RAF after BoB: mid-term strategy, tactics technology?
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Shortround6
Major General
Leaving out the P-38 and P-39 you have;
The P-40 contracts.
The P-51 contract.
The Martin Maryland.
Martin Baltimore.
Lockheed Hudson.
Lockheed Ventura.
Some B-24s (or Liberator IIs) were ordered in 1941, no turbos and with British turrets total 14 .303 guns.
Some others?
The P-40 contracts.
The P-51 contract.
The Martin Maryland.
Martin Baltimore.
Lockheed Hudson.
Lockheed Ventura.
Some B-24s (or Liberator IIs) were ordered in 1941, no turbos and with British turrets total 14 .303 guns.
Some others?
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Shortround6
Major General
Not sure, if the British don't get a plane to test in England until 4 months after Pearl Harbor it gets a little hard to figure out what was going on. Since the planes were sent by ship through the Panama Canal perhaps the British did a bit of test flying at the factory? In any case the last of the British order wound up be competed as 28 P-38F-13-LO for the USAAF, 121 as P-38F-15-LO, 174 as P-38G-13-LO, and 200 as P-38G-15-LO.
Which is an indication (but not proof) of where the British order slotted into the production schedule.
No the other single-engine Hercules design was favoured over the Bristol designs - the Boulton-Paul P.88A - interestingly enough if you follow the 'link' you'll see I commented on it there!
Just to reiterate how divorced from the political realities of the British war effort in 1940 this is, it is worth quoting Churchill as of 3rd September 1940.
"The Navy can lose us the war, but only the Air Force can win it. Therefore our supreme effort must be to gain overwhelming mastery of the Air. The Fighters are our salvation, but the bombers alone provide the means of victory. We must therefore develop the power to carry on an ever increasing volume of explosives to Germany so as to pulverize the entire industry and scientific structure on which the war effort and economic life of the enemy depends, while holding him at arms length in our Island. In no other way at present visible can we hope to overcome the immense military power of Germany, and to nullify the further German victories which may be apprehended as the weight of their forces is brought to bear upon African or Oriental theatres. The Air Force and its action on the largest scale must, therefore, subject to what is said later, claim the first place over the Navy or the Army."
The italics are mine.
The Battle of the Atlantic was perceived as a naval battle (which only the Navy could lose, or, as it did, win). It was as a direct result of this memorandum that Portal's initial list of twenty German cities to be attacked was drawn up.
Cheers
Steve
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yulzari
Staff Sergeant
In September 1940 this matched political reality. This was the only way for Commonwealth forces to strike at Germany in the absence of allies. The underlying political aim was to involve USA and USSR as a prelude to a land assault on Germany one day but an air assault was the only realistic option to keep on carrying the war to Germany as things stood then. Otherwise the war would have settled into a stalemate whereby Germany had contained Britain.
Certainly Churchillian hyperbole was in full flight and is a statement of the will to prosecute the war offensively and not sit back defensively. He defines the risk of a failure in the Atlantic but determines to take the risk to seek an eventual victory. He was a horrible man but as a leader he set the right tone.
What else could we seriously advise at that date? Now, with hindsight, we can see how weak the effort would be and the years it would take to grow an effective night bomber force. In the context of this thread the issue is to see how the resources could have been better used. For me navigation is the key. All else will follow. Nothing can be a better force multiplier than accuracy. Then Intelligence so that the accuracy can be directed to best effect. The airframes, engines and the all too vulnerable crews can then follow in the plan. Even improved bombs will multiply our putative night bomber force. So, if we can get them over the right target with the best bombs for the bomb load that can be carried wen will do better with a force of Whitleys than five times as many Stirlings operating as IOTL.
Certainly Churchillian hyperbole was in full flight and is a statement of the will to prosecute the war offensively and not sit back defensively. He defines the risk of a failure in the Atlantic but determines to take the risk to seek an eventual victory. He was a horrible man but as a leader he set the right tone.
What else could we seriously advise at that date? Now, with hindsight, we can see how weak the effort would be and the years it would take to grow an effective night bomber force. In the context of this thread the issue is to see how the resources could have been better used. For me navigation is the key. All else will follow. Nothing can be a better force multiplier than accuracy. Then Intelligence so that the accuracy can be directed to best effect. The airframes, engines and the all too vulnerable crews can then follow in the plan. Even improved bombs will multiply our putative night bomber force. So, if we can get them over the right target with the best bombs for the bomb load that can be carried wen will do better with a force of Whitleys than five times as many Stirlings operating as IOTL.
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The bombing campaign(s) would also be used as a sop to the Soviet Union by both the British and Americans to help soften the blow of their inability to launch a 1943 invasion of occupied Europe.
The politics of war will always override purely tactical military considerations and exert a not always benign, sometimes even malign, influence on strategy.
Cheers
Steve
The politics of war will always override purely tactical military considerations and exert a not always benign, sometimes even malign, influence on strategy.
Cheers
Steve
Shortround6
Major General
It also didn't need to be all or nothing either way.
The Sterling wouldn't have been a very good ASW aircraft or VLM. While it could carry a large bomb load over a short distance this didn't trade off into long range very well and for long range missions it just burned up a lot more fuel to carry very little more bomb load than the twin engine planes like the Wellington or Whitley.
From the RAF website:
Whitley V......1,650 miles (2,661km) with 4,000lb (1,816kg) bombload
Stirling III.......2,010 miles (3,242km) with 3,500lb (1,589kg) bombload
The Early Liberators weren't much use over Europe, they didn't have power turrets or turbos and were used as maritime patrol planes. First 20 equipped one Squadron of coastal command staring in June of 1941. Of the next 140, they equipped 3 coastal command squadrons and two bomber command squadrons. But the first of Liberator IIs doesn't go into service until Jan 1942. Some of the Liberator IIs were used as unarmed transports.
A LOT of Bomber Command's operations achieved little more than propaganda or morale results for quite some time. But those results were also important.
Better results could have been achieved and perhaps should have been.
Too much importance was placed on numbers or "head lines" in the propaganda war.
The Sterling wouldn't have been a very good ASW aircraft or VLM. While it could carry a large bomb load over a short distance this didn't trade off into long range very well and for long range missions it just burned up a lot more fuel to carry very little more bomb load than the twin engine planes like the Wellington or Whitley.
From the RAF website:
Whitley V......1,650 miles (2,661km) with 4,000lb (1,816kg) bombload
Stirling III.......2,010 miles (3,242km) with 3,500lb (1,589kg) bombload
The Early Liberators weren't much use over Europe, they didn't have power turrets or turbos and were used as maritime patrol planes. First 20 equipped one Squadron of coastal command staring in June of 1941. Of the next 140, they equipped 3 coastal command squadrons and two bomber command squadrons. But the first of Liberator IIs doesn't go into service until Jan 1942. Some of the Liberator IIs were used as unarmed transports.
A LOT of Bomber Command's operations achieved little more than propaganda or morale results for quite some time. But those results were also important.
Better results could have been achieved and perhaps should have been.
Too much importance was placed on numbers or "head lines" in the propaganda war.
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The Italian Campaign didn't count?
The landings were late in 1943 (September IIRC) and were not what or where the Soviets wanted and allied invasion to be.
The impact on German operations against the Russians on that Front is debatable, but this probably isn't the place for that debate. Suffice to say that around the time that the Western Allies became bogged down in Italy the Soviets had pushed the Germans back 200-250 km on the central and southern sectors of the Eastern Front without any help from the Western Allies.
Think of Soviet advances at Orel, the Belgograd/Kharkov salient, crossing the Donets (both sides of Izium). The Soviets crossed the Mius near Kuibyshev. The Donets basin (Donbas much in the news today) was entirely lost by the Germans. In the south Army Group South's 4th Panzer Army had been forced back to the Dnieper and Army Group Centre's 2nd Army had been forced back behind the Dnieper and Sosh rivers. Army Group Centre in its entirety fell back to positions east of Vitbesk along the Pronia river. I could go on.
Against this Allied operations in Italy are less significant. In the various military conferences held throughout this period Italy is only ever worthy of a few lines. In one situation report at the 'Wolfsschanze' in late October Jodl, assured the Fuhrer that he need not worry about any further allied landings in Italy. Hitler's response is illuminating.
"...he won't land anymore. He's much to cowardly for that. This landing in Salerno he did in agreement with the Italians."
There was remarkably little concern for Italy. In early October the Red Army was starting an advance that would end in Berlin, and it knew it. So did some German Generals.
We've already veered a bit off topic.
Cheers
Steve
- Thread starter
- #91
Wasn't the rotation of the Griffon stipulated by the admiralty? It had to rotate opposite to a merlin so that the torque would take a plane away from the tower not in to it I believe I read years ago.
Sicily (Husky) was July. That was hardly an invasion of mainland Europe. Even the most republican of Italians will concede that Sicily is an island in the Mediterranean Sea. I'm sure the Russians would have agreed. The invasion of mainland Italy was indeed in September, initially the 3rd and then the operation at Salerno on the 9th.
The major Soviet offensive followed on October 6th. This was launched on a front from Nevel to the Taman peninsula and built on the earlier successes. A large breach caused a broad gap in the front between Army Groups North and Centre. The 4th Panzer Army hung on to Kiev but the Germans were thrown back south east of Kremenchug (the defensive line on the Dnieper) and also on both sides of Dnepropetrovsk. The Russians also broke through near Melitopol on the Sea of Azov. They would go on to cut the land connection to the Crimea.
In the situation report of 26th October at which the catastrophic news from the Eastern Front was discussed the fighting in Italy warrants scant attention. It is noted that the 'English' and Americans are attacking positions on the Volturno and Biferno rivers but that they are being held. Positions are being prepared to the rear on the Carigliano and Sangro rivers to which a planned withdrawal would be made when necessary.
Cheers
Steve
Shortround6
Major General
Two squadrons of CC had been equipped with Whitleys in Oct 1940, perhaps a few more squadrons could have equipped over the winter or a better supply of replacement aircraft kept up?
Coastal Command didn't need dozens of squadrons equipped with 4 engine aircraft, at least in 1940/41. However a 1/2 dozen squadrons of long range aircraft might have paid good dividends.
From wiki: "By 1 December 1941 the situation was improving. Some 18 Consolidated Catalinas, nine Sunderlands, 20 Armstrong Whitworth Whitley and 170 American Hudsons. The Command's strike aircraft consisted of 60 Bristol Beaufort and 40 Bristol Beaufighters and 60 Blenheim fighter versions for a total of 397 aircraft in 18 squadrons."
Whitleys and Wellingtons could patrol at 600-700 miles from base but only at the cost of high crew fatigue. Please remember that to 'effectively' patrol a plane has to spend a number of hours at the distance form base, not just fly to and from the base. Later even the Liberators patrol distance was governed by a 14 hour flying limit rather than the fuel capacity.
Since the Germans did not have the number of U-boats in service in 1940/41 that they had later, sightings and sinkings would be rarer than later in the war but perhaps with the knowledge that the British were patrolling more effectively sooner the Germans might not have pushed the U-boat war quite as hard?
Coastal Command didn't need dozens of squadrons equipped with 4 engine aircraft, at least in 1940/41. However a 1/2 dozen squadrons of long range aircraft might have paid good dividends.
From wiki: "By 1 December 1941 the situation was improving. Some 18 Consolidated Catalinas, nine Sunderlands, 20 Armstrong Whitworth Whitley and 170 American Hudsons. The Command's strike aircraft consisted of 60 Bristol Beaufort and 40 Bristol Beaufighters and 60 Blenheim fighter versions for a total of 397 aircraft in 18 squadrons."
Whitleys and Wellingtons could patrol at 600-700 miles from base but only at the cost of high crew fatigue. Please remember that to 'effectively' patrol a plane has to spend a number of hours at the distance form base, not just fly to and from the base. Later even the Liberators patrol distance was governed by a 14 hour flying limit rather than the fuel capacity.
Since the Germans did not have the number of U-boats in service in 1940/41 that they had later, sightings and sinkings would be rarer than later in the war but perhaps with the knowledge that the British were patrolling more effectively sooner the Germans might not have pushed the U-boat war quite as hard?
- Thread starter
- #95
Indeed, my bad
Still, Hitler ordered a redeployment of some of his armed forces from SU to Italy.
parsifal
Colonel
The events in Italy and the Balkans had a direct and catastrophic effect on german operations in the east. it was not the actual invasion of Italy that caused the initial rupture. II SS Panzer Corps, which had spearheaded the attacks by 4th Panzer Army was withdrawn on the news that Mussolini had been deposed, which occurred 10 July. This action alone was directly responsible for the cancellation of the operations near Kursk, but more seriously left the germans without the capability of containing or countering soviet counteroffensives, which began in earnest at the beginning of August. By the end of september , the Italian situation, which included raising troop s to garrison or replace the 30 or so italian divs in the Balkans and Greece, had soaked up the equivalent of nearly 30 german divs. II SS was not able to return to east front operations until the end of November, by which time the heart had been torn out of AGS.
I SS Panzer XXX was formed 26 July, with the intention of sending it east as soon as possible. unlike IISS it never made it to the east. With the Italian crisis, it, like most of the other units being raised at this time was sent to Italy, to be ready for the disarming of the Italian forces when the expected surrender occurred.
Its fair to say that Italy was not a decisive front. but it is also untrue to say it had no effect. For a brief moment it caused a major rupture in the German ability to hold the initiative, which it lost as a result of both Kursk and the Italian surrender. After that, the germans never again regained the initiative, though they tried several times.
I SS Panzer XXX was formed 26 July, with the intention of sending it east as soon as possible. unlike IISS it never made it to the east. With the Italian crisis, it, like most of the other units being raised at this time was sent to Italy, to be ready for the disarming of the Italian forces when the expected surrender occurred.
Its fair to say that Italy was not a decisive front. but it is also untrue to say it had no effect. For a brief moment it caused a major rupture in the German ability to hold the initiative, which it lost as a result of both Kursk and the Italian surrender. After that, the germans never again regained the initiative, though they tried several times.
OldSkeptic
Senior Airman
- 509
- May 17, 2010
The 1940/41 period was disasterous for the British. They were all over the place in terms of strategy and went from disaster to disaster.
A large part of that was due to Churchill himself, never one for consistency.
What really mattered to them at that time were: clearing the Med and winning the Battle of the Atlantic. This guaranteed their logistics, without which they would have lost.
Juts clearing the Med was (according to Brooke) worth 2 million tons of shipping. They had to hold Malta, they had to win in North Africa, they had to destroy the Italian fleet and its merchant shipping.
Anything else was a luxury. What is amazing was how starved of air assets the NA/Malta campaign was and how the RAF fought against supplying them properly.
The BoA was an air/sea thing, but the Med was an air/sea/land war. They nearly won in North Africa, until they threw away that victory by going in the disaster of Greece.
A large part of that was due to Churchill himself, never one for consistency.
What really mattered to them at that time were: clearing the Med and winning the Battle of the Atlantic. This guaranteed their logistics, without which they would have lost.
Juts clearing the Med was (according to Brooke) worth 2 million tons of shipping. They had to hold Malta, they had to win in North Africa, they had to destroy the Italian fleet and its merchant shipping.
Anything else was a luxury. What is amazing was how starved of air assets the NA/Malta campaign was and how the RAF fought against supplying them properly.
The BoA was an air/sea thing, but the Med was an air/sea/land war. They nearly won in North Africa, until they threw away that victory by going in the disaster of Greece.
parsifal
Colonel
Greece was a no win situation whatever the brits decided. if they chose to do nothing, the minor allies, and even the major ones, would have seen it as a gross betrayal by the british. Politically, they were more or less forced down that burrow, given they were looking to stir things up in the Balkans and were worried about Turkish reactions to inaction.
As it turned out the benefits strategically outweighed the tactical losses that were suffered. Tying down German forces in the Balkans, brought about by yugoslavias emboldened repudiation of its forced alliance with Germany (mostly because of British efforts in Greece) combined with the length of time needed to overpower the greeks, put a serious dent in the Barbarossa timetable, forcing the jump off date from mid may to late June. It didn't cause the eventual collapse of the german assault on Moscow, but the reduced time for the summer offensive made it more difficult.
In addition the Germans found they needed to commit their airborne forces to the capture of Crete, and this proved to be an unrecoverable blood bath for them. In terms of the air situation, a large number of the transport pilots were instructors from the flight schools, that lost their lives in this operation. They recovered, just in time to lose large numbers allover again in a place called Stalingrad in the following year.
British strategy was anything but a mish mash. it was very clear, and deliberate and considered, and it worked a treat actually. After June 1940, Britain found herself without friends, and on the very edge of defeat. Winning where she could, whilst working ceaselessly to find friends that could help her became the number 1 priority, and in this Churchill was resoundingly successful. Britain went from being basically friendless, to having virtually the entire world on her side. that didn't just happen by accident. Churchill worked unflinchingly to use whatever means he could to achieve that grand alliance. sure, he was helped along the way by the stupidity of his opponents, but that alone would not ensure the movement of the world against the axis in the way that it did. Credit needs to be given where credit is due, and Churchill, and Britain, was responsible for the formation of the allied alliance. that was the strategy of 1940-41, and it was highly successful actually.
The notion that Britain could take Tripoli in 1940 to early 1941 is another one of those Axis smoke screens put out post war by people looking for any reason they can to criticise british strategy. There was never the slighte4st chance of that happening even with all the resources available in 1940 concentrated to that end. Britain simply lacked the MT to keep its army supplied at that distance.....the ports of Tobruch and benghasis were both wrecked and would required months to repair. The WDF was relying on supply lines that stretched all the way back to the delta, trying to cope with a road network heavily damaged. one of the major engineering achievements, seldom talked about in 1942 was the rapid repair of the Via balbia, and the rapid extension of the railway all the way to Tobruk, but in 1940 this capability did not exist. The only option available to the brits in 1940, if they wanted to continue to put pressure on the Italians was to attack in Greece. There was no "Tripoli option".
As it turned out the benefits strategically outweighed the tactical losses that were suffered. Tying down German forces in the Balkans, brought about by yugoslavias emboldened repudiation of its forced alliance with Germany (mostly because of British efforts in Greece) combined with the length of time needed to overpower the greeks, put a serious dent in the Barbarossa timetable, forcing the jump off date from mid may to late June. It didn't cause the eventual collapse of the german assault on Moscow, but the reduced time for the summer offensive made it more difficult.
In addition the Germans found they needed to commit their airborne forces to the capture of Crete, and this proved to be an unrecoverable blood bath for them. In terms of the air situation, a large number of the transport pilots were instructors from the flight schools, that lost their lives in this operation. They recovered, just in time to lose large numbers allover again in a place called Stalingrad in the following year.
British strategy was anything but a mish mash. it was very clear, and deliberate and considered, and it worked a treat actually. After June 1940, Britain found herself without friends, and on the very edge of defeat. Winning where she could, whilst working ceaselessly to find friends that could help her became the number 1 priority, and in this Churchill was resoundingly successful. Britain went from being basically friendless, to having virtually the entire world on her side. that didn't just happen by accident. Churchill worked unflinchingly to use whatever means he could to achieve that grand alliance. sure, he was helped along the way by the stupidity of his opponents, but that alone would not ensure the movement of the world against the axis in the way that it did. Credit needs to be given where credit is due, and Churchill, and Britain, was responsible for the formation of the allied alliance. that was the strategy of 1940-41, and it was highly successful actually.
The notion that Britain could take Tripoli in 1940 to early 1941 is another one of those Axis smoke screens put out post war by people looking for any reason they can to criticise british strategy. There was never the slighte4st chance of that happening even with all the resources available in 1940 concentrated to that end. Britain simply lacked the MT to keep its army supplied at that distance.....the ports of Tobruch and benghasis were both wrecked and would required months to repair. The WDF was relying on supply lines that stretched all the way back to the delta, trying to cope with a road network heavily damaged. one of the major engineering achievements, seldom talked about in 1942 was the rapid repair of the Via balbia, and the rapid extension of the railway all the way to Tobruk, but in 1940 this capability did not exist. The only option available to the brits in 1940, if they wanted to continue to put pressure on the Italians was to attack in Greece. There was no "Tripoli option".
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yulzari
Staff Sergeant
In 1940/41 Commonwealth forces had engaged Germany in Norway, Belgium and France. Withdrawn its expeditionary forces intact (if ill equipped) from the continent (together with a substantial French force). Engaged the Italian forces with a supply line that extended around the Cape, taken Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somaliland, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon whilst defending Britain against a seaborne invasion threat and an actual air assault as well as showing its determination to prosecute the war by the sad destruction of the French fleet and diverting forces to defend Greece and the Far East to the extent of sending an armoured division to Egypt whilst the invasion threat was at its highest. All against the background of a continuous naval battle from the Channel to the Indian Ocean and sending war resources to Russia in 1941. Not to mention starting a priority air assault against Germany.
The detail had to meet the exigencies of the moment and hindsight shows us where the execution was flawed but the strategy was clear. To risk defeat at home in order to clear the enemy from Africa and remove Italy from the war whilst acting to engage the USA and USSR in the war to allow a return to a continental assault on Germany from the west in concert with the night bombing campaign over Germany. A year later this is what happened.
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