RAF after BoB: mid-term strategy, tactics technology?

stona · Oct 18, 2014

And the Luftwaffe introduced the much improved Bf 109 F and the Fw 190 A, the latter designed from the get-go for a radial engine. The British took the only sensible option available to upgrade the Spitfire, and mucking about with radial engines certainly wasn't it!

In terms of "mid-term strategy, tactics and technology" a Hercules engine Spitfire is a complete non-starter.

Cheers

Steve

gjs238 · Oct 18, 2014

So should we move on then to the R-2800 powered P-51?

tomo pauk · Oct 18, 2014

This will be, hopefully, a less controversial idea:

wuzak · Oct 18, 2014

Edgar Brooks said:
I cannot understand this obsession with radial engines; the Hurricane is the same as the Spitfire, with a fuselage too narrow, and the firewall behind the wings' leading edges and level with the wingspars, so you're just not going to get the Hercules in.

Fair enough.

I never considered the Hurricane might have the same issue as the Spitfire - ie narrowness.

Edgar Brooks said:
There is an added complication, since the Hurricane was more touchy, with regard to CoG balance (they couldn't fit pilot's armour to the early Mk.I with two-blade prop, and had to have the three-blade fitted first.)

I never knew that the Hurricane was very sensative to CoG.

Edgar Brooks said:
The Hurricane was not relegated to secondary duties (unless you feel that the defence of Malta, the desert, and Atlantic convoys was secondary,) in fact the whole idea of fitting the Merlin XX + 20mm cannon was because of the expectation of the Battle of Britain restarting with the better weather; we know, now, that it didn't happen, but that wasn't known in December 1940.

I was thinking slightly longer term for the Hurricane doing secondary duties. A Hercules Hurricane - if it could be done - wasn't going to turn up any sooner than a Hercules Spitfire. ie not until 1942.

Edgar Brooks said:
There's also the consideration that it was expected that any fighting would be between 20,000'-30,000' (the 109s were flying above 20,000' before the BoB ended,) and the Hercules ran out of "puff" long before that.

Hence the suggestion that a Hercules Hurricane would work for low level ground attack, anti-tank and the like.

Shortround6 · Oct 19, 2014

Hercules as installed in a Beaufighter

Bare engine

The area/part of the engine behind the cylinder heads gets a lot smaller than 52 in real quick. Of course all that "stuff" (supercharger/carb, pumps, etc) behind the cylinders means you can't shorten the distance from the cylinder heads to the firewall by much so you still have the cg problem.

Edgar Brooks · Oct 19, 2014

wuzak said:
I never knew that the Hurricane was very sensative to CoG..

You're not the only one; as regular as clockwork comes the enquiry, "Why not fit the Griffon in the Hurricane?"
Camm had already thought of that, and submitted drawings, but it involved wholesale redrawing of the centre-section, with the stub-spars having to be raked forward, to bring the wings forward enough to retain a CoG balance. Camm was told to forget it, and concentrate on the Tornado/Typhoon.

I was thinking slightly longer term for the Hurricane doing secondary duties. A Hercules Hurricane - if it could be done - wasn't going to turn up any sooner than a Hercules Spitfire. ie not until 1942.

The Air Ministry had to put the expected fighting, in 1941, first, and the Typhoon had flown in March 1940, with the second prototype in May 1941.

Hence the suggestion that a Hercules Hurricane would work for low level ground attack, anti-tank and the like

Which Dowding had foreseen as being the province of the XX-powered IIC, in the event of a 1941 German invasion, which Mussolini effectively scuppered by mucking-up in the Mediterranean and needing German help, plus Hitler's plans for Russia.

Shortround6 · Oct 19, 2014

Edgar Brooks said:
You're not the only one; as regular as clockwork comes the enquiry, "Why not fit the Griffon in the Hurricane?"
Camm had already thought of that, and submitted drawings, but it involved wholesale redrawing of the centre-section, with the stub-spars having to be raked forward, to bring the wings forward enough to retain a CoG balance. Camm was told to forget it, and concentrate on the Tornado/Typhoon.

The Air Ministry had to put the expected fighting, in 1941, first, and the Typhoon had flown in March 1940, with the second prototype in May 1941.

Which Dowding had foreseen as being the province of the XX-powered IIC, in the event of a 1941 German invasion, which Mussolini effectively scuppered by mucking-up in the Mediterranean and needing German help, plus Hitler's plans for Russia.

The section in bold is pretty much the answer to a lot of these schemes. There was only so much engineering capacity (and that includes draftsmen to make the drawings of the new parts) and any scheme that needed more than the most minor of alterations was going to cut into another project. Hercules Hurricane instead of Typhoon? or delays Typhoon by months?

The British were caught out by several things in 1941. Not only the appearance of the FW 190 but the change from the 109E to the 109F. A Hurricane II might have been a match (or close to it) for a 109E powered by an improved DB601 but the reduction in drag the 109F achieved moved the 109 out of the Hurricane's league. Trouble is and was that it is hard to change the direction of large production programs.
It can take months to change a factory over to a new type and you have a considerable supply chain. Few, if any, British aircraft companies made their own landing gear, brakes, hydraulic equipment or electrical. These were made by specialty firms as were forgings, extrusions and other bits of metal used in the airframe. Sudden cancellation of a certain aircraft type could leave you with hundreds of tons of very expensive "stuff" that you have no use for. "stuff" on the aircraft factory floor/supply bins, "stuff" in transit, "stuff" at the supplying companies factory in various stages of completion and in some cases even further back. Landing gear maker does the machining on forgings/extrusions it buys from other companies. It could take many weeks for raw materials to go through the chain and wind up in a finished aircraft.

In the Fall of 1940 it looked like the Hurricane II would be a viable fighter aircraft. It isn't until the 109F shows up in numbers in the summer of 1941 that the decision really looks like a mistake.

stona · Oct 19, 2014

Also worth mentioning that in 1940 the cannon armed Whirlwind was seen by many, including Dowding, as the only viable anti-tank weapon the RAF had. In June 1940, when the prospect of German tanks on English beaches seemed a distinct possibility to some, Dowding wrote to Beaverbrook who had sought his opinion of the Whirlwind.

"Altogether, I feel we may be very glad indeed to have as many Whirlwinds as we can get in the near future both as anti tank weapons and in order to attack bombers as they become less and less vulnerable to rifle calibre machine gun fire, but we shall be glad enough to drop them when the Hawker fighter comes into heavy production."

The "Hawker fighter" refers to what would become the Typhoon. Hopefully no one was holding their breath in anticipation.

Cheers

Steve

tomo pauk · Nov 4, 2014

Now that the anti-tank A/C is mentioned several times - what to do next for that task? Earlier introduction of the Hurricane IIC, maybe underslung cannons for other A/C, or installation on the twin engined A/C? Maybe try an installation on the Airacobra, provided it can fit?

Shortround6 · Nov 4, 2014

The 20mm Hispano works great as an anti-tank gun as long as the tanks have 14.5mm armor or thinner. Once the armor goes to 30mm the Hispano becomes more of nuisance than an effective weapon.

You can pretty much forget shooting through the top armor. Think about it, if you use a low approach, say a 30 degree dive the shells will hit at about about 60 degrees from perpendicular to the armor and the armor will by twice it's nominal thickness then you have the tendency of the shells to ricochet (or deflect) at near that angle and the top armor may act 2 1/2 times thicker or more than it's actual thickness. Beyond the ability of the 20mm Hispano to penetrate.
You can also pretty much forget firing in a steep dive, works great from the target impact point of view but what altitude do you have to stop firing at and start pulling out so your fighter doesn't make an intimate contact with mother earth?

Off course if you can find enough suicidal pilots Westland's other great warplane was ready to step up and take on the tanks.

stona · Nov 5, 2014

In the impossible scenario when German tanks were rolling across English beaches the job of destroying them would have been the Army's, not the RAF's, and Dowding knew this perfectly well.

The cost cutting operations with which Dowding and many other senior airmen of the day were familiar, whereby a few aircraft could cow into submission some troublesome tribesmen in some far flung imperial outpost, without the expense in blood and treasure of boots on the ground, were hardly going to work against a more organised enemy and certainly not against another '1st world' army.

It's a lesson still not learnt today.

Cheers

Steve

parsifal · Nov 5, 2014

I dont think i necessarily agree with that completely. Sure having utterly obsolete equipment is likely achieve defeat and a high own casualty count. but if achieving high end technology is to be paid for in low numbers in the force availability, something the Germans tried on the eastern front, and lost abysmally then the high tech scenario doesnt work any better than the low tech one.

In the modern sense, the most advanced APCs are the American Bradley, and a bit older, but same basic idea is the German marder. Both have proven to be pretty much unmitigated disasters. Not because theres anything particularly wrong with either design....quite the contrary. Both are the ants pants when it comes to what they are, you cant get a better APC than the Bradley. but they are horrifically expensive and for that reason their deployment has been far too constricted for them to be considered effective battlefield hardware. Too few Bradleys mean they get over used, and most end up in the repair workshops rather then be out in the field.

Low tech, to the point of obsolescence is bad. High tech, to the point of affecting availability is worse. The best bet is to maintain a level of technological competitiveness, but not go all out for technical supremacy. You need to keep numbers up, but you also need to expend enough resources to retain a credible technology parity of sorts......

tomo pauk · Nov 5, 2014

The 20mm won't work against the Axis tanks of 1941 and better, unless it is installed in a dive bomber, so the firing can be done at a favorable angle vs. top armor.

For a step further, the 2pdr HV pom-pom might be the choice, unless we got the Class S in time? Once the APSV ammo is available (erstwhile for the Littlejohn adapter, but can be fired without one), should further bolster the AP capabilities.

wuzak · Nov 5, 2014

parsifal said:
In the modern sense, the most advanced APCs are the American Bradley, and a bit older, but same basic idea is the German marder. Both have proven to be pretty much unmitigated disasters. Not because theres anything particularly wrong with either design....quite the contrary. Both are the ants pants when it comes to what they are, you cant get a better APC than the Bradley. but they are horrifically expensive and for that reason their deployment has been far too constricted for them to be considered effective battlefield hardware. Too few Bradleys mean they get over used, and most end up in the repair workshops rather then be out in the field.

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aXQ2lO3ieBA

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4f2XbOY9kcg

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5E8DQSHkhGE

Shortround6 · Nov 5, 2014

No Tomo, the dive bomb approach will NOT work, at least not well. Even the dive bombers are pulling out of the dive at 1500-2000ft (500-666yds) to give themselves time to pull out.

Maybe you could put a 2pdr Pom-Pom in the bomb-bay of a Wellington and use it to strafe a column

While it is pretty much just a scaled up Maxim or Vickers gun it scaled way up

And runs about 550lbs for the LV versions, that is for gun alone with no mount and may or may not include water, These guns used two different types of belt feed (raly ones used Fabric belt) and the chances of the belts making it to the end without jamming in a plane pulling "G"s would be pretty slim.

Edgar Brooks · Nov 5, 2014

A tank track, hit by a 20mm shell, is broken, making the tank immobile, and pilots knew enough to come in from the side, if at all possible.
As Steve said, tanks, once ashore, are the job of the Army, and 30mm isn't proof against a 25lb shell, never mind a dedicated anti-tank gun. The invasion fleet would have been the target for the RAF, and, as far as I know, the invasion barges didn't have 30mm armour.
That takes us through 1941, when it was thought that an invasion was still likely, and the first Hurricane IID was built, and ready for trials, in November that year; the 40mm cannon was found capable of destroying both the Mk.III Mk.IV tanks. With those guns, it was a diving approach, to 240mph, level out at 50' and attack from the side.

tomo pauk · Nov 5, 2014

I'm afraid that a track of a medium tank will not fear of what a 20mm shell can do to it. Had that been the case, the beligerents wouldn't moved to, erstwhile, 23-30mm, and then to 37-40 mm AT guns for airborne platforms, and above 3in for ground platforms. The track, looking from the front, represents a far bigger target than when looking from the sides.
The 20mm Hispano should be capable to penetrate armor of the Pz-I and Pz-II with AP ammo, though.
I cannot agree either that, at least for period that includes 1940 and on, that targeting the tanks were strictly a domain the Army. In this thread, the quartet of 20mm was mentioned as being regarded by the RAF brass as the potent AT weapon, whether in Whirlwind or 'Hawker's fighter'; the 40mm was being developed for airborne AT job.

yulzari · Nov 5, 2014

The 1940 RAF concept was to throw the secondary units into the ground battle. Hence the retention of trained and experienced pilots in the likes of Anti Aircraft Co operation units. My source on this moved into front line service by early 1941 but I presume that the 1941 idea was much the same,albeit with better machines. The air would have seen Bothas and Henleys reverting to their design duties for example.

This would leave the front line fighters to defend in the air and the front line bombers to attack sea and port targets.

Armour is not the exclusive target on the ground. The German Army depended upon horses for transport. Hence the British instructions for all horses in the area near a German assault to be shot to deny them as replacement haulers. Tanks depend upon soft skinned transport for their fuel and ammunition and these are quite vulnerable to even a mid course trainee pilot with a Hawker Hart or a Tiger Moth and 25lb bombs. Even the Home Guard weapons were easily capable of taking off a tanks track.

Thus the RAF decision was to seek better bomber killers for 1941, not better ground attack aeroplanes. My (passed away) ex RAF contact remembers being peripherally involved with the 40mm S gun ammunition trials and told me that the anti tank rounds were lower priority than the HE rounds as the prime target was to be ships and barges in any German invasion fleet.

Shortround6 · Nov 5, 2014

It might be possible to break a track with 20mm gun fire, the question is how probable it is. and since not all tracks are created equal, just because you can break the tracks of 5-10 ton tanks(or half-tracks) does not automatically mean you can break the tracks of 20-25 ton tanks.

Firing at the side of tank gives you a better opportunity to hit suspension parts, like roadwheels (with their sometimes rubber tires), springs, shock absorbers and other stuff that, if damaged, might cause a tank to throw a track. This all results in a 'mobility' kill. Which is fine if the tank is on the march, If it is already engaged in battle (firing on friendly positions/vehicles) a mobility kill turns it into a pillbox/bunker still shooting at your ground troops.

And I am afraid that any high ranking RAF officer who told the Prime Minster that stopping enemy tanks on English beaches/shores "was not the RAF's job" would find himself commanding an army support squadron on the Northwest Frontier (Afghanistan) in short order.

It might not be the job the RAF wanted or the job they pinned their hopes of an independent air service, equal in stature and prestige to the Army and Navy, on but it certainly was one of their jobs or else a tremendous amount of money had gone down the crapper in terms of army co-operation aircraft and specifications/trials for tactical bombers like the Hawker Henley.

stona · Nov 5, 2014

tomo pauk said:
In this thread, the quartet of 20mm was mentioned as being regarded by the RAF brass as the potent AT weapon, whether in Whirlwind or 'Hawker's fighter'; the 40mm was being developed for airborne AT job.

By Dowding, not the RAF and in the same letter in which he emphasised cannon armament as being capable of destroying bombers which were becoming more heavily armoured and which were THE primary target of his command.

Fighter Command was not trained for close air support in 1940 and it was the doctrine of the time that destroying enemy vehicles on the battlefield was the Army's job.

In May 1940 an Army officer in France, requesting air support would have to telephone London to make his request. He'd be lucky to get anything within hours, the average response time was about three hours.

It wasn't until May 1941 that the War Office demanded that the RAF should be prepared to support the Army in the same way that the Luftwaffe did for its army, particularly against tanks.
This led to an incandescent reaction from Slessor (then Director of Plans at the Air Ministry) who questioned the Army's tendency to ask the RAF to do a job it should be doing itself and stating plainly that it was the job of the Army's anti-tank weapons to destroy enemy tanks on the battlefield. The RAF's job, he said, was to prevent enemy forces from functioning due to shortages of 'fuel, food and ammunition'.
He was supported by Basil Embry, who knew a thing or two about attacking German columns, who warned that the casualty rate amongst aircraft carrying out what we would now call close air support would be out of proportion to any results achieved.
The Air Ministry and RAF were implacably opposed to these sorts of operations.

The dive bomber concept was rejected by the RAF in the 1930s and it is a fact that as late as early 1941 no RAF fighter was equipped to carry a bomb (or bombs). Ground attack was something on the agenda. During the first Libyan campaign of December 1940/January 1941 strafing was carried out against Italian forces with machine guns. The RAF's first fighter bomber attack was made by 607 squadron in October 1941. In North Africa 80 squadron fitted eight 40lb bombs to its old Hurricane Is in November 1940 to become the first 'fighter bombers' in that theatre.

Cheers

Steve

RAF after BoB: mid-term strategy, tactics technology?

Major

Tech Sergeant

Creator of Interesting Threads

Captain

Major General

Senior Airman

Major General

Major

Creator of Interesting Threads

Major General

Major

Colonel

Creator of Interesting Threads

Captain

Major General

Senior Airman

Creator of Interesting Threads

Tech Sergeant

Major General

Major

Users who are viewing this thread

Similar threads