SAC's Fighters

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What aircraft?


What years? I was at Boca Chica 1971-74, doing training device support for VF101, and working part time for the base fueling contractor. Every time Hot Pad returned from a scramble we'd get an urgent call to get the birds topped off, muy pronto! If Fidel's boys were active and Willy Victor was out and about, Hot Pad would be scrambling repeatedly, and I would spend my entire shift running back and forth between Hot Pad and the fuel farm. Key West was a favorite destination for cross country "proficiency" flights, and on weekends the transient line often could pass for a military aviation museum.
Cuban Crisis: AD-5S, and sometime S2F-3 ... pre-MacNamara designations that we still used then.
I was ASW operator then, and we flew 8hr missions, usually 2 a day. We'd flown in birds from all over ... Med and WestPac, where I'd come from in a two-day, non-stop sea/air transfer. Only minor maintenance on ships, and flew trained crews and birds to Key West, Rosey Roads and Jax for major work. We often continued flight ops with our slow birds while a tanker was hooked up alongside, filling the Wasp's AvGas bunkers.

Key West Hot Pad: Mostly '68 in F-4Js.
Would rotate duty from East Coast F-4 squadrons, mostly from Oceana and I believe on occasion, MCAS Cherry Point. We didn't seem too busy at the time, and would be on duty 48 on, 48 off with two crews in staggered rotation. Our TAD was usually 3-4 weeks, and when there (or NAS Fallon for live ordnance quals) I'd go to the local car dealer and buy a beater trade-in from their back lot ... rust bucket or dent queen, with solid running gear but unsalable, so dirt cheap. The car would swap between duty crews. Would sell off base BX bulletin board for chump change when TAD was done ... Before age of rental cars. Great areas for a young, single guy if you had wheels ... beach, sailing, fishing in KW and Reno in Fallon ... and dress whites were chick magnets.

Photo Recon errata: Virtually all current accounts of the '62 Cuban Missile Crisis only mention U-2 photo recon overflights. Strangely, low level flights with USN F8U-1P Crusaders, USAF RF-101 Voodoos and amazingly, a sea skimming USN S2F-2P tour of Havana Harbor, are overlooked. Rather than hijack this thread, I'll start another to discuss.
 
Fannum, it looks like you're a little ahead of yourself here. Sure SA2s and Nikes were putting in their appearance circa 1960 (FG Powers), but they were far from an impenetrable shield for at least another decade, if ever.
It seems that there was quite a variation in opinion as to the exact lethality of the SA-2. If I recall somebody here (possibly you) mentioned the SA-2's radar beam was fairly agile and that might have led to the conclusion that the missile would be as well. Others didn't seem to have such pessimism about the capability (SAC seemed more confident).
And the Bulls and the Bears and the Badgers were always lurking out there to send their standoff missiles through the pores in the sieve.
Yeah, and the range of the interceptors were generally longer than the missiles and they could make multiple attacks.

Again, this thread was based on late 50s
That's why I mentioned the exercises from 1958-1962. From what I recall the Hercules (possibly the Hawk which came online in the summer of 1960) were used in these tests and it seemed that the bombers were able to make it through that even at altitude in some cases: Interestingly, I vaguely remember there being something that indicated an assumption that the Hawk would render fighters useless without some form of ECM (although it's capabilities eclipsed the SA-2) and this probably would make it fairly close to equivalent to the SA-3 (which came online in 1961).
a total revolution occurred in the SAC mission ... both translating to a non-nuclear, middle ground between tactical and strategic bombing. Carpet bombing was confined to the South due to the massive AAA and SAM threats up North, and initial high losses there. Also, politics kept us away from the most beneficial targets, the air bases, SAM stocks, ports, power production, etc.
While SAC's mission was predominantly nuclear-deterrence/armageddon, they were able to do conventional bombing with some of the aircraft, and the initial plans for Arc Light One was for a low-altitude bombing attack on Kep Airfield. The other attacks would have been much of the rest you said (as well as going full-arson on the cities of North Vietnam).
I was part of the USN Iron Hand project, precursor to better publicized AF Wild Weasel.
Oh really? That's pretty cool. I'm surprised the USAF didn't develop more anti-radiation missiles. There was the GAM-67, but it was subsonic (there was technically a proposed crossbow but it was cancelled). The USN seemed to have two designs, one which became the Shrike, and the Corvus. I figure the Corvus predated the Shrike and could have probably been in service a little earlier.
 
It seems that there was quite a variation in opinion as to the exact lethality of the SA-2. If I recall somebody here (possibly you) mentioned the SA-2's radar beam was fairly agile and that might have led to the conclusion that the missile would be as well. Others didn't seem to have such pessimism about the capability (SAC seemed more confident).
Yeah, and the range of the interceptors were generally longer than the missiles and they could make multiple attacks.

That's why I mentioned the exercises from 1958-1962. From what I recall the Hercules (possibly the Hawk which came online in the summer of 1960) were used in these tests and it seemed that the bombers were able to make it through that even at altitude in some cases: Interestingly, I vaguely remember there being something that indicated an assumption that the Hawk would render fighters useless without some form of ECM (although it's capabilities eclipsed the SA-2) and this probably would make it fairly close to equivalent to the SA-3 (which came online in 1961).
While SAC's mission was predominantly nuclear-deterrence/armageddon, they were able to do conventional bombing with some of the aircraft, and the initial plans for Arc Light One was for a low-altitude bombing attack on Kep Airfield. The other attacks would have been much of the rest you said (as well as going full-arson on the cities of North Vietnam).
Oh really? That's pretty cool. I'm surprised the USAF didn't develop more anti-radiation missiles. There was the GAM-67, but it was subsonic (there was technically a proposed crossbow but it was cancelled). The USN seemed to have two designs, one which became the Shrike, and the Corvus. I figure the Corvus predated the Shrike and could have probably been in service a little earlier.
You've got some good information, Zipper. However, I'd suggest laying this all out with REALISTIC time lines, especially when these promised advances were truly mission capable. War games always seem to emphasize the GAMES aspects, and in retrospect we invariably find that combos of optimism/pessimism in the ROE undermine the project. Also, politics are seldom a factor in the games. During my career, we NEVER lost a war game, but in the last 75 years, we've sure lost a LOT of wars!!
Also, look at all the pre-WW2 ads and publicity that the miraculous, fully tested and proven Norden bomb sight would put a 500 pounder into a pickle barrel from 25,000 ft!
Then post-war analysis found the true Circle of Probability to be 3-5 miles!!
Remember that Press Releases and Capability Brochures are really just bullshit you can fold.

Does anyone remember when the first standoff precision unmanned aerial weapon was tested? Look up the WWI Kettering Bug.
When was the first appearance of effective guided bombs? How about First Gulf War.
Every time we were in a conflict, we'd thrash around getting organized, get troops up to strength, get logistics straight, and only then would we get focused on stand off precision weapons. Then, peace time priorities put them on the back burner, confined to studies ... until we were deep into the next war!
That wasn't my role in VietNam, but I was in the same boat developing Anti-Sam weapons and tactics amid fighting for funding and priorities.
 
Following up on previous post. The system posted before I wanted it to, and wouldn't let me edit. We had the SAM site sensors in pretty good shape quickly, but needed to get a stand off missile to take out the site. The whiz kids at places like Saunders developed the guidance to our feedback, but we had no funding for a missile. We'd scour the Nellis and China Lake storage bunkers for obsolete missiles, and tack on our gear to test. Bullpups and Mavericks were too dear stateside, and we'd use most anything we could fit on racks and cobble a guidance package to.

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Following up on previous post. The system posted before I wanted it to, and wouldn't let me edit. We had the SAM site sensors in pretty good shape quickly, but needed to get a stand off missile to take out the site. The whiz kids at places like Saunders developed the guidance to our feedback, but we had no funding for a missile. We'd scour the Nellis and China Lake storage bunkers for obsolete missiles, and tack on our gear to test. Bullpups and Mavericks were too dear stateside, and we'd use most anything we could fit on racks and cobble a guidance package to.
So this is where HARM "fire and forget" anti radiation missiles came from? Bravo Zulu!
 
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Would rotate duty from East Coast F-4 squadrons, mostly from Oceana and I believe on occasion, MCAS Cherry Point.
By my time, the ratio was rather heavily weighted towards USMC squadrons from Cherry Pt and Beaufort, and they would show up with some pretty ragged aircraft and kit. By Jan, 1972 Navy F4Bs were nowhere to be seen, but the Marine squadrons were still showing up with them for Hot Pad into 1973-74. Strapped for cash, USMC would take advantage of Hot Pad maintenance priority to prop up their tired old birds. They would fly their tiredest old hangar queens down, put the worst pair on Ready One, declare them down, and send them off to AIMD for priority NAVY FUNDED repair. After a couple weeks, all patched up, the initial birds would get rotated back to Homeplate and get replaced by new candidates for resuscitation. They would also show up with unairworthy AAMs, get them swapped for "good" ones, then rotate the good ones home with the repaired jets. Scuttlebut had it that NAS CO complained about this to AirLant, and was told to eat it.
 
You've got some good information, Zipper. However, I'd suggest laying this all out with REALISTIC time lines, especially when these promised advances were truly mission capable.
That's a good point.

I'm really surprised more money wasn't poured into anti-radiation missiles. It was a clear means to defeat enemy air-defenses. After all, once missiles started to become a major threat which I figure would be by 5/1/60 at latest with the shoot-down of Gary Powers, though there were concerns before that which included a Canberra reconnaissance plane getting shot down (10/7/59), to our own missile developments, and potential knowledge of Soviet missile developments.

While I forgot about this, while I was searching for anti-radiation missiles, I actually found an old post of mine. I figure if the USAF didn't kill the project it would have been possible to get it to operational status by 1962 or 1963.

While I don't know anything about the WS-121B (which was a USAF development): I wouldn't be surprised if it was bigger and heavier than the Corvus and there's something to be said about small and light.
Remember that Press Releases and Capability Brochures are really just bullshit you can fold.
That's a great line...
When was the first appearance of effective guided bombs? How about First Gulf War.
I thought Vietnam saw them used to considerable effect...
 
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By my time, the ratio was rather heavily weighted towards USMC squadrons from Cherry Pt and Beaufort, and they would show up with some pretty ragged aircraft and kit. By Jan, 1972 Navy F4Bs were nowhere to be seen, but the Marine squadrons were still showing up with them for Hot Pad into 1973-74. Strapped for cash, USMC would take advantage of Hot Pad maintenance priority to prop up their tired old birds. They would fly their tiredest old hangar queens down, put the worst pair on Ready One, declare them down, and send them off to AIMD for priority NAVY FUNDED repair. After a couple weeks, all patched up, the initial birds would get rotated back to Homeplate and get replaced by new candidates for resuscitation. They would also show up with unairworthy AAMs, get them swapped for "good" ones, then rotate the good ones home with the repaired jets. Scuttlebut had it that NAS CO complained about this to AirLant, and was told to eat it.
 
fannum fannum

Uh, you didn't type anything: I think you mentioned that you ended up having that happen before when the system caused the message to appear before you were finished.

I think you might have fallen prey to the same glitch twice.
 
fannum fannum

Uh, you didn't type anything: I think you mentioned that you ended up having that happen before when the system caused the message to appear before you were finished.

I think you might have fallen prey to the same glitch twice.
Somehow, I wound up being unable to either reply or edit. Had to sign out of everything, reboot computer, and now WW2Aircraft seems to work again. All other programs still worked fine. Hmmm!
If this works, I have some Hot Pad/USMC Air comments
 
When was the first appearance of effective guided bombs? How about First Gulf War.
define "effective"
Some of the end of WW II or Korean war stuff was supposed to 10 times more effective that dropping unguided munitions but that was hardly up to the claimed accuracy ;)

Only 10-20 bombs to take out bridge vs several hundred?

Getting to even 50% hits might very well have take to the 1st Gulf War.
 
Somehow, I wound up being unable to either reply or edit. Had to sign out of everything, reboot computer, and now WW2Aircraft seems to work again.
That's unusual, but at least it works now
I have some Hot Pad/USMC Air comments
Go for it, it's never stopped me lol
 
I found some items of interest: When it came to the development of the F-88 through the F-101 there was an interest in the ability of the airplane to carry and deliver small nuclear bombs (effectively, the goal was to destroy airfields and, preferably, all the aircraft on them) shortly (and by shortly I mean a few weeks) before the F-88 made it's first flight.

When the F-101 program started in the early 1950's, this capability was to be included into the design from day one. The aircraft was to be designated as a strategic-fighter (a term applied to the F-84's as well), which had a dual air-to-air, and air-to-ground mission: The first was to cover bombers as well as clear out the way by sweeping out and ahead, and shooting down everything they could; the other was to kick down the doors using nuclear bombs.

For either mission, the aircraft was initially designed with the idea of carrying 2 x 450 gallon tanks; for the air-to-ground mission: A nuclear weapon (most likely a Mk-7) would be carried along the centerline rack. As time went on, the idea would ultimately see carrying a Mk-5 within a streamlined pod that would lower-drag, as well as carry additional fuel (much like the B-58), which was arrived at around March/April of 1953. The pod was given the internal designation Model 96 by McDonnell, was designed to attach to a hardpoint capable of carrying a 10000 lb. store, which set the ultimate weight limit. There were a variety of configurations that included varying amounts of fuel, the means to carry either a buddy-refueling mechanism, or the means to carry a sweep-jammer in order to help penetrate enemy air-defenses, as well as different bombs as time went on. The USAF seemed to grow an interest in fitting their strategic fighter with strategic nuclear weapons of increasing size and power, ultimately including the provision for the TX-15 (which later became the Mk-15) thermonuclear bomb with a yield of 1.69 to 3.8 megatons. Despite the Model 96 pod, the provision for 2 x 450 gal. tanks were to be retained.

When it came to aerial combat, the aircraft was rated for 7.33g at design-weight, which was the norm for USAF aircraft, and was expected to be able to pull 3.4g under those conditions at 40000' while flying at 0.98 Mach. The high-altitude performance is surprisingly good, considering how tiny the F-101's wings are, and would correspond to a stall-speed of 151 knots (this would probably be around 5-15 kn. less when not transonic), particularly in light of the fact that: At this point in time, gun-kills were the norm; the aircraft could accelerate/climb/dive with ease, air-to-air missiles such as the AIM-4 and AIM-9 weren't particularly useful for aircraft pulling over 2-3g; the SA-2 (and more capable SAMs) didn't exist yet, and proposed jammers were intended to deal with the threats of its time.

For the air-to-ground mission the aircraft was intended to be capable of bombing using both high and low-altitude: High-altitude provided greater range, which was naturally a benefit for destroying air-defenses located further inside enemy territory, whereas low altitude made it easy to escape detection when range wasn't as important; For high-altitude, the dive-toss was favored since it would allow a similar aiming profile to a dive-bombing followed by a pitch-up to lob the bomb forward, as is used in LABS; for low-altitude, there was the LABS and vertical ascent method: Both involved an immelman, but the vertical ascent had the loop split up with a really long vertical climb before completing the half-loop and half-roll. The idea was that the bomb would be lofted up a huge distance (and by extension, fall back down a huge distance) giving the aircraft more time to escape the blast.

The F-101 ended up with a whole host of problems: For starters, it had a serious pitch-up problem which was partially related to the T-tail, but also to vortices that formed off the nose, which was long and pointy (as is the norm for supersonic aircraft). Apparently the scale-up laws for vortices made it difficult to grasp the full effect in wind-tunnel testing, and most people weren't generally even looking for that (missile designers had realized this could be a serious issue, but most aircraft designers didn't grasp the matter fully). They couldn't do stall tests early on owing to problems with the inlets (though there were some issues with the J57 as well, but that was fairly quickly resolved) leading to compressor stalls before they got to a high enough AoA to trigger one. The problem was first misidentified as an elevator reversal, but that wasn't the real cause: He just barely entered the pitch-up boundary for the aircraft and was very lucky. The aircraft would effectively run into pitch-up problems before the aircraft would ever stall and this proved to be something that ultimately ended the air-to-air mission decisively. For reasons I'm not entirely clear of (though I speculate it had to do with their work on the X-7), the guys at Lockheed might have already been aware of their plane's propensity towards pitch-up.

Range was also somewhat of a problem, though certainly few would call the F-101 a short-legged plane: Fuel-burn was around 15% higher than expected. I'm not sure how much of this was the J57 or the inlet, and I'm not completely sure if this would have been a total deal-breaker for the long-range fighter standpoint, though it wouldn't have been well-received.

While the F-101 normally had excellent acceleration and rate of climb, but when it carried the Model-96 pod: It had poor performance in the transonic range owing to the effect on the area-ruling of the aircraft (I'm still surprised by the fact that McDonnell seemed rather slow to realize the value of the area-rule considering they were quite remarkable in some areas of aerospace engineering). It also had a negative effect on directional and roll-stability as well and, while they tried to reshape the pod to make it better conform to the area-rule: It still seemed to come up short in stability (and might not have been enough from a drag-standpoint). This ultimately had a very negative effect on the air-to-ground capability of the aircraft as it only had two hardpoints of which two were designed to carry fuel, though the Mk-28 did provide the airplane with the ability to deliver a lightweight thermonuclear bomb.
 
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