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If Japan is able to advance into Burma then the BCE has no choice but to do so, especially to keep the Burma Rd open, but in this ATL the BCE has the air and land forces needed to defeat any force that Japan can deploy in Burma. The Indian Army in the ATL was huge and the BCE has the manpower to support Burma and the SWP simultaneously.
The problem is less the loadout but the bombs themselves. Attacking refineries, as we Americans found out in Europe, 500-lb bombs weren't so useful as the total tonnage might indicate. Now, the Brit heavies could probably do some serious boomalot, what with a 4000-lb HE and a shit-ton of incendiaries. But you're going to be waiting for that, and also be waiting for the targeting aids to undo the problems outlined by the Butt Report.
It's been pointed out prior that the tropics aren't friendly to wood, which was a good proportion of the Wimpy's build. They may make the missions, but I think the operational rates are going to suffer simply due to the airplane's build.
If the RN and RAAF are active, absolutely -- the IJN will have a hard time of it. But I think @RCAF is right, that the MM will be able to sail directly to Western Aus, granted that there will be long lead-times for any items on order.
The thing is, can they get to the ships? The distance from Darwin to Balikpapan is 1200 miles one-way, which is beyond pushing the Wellington's range, not accounting for other fuel issues like the sketchy weather. Those ships are headed north.
They could do good service, no doubt. But I'm not sure they would be great at interdicting the flow of resources back to Japan, which was the point I was addressing.
I am not sure I believe that you need such big bombs to damage refineries. You apparently don't need them to damage ports and railyards. Again accuracy matters a lot. My theory (admittedly it's just an educated guess. Maybe just a guess period) is that part of why Ploesti and some of the German plants proved so resiliant is that they had a lot of repair facilities on hand, and could bring in anything they needed very quickly from nearby industrial centers by rail. So yah you busted up a lot of pipes? So what we bring in tons more. But if you do that in Java the new parts and maybe some tools and workers are all going to have to come by air or by sea. And that is a vulnerability.
Also the British subs, assuming you can resupply them in Western Australia, are going to be able to range far north. And those I think will be able to reach Brunei etc. They sunk something like 300,000 tons of shipping in the Med.
You still maybe aren't threatening the Japanese home islands, but if you can intercept their main sources of their most important raw materials, like oil, maybe you can cause them some significant problems.
This is another one I'm not certain about. Russia is very wet and swampy too, and it gets very hot in say, Crimea or the Kuban peninsula in the summer. Many of their fighter planes were made of wood, and they were initially having a lot of problems with moisture. They put a thin layer of bakelite on top of the plywood on the Yak-9, and that and a few other relatively simple measures seem to have solved that problem. Wood isn't the same as canvas of course, but I suspect there may have been a similar solution available.
As I noted before, if the heat and humidity is an insurmountable issue for the Wellingtons, then it's also going to be for the Swordfish, so they'll have to rethink a few things.
If you mean British merchant marine then yeah i agree, though it is always possible the IJN tries to interdict. That might be where you get an epic battle. I would assume British will also be sending a lot of supplies like those vast quantities of trucks RCAF was referring to from Vancouver etc. down to eastern Australia.
Yes but Broome to Kupang in Timor, which is where those Zeros came from that strafed Broome and caused so much damage with just a few 20mm cannon (and maybe light bombs?) is 545 miles. Broome to Waingapu on Sumba is 588 miles. Broome to Surabaya Java is 976 miles which may be a stretch, but I bet they could make it.
Now of course you still have a point that until the RN / British conquer some bases further north, they are only going to be able to harass the southern and eastern parts of Indonesia, New Guinea, and Burma from the Assam valley in India, or somewhere in what is now Bangladesh.
So they could cause some problems but they would not be able to reach Singapore, Brunei or most of Malaya with Wellingtons. That will require carrier attacks and that, in turn, will mean the carrier fleet will have to be improved and built up.
They certainly couldn't outright strangle Japan from Western Australia, but I could see them starting to bleed Japan. It's hard for me to figure out how you get everything you need out of Java etc. without protecting the shipping, which starts to look like you are going to see escalating conflict in the vicinity of Western Australia as they try to crush the British / Commonwealth ports there.
I also think RCAFSons point about more Indian divisions being available in Asia is interesting. There could be some epic land battles in Burma etc. much earlier than in the real world.
I do not think the Wellingtons used any particular amount of wood, aside from the composite flooring and maybe some cabinetwork. The doped-fabric skin would require more routine maintenance than aluminum, but many British designed/built aircraft with cloth skin operated in the tropics in the 1930s so it seems it was quite doable.
Sorry, but the geodesic structure members were all aluminum alloy. You can see the riveted & bolted gusset plates in the following image of the wing interior. The fuselage construction is similar.
View attachment 734891
Good point. In May 1944 the British Admiralty gave the go ahead to sink anything.Japan was signatory to the treaties that prohibited unrestricted submarine warfare - so was the UK. The US was not.
Japan and the UK did their ~best not to sink merchant ships that were not obviously of military nature and/or in exclusion zones. The US declared unrestricted submarine war against Japan on 12(?) December 1941.
As for accuracy, I'll refer again to the Butt Report, which noted that that even over known territory in Germany, the RAF couldn't put more than 5% or so of bombs within 5 miles of a target.
You're right that parts were easier to get in Europe -- but you still need to get these Wellingtons doing 1200 miles each way from Darwin, and then hope they get within 5 miles of the target.
That's why I'd discount the planes against refineries, and use subs to sink tankers instead.
Right. You won't be hitting refineries until the ground war gets closer airfields and you get long-range heavies. For intercepting at sea, planes aren't really great unless your bases are much closer.
Being a guitarist, I see the effects of humidity and temperature changes upon wood, and this is wood finished in polyurethane coatings. The necks on my guitars tighten up and loosen up overnight. Wood is a lot more sensitive to temp and humidity than metal, both immediately and in the longer run -- which is why I mentioned this: you will be doing a lot more maintenance on Wimpys than all-metal planes.
Now, if you want to coat all the wood on a Wellington in Bakelite, how many hundreds of pounds are you adding? That shit is heavy.
Right, if nothing else, turnover/replacement/maintenance rates.
And the Brits will be guarding those supplies with a good navy.
Double those distances unless you're sending one-way missions. Now put a few thousand pounds of bombs on the planes.
Yep. And further, by attacking north from Australia, the possibility of taking land airbases may keep your flattops ready for other options.
I think this war would be one of attrition, if the Brits survive the initial onslaught.
Duramold.This is another one I'm not certain about. Russia is very wet and swampy too, and it gets very hot in say, Crimea or the Kuban peninsula in the summer. Many of their fighter planes were made of wood, and they were initially having a lot of problems with moisture. They put a thin layer of bakelite on top of the plywood on the Yak-9, and that and a few other relatively simple measures seem to have solved that problem. Wood isn't the same as canvas of course, but I suspect there may have been a similar solution available.
I was referring to the many details about the operational history with the Wellingtons in the Med which were posted in some other recent discussions on this very forum. In fact, some of this was in one long thread which you yourself posted in quite a bit, so I thought you would remember it. It's quite clear to me from those operational details that Wellingtons were used successfully, as I noted, to sink ships and strike ports and logistics targets. This is one post where I quoted from that source, this post has more specific data including about Wellington ops.
| X | % cargo | % cargo | Ship losses on Africa run, GRT | |||
| X | Bragadin | Ehler | Naval | Air | Other | total |
Jan-42 | 0.07 | 9 | 3553 | 19506 | 0 | 23059 |
Feb-42 | 0.85 | 3 | 22277 | 4115 | 1483 | 27875 |
Mar-42 | 17.3 | n/a | 17276 | 6452 | 0 | 23728 |
Apr-42 | 0.78 | 1 | 15989 | 0 | 0 | 15989 |
May-42 | 7.24 | n/a | 14206 | 0 | 0 | 14206 |
Jun-42 | 22.14 | 23 | 2565 | 6837 | 0 | 9402 |
Jul-42 | 6.45 | 6 | 2480 | 7164 | 0 | 9644 |
Aug-42 | 33.03 | 33 | 26719 | 20346 | 4894 | 51959 |
Sep-42 | 20 | 20 | 10778 | 22096 | 1064 | 33938 |
Oct-42 | 44.2 | n/a | 18366 | 31245 | 0 | 49611 |
| Total | n/a | n/a | 134209 | 117761 | 7441 | 259411 |
Having already posted a lot of this data myself direct from the source (Ehler's Mediterranean Air War), and seen several other people post corroborating data with more detail in the same threads, I thought it would be a bit tiresome to go pull the book down from the shelf and re-post all this data just because you feel like a less detailed or 'in the weeds' comment (i.e. "Wellingtons could clearly perform that kind of mission") is an "editorial" or "opinion".
Draw conclusions on anecdotes and isolated data points.So now it's being claimed that I just talk with no basis in fact.
221 Squadron were the first to have the torpedo capable Wellington VIII in early 1942, Coastal Command did not control the Middle East units, 458 squadron was mostly non existent or in training in 1942, a detachment managed 15 sorties in November 1942, 6 anti submarine, 6 anti shipping, 3 minelaying.From my notes on this, it seems there were at least two Wellington torpedo bomber units active in the Med in 1942 - 38 Sqn RAF switched to ship hunting in March 1942, and 458 squadron RAAF went into ship hunting mode in September 1942. There was also 221 Squadron RAF (or were they Coastal Command?) which was operaitonal against Axis Maritime assets in the Med from January 1942 but I don't know if those planes were carrying torpedoes or not.
By the way divide the smashing successes by the effort, what is a great accomplishment for the efforts of a few is an under achievement for the work of many. 205 group controlled 7 Wellington squadrons in May 1942There appear to be another 6 Squadrons of Wellingtons operating in the Tactical role, with 205 Group by the time of Second El Alamein. At least four more seem to have arrived in Theater by the time of Operation Husky in 1943.
Right, the RAF was worried from the start about fabric covering in the tropics, they had bigger and better all metal bombers in service, and the idea is they would spend time to figure out a way so they could deploy Wellingtons not the more modern aircraft. Note the Hampden and Whitley were "all metal", the Hampden could carry mines and later a torpedo.Your original comment was "By end 1941 all 3 RAF four engined bombers were in production, forget Wellingtons and the other twins, an at peace RAF would be phasing them out and would be worried about fabric covering in the tropics." If that is indeed an insurmountable problem, then I guess the Swordfish is out. My assumption is that they could find a way to cope with this issue with some kind of coating or something.
You keep referring to the very different South Pacific, you keep using results from a very different weather zone, the Middle East and finally I did provide weather information which you ruled inaccurate.I've been in the South Pacific area before, and I've been in Northern Europe, and so have many other people. I thought it was general knowledge. Vast horizon to horizon cloud cover is not common in that region, but the weather is very volatile. If there is a typhoon, it can be. Do I really need to go dig up meteorological data to prove this?
I do not write for you. You do not quantify successes, like at least numbers of ships hit, long term damage to infrastructure, and above all the Wellington is considered the answer, no matter what.I find that your objections to my "messages" are often turgid and incomprehensible. For example I don't know what your objection was precisely to my comments about Wellingtons operating in the Med in 1942. Your posts are also typically very long. But I try to read them anyway because you sometimes have useful data, though sometimes the relevance of this data is a bit mysterious.
Let us see now, you claim the clouds in the tropics means astral navigation is usually easy, so your Wellingtons can strike accurately at night, then rule the heavier bombers are too vulnerable by day. Are they afraid of the night? The heavies would have the same navigational accuracy of the mediums, while carrying more bombs. And were better defended than the Wellingtons. Next comes British engineering can make medium bomber airfields but not heavy bomber ones in the tropics.At the risk of being accused of writing another editorial, I will try to explain my thinking. I don't know how many four engined types would be available, but yes I suspect they would be difficult to operate from remote remote or jungle fields, and they (with the exception of missions like 617 RAF with Lancasters) don't seem to have been made to strike operational or tactical targets. I never heard of them carrying torpedoes, though I know they did drop some big bombs on German ships at dockside a few times. That said the USAAF and USN did operate B-17s and B-24s respectively in the Pacific so maybe they would have a role, but unlike those aircraft i see the British four engine heavies as being maybe a little too vulnerable for daytime operations.
Good to know the Wellingtons with Bomber Command had poor accuracy but when with other commands great accuracy, but the heavies were simply inaccurate everywhere. Also pre war the assumption, which continued all the way to the Butt report, was accurate bombing, burning cities was a later idea, or to put it another way, in 1941 27,798 long tons of HE to 3,942 long tons of incendiaries. In 1942 more like 4 tons HE to 3 tons incendiary, 1943 8 to 7.Basically the four engine heavies were developed (if not originally designed) to burn down German cities at night. That is the mission they got pretty good at. What I was envisioning for the Wellington in the Pacific is basically the same role they played in the Mediterranean in 1942-1943. Which is more precisely targeted. I never claimed that this was the only possible interpretation.
Really? Where? Try it was not the wonder weapon of your beliefs.You however did assert categorically that the Wellington was not going to work in the Pacific.
I provided the information to show, once again, the gap between what you claim and reality, which I expected you to rule irrelevant. In future I will simply go no, or wrong. How many shops did PBY torpedo? Bomb? The PBY was big and slow, bad combination for low level attacks, dropping mines was safer.This is a good example of some data, which seems interesting, but I don't know what the relevance is to the thread. I brought up the "Black Cat" PBY squadrons just to point out that this was similar to what Wellingtons were doing in the Med, and showed that night torpedo and / or low-level bombing attacks were successful in the Pacific.
Broome you will be happy to know had almost as many people as Darwin, 900 and only 1,200 miles away. East Timor is around 425 air miles from Darwin, Broome around 675 miles. the RAAF had what it called an Advanced Operational base there, a detachment of men to look after the place.I believe Wellingtons could begin affecting shipping around Java very early on, and could probably expand further than that before too long. Rather than flying out of Darwin, I suspect they could have operated out of Broome, in Western Australia, where the RAAF had a small base in 1942, which was attacked by the Japanese in march 1942, destroying 22 aircraft. At that time, there was at least one US B-24 Liberator and two B-17 aircraft at the base, as well as Lockheed Hudsons and a bunch of PBY Catalinas. Even a couple of old Empire flying boats and some (Dutch?) Do 24s which were destroyed.
The short answer is the air raids did little long term damage.I think they would, again based on the havoc wrought by Japanese bombers against ports and all kinds of infrastructure and industrial targets in Burma, China, Malaya and Indonesia (Dutch East Indies). And in Darwin. All of which was done by comparatively light bombers probably carrying 1,000 or less bomb loads. Bombers with max 2,000 lb bomb loads anyway in most cases. This would include Ki-21, G3M, G4M etc.
Again an exaggeration and ignores the problems of hiding in the desert.Similar carnage was wrought in the Middle East with also very lightly armed Maryland, (early) Boston, and Baltimore bombers, all of which had light ~ 2,000 lb bomb loads as well. And by fighter-bombers which carried between 500 or even 250 lb loads for longer strikes, to as much as 1,500 lb for very short range strikes. later in the war 2,000 lbs.
Carnage, significant problems, so how did the axis hold on, let alone advance in 1942?Later, when heavy bombers capable of carrying heavy loads did arrive, they did more damage against certain types of targets, but even the light bombers were causing significant problems well before that.
There were only 142.5 Wellington Sorties credited with attacking their targets in Berlin in 1941, 155 long tons of bombs, 2,436 pounds of bombs on average. The half is for when an aircraft reported attacking two targets. For the war 36,762 bomber sorties sent (NOT attacking), 41,823 long tons of bombs dropped.Flying a raid from Broome against the base where the Zeroes attacked from in March 1942, I believe Wellingtons could carry more than 2,000 lbs. That distance is less than 600 miles, a Wellington Mk 1 is supposed to be capable of 2,500 miles, and we know that they flew raids from England to Berlin, about ~700 miles each way, with I think close to their full bomb load of 4,500 lbs. I admit I'm no expert on the Wellington so maybe someone else knows how heavy a load they brought to Berlin.
Yes, we know, all it needs is evidence of ports, roads, rail factories being destroyed.My assessment of the Colonial commercial infrastructure in the Pacific is that it was pretty fragile, prone to damage and difficult to repair and maintain, just like much of the commercial infrastructure in North Africa and the Middle East.
The belief is obvious, the data is lacking. What exactly enabled a medium bomber at night to be more accurate than a heavy one?It's worth pointing out that I am very much an advocate of, and believer in accuracy over bomb load when it comes to air strikes. Wellingtons seemed to be able to hit their (tactical and operational) targets, even at night, and I'm not sure how they did it, but the damage they caused was telling. In the Pacific Theater, the 5th Air Force under Gen Kenney emphasized very high accuracy over bomb load, with mast-head height and skip-bombing attacks, (including at night by PBYs) low level strafing, and the use of parafrag (very small parachute delayed) bombs. All of this turned out to be very effective as we know.
Wellingtons never dropped mines when with Bomber Command, they were not set up for them, the GR torpedo carrying versions could. Hampdens, the heavies, Beauforts and Mosquitoes also dropped mines. As noted with Britain at peace in 1940/41 torpedo Wellingtons were not likely to be used, nor were that as successful in the MTO as claimed, you only have to note the successes attributed to Swordfish and Beauforts and the totals of axis shipping sunk.Wellingtons in the Pacific should also be able to replicate the success of their real life counterparts in the MTO by carrying torpedoes and sinking Axis shipping with them, which would make the coasts of Java and Timor quite dangerous for Japanese shipping I think, once they got into their groove. They could also routinely drop mines into the ports, harbors, and shipping lanes.
That is a completely different type of mission, different types of crews, very different targets. I don't know if you saw the excerpts I posted from Ehlers book but it's abundantly clear that Wellingtons were hitting targets often enough to cause great harm to the enemy systems in the Med in 1942 and 1943.
I don't see why you wouldn't use every asset at your disposal. I've explained the evidence that Wellingtons would in fact work. They can also target ships which the British four engine heavy bombers can't really do.
As they pointed out, it's aluminum alloy and cloth. Adding the bakelite to the Yak-3 apparently did not add a lot of weight, as it was still a very light aircraft.
As I pointed out, Wellingtons flew missions from England to Berlin, which is a longer haul than the targets in Timor etc.
If they survived the initial phase, it would become a war of attrition. That doesn't mean it would continue until 'unconditional surrender' - most wars don't. The British might just lose Malaya and Singapore. Pushing Japan to the point of collapse would seem difficult.
None of that explains how you're going to get them hitting refineries in Borneo ... from Darwin.
It was done on occasion from Darwin with B-24. Shady Lady raid.Agreed
That would require B-29s
British Aircraft production finally hit the sort of level required to sustain the planned peace time force in 1939/40, next would come updating the force. Plenty of orders were placed in the US after the war began, if Britain was really at peace only a select few would be done. No refugee aircraft from other country's orders either. Similarly as the newer warships appeared older ones would be paid off. The RNZAF would have its Wellington force, the RAAF Sunderlands, Beauforts and Beaufighters. Not PBY etc.
Ehler does not break down the losses by cause, you assign them to Wellingtons, a consistent theme of how you make decisions. So how many of the ships were sunk by Wellingtons?
X % cargo % cargo Ship losses on Africa run, GRT X Bragadin Ehler Naval Air Other total n/a n/a n/a Total n/a n/a
That was not the editorial, I have been told the only real correction I made in my message 379 on page 19 was the SAAF Wellington squadrons, so the apparently right answers have been looked up but not reported, which does not help anyone. Instead an editorial was provided.
So when did the RAF 4 engined types enter production?
Why did the RAF fail to learn from air raid damage in Britain?
What are the correct Bomber Command Accuracy figures?
When did Loran come into service?
Is the idea Spitfire V and IX float planes were not trialled?
One of the early Dutch successes did not hit an important oil industry resources carrying ship?
The USSBS conclusions on damage done are really?
The Palembang refineries were where relative to the coast?
The weather reports provided are incorrect, why?
The crude oil production and refining capacity figures are really?
The Japanese ended up with what refineries and who controlled them were really?
The air force navigator training levels were really?
The position errors in the Bismarck sighting were?
The monsoon seasons are really?
The lasting damage done to Darwin and other allied areas were?
The true Japanese ship losses to PBY were? (Including from mines laid)
The Australian distances and populations reported are really?
It was quite an editorial.
Draw conclusions on anecdotes and isolated data points.
221 Squadron were the first to have the torpedo capable Wellington VIII in early 1942, Coastal Command did not control the Middle East units, 458 squadron was mostly non existent or in training in 1942, a detachment managed 15 sorties in November 1942, 6 anti submarine, 6 anti shipping, 3 minelaying.
By the way divide the smashing successes by the effort, what is a great accomplishment for the efforts of a few is an under achievement for the work of many. 205 group controlled 7 Wellington squadrons in May 1942
Right, the RAF was worried from the start about fabric covering in the tropics, they had bigger and better all metal bombers in service, and the idea is they would spend time to figure out a way so they could deploy Wellingtons not the more modern aircraft. Note the Hampden and Whitley were "all metal", the Hampden could carry mines and later a torpedo.
You keep referring to the very different South Pacific, you keep using results from a very different weather zone, the Middle East and finally I did provide weather information which you ruled inaccurate.
I do not write for you. You do not quantify successes, like at least numbers of ships hit, long term damage to infrastructure, and above all the Wellington is considered the answer, no matter what.
Let us see now, you claim the clouds in the tropics means astral navigation is usually easy, so your Wellingtons can strike accurately at night, then rule the heavier bombers are too vulnerable by day. Are they afraid of the night? The heavies would have the same navigational accuracy of the mediums, while carrying more bombs. And were better defended than the Wellingtons. Next comes British engineering can make medium bomber airfields but not heavy bomber ones in the tropics.
Wellington I and II at 30 to 32,000 pounds took 1,250 to 1,350 yards to clear a 50 foot obstacle on take off, the Halifax I at 60,000 pounds 1,200 to 1,400 yards, same distance for the Manchester at 50,000 pounds, the Stirling 1,500 yards at 68,000 pounds So apart from the heavier ground pressure what was the technical issue stopping the RAF from building the runways long enough for heavies?
The Wellingtons, like the Hampdens were a wartime expedient torpedo bomber, with peace in 1940/41 the RAF would have its Beaufort torpedo bomber force.
Good to know the Wellingtons with Bomber Command had poor accuracy but when with other commands great accuracy, but the heavies were simply inaccurate everywhere. Also pre war the assumption, which continued all the way to the Butt report, was accurate bombing, burning cities was a later idea, or to put it another way, in 1941 27,798 long tons of HE to 3,942 long tons of incendiaries. In 1942 more like 4 tons HE to 3 tons incendiary, 1943 8 to 7.
Really? Where? Try it was not the wonder weapon of your beliefs.
I provided the information to show, once again, the gap between what you claim and reality, which I expected you to rule irrelevant. In future I will simply go no, or wrong. How many shops did PBY torpedo? Bomb? The PBY was big and slow, bad combination for low level attacks, dropping mines was safer.
Broome you will be happy to know had almost as many people as Darwin, 900 and only 1,200 miles away. East Timor is around 425 air miles from Darwin, Broome around 675 miles. the RAAF had what it called an Advanced Operational base there, a detachment of men to look after the place.
The short answer is the air raids did little long term damage.
Again an exaggeration and ignores the problems of hiding in the desert.
Carnage, significant problems, so how did the axis hold on, let alone advance in 1942?
There were only 142.5 Wellington Sorties credited with attacking their targets in Berlin in 1941, 155 long tons of bombs, 2,436 pounds of bombs on average. The half is for when an aircraft reported attacking two targets. For the war 36,762 bomber sorties sent (NOT attacking), 41,823 long tons of bombs dropped.
Yes, we know, all it needs is evidence of ports, roads, rail factories being destroyed.
The belief is obvious, the data is lacking. What exactly enabled a medium bomber at night to be more accurate than a heavy one?
Wellingtons never dropped mines when with Bomber Command, they were not set up for them, the GR torpedo carrying versions could. Hampdens, the heavies, Beauforts and Mosquitoes also dropped mines. As noted with Britain at peace in 1940/41 torpedo Wellingtons were not likely to be used, nor were that as successful in the MTO as claimed, you only have to note the successes attributed to Swordfish and Beauforts and the totals of axis shipping sunk.
The USSBS noted the bigger bombs caused the more lasting damage, one of the I think two oil targets the Germans gave up trying to repair took multiple 4,000 pound bomb hits on a key section, leaving nothing left. London to Berlin 580 air miles, Lincoln is slightly further away.
Hampden and Whitley were "all metal",
It was done on occasion from Darwin with B-24. Shady Lady raid.
This line in the Wiki is interesting and relevant to the debate about navigating -
"Commanded by First Lieutenant Doug Craig, Shady Lady experienced tropical thunderstorms that caused severe turbulence and greatly hampered the ability of navigator John Nash to carry out celestial navigation."
Apparently eight other B-24s made the raid. And at night the local thunderstorms would be much more rare, IMO.