SAC's Fighters

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I'm curious exactly why SAC underwent a reorganization in 1957 and gave up the bulk of their fighter planes to Tactical Air Command?

I could make guesses, but it's one thing to have guesses, and another to have actual answers.

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I don't know if this is THE reason or not, but by 1957, B36s and B47s were being supplanted by the B52 as the primary strategic nuclear strike weapon, and any hope of fighter escort was clearly no longer feasible. No way was any fighter going to match the range and speed of the almighty BUFF.
 
I don't know if this is THE reason or not, but by 1957, B36s and B47s were being supplanted by the B52 as the primary strategic nuclear strike weapon, and any hope of fighter escort was clearly no longer feasible. No way was any fighter going to match the range and speed of the almighty BUFF.
From what I recall, the range of the B-36 was about the same as the B-52 without aerial refueling and there were plans to employ escorts. The first idea was to use the XF-85 Goblin and, while that ended up being cancelled: They had thought of using the F-88 for this. While the F-88 was also cancelled, it ended up becoming the F-101.

While the F-101's performance was lacking in a number of areas: It didn't seem impossible to have designed an aircraft with better low-speed handling which met the range requirements (though during that period, it seems difficult to determine who knew what).
 
From what I recall, the range of the B-36 was about the same as the B-52 without aerial refueling and there were plans to employ escorts. The first idea was to use the XF-85 Goblin and, while that ended up being cancelled: They had thought of using the F-88 for this. While the F-88 was also cancelled, it ended up becoming the F-101.

While the F-101's performance was lacking in a number of areas: It didn't seem impossible to have designed an aircraft with better low-speed handling which met the range requirements (though during that period, it seems difficult to determine who knew what).
Any way you slice it, even basing escorts at forward bases, with the engine technology of the time, no fighter that could escort the BUFFs "feet dry" to target and back to "feet wet" again would be light and agile enough to be effective in combat. The missiles of the time could not have supported a non maneuvering missile truck "fighter".
 
The idea of fighter escorts went out operationally with the Thunderjet; by the time SAC transferred its assets to TAC, the main fighter type in use was the F-84F, now operated as a stand-alone nuke-carrying platform and deployed as a Strategic Fighter rather than as a Fighter Escort.

The F-88 (and other penetration fighters) were not designed as bomber escorts.

Bear in mind too that certain flying training units also transferred to TAC around this time, so it was not just SAC which was affected.
 
In addition to the XF-85 project, the AF also tried a few other parasite fighter concepts:

Project Tip-Tow - which was intended to have fighters attached to a bomber's wingtips. This was tested with a B-29 mothership and two F-84Ds.

Project Tom-Tom - similar to Tip-Tow, which tested a pair of F-84Fs attached to a B-36's wingtips.

FICON (Fighter Conveyor) - this project was to have an F-84E (later replaced by an F-84F) carried in a modified B-36's bomb bay.

Out of all these projects, only FICON saw limited service due to it being adapted to long-range aerial recon applications.
 
FiCon (FICON) employed RF-84K (RF-84F converted for the role) rather than F-84F.
 
FiCon (FICON) employed RF-84K (RF-84F converted for the role) rather than F-84F.
The initial FICON project incorporated a standard F-84E (49-2115) and a (G)RB-36F-1-CF (49-2707).
The F-84E was replaced by the F-84F prototype: YRF-84F (49-2430).

When the project shifted from escort to recon, the (G)RB-36D was used along with the above-mentioned RF-84Ks.

I just mentioned the projects in a brief overview, is all.
 
Any way you slice it, even basing escorts at forward bases, with the engine technology of the time, no fighter that could escort the BUFFs "feet dry" to target and back to "feet wet" again would be light and agile enough to be effective in combat. The missiles of the time could not have supported a non maneuvering missile truck "fighter".
As far as I understand it, no target in the world is more than 1500 nm from the sea: I'm not sure where the outer-range where aerial-refueling would be possible prior to being in the range of Soviet interceptors of the time, but aerial refueling extends the range of an aircraft vs. what it would do on it's own fuel.

Is there any rule of thumb how much IFR affects range?

The idea of fighter escorts went out operationally with the Thunderjet; by the time SAC transferred its assets to TAC, the main fighter type in use was the F-84F, now operated as a stand-alone nuke-carrying platform and deployed as a Strategic Fighter rather than as a Fighter Escort.
To be honest, there is a part of me that assumes that SAC (rightly or not) assumed that nuclear strike was a more surefire way to support bombers than long-ranged fighter-sweeps.
The F-88 (and other penetration fighters) were not designed as bomber escorts.
Technically, they were designed as long-ranged fighters to execute roving sweeps ahead of the bombers to clear out the way. This might very well have had to do with the discrepancy in speed between early jet-fighters and propeller-driven bombers, though there were already concepts involving "convoy fighters" that would travel at their own speed (possibly in waves) which would ensure there'd be at least some fighters nearby the bombers to lend assistance.
Bear in mind too that certain flying training units also transferred to TAC around this time, so it was not just SAC which was affected.
I thought the USAF at the time had UPT and then specialized training for SAC, ADC, and TAC?
 
Nuclear bombers are by definition expendable. Escorting them in with fighters is difficult due to range limitations on the small airframes. It's probably cheaper to simply make the bomber more survivable using stand-off cruise-missiles than to design a fighter than can accompany and escort it all the way, and support said fighter with standing units and outlay.

It's not like the bombers are going to have a second mission even if they recover safely in CONUS. The bases, if airworthy at all, will probably not be able to regenerate. Why bother with fighters at that point?
 
The concept of escorted bombers was, of course, a hold over from what was needed during WWII.

During the early years of the cold war, technology had not advanced enough that an enemy bomber could effectively be brought down by anything other than interceptors.

This philosophy changed with better and more reliable SAM tech in later years.
 
The concept of escorted bombers was, of course, a hold over from what was needed during WWII.

During the early years of the cold war, technology had not advanced enough that an enemy bomber could not effectively be brought down by other than interceptors.

This philosophy changed with better and more reliable SAM tech in later years.

... and MIRV ICBMs which would render each launching and landing base useless for recovery/regeneration/restrike.
 
Nuclear bombers are by definition expendable. Escorting them in with fighters is difficult due to range limitations on the small airframes. It's probably cheaper to simply make the bomber more survivable using stand-off cruise-missiles than to design a fighter than can accompany and escort it all the way, and support said fighter with standing units and outlay.

It's not like the bombers are going to have a second mission even if they recover safely in CONUS. The bases, if airworthy at all, will probably not be able to regenerate. Why bother with fighters at that point?
Well, having the bomber survive long enough to release its ordinance would be a starting point. While there was generally an attitude that air-superiority wouldn't be needed for nuclear-war, that might have assumed we caught them with their pants down.

That said, the F-105 could fly fast enough to exceed the VMO of pretty much any fighter the Soviet Union had at the time.
 
I thought the USAF at the time had UPT and then specialized training for SAC, ADC, and TAC?

Fighter and fighter-bomber training was a mess in the '50s: often crews would complete transition/weapon training on F-80 (and later, F-84 or F-86), only to find they'd ended up on a unit which didn't operate the type they'd done transition training with. There were a few exceptions (the all-weather training schools for example), but in all instances, the Training Wings were part of Air Training Command / Crew Training Air Force. In the late '50s some of those training functions were transferred to TAC.
 
... and MIRV ICBMs which would render each launching and landing base useless for recovery/regeneration/restrike.
The first US ICBM with MIRV was Minuteman III, tested from 1968 with the first operational from Jan 1971. Maybe a bit later than you might expect?

The USN fitted Polaris A-3 with a weapon bay containing 3 independently targeted warheads in 1964.
 
The first US ICBM with MIRV was Minuteman III, tested from 1968 with the first operational from Jan 1971. Maybe a bit later than you might expect?

The USN fitted Polaris A-3 with a weapon bay containing 3 independently targeted warheads in 1964.

I was elucidating further the last line of the post I quoted, not taking issue with it; hence the introductory ellipsis.
 

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