Recurring Theme in WW2 Aviation (1 Viewer)

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Records of wrong data can be as important as the correct figures. For example the LW made decisions based on their incorrect estimates of RAF strength and losses during the BoB. Leigh Mallory also believed in the effect of his big wing based on incorrect claims

The entire early British bomber offensive was based on a combination of wishful thinking and bad statistics, long before the Butt report.

In October 1940 Peirse told Portal that he thought between one in three and one in five aircraft despatched actually found the target, depending on range, yet in the 'Oil Plan' it was assumed that 50% of bombers despatched would actually bomb the target.
An oil plant could supposedly be put out of action for four months by just two hundred sorties aiming four hundred 500lb bombs at it, despite the fact that an early analysis of attacks on the two plants at Gelsenkirchen (by the Photographic Interpretation Section) which showed neither had received any significant damage despite being attacked by 162 and 134 aircraft and 159 tons and 103 tons of bombs (both excluding incendiaries) respectively.
Poor intelligence, like pilot claims, no matter how well filtered by intelligence officers at the time, leads to bad data. If the bad data is then combined with blinkered or wishful thinking by those empowered to act upon it the errors are compounded and can be very costly.

Cheers

Steve
 
An oil plant could supposedly be put out of action for four months by just two hundred sorties aiming four hundred 500lb bombs at it, despite the fact that an early analysis of attacks on the two plants at Gelsenkirchen (by the Photographic Interpretation Section) which showed neither had received any significant damage despite being attacked by 162 and 134 aircraft and 159 tons and 103 tons of bombs (both excluding incendiaries) respectively.
Did anyone ask an oil plant manager how easily pipe racks are to repair and how difficult a reactor vessel is to destroy. The vessels I worked on were between 1 inch and 2 inches thick anything other than a direct hit may blow the pipe work valves and gauges off but it can be back up and running in days.
 
I guess that they didn't.
It's an unfortunate fact that two of the target systems considered most vital to Germany's war effort, oil and transport, were also two of the most difficult to hit and most easily repaired. The effort finally required to inflict substantial and long term damage on them was far, far greater than envisaged in 1940.
Cheers
Steve
 
Well, they never tested either the 100lb or 250lb anti-sub bombs on any sort of target until well after the war started.
Not a scrapped WW I sub or dummy hull section although torpedoes or warheads had been test that way for years.

The real wonder is that the British had plenty of experience being on the receiving end during 1940 and it still took time to come up with realistic bomb damage estimates.

BTW : "two hundred sorties aiming four hundred 500lb bombs at it,"

Is that two 500lb bombs per plane for a total of 100 tons?
 
I guess that they didn't.
It's an unfortunate fact that two of the target systems considered most vital to Germany's war effort, oil and transport, were also two of the most difficult to hit and most easily repaired. The effort finally required to inflict substantial and long term damage on them was far, far greater than envisaged in 1940.
Cheers
Steve

To add to that, I read an interview with Albert Speer done in the early eighties I believe where he was mystified why the Allies didn't go after the power grid. His opinion was it was a vulnerable asset that was the most critical. Now first I figure a power grid is pretty hard to target and knock out, you more learned gentlemen can enlighten me on that. The other issue is Speer, whom I find fascinating in a way but wouldn't trust any further than I could throw a Peterbilt.
 
The other issue is Speer, whom I find fascinating in a way but wouldn't trust any further than I could throw a Peterbilt.

If you haven't already read it, I would highly recommend 'Albert Speer: His Battle With The Truth' by Gitta Sereny (ISBN 0-333-64519-7).
It is sympathetic whilst also being revealing. The clue is in the title.

Sereny is no longer with us, she died in 2012, but others may remember her for her thorough debunking, along with Chester Lewis, of David Irving's odious 'Hitler's War', the premise of which should hardly need explaining here. It was after the Sunday Times first published this debunking of Irving's revisionism, in 1977, that Speer first made contact with her, and from this the book developed.

Cheers

Steve
 
Power grids in developed countries are large and resilient, and not all parts of it might be within range. The British looked at the German power grid in 1918 but in the end did not target it.They concentrated on what they perceived as more concentrated systems, like the chemical industry, 80% of which was concentrated in just 12 plants all of which were within range (from Nancy).
None of the Western Air Plans of 1st September 1939 even specifically mentions Germany's power grid. Power stations are not mentioned, though they might come under W.A.5(a), "The attack of German war industry".
Speer was an architect who seems to have had a grasp of economics, but he was not an airman who might have a concept of how difficult it would be to cause substantial damage to such a diffuse system. There were tactical attacks against electrical installations, not by Bomber Command, in 1941/42. Operation Chastise was effectively an attack on the German power grid, but the destruction, at huge cost, of a couple of hydro-electric stations had little lasting impact.
Cheers
Steve
 
The Huge cost of Operation Chastise was eight aircraft and crew, A very percentage of the aircraft involved and unsustainable on an ongoing campaign but small in the overall scheme of things or the sometimes dozens of aircraft lost in large raids. While the results were not anywhere near as long lasting as hoped for many raids of the time didn't accomplish as much and had higher losses. Difference may be the the amount of training an preparation put into the raid. A lot of the other raids using much less trained aircrew or aircrew that didn't speed a considerable amount of time training for one mission.
 
I'm not arguing whether the raid was worth it or not. It was successful in many terms, a recent analysis suggested it cost the Germans £5.9 billion in today's money. That seems a lot to me, but there was a significant cost to the Germans. I'm simply stating that in terms of the German power grid it had little effect, largely because of the nature of such a target.

In terms of training, there were just 56 days between the formation of 617 squadron and the raids, which is remarkable.

Cheers

Steve
 
Well, that is the nature of a "grid", taking out several points does not collapse a grid unless it is already operating at near max capacity.
However taking out a number of points will either collapse or fragment the grid. How many that is or was in the case of Germany I don't know but it is a bit like bombing just one or two oil refineries and expecting the oil system to collapse. Run at reduced output yes but not paralyze the whole the system.
 
Well, that is the nature of a "grid", taking out several points does not collapse a grid unless it is already operating at near max capacity.
However taking out a number of points will either collapse or fragment the grid. How many that is or was in the case of Germany I don't know but it is a bit like bombing just one or two oil refineries and expecting the oil system to collapse. Run at reduced output yes but not paralyze the whole the system.

Of course, all economic targets are actually systems. The nature of a power grid makes it far more resilient than some other systems. I gave the example of 80% of the German chemical industry in 1918 being concentrated in just 12 plants. Later, the German synthetic fuel production was concentrated in just 21 plants. In 1940 Germany had 8,200 power plants of various types and sizes, clearly not a viable target. Post war analysis concluded that of these the 400 major plants comprised a vital target system. Some have argued, like Speer, that this was a missed opportunity, but to take out 400 different power plants (if you could identify them correctly), in order to collapse the grid, was I believe beyond the capability of the combined bombing offensive.
Most German power production was coal fired, around 80%, and stopping the coal getting to the plants did prove effective as part of the Transport Plan. It was this, not direct attacks on the plants, that caused the black outs that were a reflection of a power shortage.
I have seen the argument that destroying just two major power stations would have crippled Berlin. Maybe, but when the bombers were struggling to hit a specific area of Berlin how could they find or hit a power station? Much modern analysis simply ignores the limitations of WW2 bombing and the effort needed to ensure the destruction of such a target, in a suburb of the most heavily defended city on earth.
Cheers
Steve
 
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If you haven't already read it, I would highly recommend 'Albert Speer: His Battle With The Truth' by Gitta Sereny (ISBN 0-333-64519-7).
It is sympathetic whilst also being revealing. The clue is in the title.

Sereny is no longer with us, she died in 2012, but others may remember her for her thorough debunking, along with Chester Lewis, of David Irving's odious 'Hitler's War', the premise of which should hardly need explaining here. It was after the Sunday Times first published this debunking of Irving's revisionism, in 1977, that Speer first made contact with her, and from this the book developed.

Cheers

Steve

Many thanks Steve, ordered the Speer book just now, looking forward to reading it.
 
Many thanks Steve, ordered the Speer book just now, looking forward to reading it.

I've dug my original copy out and may have a re-read :)

If you need an antidote to Irving's version of history, apart from Sereny, then Richard Evans 'Lying About Hitler' is also a good, though not a terribly fun read. It is, in book form, the dossier compiled over three years which served as the factual defence against the libel suit launched by Irving against Deborah Lipstadt and Penguin books. Irving lost, the comments of the judge about Irving are public record now, a racist and holocaust denier among other things.
Cheers
Steve
 
Where records do exist, there are often conflicting records sometimes even from the same source.

Agreed. Visiting the Subritsky Spitfire A58-178 a few years ago in NZ he had a letter and photos provided by the pilot who flew it on its last flight. That pilot said he was taxiing after landing at Kiriwina in New Guinea (where the aircraft was recovered from) when another aircraft taxied over the top of him. The aircraft was reduced to spares. The photo showed the tail and fuselage up to the radio door well and truly damaged and the aircraft serial.
He also had the official RAAF history card for this aircraft which says it was lost during a ferry flight inside Australia. See Aus Archives file barcode 3046008
The file covering RAAF Spitfire accidents says it was one of three that collided on the runway at Merauke in Indonesia and burned, killing one of the pilots. See Aus Archives file 6950510
178-01.jpg
178-02.jpg
 
Actually, Stona, my point above was not to stop doing historical research at all. The point is to either give attention to the entire list or let it go. To pick and choose who you decide to "audit" smacks of bias. By "bias," I mean experimental bias, not emotional bias, though that is sometimes involved, too. Let's look at so-and-so because I want to discredit him or because I want to add to his score.

If you're going to review the record, then review the entire record and hold off on results until it is done, and publish all at once as a study. Also, don't review just the U.S.A. Either review aerial victories for some particular conflict or don't. If so, do the best you can. The rules should be, "if there is no solid evidence otherwise, then WW2 scores stand as recorded. No guessing."

Picking some individual(s) out for review is classic bias and skews the picture, which was complete with WW2 numbers and is now skewed when less than 1% of all awarded U.S. aerial victories receive hot attention but the rest are deemed "OK" without any scrutiny whatsoever. That's NOT OK. It's classic discrimination. By discrimination, I simply mean treating someone different from someone else. If Boyington is OK to look at with a critical eye and a change pencil ready, then everyone else is, too, and should absolutely get the same attention to detail.

No single person can audit/rewiev all of the ww2 aerial claims.
Thus people pick a person, and/or unit, and/or specific battle or battlefiled and try to come out with numbers that are based on research of docs from all sides involved. Persons with big number of claims will receive particular attention, and a honest scholar will try to give it's best to either prove or disprove the claims. The scholar will not jump into conclusion that 'his' pilot scored more or less, while accepting other peoples scores as set into stone.
Also, the 'don't rewiev just USA' order?? Scholars do the reserch based on their preferences, available money and time. Should we expect from a British researcher to rewiev claims from USA, Germany, Japan, Italy, SU, China, Finland if we, in our infinite wisdom, will allow him to publish the research about the RAF caims? Failing to do all of these reserachs will make his research about RAF invalid? I don't think so.
 
Again, I would ask Dana about this as he is directly experienced with this specific subject. But I believe research is expensive, in terms of time, travel, etc. I don't think anyone could afford to do research or even have the time, to exhaustively visit all the locations necessary to research all sides and angles. I think there is plenty of research for the major participants, US, UK, Germany, Italy, etc. Russia not as much but more and more is coming out about that as well. Japan is also starting to develop more in terms of historical research and books being written. (Other than Japanese language) So there is hope that the exposed knowledge will continue to grow and be revealed. A common misperception is researchers just google around for info. I don't have exact numbers but I have heard the number "less than 5%" of WW2 history is available on the internet in ANY form often thrown around. Source documents are largely dispersed physically in numerous archives, some of which are in an truly horrendous state. A LOT of that history is not in official documentation at all but rather letters, diary's, notebooks, reports etc.

As a funny note about how difficult it is to document claims of combat kills, the Japanese claim to have sunk the US Carrier Yorktown over 12 times. I know it was propaganda mostly but no few claims for air combat and naval combat on all sides were based on "I think" as opposed to "I know" even when regulations required corroboration from others etc, it was largely a gentlemen's agreement in essence. But it is an intensely interesting subject to study and I love reading about it.

As for the Yorktown, and many of her sisters, I think the propaganda backfired, I recall reading an excerpt from the diary of a sailor that participated in the occupation of Japan and his recollections of being tentatively asked by Japanese civilians how American Aircraft carriers and ships could be so quickly raised and refurbished after being sunk. Especially when they had been sunk so many times!
 
I've just been in my library and though I mentioned her name I did not mention Deborah Lipstadt's book by name (honestly, I had forgotten I owned a copy).
Anyway, it is "Denying The Holocaust - The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory", The paperback can be found at very reasonable prices, around a tenner in the UK.
Cheers
Steve
 
It is shameful that a book like even needs to be written. No one in my family saw the concentration camps at the end of the war, but several knew GI's that did and they universally were haunted by what they saw for the rest of their lives. Mans inhumanity seems to know no limits.
 
It is shameful that a book like even needs to be written. No one in my family saw the concentration camps at the end of the war, but several knew GI's that did and they universally were haunted by what they saw for the rest of their lives. Mans inhumanity seems to know no limits.

It is another book which has origins in the libel suit launched David Irving against Penguin books and the author herself. Irving was of course thoroughly discredited, researchers showing, in a British Court, that he had misrepresented his sources and knowingly used forged documents to make his case. The judge, in a three hundred page written judgement agreed. His summary was,

"Irving has for his own ideological reasons persistently and deliberately misrepresented and manipulated historical evidence; that for the same reasons he has portrayed Hitler in an unwarrantedly favourable light, principally in relation to his attitude towards and responsibility for the treatment of the Jews; that he is an active Holocaust denier; that he is anti-Semitic and racist, and that he associates with right-wing extremists who promote neo-Nazism... therefore the defence of justification succeeds... It follows that there must be judgment for the Defendants."

It is quite intemperate language from a British judge, but it pretty much nailed the bast*rd.

Cheers

Steve
 
I think a further caveat should be given here. Some still consider some of Irving's work to be relevant. In particular 'Hitler's War' even today receives positive reviews.
Professor Evans, engaged as an expert witness, and aided by Thomas Skelton Robinson and Nicholas Waschmann (whose later book on the history and development of the Nazi concentration camp system I cannot recommend highly enough) was initially somewhat guarded about Irving and definitely considered the jury to be out, somewhat to Lipstadt's discomfort. After he had completed his research into Irving's writings he had made something of a volte face. He would write the following about Irving's 'history'.

"If we mean by a historian someone who is concerned to discover the truth about the past and to give us as accurate a representation of it as possible, then Irving is not a historian...Irving is essentially an ideologue who uses history in order to further his own political purposes.
Not one of Irving's books, speeches or articles, not one paragraph, not one sentence in any of them, can be taken on trust as an accurate representation of its historical subject. All of them are completely worthless as history."


No history or historian is perfect they all make mistakes, we amateurs more than most! If I had a pound for every example of 'presentism' I read on historical forums I would be living on some tropical paradise island ! What historians cannot do is willfully falsify their sources to promote their own agenda, and Irving, provably, did so as a matter of course.
Bear this in mind if you are ever tempted to read or listen to some of his twaddle.

Cheers

Steve
 

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