9 January 1941, first flight of the Lancaster. And that went on to become the mainstay of BC. Had they wished to change approach, it could have been done. Not to mention that with the appalling loss rate (IIRC around 7% on average, meaning a heavy bomber lasted on average only about 10 missions before being shot down) they needed to produce a huge number of them just to keep the fleet numbers up. With the much lower loss rate of the Mossie (or something similar), a correspondingly lower rate of production would have been needed to keep the force numbers.
RAF post BoB
- Thread starter tomo pauk
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9 January 1941, first flight of the Lancaster. And that went on to become the mainstay of BC. Had they wished to change approach, it could have been done. Not to mention that with the appalling loss rate (IIRC around 7% on average, meaning a heavy bomber lasted on average only about 10 missions before being shot down) they needed to produce a huge number of them just to keep the fleet numbers up. With the much lower loss rate of the Mossie (or something similar), a correspondingly lower rate of production would have been needed to keep the force numbers.
Good point, and even better. They could have just initially produced twin engine planes for CC then. IIRC Wellingtons were relatively widely used by CC, so just make more of them.
Shortround6
Major General
Lancaster was a modified Manchester so at least some of the factory infrastructure was in place. Conversion to Lancaster was not quite as hard as tooling up for an all new design.
Now the British bombing philosophy may have been flawed, but the metric is not losses per mission but the losses per ton (or per 100/1000 tons) dropped.
If you need, with the standard of accuracy and types of bombs staying the same, to use 2-4 times the number of planes to drop the same tonnage the loss ratio gets a lot closer.
And this assumes the Germans make no changes to their defenses. Going to low level, day light raids of greater accuracy (which were actually rather costly for the Mosquitos involved.)
means the Germans can build more light AA (20-37mm or larger?) AA guns and fewer 88mm-105, 128mm guns.
wuzak
Captain
Not arguing that the Mosquito/4,000lb bomb could have been available earlier. Well, not much earlier, anyway.
Just pointing out that there was more than one 4,000lb bomb in the arsenal.
The wing mounted bomb racks weren't available until the "universal wing" arrived with the FB.VI.
The 2 stage Mosquitoes could have been made earlier - but that would be at the cost of Spitfires. And probably only about 6 months earlier.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Staff Sergeant
- 779
- Sep 30, 2021
The reality of heavy bombers in WWII, the day attack on Huls, June 22 1943, which was a 541 acre site, or 0.845 square miles, If the site were a square then each side fence would be 4,650 feet long, the bombs were dropped over an area of 12 square miles, with 20 to 25% in the plant. The reconnaissance photo of the plant burning shows it in the middle of a built up area. Interestingly it was a pure HE strike, 243 1,000 pound and 1,202 500 pound bombs, considering how hard it is to put out rubber fires, the damage caused was very high and the strike is considered one of the best in terms of economic effects.
The shock of 1940 meant Britain was largely locked into existing types production going into 1941/42.
100 Halifax ordered in 1937, another 100 on the same contract in 1939, plus 200 from English Electric.
Hampden first order in 1936, English Electric in 1938, same year as the Canadian order, giving 3 production lines.
200 Manchesters ordered in 1937 then a bunch of 1939 orders, 150 from Fairey cancelled, 300 from Armstrong Whitworth cancelled, 100 from Metropolitan Vickers.
100 Stirling from Short Brothers in 1938, and another 100 from Short and Harland, so 2 production lines, then additional orders in 1939, including from Austin.
There were Wellington orders made in 1936, 1937, 1938 and 1939, the second production line delivered its first aircraft in October 1939, from a 1938 contract, so 2 production lines set up pre war.
The time to get more aircraft into Coastal Command was in 1939/40, being available during the happy time, but convincing the Admiralty to raise the minimum speed for a merchant ship when sailing alone would probably do more for losses, plus revising the Merchant Ship Code. According to Lloyds losses to submarines July to December 1940 were around 1.4 million tons, January to June 1941 were again around 1.4 million tons, July to December 740,000 tons. Then came the carnage in 1942, initially off the American coasts, nearly 3 million tons lost to submarines in the first half of 1942 and over 3 million in the second half.
Sorties despatched, aircraft missing, all targets, then Germany only
another 465 aircraft category E by enemy action, and 1,604 not enemy action. 7,895 missing on bomb raids, 409 on mining, 261 on other operations. Another 43 missing on anti submarine patrols but not counted in main totals. W R Chorley comes up with 8,805 missing aircraft, including those on Special Duties, training etc. sorties, Chorley has 401 Mosquito bomber versions lost, including 60 on test and training, fighter version losses put at 138 including 35 on test and training.
All targets, all operations.
The 1944 night bombing raids on Germany, Mosquito, 11,549 sorties despatched, 92.5% attacking, 59 missing, 9 Cat E enemy action, 44 Cat E not enemy action, 0.6% of despatched sorties lost to enemy action, 1% of despatched sorties lost, average bomb load dropped 2,766 pounds. Lancaster 36,687 sorties despatched, 94.1% attacking, 1,186 missing, 33 Cat E enemy action, 86 Cat E not enemy action, 3.3% of despatched sorties lost to enemy action, 3.6% of despatched sorties lost, average bomb load dropped 10,020 pounds. 3.3/0.6 times 2,766 pounds is 15,213 pounds, 3.6/1 times 2,766 pounds is 9,958 pounds of bombs, or another way 3.6 Mosquito sorties to deliver 1 Lancaster load, meaning 2.2 Mosquito lost to enemy action to 3.3 Lancaster per ton of bombs and 1 Mosquito lost to 1 Lancaster overall per ton of bombs.
The 1944 day raids on Germany, 605 Mosquito sorties, 53.4% attacking, 4 losses, average bomb load dropped 2,209 pounds, 9,950 Lancaster sorties, 92% attacking, 119 losses, average bomb load dropped 11,711 pounds, Lancasters had twice the loss rates but dropped around 5 times the number of bombs per aircraft. As usual, which is best comes down to it depends and when. Seems clear keeping enemy fighters away from the bombers was the key, either through escorts (Including electronic) or superior performance.
According to the graph in the War Room Report Tons of bombs dropped per loss to all causes on bomb raids was well in favour of the Lancaster (3 to 4 times) Q2/42 through Q3/43, in Q4/43 the Lancaster was 50% better, in Q1/44 the Mosquito was around twice as good, in Q2/44 both were about the same, in Q3/44 Lancaster over twice as good, in Q4/44 3 times as good. Losses on bombing operations in Q1/44 were about twice that of Q4/44, despite about 2.5 times the number of bomb sorties in Q4.
The shock of 1940 meant Britain was largely locked into existing types production going into 1941/42.
100 Halifax ordered in 1937, another 100 on the same contract in 1939, plus 200 from English Electric.
Hampden first order in 1936, English Electric in 1938, same year as the Canadian order, giving 3 production lines.
200 Manchesters ordered in 1937 then a bunch of 1939 orders, 150 from Fairey cancelled, 300 from Armstrong Whitworth cancelled, 100 from Metropolitan Vickers.
100 Stirling from Short Brothers in 1938, and another 100 from Short and Harland, so 2 production lines, then additional orders in 1939, including from Austin.
There were Wellington orders made in 1936, 1937, 1938 and 1939, the second production line delivered its first aircraft in October 1939, from a 1938 contract, so 2 production lines set up pre war.
The time to get more aircraft into Coastal Command was in 1939/40, being available during the happy time, but convincing the Admiralty to raise the minimum speed for a merchant ship when sailing alone would probably do more for losses, plus revising the Merchant Ship Code. According to Lloyds losses to submarines July to December 1940 were around 1.4 million tons, January to June 1941 were again around 1.4 million tons, July to December 740,000 tons. Then came the carnage in 1942, initially off the American coasts, nearly 3 million tons lost to submarines in the first half of 1942 and over 3 million in the second half.
Except losses were not regularly at 7%, nor were all losses on city raids, mine laying for example, attacks on non German targets etc. The following is from the War Room Manual, how it counts Mosquito fighter sorties is not entirely clear. Also pathfinder aircraft often did not drop their entire load, the different mission profiles of the different types and so on, treat the following as a guide, not an absolute.
Sorties despatched, aircraft missing, all targets, then Germany only
| Year | Sorties | Missing | % | Sorties | Missing | % |
1939 | 591 | 38 | 6.43 | |||
1940 | 22473 | 475 | 2.11 | 11071 | 215 | 1.94 |
1941 | 32012 | 923 | 2.88 | 20897 | 662 | 3.17 |
1942 | 35228 | 1450 | 4.12 | 22922 | 1121 | 4.89 |
1943 | 65068 | 2391 | 3.67 | 48312 | 2086 | 4.32 |
1944 | 166844 | 2770 | 1.66 | 70083 | 1831 | 2.61 |
1945 | 67483 | 608 | 0.90 | 54034 | 525 | 0.97 |
| All | 389699 | 8655 | 2.22 | 227319 | 6440 | 2.83 |
All targets, all operations.
| Missing | Cat E | Tons bombs | Ton/Missing | Ton/Loss | Aircraft |
254 | 142 | 26,867 | 105.8 | 67.85 | Mosquito |
1332 | 377 | 41,823 | 31.4 | 24.47 | Wellington |
606 | 163 | 27,821 | 45.91 | 36.18 | Stirling |
1833 | 399 | 224,207 | 122.3 | 100.45 | Halifax |
3345 | 487 | 608,612 | 181.9 | 158.82 | Lancaster |
The 1944 day raids on Germany, 605 Mosquito sorties, 53.4% attacking, 4 losses, average bomb load dropped 2,209 pounds, 9,950 Lancaster sorties, 92% attacking, 119 losses, average bomb load dropped 11,711 pounds, Lancasters had twice the loss rates but dropped around 5 times the number of bombs per aircraft. As usual, which is best comes down to it depends and when. Seems clear keeping enemy fighters away from the bombers was the key, either through escorts (Including electronic) or superior performance.
According to the graph in the War Room Report Tons of bombs dropped per loss to all causes on bomb raids was well in favour of the Lancaster (3 to 4 times) Q2/42 through Q3/43, in Q4/43 the Lancaster was 50% better, in Q1/44 the Mosquito was around twice as good, in Q2/44 both were about the same, in Q3/44 Lancaster over twice as good, in Q4/44 3 times as good. Losses on bombing operations in Q1/44 were about twice that of Q4/44, despite about 2.5 times the number of bomb sorties in Q4.
Admiral Beez
Captain
Reinforce the RAF in the Far East and (priority one) North Africa and the MTO. Don't send any British aircraft to Russia until Malaya, Burma and Australia-PNG have the air force they need to counter Japan - having just invaded FIC, it's obvious where they're going next. All those Hurricanes made in Canada that went to Russia or the bottom of the North Atlantic? Send those to Malaya, Moresby and Mandalay, not Murmansk.
Meanwhile, expedite the Mosquito and (what would become the) Meteor programs. The obstructionists in the Air Ministry that delayed and dismissed the wooden unarmed bomber and Whittle's jet engine should be dismissed.
And don't neglect RAF Coastal Command. Allocate more and better aircraft, more Sunderlands and other depth charge equipped long range patrol aircraft to combat the U-boats. Plus expedite fast torpedo armed strike aircraft like the Beaufighter (the torpedo-armed version was late to the game) to combat surface threats in the Channel and North Sea, like the Channel Dash where the RAF failed miserably. And expedite technological advances such as air-to-surface radar, leigh lights and electromagnetic de-mining rings.
RAF Coastal Command during World War II - Wikipedia
Aircraft
On the outbreak of war in 1939 Coastal Command had 18 squadrons. These consisted of ten of Avro Ansons, including four auxiliaries, two of Vickers Vildebeests , two of Short Sunderlands, three of Saro London and one of Supermarine Stranraers.Early struggles
Up to the end of 1940, Coastal Command's Anti-shipping Operations (ASO) campaign against German seaborne trade in north-west European waters had claimed a direct attack on only six vessels
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Hi,
If I am understanding correctly, the first batch of Hurricanes (39 total) weren't sent to the USSR around in early September 1941 with only 100 Hurricanes total arriving in the USSR by the end of the year (and as I understand it, I believe that most if not all of these were sent to Murmansk, whereas sending them to the Far East may have ended up taking longer). Meanwhile about 51 crated Hurricanes originally meant for Iraq were sent to Singapore around January 13th 1942, with another 48, flown off the aircraft carrier Indomitable, on or around January 27-30 1942 having to divert to Sumatra due to the lack of available airbase resources in and around Singapore.
As such, I'm not really sure that there were really that many Hurricanes available that could have been diverted from the USSR in a timeframe that would have made much any difference for the Far East, especially since the UK and Commonwealth forces in the Far East theater were already stretched to support the Buffaloes and Hurrianes that were in theater.
Regards
Pat
Malayan campaign - Wikipedia
No. 232 Squadron RAF - Wikipedia
Hawker Hurricane - Wikipedia
If I am understanding correctly, the first batch of Hurricanes (39 total) weren't sent to the USSR around in early September 1941 with only 100 Hurricanes total arriving in the USSR by the end of the year (and as I understand it, I believe that most if not all of these were sent to Murmansk, whereas sending them to the Far East may have ended up taking longer). Meanwhile about 51 crated Hurricanes originally meant for Iraq were sent to Singapore around January 13th 1942, with another 48, flown off the aircraft carrier Indomitable, on or around January 27-30 1942 having to divert to Sumatra due to the lack of available airbase resources in and around Singapore.
As such, I'm not really sure that there were really that many Hurricanes available that could have been diverted from the USSR in a timeframe that would have made much any difference for the Far East, especially since the UK and Commonwealth forces in the Far East theater were already stretched to support the Buffaloes and Hurrianes that were in theater.
Regards
Pat
Malayan campaign - Wikipedia
No. 232 Squadron RAF - Wikipedia
Hawker Hurricane - Wikipedia
Shortround6
Major General
A lot of this has been gone over in other threads.
The threat to England doesn't decrease until April/May of 1941. The British were expecting the resumption of the Fall of 1940 levels of combat with the better weather in the Spring of 1941. Once the Germans invade Russia in June of 1941 (or some weeks before?) the threat is much reduced and Britain can think about shifting forces. Except......it takes months to crate planes up and ship them to the far east, uncrate them and get them into action. It also helps if you actually have crews (like ground crews) instead of planes just parked along side the runways. The P-40s for the Flying Tigers were put aboard ships in the Spring of 1941. You need around 100 experienced, trained, ground crew for each squadron of single engine fighters.
You need the Merlin XX engines, not Merlin X engines.
You need to develop your navigation skills/equipment. Having Mosquitos scattering bombs allover western Europe like the other RAF bombers of 1940-41-early 1942 was not going to change much.
You also need to change the bomb production schedules. The 500lb bomb did not become the dominate bomb in the RAF until 1943.
You are also limited by Mosquito production. Mosquitos were built using imported wood. If you want to build more Mosquitos in significant numbers you need to to find or reallocate significant amounts of wood. Spruce and some other woods are easier to get than Balsa. In other words you have to develop some of the wood infrastructure. Or steal Balsa (assuming it is the right grade) from other uses.
Maybe they could have sped up jet development, but you are not going to get service jets until you solve several problems. You need to develop enough power (why they went for the twins) and you need to develop reliability. 1944-45-46 jets were pretty miserable in both regards. They did get better very quickly in the post war era but affecting WW II by very much was rather unlikely.
Torpedo armed Beaufighters got later model engines than the 1940-41-early 42 Beaufighters got, They would have been better than Beauforts (damning with faint praise) but you might not get quite the expected results. You also need somebody to work on the torpedoes so you can actually drop them at high speed.
Ok 1943, but by then the Blenheim was no longer in service with Bomber Command.
By the Spring of 1940 many of the Ansons had been replaced by Hudsons so I am not sure changing the situation in CC in 1939 would have made much change after the BoB as a lot of their aircraft deficiencies were already fixed. Getting actual depth charges instead of the anti-sub bombs, especially the 100lber might well have changed things a bit.
German light AA was not very good at this time, (not like later).
A lot depends on WHEN.
The threat to England doesn't decrease until April/May of 1941. The British were expecting the resumption of the Fall of 1940 levels of combat with the better weather in the Spring of 1941. Once the Germans invade Russia in June of 1941 (or some weeks before?) the threat is much reduced and Britain can think about shifting forces. Except......it takes months to crate planes up and ship them to the far east, uncrate them and get them into action. It also helps if you actually have crews (like ground crews) instead of planes just parked along side the runways. The P-40s for the Flying Tigers were put aboard ships in the Spring of 1941. You need around 100 experienced, trained, ground crew for each squadron of single engine fighters.
Very easy to do with hindsight, however you are not going to gain much because the Wooden Unarmed bomber needed a little development.
You need the Merlin XX engines, not Merlin X engines.
You need to develop your navigation skills/equipment. Having Mosquitos scattering bombs allover western Europe like the other RAF bombers of 1940-41-early 1942 was not going to change much.
You also need to change the bomb production schedules. The 500lb bomb did not become the dominate bomb in the RAF until 1943.
You are also limited by Mosquito production. Mosquitos were built using imported wood. If you want to build more Mosquitos in significant numbers you need to to find or reallocate significant amounts of wood. Spruce and some other woods are easier to get than Balsa. In other words you have to develop some of the wood infrastructure. Or steal Balsa (assuming it is the right grade) from other uses.
Maybe they could have sped up jet development, but you are not going to get service jets until you solve several problems. You need to develop enough power (why they went for the twins) and you need to develop reliability. 1944-45-46 jets were pretty miserable in both regards. They did get better very quickly in the post war era but affecting WW II by very much was rather unlikely.
Sunderlands were great aircraft, however building them was somewhat building a ship. Increasing production called for a large investment in infrastructure and factory personnel. More than was needed for the equivalent 4 engine land planes. You do need to get somebody to design and approve better anti-submarine ordnance.
Torpedo armed Beaufighters got later model engines than the 1940-41-early 42 Beaufighters got, They would have been better than Beauforts (damning with faint praise) but you might not get quite the expected results. You also need somebody to work on the torpedoes so you can actually drop them at high speed.
This could have been improved considerably by the rather simple transfer of just a few squadrons of Blenheim MK IVs replacing some of the Ansons. Except that would have prevented Bomber Command from bombing the Germans into submission in 1940, oh wait,,,,,,,,, bombing them into submission in 1941,,,,,,,,Uh, wait again,,,,,,,,,1942, yes, that is the ticket!!!!
Ok 1943, but by then the Blenheim was no longer in service with Bomber Command.
By the Spring of 1940 many of the Ansons had been replaced by Hudsons so I am not sure changing the situation in CC in 1939 would have made much change after the BoB as a lot of their aircraft deficiencies were already fixed. Getting actual depth charges instead of the anti-sub bombs, especially the 100lber might well have changed things a bit.
Transfer some Blenheim's. Some fighter versions and some bomber versions, enough to get 3-6 squadrons experimenting with tactics.
German light AA was not very good at this time, (not like later).
Absolutely on the money. People talk about bigger engines, bigger bombs, bigger guns, all of that is useless without accuracy, whats needed is better bomb sights, guns sights navigation aids and training, get the ammunition hitting where you want it first then go from there.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Staff Sergeant
- 779
- Sep 30, 2021
All Hurricanes made in Canada either stayed there or were sent to Britain, 8 were lost in the Atlantic in 1941.
In early 1941 the British needed numbers, in July 1941 large scale direct attack on Britain could be ruled out for months but not the USSR collapsing like in 1917 and opening up the chance for attacks through Iran. The time for Mosquitoes and other improvements was pre war so they entered production by/in mid 1940, many changes were on hold in order to have something now.
In early 1942 the Japanese had naval superiority in the South China Sea, try and hold Singapore with Thailand, Java and Sumatra in Japanese hands.
Singapore Hurricanes, 51 on WS.12Z arrived 13 January 1942 including pilots and ground crew, 49 from Middle East via Indomitable 27 and 28 January 1942, Operation Churn taking 39 Hurricanes by sea from Takoradi, too late for Singapore used in defence of Java, 34 Hurricanes on ferry flights from Middle East for Burma January/February 1942, Operation Cross 9 Hurricanes by sea from Takoradi for Burma arrived February 1942.
The British understood the idea of magnetic mines, what they needed was to figure out things like polarity, Southern Hemisphere built ships were quite safe for example. Operation Channel Stop in 1941, more accurately Operation Blenheim Loss. The Blenheims were the RAF day bomber force in 1940/41. The last on Bomber Command Strength was 22 August 1942, Bostons had gone operational on 11 February 1942.
The RAF channel dash response was a failure, starting with the British being sure the Germans would go through the straits of Dover at night, compounded by the failure of the multiple redundancy system watching Brest and the poor weather. Nothing quite like part of your strike force being moved to be ready for the operation on the day of the operation, so making it unavailable for the operation.
The Sunderland cost more than the Stirling but the Stirling had the better range with bombs, so the option to shut the Sunderland lines down, all Stirlings to Coastal Command but again the changes to limit shipping losses really need to start pre war and include things like better codes and higher speeds for independent sailings. The strength of Coastal Command was predicated on Germany having control of roughly WWI levels of European coastline. There was an airbase problem flying around Greenland, Iceland and the Faroes up to April 1940 and Coastal Command had lots of short range aircraft given amount of British coastal shipments that needed protection. The Hudson was the upgrade to the Anson.
Coastal Command did have 18 squadrons in September 1939 but maybe only 16 operational, by 1 January 1940 it was 24 squadrons, being 8 Anson, 1 Beaufort, 0.5 Blenheim, 3 Hudson, 2 London, 1 Stranraer, 3 Sunderland, 1 Vildebeeste, 2 Whitley (loaned from Bomber Command), 2 FAA squadrons, and a half squadron sized PR unit. From 316 aircraft at the start of the war to 385.
On 1 April 1941, still 44 Ansons and 15 Battles on strength, the nominal anti shipping force and escorts was 19 Beaufighters, 57 Beaufort, 81 Blenheim bombers, 105 Blenheim fighters, out of 570 aircraft on command strength. Blenheim bombers left Coastal Command in November 1941.
Notes from AIR 15/773, the despatches on war operations,
Sep-39 ASV mk I, well trained operator, convoys at 20 miles land at 40 miles, hard to detect U-boats, certainly not at night.
From start of war to end May 1940 "Hague Rules of Air Warfare" followed regarding merchant ships, so only proportionate force allowed if ship disobeyed instructions or opened fire
28-May-40 First attack on shipping anchored in Norwegian Fjord.
Aug-40 "Late summer", modified mark VII Depth Charge made available for Sunderlands.
In 1940 Lerwick failure impacted on Sunderland production as jigs had been dismantled in favour of the Lerwick.
Aug-40 U-boat pack/night attacks start
11-Sep-40 First Beaufort torpedo attack on merchant ships, 7 more attacks by end of month, all up 38 attacks in final 4 months, 22 sqn doing 20. Average release distance 670 yards, height 68 feet, 55 ships attacked, 10 hit
Oct-40 Hastening fitting ASV II to 502 sqn, developing an RAF depth charge, fitting R/T to aircraft and escorts. Gibraltar command, 200 Gp to CC. More sweeps around convoys versus close escort.
To 31 Dec 1940 there were 141 bombing attacks on ships at sea claiming 30 ships hit, 47 near missed. For 63 attacks with observed results, 11% from under 500 feet, nearly 50% 500 to 1,000 feet, 19% 1,000 to 2,000 feet
Feb-41 fair immunity to U-boat attack to 250 miles out, end May 400 miles, but Fw200 still active and inflicting heavy losses.
May-41 End of month last of Stranraers and Londons retired, 4 sqns equipping/equipped with Catalina, offensive sweeps now to 400 miles out, convoy escort to 300 miles, at 15 to 30 miles from ships with priority late afternoon to sunset.
Jun-41 ASV still mainly used as navigation aid, still no full time radar operators, plus lack of test gear meant problems with maintenance. ASV use not studied until after 1 May 1941.
Official exports to Russia to end November 1941, x, Hurricane loadings per early PQ convoy, x, pre protocol (early) shipment to USSR, the numbers do not exactly agree.
Officially 552 Hurricanes and 169 Tomahawks.
British GP Bomb Shell Production
In early 1941 the British needed numbers, in July 1941 large scale direct attack on Britain could be ruled out for months but not the USSR collapsing like in 1917 and opening up the chance for attacks through Iran. The time for Mosquitoes and other improvements was pre war so they entered production by/in mid 1940, many changes were on hold in order to have something now.
In early 1942 the Japanese had naval superiority in the South China Sea, try and hold Singapore with Thailand, Java and Sumatra in Japanese hands.
Singapore Hurricanes, 51 on WS.12Z arrived 13 January 1942 including pilots and ground crew, 49 from Middle East via Indomitable 27 and 28 January 1942, Operation Churn taking 39 Hurricanes by sea from Takoradi, too late for Singapore used in defence of Java, 34 Hurricanes on ferry flights from Middle East for Burma January/February 1942, Operation Cross 9 Hurricanes by sea from Takoradi for Burma arrived February 1942.
The British understood the idea of magnetic mines, what they needed was to figure out things like polarity, Southern Hemisphere built ships were quite safe for example. Operation Channel Stop in 1941, more accurately Operation Blenheim Loss. The Blenheims were the RAF day bomber force in 1940/41. The last on Bomber Command Strength was 22 August 1942, Bostons had gone operational on 11 February 1942.
The RAF channel dash response was a failure, starting with the British being sure the Germans would go through the straits of Dover at night, compounded by the failure of the multiple redundancy system watching Brest and the poor weather. Nothing quite like part of your strike force being moved to be ready for the operation on the day of the operation, so making it unavailable for the operation.
The Sunderland cost more than the Stirling but the Stirling had the better range with bombs, so the option to shut the Sunderland lines down, all Stirlings to Coastal Command but again the changes to limit shipping losses really need to start pre war and include things like better codes and higher speeds for independent sailings. The strength of Coastal Command was predicated on Germany having control of roughly WWI levels of European coastline. There was an airbase problem flying around Greenland, Iceland and the Faroes up to April 1940 and Coastal Command had lots of short range aircraft given amount of British coastal shipments that needed protection. The Hudson was the upgrade to the Anson.
Coastal Command did have 18 squadrons in September 1939 but maybe only 16 operational, by 1 January 1940 it was 24 squadrons, being 8 Anson, 1 Beaufort, 0.5 Blenheim, 3 Hudson, 2 London, 1 Stranraer, 3 Sunderland, 1 Vildebeeste, 2 Whitley (loaned from Bomber Command), 2 FAA squadrons, and a half squadron sized PR unit. From 316 aircraft at the start of the war to 385.
On 1 April 1941, still 44 Ansons and 15 Battles on strength, the nominal anti shipping force and escorts was 19 Beaufighters, 57 Beaufort, 81 Blenheim bombers, 105 Blenheim fighters, out of 570 aircraft on command strength. Blenheim bombers left Coastal Command in November 1941.
Notes from AIR 15/773, the despatches on war operations,
Sep-39 ASV mk I, well trained operator, convoys at 20 miles land at 40 miles, hard to detect U-boats, certainly not at night.
From start of war to end May 1940 "Hague Rules of Air Warfare" followed regarding merchant ships, so only proportionate force allowed if ship disobeyed instructions or opened fire
28-May-40 First attack on shipping anchored in Norwegian Fjord.
Aug-40 "Late summer", modified mark VII Depth Charge made available for Sunderlands.
In 1940 Lerwick failure impacted on Sunderland production as jigs had been dismantled in favour of the Lerwick.
Aug-40 U-boat pack/night attacks start
11-Sep-40 First Beaufort torpedo attack on merchant ships, 7 more attacks by end of month, all up 38 attacks in final 4 months, 22 sqn doing 20. Average release distance 670 yards, height 68 feet, 55 ships attacked, 10 hit
Oct-40 Hastening fitting ASV II to 502 sqn, developing an RAF depth charge, fitting R/T to aircraft and escorts. Gibraltar command, 200 Gp to CC. More sweeps around convoys versus close escort.
To 31 Dec 1940 there were 141 bombing attacks on ships at sea claiming 30 ships hit, 47 near missed. For 63 attacks with observed results, 11% from under 500 feet, nearly 50% 500 to 1,000 feet, 19% 1,000 to 2,000 feet
Feb-41 fair immunity to U-boat attack to 250 miles out, end May 400 miles, but Fw200 still active and inflicting heavy losses.
May-41 End of month last of Stranraers and Londons retired, 4 sqns equipping/equipped with Catalina, offensive sweeps now to 400 miles out, convoy escort to 300 miles, at 15 to 30 miles from ships with priority late afternoon to sunset.
Jun-41 ASV still mainly used as navigation aid, still no full time radar operators, plus lack of test gear meant problems with maintenance. ASV use not studied until after 1 May 1941.
Official exports to Russia to end November 1941, x, Hurricane loadings per early PQ convoy, x, pre protocol (early) shipment to USSR, the numbers do not exactly agree.
| Official exports | Number | Type | x | Hurricanes | Convoy | Depart | x | Prior to first Protocol | |
Aug-41 | 16 | Hurricane | x | 1 | PQ00 | n/a | x | 200 | Hurricane |
Aug-41 | 48 | Tomahawk | x | 100 | PQ01 | 29.09.41 | x | 141 | Tomahawk |
Aug-41 | 22 | Hurricane | x | 189 | PQ02 | 13.10.41 | x | 10 | Airacobra |
Sep-41 | 101 | Hurricane | x | 42 | PQ03 | 09.11.41 | x | 4 | Mustang |
Sep-41 | 93 | Tomahawk | x | 79 | PQ04 | 17.11.41 | x | 59 | Tomahawk direct from USA |
Sep-41 | 2 | Hurricane | x | 68 | PQ05 | 27.11.41 | x | 39 | 151 Wing |
Oct-41 | 77 | Hurricane | x | 5 | PQ06 | 08.12.41 | |||
Oct-41 | 3 | Tomahawk | x | 484 | Total | ||||
Oct-41 | 190 | Hurricane | x | 39 | 151 Wing | extra | |||
Nov-41 | 144 | Hurricane | |||||||
Nov-41 | 25 | Tomahawk | |||||||
Nov-41 | 18 | Airacobra |
British GP Bomb Shell Production
| Year | 250 lb | 500 lb | 1000lb |
1939 | 19100 | 84300 | 0 |
1940 | 48700 | 141600 | 1900 |
1941 | 330200 | 171800 | 23000 |
1942 | 14600 | 301800 | 109600 |
MIflyer
1st Lieutenant
Here is a question for y'all:
Post BoB were the Big Wings a failure? During the BoB I think there was one mission when the idea worked, scared the bejesus out of the Germans at a time when they already pretty well knew they were licked and this helped to drive the last nail in their coffin. Or, as Adolph Galland put it 28 years later, "The Luftwaffe did not lose the BoB. Rather, we did not like the results we were getting so we stopped." Heh. So the BoB was a forfeit?
But the Big Wings were used in RAF "leaning into France" raids, with lots of Spits escorting a piddling number of RAF bombers against targets in France. And the Luftwaffe loved that approach, enabling them to nip into those large unwieldy formations and bag a few. Then the B-17's arrived in Mid-1942, carrying bombloads in daylight that were not trivial in either effect or in accuracy and operating at much higher altitudes, and Things Changed. The first B-17 raid on France hit the boys at Abbeville, with a Spit IX escort, and knocked the place arse over teakettle.
Post BoB were the Big Wings a failure? During the BoB I think there was one mission when the idea worked, scared the bejesus out of the Germans at a time when they already pretty well knew they were licked and this helped to drive the last nail in their coffin. Or, as Adolph Galland put it 28 years later, "The Luftwaffe did not lose the BoB. Rather, we did not like the results we were getting so we stopped." Heh. So the BoB was a forfeit?
But the Big Wings were used in RAF "leaning into France" raids, with lots of Spits escorting a piddling number of RAF bombers against targets in France. And the Luftwaffe loved that approach, enabling them to nip into those large unwieldy formations and bag a few. Then the B-17's arrived in Mid-1942, carrying bombloads in daylight that were not trivial in either effect or in accuracy and operating at much higher altitudes, and Things Changed. The first B-17 raid on France hit the boys at Abbeville, with a Spit IX escort, and knocked the place arse over teakettle.
swampyankee
Chief Master Sergeant
- 3,954
- Jun 25, 2013
Galland was engaging in spin. They "did not like the results [they] were getting so [they] stopped" is losing. He just wasn't able to admit it.
Post Battle of Britain RAF? More assets to Coastal Command. Perhaps more minelaying raids, perhaps in lieu of bombing raids.
I really think allocating more resources to Coastal Command would have been the most effective strategic choice at that time.
- Thread starter
- #73
High-school bully vibe by Adolf?
Now that we've had our arses handed to us in the new school (unlike the experiences of the last 12 months in the old school), we decided we don't like the new place.
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The appearance of the Big Wing late in the BoB had a huge psychological effect, at a time when the LW bing told the RAF were down to their last 50 planes, after fighting their way to London the LW were confronted with a single formation of 50 planes. The result was nowhere near what was claimed, all pilots in the Big Wing apart from the leaders said it was complete chaos. Later in the war the USAAF would put up freakin enormous wings that filled the sky, but the pilots werent required to fly so close they could look each other in the eye and mouth jokes to each other.
Thumpalumpacus
Captain
8th AF bomber formations were pretty tight, by design. Fighter formations, not so much, again, by design.
Admiral Beez
Captain
A few other ideas post BoB into the early postwar era.
1) Do not share jet engine designs or tech with the Soviets
2) Read the late war and early postwar room. Cancel the Spiteful, Firebrand, Firecrest and Spearfish. Focus on improving the performance, reliability and timelines for the Swift, Attacker, Vampire and Sea Hawk programs. Including swept wing and transonic research.
1) Do not share jet engine designs or tech with the Soviets
2) Read the late war and early postwar room. Cancel the Spiteful, Firebrand, Firecrest and Spearfish. Focus on improving the performance, reliability and timelines for the Swift, Attacker, Vampire and Sea Hawk programs. Including swept wing and transonic research.
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In some cases such orders were placed to keep a workforce working, pilots flying and even MoD procurement departments "procuring"
Admiral Beez
Captain
Britain has lots to keep the design, procurement and testing expertise honed and intact whilst still dumping the late war and early postwar dead-end projects. For example, Fairey has the Gannet "commenced in response to the issuing of requirement GR.17/45 in 1945, under which the Admiralty sought a new twin-seat aircraft capable of performing both anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and strike missions." Fairey Gannet - Wikipedia
wuzak
Captain
The Spiteful was certainly cancelled shortly after the war. Maybe even in 1945.
Only 19 were built.
The Seafang was also dropped shortly after the war, after the Sea Vampire demonstrated a landing on an aircraft carrier.
18 Seafangs were built.
Supermarine were developing the "Jet Spiteful" from 1944. This would become the Attacker.
Only 2 Firecrests and 5 Spearfishes were built, not sure when they were cancelled.
Clayton Magnet
Staff Sergeant
- 854
- Feb 16, 2013
The Firecrest didn't even fly until 1947, and lumbered along in flight testing until 1949. Despite the fact that by 1946, it was clear that nobody wanted the airplane. It seems like a "make work" project to me
