Rn vs IJN

[Thumpalumpacus]

If Japan is able to advance into Burma then the BCE has no choice but to do so, especially to keep the Burma Rd open, but in this ATL the BCE has the air and land forces needed to defeat any force that Japan can deploy in Burma. The Indian Army in the ATL was huge and the BCE has the manpower to support Burma and the SWP simultaneously.

The Empire has no option but to defend India, sure. I'm saying that India wouldn't be a great base for offensive ops. It's great for transshipment, food resources, and guarding supply lines, but pushing a ground offensive, not so much.

 

[Shortround6]

The goal would be to keep much of Malaya and Burma, Singapore, Sumatra, Java thru Timor and New Guinea.

Maybe more. Depending on the resources that are in theater when the Japanese attack (greater than historical) the Japanese were on thin ice as it was.

Yes they have the stuff they didn't use at Pearl Harbor and the small American Islands and the Philippines but then they don't some of the advantages either.

They can't use Formosa as an air base like they did with Philippines, They can't use the Philippines as staging areas and air bases.

They have to use longer voyages for the initial attacks. Which means fewer attacks in the same time period.

With more/better forces in Malaya Singapore holds and the the Japanese attack in Sumatra is a lot harder, if it even happens.

With around 15 subs at Singapore the Japanese lose a some transports (10-15?) in the first weeks, which slows initial attack and reinforcements.
With more Cruisers and Destroyers it becomes a number of local night battles.
Japanese carrier airpower has to do more of the work than historic land air.
British land air supports/replaces the British carrier air.

Guadalcanal may never happen. The Japanese may too caught up fighting in Borneo and the Northern Islands.

Another question, can the Japanese commit their entire fleet to this or do they have to keep a reserve in case the US does join in?

 

[ThomasP]

I do not think the Wellingtons used any particular amount of wood, aside from the composite flooring and maybe some cabinetwork. The doped-fabric skin would require more routine maintenance than aluminum, but many British designed/built aircraft with cloth skin operated in the tropics in the 1930s so it seems it was quite doable.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

The problem is less the loadout but the bombs themselves. Attacking refineries, as we Americans found out in Europe, 500-lb bombs weren't so useful as the total tonnage might indicate. Now, the Brit heavies could probably do some serious boomalot, what with a 4000-lb HE and a shit-ton of incendiaries. But you're going to be waiting for that, and also be waiting for the targeting aids to undo the problems outlined by the Butt Report.

I am not sure I believe that you need such big bombs to damage refineries. You apparently don't need them to damage ports and railyards. Again accuracy matters a lot. My theory (admittedly it's just an educated guess. Maybe just a guess period) is that part of why Ploesti and some of the German plants proved so resiliant is that they had a lot of repair facilities on hand, and could bring in anything they needed very quickly from nearby industrial centers by rail. So yah you busted up a lot of pipes? So what we bring in tons more. But if you do that in Java the new parts and maybe some tools and workers are all going to have to come by air or by sea. And that is a vulnerability.

Also the British subs, assuming you can resupply them in Western Australia, are going to be able to range far north. And those I think will be able to reach Brunei etc. They sunk something like 300,000 tons of shipping in the Med.

You still maybe aren't threatening the Japanese home islands, but if you can intercept their main sources of their most important raw materials, like oil, maybe you can cause them some significant problems.

It's been pointed out prior that the tropics aren't friendly to wood, which was a good proportion of the Wimpy's build. They may make the missions, but I think the operational rates are going to suffer simply due to the airplane's build.

This is another one I'm not certain about. Russia is very wet and swampy too, and it gets very hot in say, Crimea or the Kuban peninsula in the summer. Many of their fighter planes were made of wood, and they were initially having a lot of problems with moisture. They put a thin layer of bakelite on top of the plywood on the Yak-9, and that and a few other relatively simple measures seem to have solved that problem. Wood isn't the same as canvas of course, but I suspect there may have been a similar solution available.

As I noted before, if the heat and humidity is an insurmountable issue for the Wellingtons, then it's also going to be for the Swordfish, so they'll have to rethink a few things.

If the RN and RAAF are active, absolutely -- the IJN will have a hard time of it. But I think @RCAF is right, that the MM will be able to sail directly to Western Aus, granted that there will be long lead-times for any items on order.

If you mean British merchant marine then yeah i agree, though it is always possible the IJN tries to interdict. That might be where you get an epic battle. I would assume British will also be sending a lot of supplies like those vast quantities of trucks RCAF was referring to from Vancouver etc. down to eastern Australia.

The thing is, can they get to the ships? The distance from Darwin to Balikpapan is 1200 miles one-way, which is beyond pushing the Wellington's range, not accounting for other fuel issues like the sketchy weather. Those ships are headed north.

Yes but Broome to Kupang in Timor, which is where those Zeros came from that strafed Broome and caused so much damage with just a few 20mm cannon (and maybe light bombs?) is 545 miles. Broome to Waingapu on Sumba is 588 miles. Broome to Surabaya Java is 976 miles which may be a stretch, but I bet they could make it.

Now of course you still have a point that until the RN / British conquer some bases further north, they are only going to be able to harass the southern and eastern parts of Indonesia, New Guinea, and Burma from the Assam valley in India, or somewhere in what is now Bangladesh.

So they could cause some problems but they would not be able to reach Singapore, Brunei or most of Malaya with Wellingtons. That will require carrier attacks and that, in turn, will mean the carrier fleet will have to be improved and built up.

They could do good service, no doubt. But I'm not sure they would be great at interdicting the flow of resources back to Japan, which was the point I was addressing.

They certainly couldn't outright strangle Japan from Western Australia, but I could see them starting to bleed Japan. It's hard for me to figure out how you get everything you need out of Java etc. without protecting the shipping, which starts to look like you are going to see escalating conflict in the vicinity of Western Australia as they try to crush the British / Commonwealth ports there.

I also think RCAFSons point about more Indian divisions being available in Asia is interesting. There could be some epic land battles in Burma etc. much earlier than in the real world.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I am not sure I believe that you need such big bombs to damage refineries. You apparently don't need them to damage ports and railyards. Again accuracy matters a lot. My theory (admittedly it's just an educated guess. Maybe just a guess period) is that part of why Ploesti and some of the German plants proved so resiliant is that they had a lot of repair facilities on hand, and could bring in anything they needed very quickly from nearby industrial centers by rail. So yah you busted up a lot of pipes? So what we bring in tons more. But if you do that in Java the new parts and maybe some tools and workers are all going to have to come by air or by sea. And that is a vulnerability.

As for accuracy, I'll refer again to the Butt Report, which noted that that even over known territory in Germany, the RAF couldn't put more than 5% or so of bombs within 5 miles of a target.

You're right that parts were easier to get in Europe -- but you still need to get these Wellingtons doing 1200 miles each way from Darwin, and then hope they get within 5 miles of the target.

Also the British subs, assuming you can resupply them in Western Australia, are going to be able to range far north. And those I think will be able to reach Brunei etc. They sunk something like 300,000 tons of shipping in the Med.

That's why I'd discount the planes against refineries, and use subs to sink tankers instead.

You still maybe aren't threatening the Japanese home islands, but if you can intercept their main sources of their most important raw materials, like oil, maybe you can cause them some significant problems.

Right. You won't be hitting refineries until the ground war gets closer airfields and you get long-range heavies. For intercepting at sea, planes aren't really great unless your bases are much closer.

This is another one I'm not certain about. Russia is very wet and swampy too, and it gets very hot in say, Crimea or the Kuban peninsula in the summer. Many of their fighter planes were made of wood, and they were initially having a lot of problems with moisture. They put a thin layer of bakelite on top of the plywood on the Yak-9, and that and a few other relatively simple measures seem to have solved that problem. Wood isn't the same as canvas of course, but I suspect there may have been a similar solution available.

Being a guitarist, I see the effects of humidity and temperature changes upon wood, and this is wood finished in polyurethane coatings. The necks on my guitars tighten up and loosen up overnight. Wood is a lot more sensitive to temp and humidity than metal, both immediately and in the longer run -- which is why I mentioned this: you will be doing a lot more maintenance on Wimpys than all-metal planes.

Now, if you want to coat all the wood on a Wellington in Bakelite, how many hundreds of pounds are you adding? That shit is heavy.

As I noted before, if the heat and humidity is an insurmountable issue for the Wellingtons, then it's also going to be for the Swordfish, so they'll have to rethink a few things.

Right, if nothing else, turnover/replacement/maintenance rates.

If you mean British merchant marine then yeah i agree, though it is always possible the IJN tries to interdict. That might be where you get an epic battle. I would assume British will also be sending a lot of supplies like those vast quantities of trucks RCAF was referring to from Vancouver etc. down to eastern Australia.

And the Brits will be guarding those supplies with a good navy.

Yes but Broome to Kupang in Timor, which is where those Zeros came from that strafed Broome and caused so much damage with just a few 20mm cannon (and maybe light bombs?) is 545 miles. Broome to Waingapu on Sumba is 588 miles. Broome to Surabaya Java is 976 miles which may be a stretch, but I bet they could make it.

Double those distances unless you're sending one-way missions. Now put a few thousand pounds of bombs on the planes.

Now of course you still have a point that until the RN / British conquer some bases further north, they are only going to be able to harass the southern and eastern parts of Indonesia, New Guinea, and Burma from the Assam valley in India, or somewhere in what is now Bangladesh.

So they could cause some problems but they would not be able to reach Singapore, Brunei or most of Malaya with Wellingtons. That will require carrier attacks and that, in turn, will mean the carrier fleet will have to be improved and built up.

Yep. And further, by attacking north from Australia, the possibility of taking land airbases may keep your flattops ready for other options.

They certainly couldn't outright strangle Japan from Western Australia, but I could see them starting to bleed Japan. It's hard for me to figure out how you get everything you need out of Java etc. without protecting the shipping, which starts to look like you are going to see escalating conflict in the vicinity of Western Australia as they try to crush the British / Commonwealth ports there.

I also think RCAFSons point about more Indian divisions being available in Asia is interesting. There could be some epic land battles in Burma etc. much earlier than in the real world.

I think this war would be one of attrition, if the Brits survive the initial onslaught.

I do not think the Wellingtons used any particular amount of wood, aside from the composite flooring and maybe some cabinetwork. The doped-fabric skin would require more routine maintenance than aluminum, but many British designed/built aircraft with cloth skin operated in the tropics in the 1930s so it seems it was quite doable.

While the spars were metal, the geodesic structure itself was of wood, to my understanding.

ETA: As seen below, T ThomasP corrects me on this. Please disregard this part of my reply.

 

[ThomasP]

Sorry, but the geodesic structure members were all aluminum alloy. You can see the riveted & bolted gusset plates in the following image of the wing interior. The fuselage construction is similar.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Sorry, but the geodesic structure members were all aluminum alloy. You can see the riveted & bolted gusset plates in the following image of the wing interior. The fuselage construction is similar.

View attachment 734891

I stand corrected, and thanks for the learning. Disregard that objection of mine. I'll edit the post above to reflect this.

 

[WARSPITER]

The geodetic structure on the Wellington was made from Duralumin and gave the aircraft the ability to take
hits that other aircraft would not have survived. The weakness for operations in SE Asia was the doped fabric
skin which was vulnerable to high humidity / heat combinations.

The submarine base set up at Fremantle (not Freemantle) was due to concerns about Darwin and Exmouth being
vulnerable to air attack whereas Fremantle was not. Just to be sure some subs were also based at Albany, much
further South.

As far as the USN subs went, Fremantle was second only to Pearl Harbour. Dutch and British subs operated from
there at different dates. From 1942 to 1945 submarines from Freo ranged as far as the Phillipines and accounted
for just over 15 million tons of enemy shipping.

There were also 1500 vessels sunk (mostly coastal) which were under 500 tons and not included in total tonnage
calculations.

As to the Japanese submarines, a joint RN / USN report after the war stated they found it impossible to believe that
submarines could spend weeks on the US west coast 'without contacts,' or spend more than 40 days running
among the Solomons during the Guadalcanal campaign 'without seeing any targets. Logs showed that on too many
occasions when a contact was sighted, it 'too far away to engage".

This shows that Japanese sub commanders knew how vulnerable their vessels were. As a result, the submarines operating
from Fremantle sank over 50% more tonnage than the entire Japanese submarine fleet.

Although that doesn't pan out well, as noted earlier in this thread the Japanese doctrine of luring the enemy into one
large fleet engagement meant that Japanese subs were mostly looking to sink fighting vessels when they would have
been much better employed going after transport.

A later Japanese assessment pointed to shipping losses by submarine attacks as one of the root causes for Japan's
defeat, which is correct.

 

[ThomasP]

Japan was signatory to the treaties that prohibited unrestricted submarine warfare - so was the UK. The US was not.

Japan and the UK did their ~best not to sink merchant ships that were not obviously of military nature and/or in exclusion zones. The US declared unrestricted submarine war against Japan on 12(?) December 1941.

 

[WARSPITER]

Japan was signatory to the treaties that prohibited unrestricted submarine warfare - so was the UK. The US was not.

Japan and the UK did their ~best not to sink merchant ships that were not obviously of military nature and/or in exclusion zones. The US declared unrestricted submarine war against Japan on 12(?) December 1941.

Good point. In May 1944 the British Admiralty gave the go ahead to sink anything.

 

[ThomasP]

I am not sure what all the Japanese did later in the war, but I do not recall that they went crazy sinking Allied shipping. Also, there were reports of Japanese sub commanders refusing to target merchant ships that were not readily identifiable as enemy combatants.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

As for accuracy, I'll refer again to the Butt Report, which noted that that even over known territory in Germany, the RAF couldn't put more than 5% or so of bombs within 5 miles of a target.

You're right that parts were easier to get in Europe -- but you still need to get these Wellingtons doing 1200 miles each way from Darwin, and then hope they get within 5 miles of the target.

That is a completely different type of mission, different types of crews, very different targets. I don't know if you saw the excerpts I posted from Ehlers book but it's abundantly clear that Wellingtons were hitting targets often enough to cause great harm to the enemy systems in the Med in 1942 and 1943.

That's why I'd discount the planes against refineries, and use subs to sink tankers instead.

Right. You won't be hitting refineries until the ground war gets closer airfields and you get long-range heavies. For intercepting at sea, planes aren't really great unless your bases are much closer.

I don't see why you wouldn't use every asset at your disposal. I've explained the evidence that Wellingtons would in fact work. They can also target ships which the British four engine heavy bombers can't really do.

Being a guitarist, I see the effects of humidity and temperature changes upon wood, and this is wood finished in polyurethane coatings. The necks on my guitars tighten up and loosen up overnight. Wood is a lot more sensitive to temp and humidity than metal, both immediately and in the longer run -- which is why I mentioned this: you will be doing a lot more maintenance on Wimpys than all-metal planes.

Now, if you want to coat all the wood on a Wellington in Bakelite, how many hundreds of pounds are you adding? That shit is heavy.

As they pointed out, it's aluminum alloy and cloth. Adding the bakelite to the Yak-3 apparently did not add a lot of weight, as it was still a very light aircraft.

Right, if nothing else, turnover/replacement/maintenance rates.

And the Brits will be guarding those supplies with a good navy.

Double those distances unless you're sending one-way missions. Now put a few thousand pounds of bombs on the planes.

As I pointed out, Wellingtons flew missions from England to Berlin, which is a longer haul than the targets in Timor etc.

Yep. And further, by attacking north from Australia, the possibility of taking land airbases may keep your flattops ready for other options.

I think this war would be one of attrition, if the Brits survive the initial onslaught.

If they survived the initial phase, it would become a war of attrition. That doesn't mean it would continue until 'unconditional surrender' - most wars don't. The British might just lose Malaya and Singapore. Pushing Japan to the point of collapse would seem difficult.

 

[marathag]

This is another one I'm not certain about. Russia is very wet and swampy too, and it gets very hot in say, Crimea or the Kuban peninsula in the summer. Many of their fighter planes were made of wood, and they were initially having a lot of problems with moisture. They put a thin layer of bakelite on top of the plywood on the Yak-9, and that and a few other relatively simple measures seem to have solved that problem. Wood isn't the same as canvas of course, but I suspect there may have been a similar solution available.

Duramold.

The Duramold process initially used a pressure bag placed over a steam-heated convex cast-iron
die, which was similar to Haskelite's unsuccessful approach to molding fuselage panels in World War
I (except for the pressure bag). Duramold also differed from earlier molded plywoods in its use of
phenolic resins and thin veneers of 1/48 in. (0.5 mm) to 1/2o in. (1.3 mm) thickness, reminiscent of
Kraemer's work at the DVL. These thin veneers were easily bent into the compound curvatures
needed for streamlined surfaces.37
The Duramold process permitted dramatic increases in speed of production, even allowing for
exaggerated claims. The F-46 fuselage consisted of two half-shells molded on the same die and
then assembled with casein glue. Due to the high buckling strength of Duramold, the fuselage required
very few internal stiffeners, simplifying assembly Meyercord estimated that a single die could turn
out a complete fuselage shell in two hours.
Later reports claimed that it had taken nine men at Haskelite only a single hour to produce the first
fuselage half-shell. According to Clark, assembly of the fuselage at Fairchild required just five hours
and twenty minutes, although he did not specify the number of workers and did not include interior
furnishings.3
Even with this incomplete data, the Duramold fuselage clearly required just a fraction of the labor
needed for a comparable all-metal fuselage, which could require up to six person-months to complete.

Wings of wood, wings of metal : culture and technical choice in American airplane materials, 1914-1945
Impregnated wood veneer sheets with resin. It's an early composite material. A similar plywood from 1917 called Haskelite was used in boatbuilding and Curtiss seaplanes.

largest use was for Howard Hughes Spruce Goose.
smaller scale, you can see how it was done here

View: https://youtu.be/JhyYrbxR0gE

De Havilland had a similar process.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

British Aircraft production finally hit the sort of level required to sustain the planned peace time force in 1939/40, next would come updating the force. Plenty of orders were placed in the US after the war began, if Britain was really at peace only a select few would be done. No refugee aircraft from other country's orders either. Similarly as the newer warships appeared older ones would be paid off. The RNZAF would have its Wellington force, the RAAF Sunderlands, Beauforts and Beaufighters. Not PBY etc.

I was referring to the many details about the operational history with the Wellingtons in the Med which were posted in some other recent discussions on this very forum. In fact, some of this was in one long thread which you yourself posted in quite a bit, so I thought you would remember it. It's quite clear to me from those operational details that Wellingtons were used successfully, as I noted, to sink ships and strike ports and logistics targets. This is one post where I quoted from that source, this post has more specific data including about Wellington ops.

X	% cargo	% cargo	Ship losses on Africa run, GRT
X	Bragadin	Ehler	Naval	Air	Other	total
Jan-42​	0.07​	9​	3553​	19506​	0​	23059​
Feb-42​	0.85​	3​	22277​	4115​	1483​	27875​
Mar-42​	17.3​	n/a	17276​	6452​	0​	23728​
Apr-42​	0.78​	1​	15989​	0​	0​	15989​
May-42​	7.24​	n/a	14206​	0​	0​	14206​
Jun-42​	22.14​	23​	2565​	6837​	0​	9402​
Jul-42​	6.45​	6​	2480​	7164​	0​	9644​
Aug-42​	33.03​	33​	26719​	20346​	4894​	51959​
Sep-42​	20​	20​	10778​	22096​	1064​	33938​
Oct-42​	44.2​	n/a	18366​	31245​	0​	49611​
Total	n/a	n/a	134209​	117761​	7441​	259411​

Ehler does not break down the losses by cause, you assign them to Wellingtons, a consistent theme of how you make decisions. So how many of the ships were sunk by Wellingtons?

Having already posted a lot of this data myself direct from the source (Ehler's Mediterranean Air War), and seen several other people post corroborating data with more detail in the same threads, I thought it would be a bit tiresome to go pull the book down from the shelf and re-post all this data just because you feel like a less detailed or 'in the weeds' comment (i.e. "Wellingtons could clearly perform that kind of mission") is an "editorial" or "opinion".

That was not the editorial, I have been told the only real correction I made in my message 379 on page 19 was the SAAF Wellington squadrons, so the apparently right answers have been looked up but not reported, which does not help anyone. Instead an editorial was provided.

So when did the RAF 4 engined types enter production?
Why did the RAF fail to learn from air raid damage in Britain?
What are the correct Bomber Command Accuracy figures?
When did Loran come into service?
Is the idea Spitfire V and IX float planes were not trialled?
One of the early Dutch successes did not hit an important oil industry resources carrying ship?
The USSBS conclusions on damage done are really?
The Palembang refineries were where relative to the coast?
The weather reports provided are incorrect, why?
The crude oil production and refining capacity figures are really?
The Japanese ended up with what refineries and who controlled them were really?
The air force navigator training levels were really?
The position errors in the Bismarck sighting were?
The monsoon seasons are really?
The lasting damage done to Darwin and other allied areas were?
The true Japanese ship losses to PBY were? (Including from mines laid)
The Australian distances and populations reported are really?

It was quite an editorial.

So now it's being claimed that I just talk with no basis in fact.

Draw conclusions on anecdotes and isolated data points.

From my notes on this, it seems there were at least two Wellington torpedo bomber units active in the Med in 1942 - 38 Sqn RAF switched to ship hunting in March 1942, and 458 squadron RAAF went into ship hunting mode in September 1942. There was also 221 Squadron RAF (or were they Coastal Command?) which was operaitonal against Axis Maritime assets in the Med from January 1942 but I don't know if those planes were carrying torpedoes or not.

221 Squadron were the first to have the torpedo capable Wellington VIII in early 1942, Coastal Command did not control the Middle East units, 458 squadron was mostly non existent or in training in 1942, a detachment managed 15 sorties in November 1942, 6 anti submarine, 6 anti shipping, 3 minelaying.

There appear to be another 6 Squadrons of Wellingtons operating in the Tactical role, with 205 Group by the time of Second El Alamein. At least four more seem to have arrived in Theater by the time of Operation Husky in 1943.

By the way divide the smashing successes by the effort, what is a great accomplishment for the efforts of a few is an under achievement for the work of many. 205 group controlled 7 Wellington squadrons in May 1942

Your original comment was "By end 1941 all 3 RAF four engined bombers were in production, forget Wellingtons and the other twins, an at peace RAF would be phasing them out and would be worried about fabric covering in the tropics." If that is indeed an insurmountable problem, then I guess the Swordfish is out. My assumption is that they could find a way to cope with this issue with some kind of coating or something.

Right, the RAF was worried from the start about fabric covering in the tropics, they had bigger and better all metal bombers in service, and the idea is they would spend time to figure out a way so they could deploy Wellingtons not the more modern aircraft. Note the Hampden and Whitley were "all metal", the Hampden could carry mines and later a torpedo.

I've been in the South Pacific area before, and I've been in Northern Europe, and so have many other people. I thought it was general knowledge. Vast horizon to horizon cloud cover is not common in that region, but the weather is very volatile. If there is a typhoon, it can be. Do I really need to go dig up meteorological data to prove this?

You keep referring to the very different South Pacific, you keep using results from a very different weather zone, the Middle East and finally I did provide weather information which you ruled inaccurate.

I find that your objections to my "messages" are often turgid and incomprehensible. For example I don't know what your objection was precisely to my comments about Wellingtons operating in the Med in 1942. Your posts are also typically very long. But I try to read them anyway because you sometimes have useful data, though sometimes the relevance of this data is a bit mysterious.

I do not write for you. You do not quantify successes, like at least numbers of ships hit, long term damage to infrastructure, and above all the Wellington is considered the answer, no matter what.

At the risk of being accused of writing another editorial, I will try to explain my thinking. I don't know how many four engined types would be available, but yes I suspect they would be difficult to operate from remote remote or jungle fields, and they (with the exception of missions like 617 RAF with Lancasters) don't seem to have been made to strike operational or tactical targets. I never heard of them carrying torpedoes, though I know they did drop some big bombs on German ships at dockside a few times. That said the USAAF and USN did operate B-17s and B-24s respectively in the Pacific so maybe they would have a role, but unlike those aircraft i see the British four engine heavies as being maybe a little too vulnerable for daytime operations.

Let us see now, you claim the clouds in the tropics means astral navigation is usually easy, so your Wellingtons can strike accurately at night, then rule the heavier bombers are too vulnerable by day. Are they afraid of the night? The heavies would have the same navigational accuracy of the mediums, while carrying more bombs. And were better defended than the Wellingtons. Next comes British engineering can make medium bomber airfields but not heavy bomber ones in the tropics.

Wellington I and II at 30 to 32,000 pounds took 1,250 to 1,350 yards to clear a 50 foot obstacle on take off, the Halifax I at 60,000 pounds 1,200 to 1,400 yards, same distance for the Manchester at 50,000 pounds, the Stirling 1,500 yards at 68,000 pounds So apart from the heavier ground pressure what was the technical issue stopping the RAF from building the runways long enough for heavies?

The Wellingtons, like the Hampdens were a wartime expedient torpedo bomber, with peace in 1940/41 the RAF would have its Beaufort torpedo bomber force.

Basically the four engine heavies were developed (if not originally designed) to burn down German cities at night. That is the mission they got pretty good at. What I was envisioning for the Wellington in the Pacific is basically the same role they played in the Mediterranean in 1942-1943. Which is more precisely targeted. I never claimed that this was the only possible interpretation.

Good to know the Wellingtons with Bomber Command had poor accuracy but when with other commands great accuracy, but the heavies were simply inaccurate everywhere. Also pre war the assumption, which continued all the way to the Butt report, was accurate bombing, burning cities was a later idea, or to put it another way, in 1941 27,798 long tons of HE to 3,942 long tons of incendiaries. In 1942 more like 4 tons HE to 3 tons incendiary, 1943 8 to 7.

You however did assert categorically that the Wellington was not going to work in the Pacific.

Really? Where? Try it was not the wonder weapon of your beliefs.

This is a good example of some data, which seems interesting, but I don't know what the relevance is to the thread. I brought up the "Black Cat" PBY squadrons just to point out that this was similar to what Wellingtons were doing in the Med, and showed that night torpedo and / or low-level bombing attacks were successful in the Pacific.

I provided the information to show, once again, the gap between what you claim and reality, which I expected you to rule irrelevant. In future I will simply go no, or wrong. How many shops did PBY torpedo? Bomb? The PBY was big and slow, bad combination for low level attacks, dropping mines was safer.

I believe Wellingtons could begin affecting shipping around Java very early on, and could probably expand further than that before too long. Rather than flying out of Darwin, I suspect they could have operated out of Broome, in Western Australia, where the RAAF had a small base in 1942, which was attacked by the Japanese in march 1942, destroying 22 aircraft. At that time, there was at least one US B-24 Liberator and two B-17 aircraft at the base, as well as Lockheed Hudsons and a bunch of PBY Catalinas. Even a couple of old Empire flying boats and some (Dutch?) Do 24s which were destroyed.

Broome you will be happy to know had almost as many people as Darwin, 900 and only 1,200 miles away. East Timor is around 425 air miles from Darwin, Broome around 675 miles. the RAAF had what it called an Advanced Operational base there, a detachment of men to look after the place.

I think they would, again based on the havoc wrought by Japanese bombers against ports and all kinds of infrastructure and industrial targets in Burma, China, Malaya and Indonesia (Dutch East Indies). And in Darwin. All of which was done by comparatively light bombers probably carrying 1,000 or less bomb loads. Bombers with max 2,000 lb bomb loads anyway in most cases. This would include Ki-21, G3M, G4M etc.

The short answer is the air raids did little long term damage.

Similar carnage was wrought in the Middle East with also very lightly armed Maryland, (early) Boston, and Baltimore bombers, all of which had light ~ 2,000 lb bomb loads as well. And by fighter-bombers which carried between 500 or even 250 lb loads for longer strikes, to as much as 1,500 lb for very short range strikes. later in the war 2,000 lbs.

Again an exaggeration and ignores the problems of hiding in the desert.

Later, when heavy bombers capable of carrying heavy loads did arrive, they did more damage against certain types of targets, but even the light bombers were causing significant problems well before that.

Carnage, significant problems, so how did the axis hold on, let alone advance in 1942?

Flying a raid from Broome against the base where the Zeroes attacked from in March 1942, I believe Wellingtons could carry more than 2,000 lbs. That distance is less than 600 miles, a Wellington Mk 1 is supposed to be capable of 2,500 miles, and we know that they flew raids from England to Berlin, about ~700 miles each way, with I think close to their full bomb load of 4,500 lbs. I admit I'm no expert on the Wellington so maybe someone else knows how heavy a load they brought to Berlin.

There were only 142.5 Wellington Sorties credited with attacking their targets in Berlin in 1941, 155 long tons of bombs, 2,436 pounds of bombs on average. The half is for when an aircraft reported attacking two targets. For the war 36,762 bomber sorties sent (NOT attacking), 41,823 long tons of bombs dropped.

My assessment of the Colonial commercial infrastructure in the Pacific is that it was pretty fragile, prone to damage and difficult to repair and maintain, just like much of the commercial infrastructure in North Africa and the Middle East.

Yes, we know, all it needs is evidence of ports, roads, rail factories being destroyed.

It's worth pointing out that I am very much an advocate of, and believer in accuracy over bomb load when it comes to air strikes. Wellingtons seemed to be able to hit their (tactical and operational) targets, even at night, and I'm not sure how they did it, but the damage they caused was telling. In the Pacific Theater, the 5th Air Force under Gen Kenney emphasized very high accuracy over bomb load, with mast-head height and skip-bombing attacks, (including at night by PBYs) low level strafing, and the use of parafrag (very small parachute delayed) bombs. All of this turned out to be very effective as we know.

The belief is obvious, the data is lacking. What exactly enabled a medium bomber at night to be more accurate than a heavy one?

Wellingtons in the Pacific should also be able to replicate the success of their real life counterparts in the MTO by carrying torpedoes and sinking Axis shipping with them, which would make the coasts of Java and Timor quite dangerous for Japanese shipping I think, once they got into their groove. They could also routinely drop mines into the ports, harbors, and shipping lanes.

Wellingtons never dropped mines when with Bomber Command, they were not set up for them, the GR torpedo carrying versions could. Hampdens, the heavies, Beauforts and Mosquitoes also dropped mines. As noted with Britain at peace in 1940/41 torpedo Wellingtons were not likely to be used, nor were that as successful in the MTO as claimed, you only have to note the successes attributed to Swordfish and Beauforts and the totals of axis shipping sunk.

The USSBS noted the bigger bombs caused the more lasting damage, one of the I think two oil targets the Germans gave up trying to repair took multiple 4,000 pound bomb hits on a key section, leaving nothing left. London to Berlin 580 air miles, Lincoln is slightly further away.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

That is a completely different type of mission, different types of crews, very different targets. I don't know if you saw the excerpts I posted from Ehlers book but it's abundantly clear that Wellingtons were hitting targets often enough to cause great harm to the enemy systems in the Med in 1942 and 1943.



I don't see why you wouldn't use every asset at your disposal. I've explained the evidence that Wellingtons would in fact work. They can also target ships which the British four engine heavy bombers can't really do.



As they pointed out, it's aluminum alloy and cloth. Adding the bakelite to the Yak-3 apparently did not add a lot of weight, as it was still a very light aircraft.



As I pointed out, Wellingtons flew missions from England to Berlin, which is a longer haul than the targets in Timor etc.



If they survived the initial phase, it would become a war of attrition. That doesn't mean it would continue until 'unconditional surrender' - most wars don't. The British might just lose Malaya and Singapore. Pushing Japan to the point of collapse would seem difficult.

None of that explains how you're going to get them hitting refineries in Borneo ... from Darwin.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

None of that explains how you're going to get them hitting refineries in Borneo ... from Darwin.

Agreed
That would require B-29s

 

[EwenS]

Agreed
That would require B-29s

It was done on occasion from Darwin with B-24. Shady Lady raid.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

British Aircraft production finally hit the sort of level required to sustain the planned peace time force in 1939/40, next would come updating the force. Plenty of orders were placed in the US after the war began, if Britain was really at peace only a select few would be done. No refugee aircraft from other country's orders either. Similarly as the newer warships appeared older ones would be paid off. The RNZAF would have its Wellington force, the RAAF Sunderlands, Beauforts and Beaufighters. Not PBY etc.

X	% cargo	% cargo	Ship losses on Africa run, GRT
X	Bragadin	Ehler	Naval	Air	Other	total
Jan-42​	0.07​	9​	3553​	19506​	0​	23059​
Feb-42​	0.85​	3​	22277​	4115​	1483​	27875​
Mar-42​	17.3​	n/a	17276​	6452​	0​	23728​
Apr-42​	0.78​	1​	15989​	0​	0​	15989​
May-42​	7.24​	n/a	14206​	0​	0​	14206​
Jun-42​	22.14​	23​	2565​	6837​	0​	9402​
Jul-42​	6.45​	6​	2480​	7164​	0​	9644​
Aug-42​	33.03​	33​	26719​	20346​	4894​	51959​
Sep-42​	20​	20​	10778​	22096​	1064​	33938​
Oct-42​	44.2​	n/a	18366​	31245​	0​	49611​
Total	n/a	n/a	134209​	117761​	7441​	259411​

Ehler does not break down the losses by cause, you assign them to Wellingtons, a consistent theme of how you make decisions. So how many of the ships were sunk by Wellingtons?



That was not the editorial, I have been told the only real correction I made in my message 379 on page 19 was the SAAF Wellington squadrons, so the apparently right answers have been looked up but not reported, which does not help anyone. Instead an editorial was provided.

So when did the RAF 4 engined types enter production?
Why did the RAF fail to learn from air raid damage in Britain?
What are the correct Bomber Command Accuracy figures?
When did Loran come into service?
Is the idea Spitfire V and IX float planes were not trialled?
One of the early Dutch successes did not hit an important oil industry resources carrying ship?
The USSBS conclusions on damage done are really?
The Palembang refineries were where relative to the coast?
The weather reports provided are incorrect, why?
The crude oil production and refining capacity figures are really?
The Japanese ended up with what refineries and who controlled them were really?
The air force navigator training levels were really?
The position errors in the Bismarck sighting were?
The monsoon seasons are really?
The lasting damage done to Darwin and other allied areas were?
The true Japanese ship losses to PBY were? (Including from mines laid)
The Australian distances and populations reported are really?

It was quite an editorial.


Draw conclusions on anecdotes and isolated data points.


221 Squadron were the first to have the torpedo capable Wellington VIII in early 1942, Coastal Command did not control the Middle East units, 458 squadron was mostly non existent or in training in 1942, a detachment managed 15 sorties in November 1942, 6 anti submarine, 6 anti shipping, 3 minelaying.


By the way divide the smashing successes by the effort, what is a great accomplishment for the efforts of a few is an under achievement for the work of many. 205 group controlled 7 Wellington squadrons in May 1942


Right, the RAF was worried from the start about fabric covering in the tropics, they had bigger and better all metal bombers in service, and the idea is they would spend time to figure out a way so they could deploy Wellingtons not the more modern aircraft. Note the Hampden and Whitley were "all metal", the Hampden could carry mines and later a torpedo.


You keep referring to the very different South Pacific, you keep using results from a very different weather zone, the Middle East and finally I did provide weather information which you ruled inaccurate.

I do not write for you. You do not quantify successes, like at least numbers of ships hit, long term damage to infrastructure, and above all the Wellington is considered the answer, no matter what.

Let us see now, you claim the clouds in the tropics means astral navigation is usually easy, so your Wellingtons can strike accurately at night, then rule the heavier bombers are too vulnerable by day. Are they afraid of the night? The heavies would have the same navigational accuracy of the mediums, while carrying more bombs. And were better defended than the Wellingtons. Next comes British engineering can make medium bomber airfields but not heavy bomber ones in the tropics.

Wellington I and II at 30 to 32,000 pounds took 1,250 to 1,350 yards to clear a 50 foot obstacle on take off, the Halifax I at 60,000 pounds 1,200 to 1,400 yards, same distance for the Manchester at 50,000 pounds, the Stirling 1,500 yards at 68,000 pounds So apart from the heavier ground pressure what was the technical issue stopping the RAF from building the runways long enough for heavies?

The Wellingtons, like the Hampdens were a wartime expedient torpedo bomber, with peace in 1940/41 the RAF would have its Beaufort torpedo bomber force.

Good to know the Wellingtons with Bomber Command had poor accuracy but when with other commands great accuracy, but the heavies were simply inaccurate everywhere. Also pre war the assumption, which continued all the way to the Butt report, was accurate bombing, burning cities was a later idea, or to put it another way, in 1941 27,798 long tons of HE to 3,942 long tons of incendiaries. In 1942 more like 4 tons HE to 3 tons incendiary, 1943 8 to 7.

Really? Where? Try it was not the wonder weapon of your beliefs.

I provided the information to show, once again, the gap between what you claim and reality, which I expected you to rule irrelevant. In future I will simply go no, or wrong. How many shops did PBY torpedo? Bomb? The PBY was big and slow, bad combination for low level attacks, dropping mines was safer.


Broome you will be happy to know had almost as many people as Darwin, 900 and only 1,200 miles away. East Timor is around 425 air miles from Darwin, Broome around 675 miles. the RAAF had what it called an Advanced Operational base there, a detachment of men to look after the place.

The short answer is the air raids did little long term damage.


Again an exaggeration and ignores the problems of hiding in the desert.


Carnage, significant problems, so how did the axis hold on, let alone advance in 1942?


There were only 142.5 Wellington Sorties credited with attacking their targets in Berlin in 1941, 155 long tons of bombs, 2,436 pounds of bombs on average. The half is for when an aircraft reported attacking two targets. For the war 36,762 bomber sorties sent (NOT attacking), 41,823 long tons of bombs dropped.


Yes, we know, all it needs is evidence of ports, roads, rail factories being destroyed.


The belief is obvious, the data is lacking. What exactly enabled a medium bomber at night to be more accurate than a heavy one?


Wellingtons never dropped mines when with Bomber Command, they were not set up for them, the GR torpedo carrying versions could. Hampdens, the heavies, Beauforts and Mosquitoes also dropped mines. As noted with Britain at peace in 1940/41 torpedo Wellingtons were not likely to be used, nor were that as successful in the MTO as claimed, you only have to note the successes attributed to Swordfish and Beauforts and the totals of axis shipping sunk.

The USSBS noted the bigger bombs caused the more lasting damage, one of the I think two oil targets the Germans gave up trying to repair took multiple 4,000 pound bomb hits on a key section, leaving nothing left. London to Berlin 580 air miles, Lincoln is slightly further away.

Ok well, I see once again a lot of turgid anger here. You don't rate what I post, and I don't rate most of what you post either to be honest.

What I am detecting though (and kind of remember from the other thread on the Mediterranean air war) is that you have a problem with Ehler's book. And with the notion that air war played a decisive factor in the war in the Med. I'd say take that up with Ehlers.

Same for your claims about the weather in the Tropics. I live in the bloody Tropics, and worked for 25 years in the maritime industry, where issues of navigation routinely come up. I have also lived in Northern Europe, specifically at the time what was called 'West Germany', and I have seen the skies there with my own eyes. Believe whatever you would like to believe, call it anecdotal evidence. I'm fine with that.

I also have done some research on the PBY "Black Cats", including reading books with data from the Japanese side and all the classics on the Pacific War, Lundstrum, First Team, Shattered Sword, as well as newer series like the South Pacific Air War by Michael Claringbould - they did hit targets in my opinion and were tactically effective in their role. I'm Ok with you disagreeing on that. You and I seem to live in different universes, and that ain't going to derail me or you I suspect.

Hampden and Whitley were "all metal",

I admit I am not an expert on these aircraft, but from what I have read, Hampden and Whitley were all-metal disasters. They were failures as bombers, not used in Theaters like North Africa, and quickly relegated to non-combat duties. If they were useful, why did they bother using Wellingtons and all the American types?

Beuafort was used, and with some success (notably in the Pacific by the Australians) but was generally noted for taking fairly high losses, and it did not have anywhere near the range of the Wellington. However, properly escorted, such as by Beaufighters perhaps, it may have turned out to be a viable weapon for the British in this scenario. It's just not going to reach the East Indies from Australia.

The significant argument remaining here is whether the British four engine heavy bombers would have had a role. My assumptions about the viability of the Wellington for the Pacific Theater is based mainly on learning about it's successful operational history (per Ehlers and several other sources). They worked out methods to make them effective against operational and tactical targets, including ports, airfields, trucks and trains, and in particular, ships. I found his book convincing, you apparently did not (?).

My assumption, I admit I don't know this for certain, is that the British four engined heavy bombers were a bit more challenging to use and support in remote field areas. You have twice as many engines per aircraft, (more maintenance, more fuel) you will need longer and harder runways etc. And they do not seem to be used very much against operational or tactical targets, 617 squadron being somewhat of an exception, and the main reason is that they didn't carry torpedoes.

Now that said of course, they did get B-17s and B-24s to work in this environment. And they did eventually get them to be useful against some operational and tactical targets, though they were never very good at sinking surface warships. B-24s got pretty good at ASW.

It may of course have been possible to adapt Lancasters to being useful in the Pacific. They did use some Halifax bombers in the Med. But for example 205 Group seemed to mainly use Wellingtons through 1943, gradually replaced by Liberators in 1944-45. And while the conditions are different, North Africa and the Middle East are also in the Tropics. It is this actual real operational history which gave me the idea Wellingtons might be useful. As some may have noted, I go largely by operational history when assessing the utility of aircraft in WW2.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

It was done on occasion from Darwin with B-24. Shady Lady raid.

Yep, although the Shady Lady barely made it....

Shady Lady (aircraft) - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

This line in the Wiki is interesting and relevant to the debate about navigating -

"Commanded by First Lieutenant Doug Craig, Shady Lady experienced tropical thunderstorms that caused severe turbulence and greatly hampered the ability of navigator John Nash to carry out celestial navigation."

Apparently eight other B-24s made the raid. And at night the local thunderstorms would be much more rare, IMO.

And by the way Broome is slightly closer, 1211 miles vs 1232 from Darwin.


One other point about bombing damage. I do not think, or claim, that you can permanently destroy dock facilities, airfields, or refineries with relatively light bombing raids. But I think they can certainly be disrupted. And in the Pacific Theater this sometimes seemed to be long lasting disruption which these facilities could be slow to recover from. Places like Rangoon and Singapore were pretty badly damaged by light Japanese bombers. Darwin was certainly badly disrupted. It imposed an urgent need to defend Darwin, first with the US 49th FG, and then during the second campaign against it, by the 1st Wing RAAF (which had trouble initially but eventually adapted to the task).

In just one early raid on Darwin in 19 February 1942, with both carrier and land based strike aircraft, the Japanese sunk 11 ships, grounded 3, damaged 25, and destroyed 30 airplanes, and killed 236 people.

The advantage, as I see it, of night raids by any (forget Wellingtons, pick your bomber you can find that can reach the target at night), is that the damage would be ongoing, and the Japanese had very limited capabilities in air defense at night.

Wellington came up on to my 'radar' because of recently reading about how effective they were (according to Ehlers and some others) in the MTO.

That's it.

 

[EwenS]

This line in the Wiki is interesting and relevant to the debate about navigating -

"Commanded by First Lieutenant Doug Craig, Shady Lady experienced tropical thunderstorms that caused severe turbulence and greatly hampered the ability of navigator John Nash to carry out celestial navigation."

Apparently eight other B-24s made the raid. And at night the local thunderstorms would be much more rare, IMO.

In your opinion!

The following article paints a rather different picture of that first raid. 12 B-24 took off. 3 failed to reach the target due to "weather, mechanical problems and fuel shortages" only 9 reached the target. In doing so they encountered 3 separate "vicious" weather fronts that they had to pass through on both the outward and return journeys. So far more than "rare", "local thunderstorms".

Four days later, and again in bad weather they repeated the exercise.

Valor: First at Balikpapan | Air & Space Forces Magazine

In August 1943, crews of the 380th Bomb Group flew three of the most daring missions of World War II.

www.airandspaceforces.com