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Luftwaffe pilots had a thorough training program before and during the early stages of the war. This included glider school and then advancing to the powered schools where many pilots even crossed trained on the various aircraft (single multiple engined airframes) available at that time.
I see mention of high pilot losses (the plague) and am wondering if this was a result of the Luftwaffe reducing pilot training requirements in order to get pilots into the air quicker.
The cultural explanation is important, I agree. I'm looking for more evidence, or at least quotes, on the topic.USAF had a reputation of doing things more "by-the-book" while the USN was reputed to be more of a 'seat-of-the-pants' operation.
You are aware that the majority of transfer pilots were civil pilots, employed by either the manufacturers delivering new aircraft or by the Luftwaffe for ferrying existing aircraft for repair or refitting.
The quality of training could be called into question regarding these pilots and when one crashed, it had to be investigated by the Luftwaffe, because it involved military property.
So in those reports, how many accidents involved civil pilots and how many were qualified Luftwaffe pilots, any idea?
[This] led to a relatively low aviation discipline within the entire Air Force, which in turn resulted in regular complaints by the Air Force leadership. ... [Field Marshall O-11 rank Erhard] Milch complained about declining aviation discipline and mentioned the loss rates during transfer [long-distance change of base] flights, on the order of 20% damaged or destroyed [in Fall 1942]. [In comparison,] the overall American losses during transport flights from the US across the At- lantic Ocean [were 1.2%].
The Air Force Leadership Staff mainly blamed the pilots' carelessness, who would laugh about accidents they survived, without any embarrassment. In the case of the Air Force, this was not simply the result of the intensifying war... [Fa- mous pilot Werner] Mölders noted as early as 1935 in his diary that there were very many accidents due to lack of discipline, and[General Adolf] Galland's bi- ographers noted that accidents were a daily occurrence in 1938.
If not storage, how many went to other nations, such as the USAF's Night Fighter unit (416th/425th), 802nd recon (8th recon sqdrn/8th weather recon) and the 25th BG?...many of the Mossies produced would have been delivered into storage.
Interesting work, thanks for making it available.
The Front-Line Mosquito strength in the west was 885 aircraft at the start of November '44. During the 6-month period from the start of November '44 to the end of April '45, according to my figures, the front-line units lost 243 Mosquitos to accidents, and 295 in action (all causes - flak, aircraft, misadventure, etc) I make that a 27.5% loss to accidents and 33.3% loss to operational causes.
Also U.S. WAAC (Women Army Auxilery Corps), U.S. Navy WAVES (Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service) did ferry serviceUS and UK ferry pilots, under US WASP and the British ATA, were civilian organizations. In Fall of 1944, the WASP were disbanded as the USAAF had sufficient military pilots.
Very interesting! 27% is very similar to the Luftwaffe numbers in the "good years." Is there any chance of finding similar data for other RAF aircraft? I don't have a sense of whether the Mosquitos were more or less accident prone than other aircraft. I suppose many of their operations were at night, which would make landings harder. (But was blackout still being observed that late in the war?)
I would love to put this into the paper as a comparison. Perhaps I can find similar data for USAF.