Yeah I was going to bring up a point I've heard bandied about by some historians, that during 41-42 most of the Battle of Britain vets were reassigned to overseas squadrons, leaving relatively inexperienced recruits in the new MkV's to fight the experten of JG2 and 26 on the Channel Front. This was probably a factor.
There are a couple of other points too, this one is a pet theory of mine after some technical research and cross referencing with pilot reports (on both sides). I'm open to correction but see what you think.
In 1942 the FW had a lot of teething troubles, the A-2 overheated the second cylinder bank which often shut down during flight, the A-3 still had tremendous overheating problems and those still fitted with 801C-2 motors (most were, few received the D motor) had severe altitude performance issues (there was a mismatch between supercharger sizing and critical altitude in the B4 configuration meaning it didn't do so fantastic anywhere above 3000 metres even though it was a monster under this height). Both types had severe vibration problems under high output conditions (it appears throttle restrictions were made which were not reflective of output potential on the bench for the BMW motor, which using C2/3 fuel should always have been 1800hp from the start, until the engine mounting was redesigned in the A-5 output was restricted to ~1600hp even using C3, this was actually mostly an engine speed restriction due to vibration).
Even with these teething problems the early series Antons were still very powerful a/c at low altitude and for short periods could really whoop some ass. But tactics had a lot to do with this. According to a report of typical Channel Front interception of British MkV Spits in 1942 by I./JG26 two flights of Fw190A took off to shepherd the RAF Spits into each other.
One flight of Fw190A pursued them directly from behind in the high speed condition at around 3000 metres altitude. The Spits could not get away and were chased to the coast, where the Focke's finally caught up with them. But the Spits were still good for combat whilst the Fw's were all overheating and required a cooldown period for their motors. The British never found out about this however.
The second group of Fw had flown directly toward the coast instead of chasing the Spits and had time to settle into a cruise condition at 5000 metres by the time the Spits and their pursuers arrived.
Then the first group (the pursuers) broke off contact, climbed and cooled their engines.
The second group (the actual interception) dove with already cooled engines and attacked in a tag team.
According to the report the FW-drivers had only a few minutes of very good performance before they overheated, but then the first group would change over again, and the second group would now climb and cool. It was a tag team.
The British report for the same combat was merely the sky being filled with Focke Wulfs and the fact they frequently changed positions, and that their a/c performance was clearly superior.
But you see in a one-on-one the Spit V would start performing better in sustained combat, if the FW could not breakaway and cool his engine. At least for these early series FW.
So my tender is the situation on the Channel Front was partly comparative performance, partly pilot experience and partly the tactics being used. There were still circumstances which could've been exploited, and the air superiority of the Luftwaffe here was I think as much situational as inherent.
(note) I should add for prosperity when I mention "pilot reports" I am talking about excerpts being referenced in other publications, not trying to sound like I have a bunch of primary source pilot reports sitting in front of me
