Pursuit to the German Border. September 1944.

[davebender]

It didn't really matter how much we bombed any of the ports anyway, did the Germans move out of any without doing their utmost to destroy them first?

I don't buy that excuse.

Withdrawing German military units typically blocked the port itself but they did not destroy the surrounding city. If the city remains intact it's a lot easier to repair the port.

 

[tyrodtom]

Rouen was also a major rail terminus very close to Normandy, it certainly wouldn't be smart to leave that operational during the invasion.

Will you buy that excuse? That's the whole problem with leaving any ports or major rail lines intact, already pointed out by a previous poster, they can be used both ways.
And they will be used first by the Germans to counter the invasion.

 

[Shortround6]

"Cutting" rail lines doesn't work very well. Even a 1000lb bomb hitting directly on a rail line can be repaired ( probably not to 100%) in just a few days. Fill in the hole, tamp, put down the gravel road bed, replace ties and rails. Rip up ties and rails from a little used siding if you have too. It takes labor but but requires little in raw materials or tooling. This is why they went after marshaling yards. The chances of hitting something were much better. A whole bunch of parallel tracks and the switches (points) required more labor to make and install than straight track.
The Allies had over two years of bombing railroads and assessing damage (including spies on the ground) to figure out what they needed to do.
If you become predictable in the locations you bomb it becomes that much easier for the enemy to set up Flak traps.

 

[tyrodtom]

And at Rouen there would no doubt be a major marshalling yard.

 

[syscom3]

The Allies needed a port. Everything I've read about this time states that the Allies had overstretched their supply lines. I believe that was the first priority at the time - supply.

Which why Antwerp and the estuary was so important.

Shortround6 ; The allies found that bombing marshaling yards in order to damage them was largely ineffective. The Germans could get the primary lines back in operation in a matter of hours. However, the allies did note that marshaling yards are usually full of rail cars and engines. Of which wrecking them is often a better deal. What good is a railroad if you have no rolling stock.

 

[davebender]

I agree. You need to destroy bridges the rail lines pass over.

 

[tyrodtom]

Any one railway is only going to have so many people availible to repair cut rail lines. Cutting several rail lines in multiple areas can overtax the manpower on hand. And that was all that was required just before and right after D-Day. They didn't want to complelty destroy the rail lines, just temporaily disable them.

 

[syscom3]

Any one railway is only going to have so many people availible to repair cut rail lines. Cutting several rail lines in multiple areas can overtax the manpower on hand. And that was all that was required just before and right after D-Day. They didn't want to complelty destroy the rail lines, just temporaily disable them.

The germans never had a problem in finding enough people to repair the railroads. Forced conscription at the point of a gun solved that issue.

As for allied intention for destroying the lines in France and the Netherlands? The allies wanted them wrecked to the point they were useless, many times over. It was imperative that the Germans could not use them in any capacity to move reinforcements to Normandy.

 

[tyrodtom]

Then the only way I can think of to disable a rail system long term is to take out major bridges, or tunnels. Neither is easy to do, because it takes fair amout of precision with big bombs. How many bridges and tunnels did the allies destroy in France?
True the Germans had a pretty large potential labor pool, but every civilian dragooned into repairing railways, is one less to dig anti-tank ditches and build fortifications.

 

[stona]

True the Germans had a pretty large potential labor pool, but every civilian dragooned into repairing railways, is one less to dig anti-tank ditches and build fortifications.

A shortage of labour was a real problem by 1944. So much so that the concentration camp administration sought to induce camp commandants to take measures to prolong the lives of their forced labourers, who in 1944 were becoming a more precious commodity. It only worked to a statistically minor extent.

Steve

 

[Ferdinand Foch]

I'm with syscom and Njaco on this one. By September, the Allies were running low on supplies. There was just enough supplies left for one more major push
at this time. If were thinking of Market-Garden, it did offer a way into the Ruhr Valley in a quick manner-provided that everything went according to plan. We all
know how that ended. Again, the biggest thing that armies like this need are supplies. BT has a quote that I respect, about how great generals think of logistics
instead of tactics. Unless supplies could have been delivered quickly enough to the front in great quantity, the Allies are going nowhere. Even if they took Aachen,
then what? Would have even have enough gas, ammo, etc. to exploit that? Probably not. In regards to Ike's Broad Front strategy, I think the rationale behind was
that one major push could end up being surrounded by the Germans. With the Broad Front idea, the German's would have to defend several points of attack at
once, using up their manpower and resources. Anyway, I'm starting to ramble.