked the pilots to just clarify some details. Amazingly, Lanphier and Barber talked candidly and freely about the mission. On May 11, 1943, Lodge filed his story with the censors for transmission back home. Although he did not mention the breaking of Japanese codes, he wrote that American "intelligence had trailed Yamamoto for five days" and that American pilots had specifically targeted him. The story included Lanphier's description of the mission and quoted Strother as saying that the U.S. military had known Yamamoto's itinerary.

If Lodge's story had seen the light of day, the JN-25 code might have quickly become a thing of the past. Not only did his story show that the United States knew of Yamamoto's death, which Japan had not announced, but also that the Americans had known Yamamoto's location. No Australian coastwatcher would have known his precise schedule; a compromised JN-25 code was the only explanation.
The censors could not believe what they read. They quickly passed the story up the chain of command. Nimitz immediately ordered Halsey to "secure and seal in safe" Lodge's notes and story. He told Halsey to "initiate immediate corrective measures and take disciplinary action as warranted."

Lanphier, Barber, and Strother returned from leave to find a summons to meet Halsey on his flagship. When they arrived, an irate Halsey refused to return their salutes and simply stared at them. When he finally erupted, As Barger later recounted: he started in on a tirade of profanity the like of which I had never heard before. He accused us of everything he could think of from being traitors to our country to being so stupid that we had no right to wear the American uniform. He said we were horrible examples of pilots of the Army Air Force, that we should be court-martialed, reduced to privates, and jailed for talking to Lodge about the Yamamoto mission.

Halsey eventually reduced their Medal of Honor recommendations to the second-highest valor award, Navy Crosses.

On May 21, 1943, just over a month after the mission, Japan announced that Yamamoto had met a "gallant death on a war plane" while "engaged in combat with the enemy." It was front-page news in the United States.

American officials kept up their façade about not knowing what had happened. The U.S. Office of War Information told reporters it thought Yamamoto had been killed in a passenger plane crash between Bangkok and Singapore on April 7, 1943. Other news accounts claimed he might have taken his own life because of recent Japanese setbacks.
Then, two magazine articles poked holes in the American cover story.
The May 31, 1943, issue of Time magazine included a story on Yamamoto's death. It ended with: "When the name of the man who killed Admiral Yamamoto is released, the U.S. will have a new hero." That was incompatible with an accidental plane crash or suicide. In that same issue, another story described a mission in the South Pacific that mirrored Operation Vengeance. Although the story did not explicitly name Yamamoto, it described Lanphier shooting down a bomber and, on the way home, wondering if he "had nailed some Jap bigwig." The implication was clear: the United States knew its fliers killed Yamamoto.

Loose talk about the mission continued and was so prevalent that General Marshall wanted to make an example of any officer caught talking about it.

The story behind Operation Vengeance became public less than two weeks after Japan's formal surrender. "Yamamoto Death In Air Ambush Result of Breaking Foe's Code," blared a headline in the New York Times on September 10, 1945. The story, written by an Associated Press reporter, credited fellow reporter Lodge as the source for stating that Yamamoto had "met flaming death…because this country broke a Japanese code." American fliers, the Associated Press reported, "knew in advance the course his aerial convoy was to follow and ambushed him." Two years after he initially filed his story with the censors, Lodge finally had his scoop.

Great post Mike. I seem to remember there was some sort of cover story about locals or spies advising on Yamamotos movements to explain the interception.

 

[mikewint]

To be safe, he and Layton concocted a cover story: that Australian coastwatchers hiding in the jungles of Rabaul had tipped them off.

 

[gumbyk]

I generally agree, however its not as wild as it may seem, although bougainville in particular is a hotbed of simmering land ownership disputes. just for the record, Bougainville is not part of PNG. it is a separate state, quite independent of the Port Moresby administration

The issue fuelling the problem is land ownership. it is quite reasonable for landowners to want admission fees paid for access onto their land. the problem is that land ownership in the Solomons is not defined by survey or government record. its governed by tribal ownership, passed down by word of mouth, often on the basis of handshake deals. If money is likely to be derived from ownership, in an impoverished, uneducated society like the Solomons, its not hard to work out what is likely to happen.

but it is possible to view these sites in relative safety, you just need the permissions. that's best arranged via the organized tour parties

Nocookies

Yeah, I know PNG, Bougainville, and the Solomons are different countries, and I also understand the reasons for Bougainville being that hotbed of resentment (mainly towards Australia). My comments were specific to PNG, and based on personal experience, both mine and people I know.
It doesn't matter what permission you have in PNG, someone can change their mind on a whim and you're screwed.

 

[DAI PHAN]

I believe the wreckage should be ferried back to the States and have its place in a museum where people can appreciate its history. Leaving to rot in the jungle is a disservice to its legacy. Am I the owner of a piece of the highly valuable and historical significant wreck in our modern time history ??? Dai

 

[rochie]

I believe the wreckage should be ferried back to the States and have its place in a museum where people can appreciate its history. Leaving to rot in the jungle is a disservice to its legacy. Am I the owner of a piece of the highly valuable and historical significant wreck in our modern time history ??? Dai

Why America ?
If it was to be moved, why not back to Japan ?

 

[mikewint]

Dai, I don't mean to "Harsh your mellow" and/or "rain on your parade" BUT... As I and others have posted UNLESS you have a serial number and/or an independently verified chain of custody document by a recognized authority you can believe what you want but it has no standing. If you have your piece analyzed by a reputable firm AND the paint and metal are consistent with KNOWN Japanese usage at the time (Yamamoto's Betty was brand new) ALL you can say is that what you have could POSSIBLY be from the aircraft.
Ron Cole's "say so" is insufficient, as is the "say so" of the excavators. Even if I had pictures of myself at the crash site holding a piece of metal does not mean that the piece I send you came from that source.
One has only to look at the trade in religious relics. The number of pieces of the "True Cross" could make a small forest.
So in short: The check is in the mail...Of course I'll respect you in the morning...This hurts me more than it hurts you....I'm from the government and I'm here to help you...I can quit any time....I love the gift...Of course I'll warn you before...

 

[DAI PHAN]

Dai, I don't mean to "Harsh your mellow" and/or "rain on your parade" BUT... As I and others have posted UNLESS you have a serial number and/or an independently verified chain of custody document by a recognized authority you can believe what you want but it has no standing. If you have your piece analyzed by a reputable firm AND the paint and metal are consistent with KNOWN Japanese usage at the time (Yamamoto's Betty was brand new) ALL you can say is that what you have could POSSIBLY be from the aircraft.
Ron Cole's "say so" is insufficient, as is the "say so" of the excavators. Even if I had pictures of myself at the crash site holding a piece of metal does not mean that the piece I send you came from that source.
One has only to look at the trade in religious relics. The number of pieces of the "True Cross" could make a small forest.
So in short: The check is in the mail...Of course I'll respect you in the morning...This hurts me more than it hurts you....I'm from the government and I'm here to help you...I can quit any time....I love the gift...Of course I'll warn you before...

Fully agreed. DP

 

[swampyankee]

The Hitler diaries got as far as being serialised in the newspapers before being exposed as a fraud.

I wouldn't be surprised if some people still think they were genuine.