This might have been true of B.12/36, from which the Stirling came, but not of P.13/36, from which the Manchester/Lancaster and the Halifax by way of the HP.56, which were designed to be smaller overall than the aircraft of B.12/36, twin instead of four engines. On both specs gun turrets were mandatory for defence. The Hali certainly had a large enough fuse to carry troops and was used in that role, but it was somewhat larger than the HP.56 design. Which ever way you look at it, you're not going to get 24 troops in the fuselage of the Manchester/Lancaster!
Merlin has a point. This would or should be number one priority. A more defensive stance in late 1940 should be applied to all the services across the entire country; shoring up the barricades for the night bombing offensive, at the expense of other commands if need be. As with the rest of you, no leaning into France; a waste of resources. The first priority is night fighter defences. Let's look at the options post BoB:
Blenheim; obsolescent but a necessity since there is a desperate shortage of suitable aircraft, but once these come on line the Blenheims should go to OTUs. Their radar is an advance, but proved faulty in service, plus the Blenheims were so slow, they often couldn't catch the enemy bombers. Bring Blenheim production to a standstill and concentrate on bringing Beaufighters in their place on the production lines.
Beaufighter; not available in large numbers initially, plus, very difficult for pilots used to the benign handling of the Blenheim and Defiant to get used to. There were a large number of crashes at OTU level as a result. This was largely from the Beaufighter Mk.II with its Merlins, whose handling was described as 'evil', but these are also necessary; an evil handling Beaufighter is better than no evil handling Beaufighter in the numbers game. Advanced specific training at OTU level to assist tyro pilots to get round its handling issues. Beaufighters were hampered in service by the radar sets also and the type really didn't get into service in suitable numbers to replace interim types until early '42 as a result of technical difficulties - much effort should be expended to sort electronic issues out to facilitate smoother radar ops for British night fighters.
Defiant: As a result of the Beaufighter's unexpected troublesome introduction into service, the Defiant rose in importance. Although not ideal, it had little or no vices in its entry into night fighter service, plus it was available in numbers. BP had been building Defiants for more than a year or so, so the two squadrons that served in the BoB can be bolstered by fresh production examples used strictly for new night fighter units. Little can be done with the Defiant; it's not going to get any faster and the Daffy Mk.II is also having trouble with its radar, but it's better than nothing. Once Beaufighters come on line, the Defiants can be sent to OTUs (the largest Defiant operator was 60 night fighter OTU).
Hurricane: In my scenario, the Hurricane takes on greater prominence as a night fighter. Since day fighter units are not going to be so busy on offensive ops, I propose that day Hurri squadrons (not all, though) convert to strictly night ops, along with new build Hurricanes, with crews going through OTUs for specialist training. Once the 'thin wing' Tornado/Typhoon is sorted out, it would replace the Hurricane in production altogether, since it was approaching obsolescence by 1942 - 43, and go into service as the RAF's single-seat night fighter.
Mosquito: By the end of BoB the DH.98 prototype had not yet flown, but a spec for a night fighter variant had been issued, so little can be done to the Mossie's timeline that wasn't done in reality. The idea of building the Mossie with a tail turret can be canned for certain!!! Perhaps anticipating a need and establishing production facilities (for engines as well - Canadian Mossies had Packard Merlins) in Canada and Australia from the outset when the type was ordered?
OTUs: More specialist night fighter OTUs are required, with radar operations taking prominence. Experienced aircrews on front line squadrons would naturally be given a tour of the OTUs to facilitate training, and to give them a bit of a rest.
New designs: In July 1940 Spec F.18/40 for a new night fighter was issued, in December it was altered to incorporate a turret - scrap that and continue it without said appendage. The Gloster Reaper was one aircraft conceived to this, but it wasn't progressed with because Gloster didn't have the resources to work on jets simultaneously to setting up production for the Reaper. Jets are obviously important for the future, so that cannot be interrupted. Two options are available here. Another firm, Boulton Paul or Miles perhaps could put the Reaper into production as a twin engine fighter bomber/night fighter, photo recon platform, estimating an in-service date to suppliment Mossies and Beaufighters in 1942, or option two undertake Mosquito production (easier for Miles than Boulton Paul) and can the F.18/40 spec altogether.
Another option is looking to the USA. Traditionally, Douglas Havocs arrived for RAF service since the US didn't have a specialised night fighter in late 1940, but the Havoc was slow, like the Defiant and Blenheim, but it bolstered numbers. Perhaps a Lockheed Lightning night fighter derivative? We are straying into other threads here.
That's the aircraft side of things, obviously greater defensive measures around the country would be put in place to combat the German bombers and deter their use of sophisticated radio nav aids.
Once the bombing offensive - in late 1940 no one could judge when this might happen - the next step in the plan would be to look at offensive elements and improving the RAF's strike capabilities. Traditionally, the German invasion of Russia gave the British some breathing space, so once the bombing offensive against Britain eases, step two can be acted on. This involves improving Bomber Command and crucially, Army Co-operation Command, which takes on increased importance in my scenario.
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