Royal navy A.A.gunnery.

[starling]

Hi all,of all the major belligerent ww2 Countries,did the royal Navy have the "worst"Anti Aircraft Gunnery.? Thankyou ,Starling.

 

[kettbo]

Are you talking Gunnery as in shots fired to shots hit? gun direction? over-all capability?

What period are you asking because overall things got better for them with more AAA weapons, DP mounts 5" and below, more RFC.
Early war old school ideas and small fitment of AAA weapons. For example prewar DDs had a single AAA gun 4" and some auto cannon, late war classes had twin or single DP mounts (when available) with TDC and RFC and VT/Proximity fusing. Larger ships got better AAA suites during overhauls or repairs. Some of the early war commissioned capital ships had the 5.25" gun and later strong 40mm close-in AAA

Early on I'd have to say the RN was POOR, like most everybody else in late 1939/1940.

o The USN had the 5"/38 most in DP mounts initially and the 40mm coming into service in vast numbers '42/43. Pretty good equipment then add VT fusing and RFC, becomes very good compared to others.
o IJN 127mm were DP in most of the newer classes, all the new build stuff and heavy units that were modernized. Decent weapon, useful ROF. Just lacking in RFC direction most of the war. Big shortfall was the 23mm AAA close in armament lacked the range and killing power needed
o The Germans had secondary weapons then heavy AAA which was old-school. Smaller warships slightly better than most others early war AAA outfit. The later 37s were capable, quad 20s were lethal if you took hits, twin 20s useful. Again, RFC and TDC not up to the USN in their 1944/45 standard.


Think quantity and quality. Anti Air defense thinking and weaponry was primitive at the beginning of the war. Little plane on ship action in the past for the threat analysts to develop defense concepts and weapons. Throughout the war, more weapons added, thus more rounds shot upward means more planes shot down or damaged, or distracted. Add central control, then improved control, then Radar Fire Control. VT fusing made "Close" count for those who had it.

 

[starling]

Thanks for that fine eloquent answer,cheers.Starling.

 

[starling]

Hey guys,Did any major R.N.units,BB's or C.V's recieve anti aircraft "refits",whilst in U.S.shipyards.?thanks,Starling.

 

[starling]

Hey guys,so would you say that late war(let's say in the P.T.O),that the R.N.was on a par with U.S.Navy.? Obviously the guns themselves were different in the main D.P.weapons,but was the Radar,etc nearly equal.Thanks,Starling.

 

[stona]

Royal Navy gunners typically overclaimed at a rate of 4 or 5 to 1, hardly surprising when every gun within a mile might be firing on the same target.

Shipboard anti aircraft defence is a last resort and the least effective of the so called "three layers".

The first defence is interdiction of enemy airfields or carriers to prevent their aircraft taking off to attack your ships or to destroy them before they can do so.

Second is fighter protection provided by a task forces air group to prevent aircraft getting within efective range of your naval assets.

Steve

 

[RCAFson]

In 1939, the Royal Navy had the most advanced naval AA gunnery systems of any navy. Take a look at the design and AA weapons systems of HMS Renown and HMS Valiant in 1939 and compare them to any other foreign ship in 1939.

Renown had 4 HACS Mk IV directors controlling 20 4.5in (10 x 2) DP guns and 24 (3 x 8 ) 40mm pom-poms each with it's own director and 16 .5in MGs (4 x 4). No other navy had any thing even close to this level of AA firepower backed up by full director control.

In 1940 the battleship K.G.V. introduced the Mk IVGB director, 4 of which controlled her 16 x 5.25in DP guns, plus she had 4 MK IV pom-pom directors controlling 32 40mm pom-pom guns and KGV also had type 279 radar which gave KGV radar ranging for aerial targets. Again this was far superior to anything else afloat, in terms of AA capability.

In 1941 the KGV class battleship, Prince of Wales, went into service with no less than 9 AA FC radars including 4 x type 285 which provided ranging for her 4 HACS Mk IVGB directors, which controlled the 5.25in guns, and 4 x type 282 radars which provided radar ranging for her 4 Mk IV pom-pom directors. PoW was so far ahead of the field in terms of AA control, that she simply had no rivals in any other navy - the Axis navies never developed AA FC radar. The USN did not begin to fit AA FC radars to their ships until early 1942, and they only managed that because of UK and RN technical assistance.

I recently read a fascinating book called "Flagship to Murmansk" by Robert Hughes which gives a very vivid account of RN AA gunnery aboard the AA cruiser, HMS Scylla.

 

[fastmongrel]

the Axis navies never developed AA FC radar.

Not true the German Navy had AA FC radars and they were no better or worse than Allied equivalents just not fitted to enough ships.

German Radar of World War II

 

[RCAFson]

Not true the German Navy had AA FC radars and they were no better or worse than Allied equivalents just not fitted to enough ships.

German Radar of World War II

The only mention, in the above article, of of AA FC radars actually fitted to a ship was this set, fitted to Tirpitz:

Again in the spring or summer of 1944, the third AA director, fitted just abaft the mainmast (German nickname 'Wackeltopf') was raised by 2m and equipped with an AA gunnery radar, probably Würzburg-C or Würzburg-D. As previously mentioned the Würzburg had originally been developed for the Luftwaffe, but it was later navalised for the German Navy's AA shore batteries under the following designation: FMG 39T/C (later FuSE 62C) Würzburg-C became the Navy FuMO 212, and FMG 39T/D (later FuSE 62D) Würzburg-D became the Navy FuMO 213. This reveals a fact that has not previously been published.

Tirpitz had the most sophisticated radar equipment of all the larger German surface units. However, without interviewing eye-witnesses we cannot know that these sets were not experimental, nor how effective they were under battle conditions.

Tirpitz at that point was just a floating gun battery.

 

[parsifal]

Royal Navy gunners typically overclaimed at a rate of 4 or 5 to 1, hardly surprising when every gun within a mile might be firing on the same target.

Shipboard anti aircraft defence is a last resort and the least effective of the so called "three layers".

The first defence is interdiction of enemy airfields or carriers to prevent their aircraft taking off to attack your ships or to destroy them before they can do so.

Second is fighter protection provided by a task forces air group to prevent aircraft getting within efective range of your naval assets.

Steve

im afraid i dont agree with this. Westermann has done an exhaustive study on AA effectiveness, which shows that for high level strategic bombers , it was about as effective as your 'second tier' of defence (the land based equivalent at least). What you are saying is not without some basis....there was gross overclaimimg, but then so too was there overclaiming in the air as well.

The other thing is that AA effectiveness should not be measured on the kill rates achieved. Its primary mission was always to affect accuracy rather than kill things, and ther is strong evidence to support the notion that the RN was quite good at that.

The RN was unfortunate in that it did not have a great director control system until later in the war, and its failure to produce a widespread DP for DDs cost it dearly early on. this makes a bit of a nonsense the claim that "every gun within a mile of the target would open up at the atackers. Light AA was really only effective for the target ship and one ship adjacent, since the TDs were often at least 700 yds and effective range of weapons like the oerlikon about 400 yards, over open sights.

Ive read somewhere (will try and pinpoint the source), that in 1942 the average ammunition expenditure per kill was about 2500-3000 rounds for the RN. At the same time USN ammunition expenditure per kill was about 1500 rounds per kill. In late 1944 that same USN study estimated the average rounds per kill was down to 500 rpk.

 

[fastmongrel]

Ive read somewhere (will try and pinpoint the source), that in 1942 the average ammunition expenditure per kill was about 2500-3000 rounds for the RN. At the same time USN ammunition expenditure per kill was about 1500 rounds per kill. In late 1944 that same USN study estimated the average rounds per kill was down to 500 rpk.

I think that should average rounds per claim. Kills is another matter some claims for certain ships are so extraordinary that it is laughable they must have shot down every single attacker if the claims were true.

Your right that the main mission of AA is to keep the ship floating and fighting, knocking a plane down is a distant second if your sinking. it took the proximity fuse, gun stabilisation, stabilised radar and automatic fire control to start killing planes in big numbers, before 1944 it didnt matter how good your fire control was it still relied on humans making judgements which is always going to cause errors particulary if an action is a long one. It didnt matter if you had the USN Mk 37 director or the RN Mk IV the problem of hitting a moving plane from a moving ship with a fire control and gun system that was at best stabilised in 2 planes and initially aimed by the Mk1 eyeball was such that most fire was little more than undirected untimed barrage fire.

Before 1944 most Destroyers would have been better off landing there heavy DP guns and AA fire control and shipping lighter Low Angle main guns with as many gyro aimed automatic weapons as could be fitted and manned.

 

[renrich]

Quite a number of years ago I read a book authored by a retired British Admiral about the RN during WW2. I am a great admirer of the RN. Read every one of C S Forester's books and one of my favorite books in my library is "Castles of Steel" by Massie. My favorite naval battle to read about is Jutland. In the WW2 book by the Brit Admiral, he said that the RN, on the whole, had very poor AA because of poor director performance.

Another subject I would like to put some perspective on is the armored flight decks of the RN CVs and the efficacy thereof. The RN lost four CVs in WW2, three by subs and one by surface action. The US lost four CVs in WW2, one by sub and three from bombs and torpedos. I have read thoroughly about the actions where the US CVs were lost and I question strongly that the CVs would have been sunk without the torpedo hits. I am not sure that it is therefore provable that the armored flight decks were necessary along with their drawbacks. The torpedos were the ship killers and the armor on flight decks could not protect from them as evidenced by Courageous, Eagle and Ark Royal.

 

[Glider]

This is of course a complex subject but there can be little doubt that in many ways the RN were the most advanced AA at the start of the war. The converted Merchent AA vessels were as good as the best warships around, the old WW1 cruisers were often converted to AA vessels, some old WW1 destroyers were converted to escort vessels with a comprehensive AA complement. The first dedicated AA cruisers were being builts and early BB's were being equipped with a heavy AA defense.

Few would deny that the serious mistake was not giving DD's a DP main weapon indeed 6 x 4in DP would have been better than the 4 x 4.7 LA normally carried.

However the USN with the 5in DP and proximity fuse combined with the latest directors were by far the best. The RN had HMS Delhi equipped with this combination and wanted these fitted to all RN destroyers ( I think it was 60 sets) but the US couldn't supply these as the USN had priority.

For the last 12-18 months of the war with the quad 40mm the USN had the best AA outfit

 

[kettbo]

from British vessels lost at sea in World War 2 - major warships

just the ones that sank, lots more damaged by aircraft

EDIT 23 AUG
Battleship (somehow I deleted this off the list)
PRINCE OF WALES (35,000t, 31/3/41), sunk by Japanese torpedo-aircraft, E coast of Malaya, December 10, 1941 (Casualty List)


Battlecruisers

REPULSE (33,250, 1916), sunk by Japanese torpedo-aircraft, E coast of Malaya, December 10, 1941 (Casualty List)

Monitor

TERROR (7,200t, 1916), bombed (22nd) and sunk off Derna, Libya, February 23, 1941

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

Fleet carriers

HERMES (10,850t, 1924), sunk by Japanese aircraft off Ceylon, April 9, 1942 (Casualty List)



CRUISERS


CALCUTTA (AA ship, 4,200t, 1919), sunk by aircraft bombs during evacuation of Crete, June 1, 1941 (Casualty List)

CORNWALL (10,000t, 1928), sunk by Japanese dive bombers, Indian Ocean, April 5, 1942 (Casualty List)

COVENTRY (AA ship, 4,290t, 1918), sunk by dive bombers, E Mediterranean, September 14, 1942 (Casualty List)

CURLEW (AA ship, 4,290t, 1917), sunk by aircraft bombs, off Ofotfiord, Norway, May 26, 1940 (Casualty List)

FIJI (8,000t, 17/5/40), sunk by aircraft bombs during evacuation of Crete, May 22, 1941 (Casualty List) Note, sunk by Bf109s and Ju88s

GLOUCESTER (9,600t, 31/1/39), sunk by aircraft bombs during evacuation of Crete, May 22, 1941 (Casualty List)

SOUTHAMPTON (9,100t, 1937), sunk by dive bombers, E of Malta, January 11, 1941 (Casualty List)


*** YORK (8,250, 1930), lost at Suda Bay, Crete after damage on various dates by explosive motor boats and aircraft, May 22, 1941


Cruiser minelayers

LATONA (2,650y, 4/5/41), attacked by aircraft, E Mediterranean, October 25, 1941 (Casualty List)


DESTROYERS

AFRIDI (Leader, 1,870t, 1938), sunk by aircraft bombs, off Norway, May 3, 1940

BASILISK (1,360t, 1931), sunk by aircraft bombs, off Dunkirk, France, June 1, 1940

BEDOUIN (1,870t, 15/3/39), sunk by aircraft torpedo, Central Mediterranean, June 15, 1942

BOADICEA (1,360t, 1931), sunk by aircraft torpedo off Portland, English Channel, June 13, 1944

BRAZEN (1,360t, 1931), sunk by aircraft off Dover, S England, July 20, 1940

CODRINGTON (Leader, 1,540t, 1930), bombed and sunk in Dover Harbour, S England, July 27, 1940

DAINTY (1,375t, 1932), sunk by aircraft, off Tobruk, Libya, February 24, 1941

DARING (1,375t, 1932), sunk by U-boat torpedo off Duncansby Head, N Scotland, February 18, 1940

DEFENDER (1,375t, 1932), sunk by aircraft bombs, off Sidi Barrani, Egypt, July 11, 1941

DELIGHT (1,375t, 1933), bombed and sunk off Portland, S England, July 29, 1940

DIAMOND (1,375t, 1932), sunk by aircraft bombs during evacuation of Greece, May 27, 1941

GRENADE (1,335t, 1936), sunk by aircraft bombs, in Dunkirk Harbour, France, May 29, 1940


GREYHOUND (1,335t, 1936), sunk by aircraft bombs during battle of Crete, May 22, 1941

GURKHA (1,870t, 1938), sunk by aircraft bombs, off Stavanger, Norway, April 9, 1940

HAVANT (1,400t, 1939), sunk by aircraft bombs, off Dunkirk, France, June 1, 1940


HEREWARD (1,340t, 1936), sunk by aircraft bombs, off Crete, May 29, 1941


IMPERIAL (1,370t, 1937), sunk by own forces after being bombed, off Crete, May 29, 1941 oops!

INGLEFIELD (Leader, 1,530t, 1937), sunk by aircraft, glider-bomb,off Anzio, W Italy, February 25, 1944

INTREPID (1,370t, 1937), sunk by aircraft, in Leros Harbour, Dodecanese, September 27, 1943

JACKAL (1,760t, 13/4/39), sunk by aircraft, E Mediterranean, May 12, 1942

JANUS (1,760t, 5/8/39), sunk by aircraft torpedo off Anzio, W Italy, January 23, 1944


JUNO (1,760t, 25/8/39), sunk by aircraft bombs during battle of Crete, May 21, 1941

KASHMIR (1,760t, 26/10/39), sunk by aircraft bombs during battle of Crete, May 23, 1941

KEITH (Leader, 1,400t, 1931), sunk by aircraft bombs, off Dunkirk, France, June 1, 1940

KELLY (Leader, 1,760t, 23/8/39), sunk by aircraft bombs during battle of Crete, May 23, 1941

KINGSTON (1,760t, 14/9/39), sunk by aircraft bombs, at Malta, April 11, 1942

KIPLING (1,760t, 22/12/39), sunk by aircraft, E Mediterranean, May 11, 1942

LANCE (1,920t, 13/5/41), sunk by aircraft bombs, at Malta Subsequently salved, April 9, 1942

LIVELY (1,920t, 20/7/41), sunk by aircraft, E Mediterranean, May 11, 1942


MASHONA (1,370t, 30/3/39), sunk by aircraft bombs, N Atlantic, May 28, 1941

NESTOR (On loan to RAN, 1,760t, 12/2/41), sunk by aircraft bombs, E Mediterranean, June 15, 1942

PANTHER (1,540t, 12/12/41), sunk by aircraft bombs, Scarpanto Strait, Dodecanese, October 9, 1943

QUENTIN (1,705t, 15/4/42), sunk by aircraft torpedo, W Mediterranean, December 2, 1942

TENEDOS (1,000t, 1919), sunk by aircraft during attack on Colombo, April 5, 1942

VALENTINE (Leader, 1,090t, 1917), bombed, grounded and abandoned in River Scheldt, Belgium, May 15, 1940

VAMPIRE (On loan to RAN, 1,090t, 1917), sunk by aircraft bombs, E of Ceylon, April 9, 1942


WATERHEN (On loan to RAN, 1,100t, 1918), sunk by aircraft bombs, off Sollum, Egypt, June 29, 1941

WESSEX (1,100t, 1918), sunk by aircraft bombs, off Calais, France, May 24, 1940

WHITLEY (1,100t, 1918), damaged by bombs, beached between Nieuport and Ostend, Belgium, May 19, 1940

WILD SWAN (1,120t, 19), sunk by aircraft bombs, Western Approaches, June 17, 1942

WREN (1,120t, 1923), bombed and sunk off Aldeburgh, Suffolk, E England, September 27, 1940

WRESTLER (1,100t, 1918), damaged beyond repair by mine off Normandy, June 6, 1944

WRYNECK (1,100t, 1918), sunk by aircraft bombs during evacuation of Greece, May 27, 1941

ZULU (1, 870t, 6/9/38), sunk by aircraft bombs, E Mediterranean, September 14, 1942

cut off lesser units for space consideration


Hipshot: Lack of AAA, AAA ammo, and gunnery control lead to massive losses through 1942
Losses in the Med were severe

 

[RCAFson]

from British vessels lost at sea in World War 2 - major warships

just the ones that sank, lots more damaged by aircraft



FIJI (8,000t, 17/5/40), sunk by aircraft bombs during evacuation of Crete, May 22, 1941 (Casualty List) Note, sunk by Bf109s and Ju88s

GLOUCESTER (9,600t, 31/1/39), sunk by aircraft bombs during evacuation of Crete, May 22, 1941 (Casualty List)

MASHONA (1,370t, 30/3/39), sunk by aircraft bombs, N Atlantic, May 28, 1941

Hipshot: Lack of AAA, AAA ammo, and gunnery control lead to massive losses through 1942
Losses in the Med were severe

Let's consider a few examples from May of 1941. Fiji and Gloucester were detached from the main fleet that was covering Crete, and in so doing were exposed to wave after wave of Nazi bombers, until both ships finally ran out of ammo, and the Luftwaffe was able to close in for the kill:

2. It was dawn on May 21st that HMS Fiji, in company with the majority of med. Fleet left Alexandria. For the last fortnight units of the fleet had patrolled the waters round Crete waiting for the German assault. Each night cruisers had been busy ferrying supplies of men and material to the island in a hurried preparation. At last news had come from reconnaissance aircraft that convoys were stealing down the Greek coast and we knew the attack was imminent.

3. On arrival off Crete about 2100, the fleet split up into 5 separate units. Two striking forces of cruisers and destroyers entered the Aegean itself, one force patrolled the north eastern entrance to the Aegean; one patrolled the NW entrance, while the main battle fleet cruised to the south'ard as a covering force just in case the Italian fleet came on the scene. The Fiji, only 4 months in commission again after being repaired from a torpedo attack, was detailed to accompany the war hardened Gloucester, who had come successfully through all the actions in the med, the two being escorted by the destroyers Kandahar and Kingston. We were closed up at action stations all night but nothing happened and dawn saw all units withdrawing on to the main battle-fleet off the Western end of Crete. On board the Fiji we were just changing from action to A.A. Defence when R/Df reported "aircraft Green 100, large formation 15 miles". All that day formations attacked the fleet, but we kept together and put up a massed barrage that deterred them from pressing home their attacks. Some of the daring spirits however sometimes broke through and one registered a hit on Warspite which wiped out her starboard 4-in. Battery but did not decrease her speed.

We were attacked at regular intervals throughout the day but no more casualties occurred. With darkness, we once more split up into our separate units and went in searching for convoys. During the night one of the striking forces in the Aegean ran into a German convoy of several transports and 20 or 30 caiques, which are fishing craft's little smaller than our drifters. Our force got in the middle of them blazing away with everything they had, and a few thousand Jerries met a watery end that night. Unfortunately, in the melee the Carlisle was torpedoed by an e-boat and Naiad took her in tow, reducing the speed of withdrawal to 6 knots. With dawn aircraft were sighted and Naiad asked for assistance. Meanwhile the remaining forces had withdrawn and were just rejoining the battle fleet. Fiji had just reported only 350 rounds of 4-in. H.A. Ammunition remaining, but before that could have got through, a signal came from Warspite "Force Z to proceed with all despatch to cover the withdrawal of force Y". I was in the 6-in. T.S. At that moment and the Gunnery Officer's voice came through "Our big moment has come. We are going in. Warn all quarters to be prepared both for surface and air attack", Almost immediately came the warning from R/DF "Large formation approaching from Green 15; 12 miles". Shortly afterwards from the Gunnery Officer came "I can see them they are passing ahead to attack the fleet". Then came a medley of voices, through which broke the Gunnery Officer's "With C.P.B.C load, load, load". "Surely you mean H.E sire?" I queried. "No" he answered, "there is a lot of smoke on the horizon and it looks as if we shall get our teeth into something at last", The log now showed 34 knots and it seemed the ship herself was quivering with excitement. The low angle R!DF gave a cut at 2400 yards and then from the R.A.set "Aircraft approaching from ahead 12 miles". From the Gunnery Officer came "Repel aircraft, turrets follow director, stand by to Clear guns". I waited for no more, as my repel aircraft station was the 4 in. T.S and I had to husband that ammunition.

I arrived just as the ship shook under the discharge of the 12-6-in., and I watched the R/DF pricker creeping along the range plot. 13,000 - 12,000 - 10,000 "Open Fire". They began a confused medley of sound through my phones. The crack crack of the 4-in., the whoosh and shake of the 6 in., the roar of diving bomber engines; the pom-pom and chatter of close range weapons; the whistle of falling bombs the tilt of the deck as the helm went over followed by the concussion as the bombs exploded near, and a clang-clang as pieces hit the ship's side. Often the ship seemed to leap and then drop back again. Above all this I could hear the 4-in., Control Officer commenting "That was close, I'm drenched to the skin". "I believe they've got the Gloucester; no, she's coming out of the spray; Yes we are all here still". Occasionally he would say "That's one so-and-so less" or "Did you see the pieces fall from that one, I don't think he'll get far".

During the first lull I checked the ammunition and was forced to order the director to wait until the target commenced his dive before firing. Then came a blow as the 4-in. Control officer said "God, they've got the Gloucester this time; Yes, she's stopped and on fire". Over the broadcast system came "All available hands stand-by to let go c Carley rafts." We zig-zagged a bit more and then turned towards where the Gloucester was slowly settling in the water and men were already taking to the water. A stick of three bombs had caught her amidships. We could not stop as once more came the warning "Aircraft ahead" so as we passed we dropped the carley rafts which hung from the sides of our hangars and went on to draw the attack away from her. We fired the last of our I-I.E. and I ordered "Carry on with practice and target smoke-shell". Long before this the 6-in, had finished their H.E and were firing low angle armour piercing shell. I went on deck to go to the after 4-in. T.S. Just as a terrific explosion seemed to lift the ship right out of the water. We heeled right over but came back upright and with a sigh of relief I saw we were still going at full speed. I went over to the side of the explosion and found the triple torpedo tubes had been lifted bodily inboard. Then I went on the 4-in. Gun deck and found the deck under the foremost mounting had been rolled up like a piece of cardboard and the gun thrown over backwards. Looking over the ship's side I saw a sheet of armour about 20 feet long hanging by two bolts and flapping in the rust of the water. I think that near miss must have been a small one, say about 2,000 lbs. But there was not time to think about it, as back they came again; heinkels this time, 9 of them. As I looked up at them I remember thinking "How beautiful they look, just like a flight of swallows with the sun shining on them"..
HMSFA Member Articles - Page 4
HMS Fiji (58) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

So Fiji was using radar directed AA to defeat the attacks, at a time when the USN didn't have any radar FC of any kind. Fiji and Gloucester were overwhelmed by massive numbers of aircraft, until they simply ran out of ammo...and that doesn't sound like ineffective AA to me.

Mashona and Tarter had 6 x 4.7in guns controlled by by a FC computer and HA Director and a twin 4in gun aft, she also had a 4 barrel pom-pom and either 20mm guns or additional quad .5in MGs.

Mashona was in company with Tarter, and here's a summary of the action that led to her loss:

After this, on 28 May Tartar was returning to Scapa Flow with HMS Mashona, when they came under heavy air attack west of Ireland, and Tartar's action report states: "...It is believed that all attacking aircraft were H.E. 111's. Occasionally a F.W. Condor was seen shadowing astern. It is estimated that about 50 aircraft took part in the attacks over a period of 13 hours..."[5] The Mashona was hit and badly damaged, eventually capsizing, but in return Tartar shot down an He 111 bomber.[6] Tartar was able to rescue 14 officers and 215 ratings, and transported them to Greenock. During this engagement " Tartar used her Fuze Keeping Clock to aim her 4.7" guns and "...Every gun was used, the 4.7" in controlled fire and the 4" and close range weapons firing independently. 290 rounds of 4.7", 255 rounds of 4", 1,000 rounds of pom pom and 750 rounds of .5 machine gun ammunition were fired."[7]
HMS Tartar (F43) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

So we have a series of lengthy attacks, that led to one of the two destroyers being hit; again this doesn't sound like ineffective AA. Rather, it seems that the Luftwaffe kept their distance, and relied upon shear weight of numbers to score hits against RN's ships that were dispersed and open to attack by overwhelming numbers of aircraft - I don't see any other navy doing better in the same time frame, and I'm actually pretty sure that they would do worse, since no other navy had as much AA firepower per ship or the same level of FC technology as the RN in May 1941.

 

[fastmongrel]

Go ask any current Naval commander how he would like to operate in the Med within 30 miles of the airfields of 2 major powers. He would probably go a bit green round the gills and ask you to change the subject. There is a long line of critics of the Royal Navy (including myself with my 20/20 hindsight) but what other Navy could have operated in the Med and not lost a similar number of vessels.

 

[Glider]

This might be of interest. Its a summary of a decoded Luftwaffe Enigma message Aug 1940

 

[renrich]

I have a Janes, 1945 ( not an original) and a 1942 Janes(original) When you look at the war loss section, it is staggering how many British vessels went down. Probably the most dangerous British type to serve on in WW2 was the armed merchant cruiser. Very sad.

 

[parsifal]

Here is a link to the Hyperwar site. Chapter 3 gives a pretty good summary of AA effectiveness and the amount of ammunition expended for each kill by the USN

HyperWar: Antiaircraft Action Summary--World War II

 

[parsifal]

Unfortunately I cant find much reliable estimates of RN ammunition expenditure for each kill. some sources suggest or estimate about 1000 rounds per kill, but that seems pretty optimistic. From the look of it, I think we are going to have to look at random or typical enagements to get a representative sample....where the ammunition expenditure is known, and the number of kills is also known. Anyone got any examples like that?