Seafire vs. Sea Hurricane

[slaterat]

Off Norway they were landing with 40kts of wind over the deck.

True, but you have 10 RAF pilots, none who had never made a carrier landing before. They went 10/10 landing Hurricanes without any modifications for naval use at all. No strengthened fuselage, no arrestor gear. no under carriage modifications nada. Brown seems overly critical of the Sea Hurricane, especially considering how well it performed both landing and taking off from carriers.

 

[slaterat]

Here's one of my favorite pictures entitled "Moment of Truth". Not sure where I found it.

 

[slaterat]

I think the Hurricane would of been one of the easier fighters to convert to folding wings as it already had pin joints holding the outer wing panels in place. I believe the reason this was not done was the usual , just not enough resources to devote to the project, and considering the FAA already had folding wing Martlets on order why bother?

 

[SaparotRob]

Here's one of my favorite pictures entitled "Moment of Truth". Not sure where I found it.

Beautiful picture.

 

[Admiral Beez]

However, even in 1945, the F4U was an incredibly 'hot ship', but its often lost in discussions it was actually a pre war, as in pre 1939 war, fighter.
Yes, the Corsair was a handful, the 'Bent Winged Bastard' or 'Ensign Eliminator' depending on RN or USN usage, but it was head and shoulders ahead of its contemporaries.

I've always liked the look of the Corsair in FAA colours. Here's Canada last (or second last) VC, awarded posthumously to Lt. Robert Hampton Gray.

And another Corsair painted in tribute to Gray.

I wonder what a Sea Hurricane would look like in BPF blue scheme. Something similar to this PRU scheme here.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Here's one of my favorite pictures entitled "Moment of Truth". Not sure where I found it.

Poor devils off Norway. All RAF Hurricanes and Gladaitors safely landed without arrestor hooks. Shown below shortly thereafter. Only to be lost due to HMS Glorious' shoddy command.

 

[nuuumannn]

Its interesting but I have never heard of the Sea Hurricane having a suspect undercarriage.

No one's saying the Hurricane had suspect undercarriage. Surely you can appreciate the difference on landing between approach and roundout and stopping within mere metres, and stopping within hundreds of metres, with space for a nice rolling halt, and the unforeseen consequences that might have if the undercarriage was not designed for it. Energy management.

True, but you have 10 RAF pilots, none who had never made a carrier landing before. They went 10/10 landing Hurricanes without any modifications for naval use at all. No strengthened fuselage, no arrestor gear. no under carriage modifications nada. Brown seems overly critical of the Sea Hurricane, especially considering how well it performed both landing and taking off from carriers.

Yup and that demonstrates the training and skill of the pilots as much as the aircraft's abilities. The Hurricane had a nice big generous wing area, relatively low stalling speed for its size and weight, it had good visibility from the cockpit and it had a wide track undercarriage. The RAF pilots were trained in making short field take offs and landings, which was effectively what they were doing. Get those same pilots into regular carrier operations in carrier aircraft with the mods required for catapulting and arrested landings without training and the difference would be telling. Carrier operations require a little bit more than just the ability of pilots and aircraft to be able to carry out short field take-offs and landings.

Brown was critical of the Hurricane because it was his job to be. He was a test pilot expected to discover how an aircraft would handle in a carrier environment. If it bounced on landing, as the Hurricane did, then he's gonna adversely comment on it.

This is what he said about the Sea Hurricane on approach:

"For deck landing the approach could be made at 70 kts, but the Hurricane was outside the deck landing class of the Wildcat; then it was to be remembered that it was not tailormade for this job. There was no question of adopting the crabbed approach with the Sea Hurricane as was later to be developed for the Seafire to improve forward vision. The use of rudder on the approach in the Sea Hurricane produced a considerable increase in nose heaviness, which was quite unacceptable in this delicate situation, so it was a straight approach or nothing and the inadequate view forward simply had to be accepted. its harsh stalling characteristics were anything but suited for deck landing and the undercarriage had lots of bounce in it which could prove embarrassing on occasions. At least it was more robust than the Seafire that was to succeed it and could withstand quite a lot of deck landing punishment."

I think the Hurricane would of been one of the easier fighters to convert to folding wings as it already had pin joints holding the outer wing panels in place. I believe the reason this was not done was the usual , just not enough resources to devote to the project, and considering the FAA already had folding wing Martlets on order why bother?

The truth is more prosaic. The Martlet and Hurricane were required because the FAA didn't have enough single-seat fighters of sufficient quality and it needed as many as it could get its hands on. The Air Ministry not pursuing a naval single-seat fighter in the mid to late 1930s left the FAA desperately short of modern fighter aircraft at the beginning of the war.

Had Hawker incorporated folding wings, adjusted oleos and other mods into the Hurricane's structure then it would have been a better behaved deck operating aircraft. As I've mentioned earlier, the Sea Hurricane was intended as a stop-gap because the Admiralty had a shortage of suitable single-seat fighters. Hawker quite easily could have taken the time and modified the aircraft more intensely to enable it to behave better on a carrier deck, but that's not what the Admiralty wanted within the time span. The navy needed a carrier fighter yesterday and the Sea Hurricane was designed to fulfil that need as expeditiously as possible. It's worth remembering that by the time the Sea Hurricane I entered service the Air Ministry had already declared the RAF's Hurricane Is obsolete as frontline fighters in late 1940. The Sea Hurricane was barely adequate because there wasn't time to make it good. That doesn't mean it couldn't have been done, though.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Had Hawker incorporated folding wings, adjusted oleos and other mods into the Hurricane's structure then it would have been a better behaved deck operating aircraft.

Were there any mods that might have improved the rudder issues affecting pitch at low speeds?

 

[nuuumannn]

Were there any mods that might have improved the rudder issues affecting pitch at low speeds?

Applied to the Hurricane? Don't think so. Counterweights within the control cable circuit might have eased the issue, but it would have taken some trial and error of course. Doesn't mean it couldn't have been done.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Applied to the Hurricane? Don't think so. Counterweights within the control cable circuit might have eased the issue, but it would have taken some trial and error of course. Doesn't mean it couldn't have been done.

Right, the Hurri. I'm pretty ignorant about aeroengineering. It just struck me as odd that the rudder would affect pitch and I was wondering how anyone might have analyzed and corrected it. Do you or anyone else reading know what caused this issue?

 

[nuuumannn]

It just struck me as odd that the rudder would affect pitch and I was wondering how anyone might have analyzed and corrected it.

Not so much pitch change, more like sink rate. Side slipping requires a boot full of rudder, which would cause the nose to change attitude, in the Hurricane's case, shove it down, which increased the rate at which the aircraft descended. Obviously this makes it easier to see over that long nose, but it means the aircraft is now approaching faster (vertically, not horizontally, approach speed would be the same, 70 kts, but vertical speed would have increased) than it was before the boot load of rudder was put in. You don't want that when your stopping distance can only be counted on one hand.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Not so much pitch change, more like sink rate. Side slipping requires a boot full of rudder, which would cause the nose to change attitude, in the Hurricane's case, shove it down, which increased the rate at which the aircraft descended. Obviously this makes it easier to see over that long nose, but it means the aircraft is now approaching faster (vertically, not horizontally, approach speed would be the same, 70 kts, but vertical speed would have increased) than it was before the boot load of rudder was put in. You don't want that when your stopping distance can only be counted on one hand.

Oh, I see. That makes sense, thanks for clearing it up for me.

 

[Admiral Beez]

The Martlet and Hurricane were required because the FAA didn't have enough single-seat fighters of sufficient quality and it needed as many as it could get its hands on.

i never considered the Marlet as a stopgap. Assuming timing and availability, I'm sure the FAA would gladly swap every Sea Hurricane, Seafire, Fulmar and Firefly for an equal number of folding Martlets.

 

[nuuumannn]

never considered the Marlet as a stopgap.

That maybe the case, Admiral, but it was. It was a great naval fighter, but it was bought to fill the gap in capability until the Firebrand was ready, bearing in mind that was originally built to be the high performance naval fighter ordered for the FAA in lieu of a decent carrier based single-seater after the Admiralty gained control of the FAA from the Air Ministry. The problem (for want of a better expression) with the Martlet was not its suitability for the task, but that by 1941/1942 it was no match for contemporary enemy land based fighters, like the Bf 109F or Fw 190, but the request for it came before these aircraft appeared and why not? Especially if all you have are Fulmars, Skuas and Sea Gladiators...

Of course the French examples on the Grumman production line were converted for British use and this was all done through the British/French Purchasing Commission, but someone in Britain requested them; they weren't just given to the navy, in case someone stipulates...

 

[Shortround6]

Assuming timing and availability, I'm sure the FAA would gladly swap every Sea Hurricane, Seafire, Fulmar and Firefly for an equal number of folding Martlets.

The timing thing covers quite a number of of years. Fulmar was ordered in mid 1938. The specification was several years older.

The Firefly specification was being worked on before the Fulmar production planes were delivered.
the Firefly didn't go operational until Oct 43, (1st squadron) and was still in use in the MK I version at the end of WW II.
At which time the Firefly was defiantly not what was wanted for air to air combat. But in late 1943 and 1944 the Martlet wasn't wanted for air to air combat either.
Air to air meaning fighter vs fighter.
The Firefly had morphed into a strike fighter or search/recon plane or night fighter depending on equipment fit so the Martlet wasn't able to do any of the jobs the Firefly would up doing.
Leaving the Firefly MK IV out of this as it didn't show up in service until after the war.

The Martlet had it's place but it's place was increasing limited after 1942 except in the Pacific.

 

[Shortround6]

On the issue of the Hurricane landing.

It had several good points compared to the Spitfire, it may have had some bad points but each point on each aircraft was a matter of degree, not checking off a yes or no box.

The Hurricane might have suffered large losses operating off Salerno just not quite as many as the Spitfire.
To pick a number out of the hat would 55 losses instead of 70 been judged a success? or 50?
Salerno had several problems no matter what aircraft was used.
1 was lack of training.
2. was the lack of carrier speed combined with the no wind (or very low wind) conditions. 17 kt carrier with zero wind is a bit different than a 17kt carrier in the Atlantic with 10-15kts of wind.
3. there was often a haze over the sea making visibility low for picking up the carriers and lining up.
4. the carriers were supposed to stay in a confined area they often had to turn around and go back to the other end of the operational area (at 17kts) and then turn around 180 degrees and go back again to conduction operations.
5 does depend on the aircraft. The Spitfires had limited endurance, the Hurricane would be little different.

Carrier landings have a few differences from landing on grass fields. On grass if you come in 4-5mph hot you usually have enough space to slow and stop, little change to the landing gear.
With an arrester hook you are going to stop in exactly the same space regardless of the speed (unless you go around again) and the increased forces are taken up by the arresting gear and by the landing gear slamming into the deck. Even a good landing can have a vertical speed of 3-5mph (run you car into a brick wall at 5mph).

And would Sea Hurricane IIC's been able to do the job at Salerno vs the Italian/German aircraft?
The Seafires were put aboard the escort carries just before the operation because the RN (and the allied command) didn't want to use Martlets vs the Axis forces.
What was supposed to be a one day operation turned into four days when the ground forces didn't capture the Italian airfields on the first day (or 2nd or 3rd or 4th) and allow shore based aircraft to take over.

 

[EwenS]

The lack of training time ahead of Salerno was compounded by 3 of the Seafire squadrons being moved from Indomitable to the escort carriers.

Indomitable had been torpedoed on 16th July 1943 off Sicily, and her 3 Seafire squadrons were reallocated as follows when the escort carriers arrived at Gibraltar:-
807 to Battler on 14th Aug
880 to Stalker mid-Aug
899 to Hunter on 28th Aug (her arrival had been delayed by storm damage in the Bay of Biscay forcing her return to Britain for repairs).

These ships then had little sea time to allow the pilots to adjust to the much smaller flight decks before they sailed from Gibraltar on 31 Aug / 1 Sept to arrive at Malta on 5th Sept before sailing for Salerno on the evening of 8th September to begin operations the next morning.

Both Formidable & Illustrious forming part of Force H during Operation Avalanche also had small numbers of Seafires aboard but suffered no losses during the Operation according to Hugh Popham, later transferring some of their aircraft Force V.

So in those no/light wind conditions the deck size proved important.

 

[Glider]

No one's saying the Hurricane had suspect undercarriage. Surely you can appreciate the difference on landing between approach and roundout and stopping within mere metres, and stopping within hundreds of metres, with space for a nice rolling halt, and the unforeseen consequences that might have if the undercarriage was not designed for it. Energy management.

I am very aware of the difference in landing on a carrier compared to your average airfield. The point is that the Hurricane has a more robust undercarriage and from the video's that I have seen little propensity to bounce. Clearly it did from the reports but it also went on to serve well in the role so the difficulty wasn't a deal breaker.

I don't know, as clearly others know more about the Sea Hurricane than I, but if the problem had been significant then changes to the undercarriage would have been made. I wouldn't have thought that this involved major changes to the design.

In the admittedly few operational reports I have seen. I haven't seen any evidence that the Sea Hurricane was difficult to land and / or had a worse than average accident record than any other Naval fighter. That is all that I am saying.

The major problem seems to have been the range, performance, lack of wing folding and ammunition carried.

 

[Shortround6]

I am very aware of the difference in landing on a carrier compared to your average airfield. The point is that the Hurricane has a more robust undercarriage and from the video's that I have seen little propensity to bounce. Clearly it did from the reports but it also went on to serve well in the role so the difficulty wasn't a deal breaker.

I don't know, as clearly others know more about the Sea Hurricane than I, but if the problem had been significant then changes to the undercarriage would have been made. I wouldn't have thought that this involved major changes to the design.

In the admittedly few operational reports I have seen. I haven't seen any evidence that the Sea Hurricane was difficult to land and / or had a worse than average accident record than any other Naval fighter. That is all that I am saying.

The major problem seems to have been the range, performance, lack of wing folding and ammunition carried.

You are pretty much correct.

The problem with bounce was one more thing they didn't need. Mostly due to timing. Very few Sea Hurricanes were built as Sea Hurricanes. Most were converted RAF aircraft and often well used at that (one aircraft had one crash landing and one combat damage report on it's log before it ever showed up at the FAA). Since they only were planning on using the Sea Hurricane until the Seafire or the Firefly (or Firebrand) show up they didn't spend much time sorting out things out. The Sea Hurricanes were built (modified) in small batches.
It took Vought quite a while to sort out the bounce problem with the Corsair. I don't know if it got shoved to back burner while other stuff got sorted out but sorting out landing gear bounce involves a lot of trial and error, or a lot of luck. Most carrier aircraft were designed with more landing gear stroke/travel than land aircraft. More travel meant more distance to soak up the impact and more travel meant more time to transmit the force to the aircraft structure.
If your travel distance (say 6 inches?) is fixed all you can do is play games with the oleo pressures. Basically you are dealing with a hydraulic/gas spring. But if you lower the pressure for a bit less bounce you may bottom out more often or harder and still be in trouble. It is a trade off between too much "spring" and not enough. And you are dealing with variable aircraft weight and temperatures.
Not saying it can't be done, just saying it might not be as easy as it appears and with the piecemeal ordering (or transfer of RAF machines) in batches and at the last minute, Hurricanes with Merlin XX engines and four 20mm guns don's show up until May of 1942,

One reason the F4F was liked as a carrier aircraft was that it has 12.5in of oleo defection from all the way extended to full compression. It used a few inches just sitting on the deck.
This actually gave problems when operated from land. It had a narrow track and the soft (spongy) suspension allowed the plane to roll from side to side while taxiing. A P-40 had about 7in of travel. It was going to hit "harder" even at the same speed as the F4F or be more prone to bottoming the oleos out on a hard landing and breaking the attachment points or punching the oleo strut through the top of the wing (broken attachment point). Using the P-40 because I don't have oleo travel distance for the Hurricane.

Vought solved the problem without changing the outside of the landing gear.

 

[EwenS]

That maybe the case, Admiral, but it was. It was a great naval fighter, but it was bought to fill the gap in capability until the Firebrand was ready, bearing in mind that was originally built to be the high performance naval fighter ordered for the FAA in lieu of a decent carrier based single-seater after the Admiralty gained control of the FAA from the Air Ministry. The problem (for want of a better expression) with the Martlet was not its suitability for the task, but that by 1941/1942 it was no match for contemporary enemy land based fighters, like the Bf 109F or Fw 190, but the request for it came before these aircraft appeared and why not? Especially if all you have are Fulmars, Skuas and Sea Gladiators...

Of course the French examples on the Grumman production line were converted for British use and this was all done through the British/French Purchasing Commission, but someone in Britain requested them; they weren't just given to the navy, in case someone stipulates...

I posted this a few months ago on another thread concerning the Martlets from the French order. Just one of many contracts taken over.

"At 0330 on Monday, 17 June 1940, some five hours before the US Treasury froze all French assets in the USA, the head of the British Purchasing Commission, Arthur Purvis, signed a deal with French representatives, that assigned French interests in some 151 aircraft and engine contracts worth some $425m to Britain. Amongst those was the contract for 81 G-36A, Grumman's export designation for the F4F. These became known as Martlet I when they arrived in Britain in Sept 1940.

This decision was to
1. Obtain the aircraft
2. To convince the US public that Britain would fight on and
3. Because of what was seen as a "moral" responsibility since the two countries had worked closely together to procure aircraft in the US and it was seen, at least in part, as a joint commitment.

Arthur Purvis, who signed the document, said it was the hardest decision he ever made. He is said to have sat for half an hour, pen in hand, before appending his signature to the document.

$425 million in 1940 is about $8.5 billion in today's terms. All transferred with a single signature. No wonder he hesitated!"

ASSETS OF FRANCE PROTECTED HERE; 'Freezing' Order by Roosevelt Applies to Securities Valued at Upward of $1,000,000,000 UNDER LICENSING SYSTEM British Are Expected to Take French Earmarked Gold for Common War Chest (Published 1940)

Sec Morgenthau executes order

www.nytimes.com

10 of these French aircraft were lost at sea while en route to Britain. The remainder arrived at the Scottish Aviation Ltd plant at Prestwick in Aug/Sept 1940 to be modified to meet FAA requirements (things like British instruments being fitted).

A short time after taking on the French contract, Britain exercised the option clause in it, thereby placing an order for its first 100 Martlets (per Air Arsenal North America). Deliveries of the first 10 with fixed wings was made in March 1941, with the delivery of the remainder delayed until late 1941 to April 1942, so that advantage of the folding wing being developed by Grumman could be taken. The next batch of 220, delivered in the second half of 1942, fell under Lend Lease.

The initial design proposal that ultimately led, via a mid-1940 Spec, to the Firebrand was selected in Jan 1940. The Admiralty were at that point looking for a 400mph fighter.

So in that context both the Martlet and the Sea Hurricane were very much interim aircraft. By mid-1941 It was clear that the Firebrand wasn't going to appear in operational service anytime soon, so an alternative had to be found. And so enter the Seafire. After the go-ahead in Oct 1941, a hooked Spitfire Vb was landed on Illustrious on 10 Jan 1942 and the first squadrons began receiving Seafire Ib and IIc in June in time for service during Operation Torch in Nov.

The Firebrand made its maiden flight on 27 Feb 1942 but didn't go aboard a carrier until a year later by which by which time its performance was proving disappointing. Then the Ministry of Aircraft Production decided to prioritise Typhoon for the Sabre engine. And the Firebrand as a fleet fighter was effectively dead.