Retreat after retreat. Would the RAF been better off building bomber transports in a 1:1 ratio with medium bombers?

[Kevin J]

No they didnt 4,792 Ju52 were produced between 1933 and 1951



No they didnt 4900 were built between 1939 and 1952.

The most the Germans and Soviets would have had in service at any one time during the war would have been measured in the low hundreds.

Stop being picky.

 

[Graeme]

Water can be made out at night. Its visible. Low level daylight raids were made but they were suicidal.

Made me think of the two dams in the Hurtgen Forest. The plan was to destroy them and flood the area around Schmidt. Dunno if the attacks were high or low level(?). But according to author Antony Beevor three attacks were made, no damage incurred and Bomber Command "refused to try again".

 

[Shortround6]

The most the Germans and Soviets would have had in service at any one time during the war would have been measured in the low hundreds.

I don't know about the soviets but the Germans had Ju 52s in the mid to high hundreds in service a number of times during the war.
Post war production of the Ju 52 was about 415 by the French and 170 by Spain.

Around 500 Ju 52s were used in the Attack on Norway with about 150 lost. 430 were used in the attack on Holland with 2/3rds destroyed or badly damaged.
493 were supposed to have been used on the attack on Crete with about 170 written off by the end.

Due to these losses only about 200 were available for the attack on Russia. However that is not the total number in service. That was number in the 4 transport Gruppen operating in Russia. There were losses and the need for air transport was such that in Dec 1941 7 more Gruppen were formed (how many at full strength?) by raiding the training and instrument flying schools and taking planes, instructors and advanced students. However the schools were not completely wiped out so some planes did remain in training service.

 

[Dimlee]

Never giving in. Fighting to the end.

I'm not sure we can call this the Soviet strategy. There was a policy which didn't allow to surrender. Laws, regulations, standing orders, etc. - everything was filled with the slogan " Red Army solider does not surrender". But reality was different despite the draconian orders of 1941-1942 which turned millions of POWs (and their family members) into outlaws. So, if we call this the strategy, then it was the one that did not work actually.

 

[Dimlee]

to further the last post, Russia had a really crappy rail network, at least as far as number of rail lines per unit of land mass. The Road network was pretty dismal and may not even deserve the title road network (at least during WW II) Russian infrastructure was such that they made wide use of hydrofoils and air cushion river ferries in the 1960s and 70s to make use of the rivers when they were not frozen. With vast distances and often not a lot between major cities air travel/transport made more sense than in some other countries.

It sounds logical, - in theory. But majority of USSR civilian hydrofoil boats were deployed in the areas with developed infrastructure: Black Sea and Baltic coastal areas, rivers such as Volga and Dnieper. And costs of operations were so high that most of those fleets vanished after they were left without state subsidies in early 1990s. Fast and nice looking... and absolute economic nonsense.

 

[Shortround6]

Granted they were not exactly high speed but able to nose into a river bank doesn't call for much infrastructure.

Economic viability may have had little to do with it. Few western city subway systems or commuter rail trains are economically viable without government subsidies. The problem for many western governments is that the alternatives are either more expensive ( more roads, bridges and tunnels) or politically troublesome. HIgher commuter ticket prices and the pricing of some workers out of the job market.
For the Russians it might have been more rail lines and trains or commuter buses on new roads or ?????

Most transport in many countries is subsidized to a greater or lesser extent. In the US the large trucks don't really pay for the wear and tear on the highways they cause despite the road/fuel tax. The Airlines don't pay for the gov air traffic control system and they rent space at the airports which were built with government subsidies.

Lets not forget the DC-3/LI-2 was the first airliner that could operate at a profit without a government subsidy.

 

[Freebird]

Just looking at USSR production. Il-4 and Li-2 built in equal numbers. We retreated in Belgium, Malaya and Burma. You need 5 tons of supplies for every 2000 troops.

From The Pacific War Online Encyclopedia: Logistics

For the US in 1942 "Once overseas, each man required about 45 pounds (20 kg) of supplies per day. ."

Even Shortround's numbers are low estimates, by about 50%
(I believe that your source doesn't include artillery)
45 pounds per man x 4,000 men is about 90 tons.

Eisenhower (in his book) and various other sources give a figure of 500 tons/day for a division, or about 170 tons per regiment (British brigade)


Using Kevin's estimate of 5 tons per 2,000 troops, what does that get?
Let's assume a force of about 4,000 men, which is about the size of a British brigade group, with an artillery regiment of 24 guns attached. (1/3 of the divisional artillery brigade).

20,000 lbs (10 tons) ÷ 24 guns ÷ 25 pounds per shell = 33 rounds per gun.
33 rounds per gun is enough for 11 minutes normal fire, or 6.5 minutes of intense fire.
Not that much...

Even that assumes that no tonnage is used for food, water or personal ammo, so your troops wouls be eating mangrove leaves and repelling Japanese assaults with bayonets only.

 

[Freebird]

After receiving better info I must raise that number to 350. I just regard the Malayan campaign as a fiasco and the Singapore surrender as a disaster, so I'm looking for a way around this. My idea is 350 bomber transports supporting our glorious Imperial armies.

If you are wondering if the British could have prevented the Malaya/Singapore debacle, they could indeed have done so, the main obstacles were some disastrous miscalculations and the lack of political will.

Air Transport however is not your answer.
By the time airdropping supplies becomes useful, you've already royally screwed up.

No government could foresee or would plan in advance for their forces to be isolated and need airborne supply.

 

[Kevin J]

If you are wondering if the British could have prevented the Malaya/Singapore debacle, they could indeed have done so, the main obstacles were some disastrous miscalculations and the lack of political will.

Air Transport however is not your answer.
By the time airdropping supplies becomes useful, you've already royally screwed up.

No government could foresee or would plan in advance for their forces to be isolated and need airborne supply.

Except of course in the Burma Campaign later in the war where transport aircraft were used to supply infiltrated and cut off units. Looking at the Malayan rail network in WW2. It should have been sufficient.

 

[Kevin J]

I think I'd agree that only retreat to the sea was the solution for the BEF.

 

[Kevin J]

In Malaya the problem was infiltration by the Japanese through the jungle behind our forces. The lack of transports was a lack of foresight. It wasn't battleships that were needed to attack the landing beaches but skip bombers to attack the landing ships and cannon armed aircraft to attack the landing craft and to harass those already landed. Skip bombing was a technique tested in 1923.

 

[Freebird]

In Malaya the problem was infiltration by the Japanese through the jungle behind our forces.

This was more of a result of untrained, inexperienced and poorly equipped units, rather than lack of airborne supply capabilities.

The lack of transports was a lack of foresight.

The Far East was considered 4th priority, below the UK, Western Desert and aid to the Soviets.
Even if the British had a couple hundred transports to deploy overseas, they'd be sent to Egypt or the Med before the Far East.

but skip bombers to attack the landing ships and cannon armed aircraft to attack the landing craft and to harass those already landed. Skip bombing was a technique tested in 1923.

Skip bombing is likely not effective with inexperienced pilots.
Torpedo bombers would be far more effective and useful

 

[Kevin J]

This was more of a result of untrained, inexperienced and poorly equipped units, rather than lack of airborne supply capabilities.



The Far East was considered 4th priority, below the UK, Western Desert and aid to the Soviets.
Even if the British had a couple hundred transports to deploy overseas, they'd be sent to Egypt or the Med before the Far East.



Skip bombing is likely not effective with inexperienced pilots.
Torpedo bombers would be far more effective and useful

Yes, lots of problems. An invasion during the monsoon season, so how viable are any air ops? Lack of transports, lack of multi-seat skip bombers fast enough to evade Japanese fighters. I don't think we had any of either anywhere in late 1941. Operation Sea Lion has been wargames, but has anyone wargamed a plausible workable British defence of Malaya?

 

[Freebird]

Operation Sea Lion has been wargames, but has anyone wargamed a plausible workable British defence of Malaya?

Yes

 

[Dimlee]

Granted they were not exactly high speed but able to nose into a river bank doesn't call for much infrastructure.

Economic viability may have had little to do with it. Few western city subway systems or commuter rail trains are economically viable without government subsidies. The problem for many western governments is that the alternatives are either more expensive ( more roads, bridges and tunnels) or politically troublesome. HIgher commuter ticket prices and the pricing of some workers out of the job market.
For the Russians it might have been more rail lines and trains or commuter buses on new roads or ?????

Most transport in many countries is subsidized to a greater or lesser extent. In the US the large trucks don't really pay for the wear and tear on the highways they cause despite the road/fuel tax. The Airlines don't pay for the gov air traffic control system and they rent space at the airports which were built with government subsidies.

Lets not forget the DC-3/LI-2 was the first airliner that could operate at a profit without a government subsidy.

Thanks for photos. Boats of that particular type were neither hydrofoils nor hovercrafts, yet there was some "air cushion" effect, or, how it was called (translated from Russian) "the air lubrication". Unsafe, not comfortable, destructive for environment... but yes, they did help a lot in improving transport links on rivers and lakes. On short routes, 100-200km mostly.

As for the high speed (hydrofoil) fleet in the peak of its development, it consisted of Kometa, Meteor and Voskhod types - good vessels for its time, by the way.. Hovercrafts were less numerous, more costly.

Economic viability.... Yes, it was largely ignored in USSR once the Party and the Government made a decision to dump to spend money on another grand project.
Sorry, but comparison to other (non socialist) countries is not relevant. As mentioned, most of those nice vessels were deployed where transport infrastructure has been already developed better and much better than in remote regions which you referred to. So yes, for the Soviets adding few more rail wagons or few more dozens of buses made much more sense. Or (on the coastal routes) deployment of 1-2 cruise ships. Why the Soviet government took such decisions and MMF (Ministry of Merchant Marine Fleet, the owner and operator) did not object? Why the seat on Kometa from Odessa to Yalta was of about the same price as a bunk in a cabin on cruise ship on the same route and just a bit more expensive then train ticket? There are several answers but none of them is economically sound. And again, they did not cover vast distances, about 500-550 km was maximum subject the engines were in good order and the weather was fine.

P.S. Sorry for prolonged off topic commentary. This subject is close to my earlier career.

 

[Kevin J]

Yes

View attachment 546872

Okay and what was done? What were the results?

 

[Dimlee]

Just a side note.

I noticed that USSR was mentioned as a way of comparison. I never read a book which provided complete story about VVS/GVF transport fleet during WWII. So I looked quickly through my files and some articles available in Internet.
Information available is not complete and sometimes contradictory - even in the same source.

Some key figures which I managed to find.
1. Total number of GVF(civilian air fleet) transport aircraft in 1941-1945: the lowest 217 end 1942/early 1943, the highest 436 in August 1945.
This is only GVF which represented from 50% to 90% of total transport capacity through the war. At the same time, figures above include all aircraft deployed all over USSR. Share of GVF transport planes involved in military service varied between 30% and 70%.
2. Total cargo capacity (GVF, VVS and probably Navy): 1620 mt in June 1941 (80% was considered "combat ready").
I could not find data for 1945 but probably it did not increase. As per one source total capacity at the end of 1943 was just 428 mt.
3. Li-2/PS-84 and C-47(from summer 1943) were the backbone of GVF transport fleet.
4. TB-1 and TB-3 were used extensively and in constantly diminishing numbers until summer 1944.
5. Total GVF transport a/c available for military operations: 120 in July 1941 and 228 in August 1945. The latter figure includes 35 B-25.
6. Final results of GVF transport aviation: about 1.6 mln persons (incl. 67 thousands across the front lines), 122 thousands metric tons of cargo.
7. According to the report published in 1985, GVF has delivered 94% of all air transport volume. At the same time, all air transport (VVS, GVF, Navy) carried 0.2% of total war related volume transported.

 

[Freebird]

But none of the airfields in Malaya were night-capable (a few in Singapore were used for night ops but only in extremis).

Among the very first air actions of the Pacific War was the RAAF Hudson's from Khota Baru against the Japanese invasion fleet, so they must have been capable of nighht flying?

Yes SEAC was severely under equipped for fighters. IIRC it was estimated that 500 were needed. .

500 modern aircraft, not 500 fighters

 

[Kevin J]

Among the very first air actions of the Pacific War was the RAAF Hudson's from Khota Baru against the Japanese invasion fleet, so they must have been capable of nighht flying?



500 modern aircraft, not 500 fighters

Given that just Malaya was the size of England, I'll stick with my 500 fighters. Then there's Singapore, Sabah, Sarawak and Brunei to defend the other side of the South China Sea. Hong Kong 1600 miles north is defenceless against air attack.

 

[Freebird]

Given that just Malaya was the size of England, I'll stick with my 500 fighters. .

Given that the UK & Western Desert also requires fighters, adding 400+ fighters wasn't a realistically achievable goal IMO.
Adding about 100-150 fighters would be much more workable.