Boy, there sure is quite a bit to go through here. Activity's certainly picked up. Spoke too soon.
Joblin, the above tells me that a thread should be started to look at what is considered a victory / kill and what is considered a loss.
I might have to agree. It seems that it could sustain an entire discussion on its own, especially since it will likely be concerned with all theatres of WWII, if not other wars entirely. Personally, I'm quite lazy, but I might go ahead and start it myself sometime tomorrow, or the day after, if no one else does.
Basic to the issue is whether the losses were reported truthfully. Telling the truth in the Soviet Union could get you killed if Stalin didn't want to hear it just then and the same can be said for a few cases in Japan.
I have had a similar thought running through my head as I went through Claringbould's Osprey books and Dunn's articles. Both authors appear to view the Japanese records they do have on hand as fairly reliable in terms of losses, Claringbould especially, who has gone as far as to describe them as "reliable" and "hard data", among other similar terms. In the case of the Corsair, he has gone on record as stating that IJNAF operational records aligned closely with Corsair unit mission logs when compared.
S
Steamed_Banana
has raised some good points regarding the quality of Japanese records, namely, their focus on deaths as opposed to airframes lost or written off, but still, Claringbould's and Dunn's claims regarding such records will need to be addressed first before any conclusive statements can be made on their reliability. This also applies to your objections concerning Japanese documents and their availability, comprehensiveness, and reliability,
Thumpalumpacus
.
I have read a great deal of Claringbould's Work, (notably several volumes each from both South Pacific Air War series and Solomons Air War series). I've also read several other similar books which cover the same and other Theaters with the same approach of using both-sides loss data rather than just claims, notably but not limited to Christopher Shores now sadly out of print three volume "Bloody Shambles" series about Burma and India, and his five volume Mediterranean Air War Series. Also Christer Bergsrom's "Black Cross / Red Star" series (which I don't 100% rate) and The First Team, Into the Endless Mist, Volume 2 (on the Aleutian War) and some others.
I have my ways of tracking down out-of-print books. I will check all these titles out later.
I think you will find that these and some others are actually known here, and many here own these books and have read many of them, but I would somewhat agree on your take that the implications of the data they show has really not been taken seriously into consideration. I agree with several of your points, namely:
Overclaiming was much worse than we assumed - (On every side). This definitely varied by Theater, with the South Pacific being one of the most chaotic and difficult to verify, but it was certainly much greater than I think people have realized. I should also note that overclaiming is often not intentional. Air combat is confusing, precisely who shot down an aircraft that was clearly destroyed (blew up, pilot bailed out etc.) isn't always obvious, and it turns out enemy aircraft may look destroyed but survive to limp home. Including Japanese aircraft, to wit ...
Japanese Aircraft were much more formidable than the postwar legend has it - I agree with you that A6M and Ki-43 were far more effective fighters (and for much longer) than seems to be the consensus in the Anglophone sphere, both around here where people really could know better, and more generally.
Japanese Fighters were nowhere near as flimsy and disposable as the legend has it - Part of the reason for overclaiming is that it's quite clear that Japanese fighters often took heavy battle damage and still managed to limp home.
I generally agree with all these points. Indeed, it's most likely the case that over-claiming often wasn't intentional, though that didn't prevent it from being convenient for those in charge, especially in more repressive countries like Japan and the USSR.
Some Allied Fighters were not as superior as claimed - This is a tricky one, because I think you are overstating it a little (and such claims tend to be overblown in both directions), but it's clear that Japanese fighters were not instantly overwhelmed by the second generation US (and British) fighters. Largely, I think, it's as Shortround6 said, many of them had long teething periods and the early versions were nowhere near as good as the later ones. But the later ones did eventually arrive...
Claringbould largely attributes the gradual and non-dramatic increase in success of the Corsair in combat against the A6M to a decline in skilled and experienced Japanese pilots as a result of attrition, and the consequent shortening and slackening of training to compensate for these losses; general consensus would already agree with this explanation to some degree. This almost certainly applies to other Allied and Japanese fighter aircraft, the F6F in particular. Indeed, a handful of aerial battles covered at the end of Claringbould's book on the matter appear to have ended with Zeros sustaining increasing losses against the Corsair. The question now concerns the extent to which inexperience a factor in Japanese losses, and the composition of veterans and fresh replacements, especially in later engagements with aircraft like the Hellcat, some of which looked to have been appallingly lopsided in the latter's favour, even factoring in losses recorded by the Japanese.
...These kinds of sources are really changing perception of the air war in WW2. You would think in a place like this that would be more welcome, but it's kind of hard to get your head around. In fact you yourself seem to be struggling with the revelations.
WWII aviation, if not WWII as a whole, is often hyped up as this intense technological arms race, with terms like "horsepower race" being thrown around quite commonly. Later generation WWII fighters—with the exception of novel, and rather experimental, jet and rocket fighters—are often treated as being significantly (i.e. to a noticeable, non-negligible degree) better, with any issues they may experienced attributed to such things as "operational losses", "teething issues", and some combination of "inexperience" and 'incorrect tactics'. Sometimes the merits of the earlier aircraft of the war are acknowledged, but they are still often treated as considerably inferior; the constant references to dubious and excessive "victory"-to-loss ratios are emblematic of this problem.
And I think you are also overstating some issues.
In Claringbould's Solomon Air War and South Pacific Air War series, it's already clear that there were some lop-sided victories for the Allies. I just finished reading South Pacific Air War Volume 6 which came out in August, and covers Jan-March 1943. And it's quite clear in that volume that Richard Bong for example did already shoot down a few Japanese fighters, and the Battle of the Bismark Sea was a very lopsided Allied victory. In the appendix of that book he lists losses for each side in each volume, it's pretty clear that the Guadalcanal Campaign was also a catastrophe for the Japanese. In Oct 42 they lost 225 aircraft vs 203 for the US (including 85 A6M, vs 77 F4F lost) and much more telling, the Japanese lost 428 aircrew killed vs. 104 for the US.
Volume 6 also shows a lot of action for the P-38s, which did seem to do a bit better than the Japanese fighters, but they had some limitations. They were picking off Japanese fighters from altitude, often not lingering long to defend the bombers, (for very good reasons as these were the early P-38s, as Shortround6 noted.) But it does look like Bong already figured out how to make them work.
Another thing worth noting, for reasons I'm not really sure of, the US lost almost twice as many aircraft to accidents, mechanical problems and weather as the Japanese did, but by the end of this volume (Vol III) the Japanese had lost significantly more fighters than the US did. Mostly to P-38s, P-40s, and heavy bombers like B-17s and B-24s.
All this makes me wonder, how well did the P-38 (and P-47) compare to the P-40 (and P-39), and likewise, the F6F and F4U to the F4F, especially when Japanese reports are considered? The 2nd-generation Allied (in this case, US) would have to perform noticeably better than their older counterparts, say, 1.5:1 against 1.1:1 or similar, otherwise, I don't think that they succeeded in justifying themselves, given their likely higher costs and technical complexity.
I also remain sceptical about the performance of the P-38; the first part of Rick Dunn's examination of the P-38's record doesn't seem too negative, though the P-38 does not appear too dominant, with the enemy losing perhaps one additional airframe (which could potentially have been recovered later) in encounters with it, if even that. Both the second part of this examination and Claringbould's book on the Bougainville air campaign are harrowing in comparison, with numerous engagements where it seems that Zeros were able to shoot down P-38s with only moderate damage at best, certainly no losses. The most shocking encounter, and it did legitimately shock me when I read it, took place on November 7, with four P-38s shot down by defending A6Ms over Rabaul without any loss to their own despite massive over-claiming on the part of the P-38 pilots. Even if the P-38 was unable to exercise its advantages in the Rabaul-Solomons area as it could over New Guinea, and it should be noted that it was frequently utilised in low-altitude strafing runs in the former, given its superior speed, especially its climb, and its superior firepower, this remains a grisly result for the famed Lightning. The information Claringbould's
Pacific Profiles book on the P-38 supposedly suggests a 1:1 loss ratio against Japanese aircraft (overall?) if that Modelling Madness review is to be believed.
Some other things to keep in mind:
It's still basically the first generation of these new types of Operational Histories, - and they do have errors. This new approach is really exciting and promising, but it's not perfect yet. One thing to note, as an example, when Christopher Shores first attempted his first book on the Mediterranean - "Fighters over the Desert" way back in 1969, he checked the German records but forgot to check the Italian (and also, it was a lot harder to do). He concluded that most DAF aces had overclaimed by enormous amounts, which turned out to be a kind of overcorrection. Another researcher from Australia challenged him with his own book pointing out several omissions by Shores, who then eventually went back, made an alliance with an Italian researcher and was then able to include the Italian losses ... or at least some of them... plus more of the German losses (including forced landings etc.) and a lot more detail in general, in his new Mediterranean Air War series, and this was much more successful.
I think we are going to need to see a couple more rounds of checking these initial attempts to be real sure that we know, as best we can know, what really happened. But we can already at this point start to see some new and to me interesting patterns emerging.
I would agree with you here, though I will that add that it's to be expected, but still quite annoying nonetheless, that the ETO and MTO were the very first to receive this level of attention, and that's not to speak of the amount of attention late-war German aircraft receive compared to late-war Japanese fighters, especially in terms of specifications, and correcting them for any wartime deficiencies in resources and in manufacturing. The late-war Japanese fighters usually have the same, tired Francillon figures ascribed to them, often with little to no context behind them.
The second / third generations of "uber" fighters did actually take a toll - In Shores "Bloody Shambles" Volume III, it's quite clear that the P-51B/C/D and the Spitfire Mk VIII did in fact take a significantly unequal toll of the Ki-43s. By this point these were Ki-43-II and also some III (I don't know the exact number of these flying but I think Shortround6 is wrong about the numbers, there were definitely more than ten because there were whole units flying them). It was clear in the data and the Japanese pilots were complaining about it. They specifically noted that Spit VIII could outclimb them and that both Spit VIII and P-51B/C/D could extend away at will and come back to attack again.
Dunn's article claims otherwise, at least in the case of the Spitfire VIII. He actually states that the Merlin-powered P-51s (and the P-38s) performed better in fighter sweeps than the Spitfire over Burma and India, but I currently don't have any sources on hand comparing Merlin P-51 and Ki-43 losses in a similarly fair and comprehensive approach to that of Claringbould's and Dunn's works.
My understanding about the F6F and the F4U is that initial successes were not as dramatic as some people think or thought, in fact as you noted the Corsairs initially were about equal, but they did actually start taking a heavy toll as they improved technical problems and developed tactics to suit the new aircraft. Claringbould's month by month operational history books haven't really got to this point yet, but probably the next volumes will see some Corsair data which should be very interesting. I think there were Corsairs in combat over the Solomons in April 1943.
According to Claringbould, the A6M was still quite competent in combat against the Corsair around the Rabaul-Solomons area in 1943, with a roughly 1.5:1 loss-to-loss ratio in a particular engagement over the Russell Islands on May 13, 1943, in the former's favour, with three pilots lost and one force-landing, against two pilots missing, two ditched air-frames and two force-landings. It is not a favourable picture for the Corsair here.
What the exact ratios were I don't know for sure, but as someone already noted upthread, you don't need 7-1 to make a big difference. If there are frequent air clashes, 2-1 or even 1.5-1 in losses is actually a pretty big deal.
From what I've read, many engagements through 1943-44 suggest roughly even ratios for the fighter aircraft involved, sometimes even in the Zero's or Oscar's favour, though this balance had noticeably shifted by mid-1944. The increasing influx of fresher, less experienced pilots did contribute to this change in circumstances, however, perhaps more than most people would think or would like.
In Bloody Shambles Vol 3, Ki-43-I and II were dominant over Hurricane Mk I and IIb and IIcs, about equal with Spitfire Mk V, P-38s and P-47s in this Theater, and seemed to have an edge over the early P-51A mustangs as well. On the other hand the RAF Mohawks seemed to hold their own against them, US P-40s clearly had an edge, and the Beaufighters and Vengeances rarely got shot down, but on the other hand Ki-43s shot down a lot of B-24s, C-47s, Blenheims and other Allied bombers. It's noteworthy that even at this stage (say 1942-43), it clearly wasn't a cakewalk for the IJA. They were taking steady losses, and the Ki-43 Sentai leaders were already being killed at an alarming rate, being replaced every few months. But it seems to be when the merlin powered P-51B and C started arriving, and the Spit VIII, they were having serious problems. The Spit VIII were brought in after an RAF officer finally made a big stink about the unsuitability of the Hurricane in this Theater. Once the new Mustang and the Spit VIII arrived, the Japanese pilots talked about it and the Ki-43 units started being used as close air support / fighter bombers, with the Ki-84 taking over most of the air to air (and according to some Japanese fighter pilots, using their speed to flee the battle area more often than not).
The Spitfire VIII did appear to have a marginal advantage to some degree, perhaps 1.5:1 to 2:1 in terms of losses, at least according to Dunn. Not terrible, but not crushing either. I suppose that, at the very least, this Spitfire model had proven itself as a marked improvement over the Ki-43. Still, the Ki-43 wasn't completely outclassed at altitudes below 20,000 feet (~6000m), where much of the fighting took place. Accounts from both sides, as provided by Dunn, speak of this. Supposedly, however, the Spitfire VIII's claims/victory(?)-to-loss ratio was only >1:1 in the theatre, at least according to a US Navy report from June 1944, though this ratio is inclusive of all Japanese aircraft types besides just fighters alone. Taking into consideration over-claiming, Dunn asserts that the Spitfire actually had a negative ratio until then. I'm not entirely sure if that's the case, and the engagements between the Spitfire and the Ki-43, as he describes, don't suggest such an appalling record...
The big question though, for me, is Why would this turn you off to WW2 Aviation History?
The old consensus was wrong. We now have an opportunity to develop a new one. To me it's fascinating. I don't know if people in this particular venue will really welcome the news, but it's certainly an exciting time if you are interested in this subject, as far as I can tell. Yes it's perhaps a bit shocking to find out that all that 11-1 stuff was B.S. But these old legends never fully rang true for me. Now we are starting to see something closer to the truth, not just in WW2 but also in the Korean War, Vietnam, many others. I think it's fascinating stuff. I wait for new releases of these operational histories with baited breath. The story wasn't nearly as simple as we thought. There was more than one way for a fighter to be effective, it seems. There is a lot to learn. Isn't that a good thing?
I'm coming around to your perspective, though I remain of the opinion that such a path is murky, unclear, and, at this stage, still rather disappointing, especially given that so many relevant records have been lost to time, and so many misconceptions and speculation are, and will remain, abound.
Since the discussion has expanded beyond Claringbould's and Dunn's books and articles, it would be fair to say that you're relevant to the discussion now,
Thumpalumpacus
. You have also provided potentially interesting recommendations for authors, but unless they have any new, profound and relevant information, especially that which takes into account actual losses as recorded by Japanese sources, I'm unsure how they would put to rest any of Claringbould's or Dunn's claims, which I have been echoing throughout this thread.
Are you asking my opinion? If so, I say "yes".
Force-landings do usually come about as a result of damage sustained during combat, normally by enemy fire, correct? Operational losses would more so apply to things like engine troubles, faulty landing gear preventing a smooth, convenient landing, which could have been brought about by such things as faulty manufacturing, design problems, non-combat related causes in general, wouldn't they? Wouldn't force-landings not be operational losses, then, especially if they result from damage sustained in combat? Can operational losses arise, directly and unambiguously, from damage in combat? Do you consider ditching as a result of combat damage to also be operational losses?
A separate thread on this topic might just come in handy. And regardless, force-landings still suggest that said aircraft were outfought by their opponents in the air.
No one is arguing that American pilots did not overclaim. Please put that red herring to bed for once and for all.
The problem here is that
GregP
and
G
Geoffrey Sinclair
, especially the former, have previously cited the same, profligate victory-to-loss ratios for US aircraft.
G
Geoffrey Sinclair
is more willing to admit to over-claiming, but he, funnily enough, echoes the sentiments of US High Command, that even if over-claiming exaggerated the ratio by 3-to-1—and according to Dunn, it could have been as high as 4.4-to-1—that the Allied aircraft would still have been breaking even (which is what Claringbould and Dunn both suggest to some degree), if not performing better either way...
I'm sure they were aware of the problem, probably during the war, and certainly after the war.
Like
G
Geoffrey Sinclair
, the US High Command did not realise the full extent of the problem, given how they both guess(ed) an upper limit of a 3-to-1 over-claiming ratio, when it was arguably worse than expected. Take, for example, the period 1-15 January 1944. Japanese messages intercepted by Allied intelligence stated that 44 aircraft were lost in combat. American claims during that same period reached a figure of 193, around 4.5 times greater. Similarly high ratios like the 4.9-to-1 combat ratio yielded by Nimitz's monthly report for December 1943, and the nearly 5:1 ratio claimed by the three Hellcat squadrons over the Solomons, are likely similarly suspect, especially the latter, as Dunn went through their record in great length in his article on the F6F.
The fact that you seem to think that additional weight only affects speed is not encouraging. Weight doesn't affect straight-line speed as much as it does climb rate and horizontal maneuverability, which I'm sure we agree are very important in air combat. This doesn't mean that speed is not important, though. It means that if you don't increase power as you increase weight, you're decreasing performance parameters vital to combat.
Fact? Where did I state that additional weight only affects speed? I don't disagree with your point that more power is needed with additional weight, given that I mentioned the A7M in my little hypothetical. It's just that aircraft, especially manoeuvrable aircraft with relatively lower wing loadings like the A6M, A7M, Ki-43 and the Ki-61 to some degree, need not have firepower, climb, and level speed equivalent or superior to their opponents to hold their own against them in combat. The A6M's record against the Corsair and F6F, especially in 1943, when experienced Japanese pilots were still in sizable numbers, is evidence of this. This implies less weight, and consequently, less horsepower required.
There is an over looked aspect of Allied pilot quality. For the US the Navy entered the war with some vey experienced pilots, not in combat but overall they had some high time pilots. Thach for instance became an aviator in 1930. O'Hare finished his aviator training on May 2nd 1940. He had been flying for just about 22 months when he made his famous intercept on the Japanese bombers. We can argue about the exact score but the point is that Thach was pulled from combat after Midway and O'Hare was pulled from combat after that one fight and did not return to combat until 1943.
Much of the combat the US engaged in the 2nd part of 1942 and a lot of 1943 was with lower time pilots than they had in first part of 1942. This is on average. It took a while to get the average experience back up and while the US pilots got a more than average number of flight hours it still was not enough for combat. US did lengthen the training as the war went on and using a number of combat veterans helped increase the quality of training.
Japanese had the problems of using fewer flight hours in training as the war went on and they didn't rotate their pilots back to the training schools as often so the new pilot quality really took a hit. Where they crossed over is certainly subject to question.
The American aircraft helped more of their pilots survive and return to action. which certainly helped in the long run. The US effort put into aircrew rescue is often overlooked.
But that starts at the beginning. Using the parachute, having a decent radio to make a mayday call (or mayday call by wingman). Having armor/BP glass, decent protection on fuel tanks. Having the crashboats/PT boats/ Submarines that can be assigned to the right areas.
Interesting, but it does make comparisons between the A6M and Ki-43, and the 2nd-generation Allied aircraft of the war, much harder, as this information suggests that there was rarely an engagement in 1943-44 involving similar numbers of experienced Japanese and US pilots.
Claringbould's book on the A6M and F4U, for instance, suggests a loss ratio slightly in favour of the former earlier on in 1943, this balance shifting slightly to the F4U into 1944. With the increase in US experience and concurrent decrease in Japanese experience, I'm thinking that this still implies that a more evenly matched battle would result in a roughly one-to-one loss ratio, like Claringbould and Dunn would lean towards, with the F4U having little to no advantage over what should have been an inferior opponent. This could similarly apply to other engagements between Allied and Japanese aircraft, and we would return to square one, essentially. This is just speculation on my part, however.
I think that 70%-90% ratio is overstated, (I think it comes from a statement by Erik Hartmann?) and is more applicable in the early war when:
1) Pilots, especially on the Allied side, were often inexperienced and untrained.
2) Allied pilots in many Theaters were not flying with Wingmen and / or in Finger-Four formations.
3) Most fighters were turtleback type rather than bubble canopy. (Malcolm hood was a partial solution to this, but I don't know the exact dates these became available to various fighter types, the RAF had it first...)
4) Many fighters (notably Russian and Japanese, and I think Italian too) either didn't have radios or had radios that were barely working
5) and it took a while for these to be fitted with rearview mirrors
6) Even once they got radios, it took a while before these to be truly reliable and good procedures for their use had been worked out.
In the Middle East and Burma, even in 1942 through early 1943 the Anglo-Americans were still having some problems with radio communication (for example between squadrons and between fighters and bombers), but by then all the fighters at least had rearview mirrors and squadron radio coms at relatively short range (a few miles) were usually at least partly functional.
In the Middle East they worked out, by around mid-1942, standard procedure for entire squadrons turning into enemy attacks from above, coordinated with the radio. This made a huge difference in outcomes, as the Axis fighters (Bf 109F and G, MC 202) usually had the altitude advantage. They also started using Finger-Four / Two pairs of Wingmen formations at this time.
It's noteworthy that Japanese fighters had better canopies for situational awareness from the get-go.
View attachment 849497'
Ki-43
View attachment 849498
A6M
On the other hand radios were often lacking.
Whether fighters saw or noticed the enemy before being attacked depended partly on this, and partly on the size of the engagement, and partly on how the engagement started (were they bounced etc.) but it was quite common for small engagements to take place where both sides saw the other long before they engaged. It depends on altitude, on the mission (flying escort? intercepting enemy bombers? fighter sweep? Recon? fighter bomber attack), the weather, functional radios?)
Ah, radios. I had forgotten that crucial aspect of aerial warfare. The fact that Japanese aircraft often had to make do without them due to a variety of issues makes their performance against 2nd-generation Allied aircraft all the more commendable, and conversely, dampens my enthusiasm for the latter.
As for your post,
T
ThomasP
, I think that I, or
S
Steamed_Banana
, since he's mentioned transcribing and posting passages, will have to go through the works of Claringbould, Dunn, and similar authors, in great detail on this forum, in this thread or another dedicated to them solely, to address sufficiently the points you have raised. Something similar to
Wild_Bill_Kelso
's thread on the Ki-43's combat history.
In Shores Bloody Shambles Vol III, Ki-43s routinely shot down, and sometimes pursued and caught P-51A and P-38s after a long chase, which I assume may be due to the latter having to maneuver around mountainous terrain, or for other reasons I haven't thought of. But it's clear that at least sometimes other factors trumped the effects of speed, because these planes are all 30-60 mph faster than a Ki-43, depending on the specific models and load-outs, altitude etc.
Bottom line, it's a more complex story than we thought.
I've heard numerous sources, here, maybe, and across the internet, speak of Japanese aircraft, even earlier examples like the A6M, having a kind of emergency boost, though it would be difficult to sustain such a boost depending on the length of a given chase. The figures given for Japanese aircraft speeds, from what I can gather, were often achieved with some equivalent to 'normal' or 'military', as opposed to take-off, or 'full', power. The Japanese apparently tended not to list the maximum effective speed for their aircraft, basically. The Allied aircraft could also have been underperforming, if only slightly, as a result of wartime conditions. But I do agree with you otherwise.
Edit: This is the second time that someone has quoted a post of mine without saying anything whatsoever.
F
Flylo
B
Bob W
Do you have anything at all to add to this discussion?