Seafire vs. Sea Hurricane

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Grumman built G-36A/Martlet I July to October 1940, acceptances were 1, 30, 29, 21, exports were 0, 27, 27, 27. Britain says the imports were August to December 1940, 6, 38, 3, 15, 6. Back at Grumman they were building F4F-3 until February 1941, switched to F4F-3A March to May, then back to F4F-3. 30 F4F-3A sold to Greece but ended up with the British in the Middle East as Martlet III.

According to the USN acceptance report the F4F-3/G-36B/Martlet II had the P&W R-1830-S3C4G engine. 10 accepted in March 1941, 9 exported the next month, next acceptance was in June, then 2 in August, 3 in September, 6 in October, 14 in November, 24 in December 1941, 1 in February 1942, 33 in March and 6 in April. Exports did not resume until January 1942, 5 that month, then 6, 11, 24, 0 and finally 45 in June. The British disagree with export dates, recording 32 arrivals in Britain in January, 1 more in May and 1 in July, while 35 arrived in Mombassa May to October 1942., 5 more lost at sea, rest delivered by RN, mostly to the Indian Ocean area.

The F4F-4B/Martlet IV/Wildcat IV with Wright R-1820-G205A furnished by British, 1 acceptance in February 1942 then production from June onwards. The first 10 arrived in Britain in August.

Admiralty Fleet Order 3186/1943
Martlet I and IV Aircraft Types of Engines Fitted. A.M.R. 2498/43. - 15 July 1943.

Some confusion may at present exist concerning the types of Cyclone engines which can be fitted in Martlet I and IV, due to the large variety of type numbers which may be found stamped on the engine date plates.

2 (a) Engines suitable for the Martlet I : Cyclone G.205A, Cyclone G.205A-2
2 (b) Engines suitable for the Martlet IV : Cyclone G.205A-3, Cyclone G.251A, Cyclone R.1820-40B

3 Apart from minor differences between the engines listed in 2(a) and 2 (b) above, such as ignition harness elbows, tachometer drives etc., the main difference is that 2(a) are fitted with 3 jaw starter shaft dog suitable for an electric-inertia starter, while 2(b) are fitted with a 12 jaw starter shaft dog suitable for a cartridge starter.

4. Engines shown within groups 2(a) and 2(b) respectively are interchangeable with other engines shown in the same group.

5. All engines shown in group 2(b) are fitted with an external oil scavenge line running from the oil pump at the rear of the engine to the sump at the front of the engine. Engines in group 2(a) were not originally fitted with this external scavenge line, but are being fitted on overhaul by the incorporation of Mod. Cyclone/45 so that this line alone may NOT be taken as a criterion by which to identify Martlet IV engines.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

One of the statements that keeps getting repeated when discussing the Seafire is that more were lost in nonoperational incidents than in combat. This is true for any carrier based aircraft.

The biggest single cause of losses for the USN was nonoperational flights. Even on operational sorties non-combat losses constituted a very substantial portion of losses, certainly greater that losses suffered in air-to-air combat. In fact, air to air combat finishes in last place. The exceptions are the F4F which was facing the Japanese navy when it was at its performance peak and the unfortunate TBD

 

[PAT303]

The lack of training time ahead of Salerno was compounded by 3 of the Seafire squadrons being moved from Indomitable to the escort carriers.

Indomitable had been torpedoed on 16th July 1943 off Sicily, and her 3 Seafire squadrons were reallocated as follows when the escort carriers arrived at Gibraltar:-
807 to Battler on 14th Aug
880 to Stalker mid-Aug
899 to Hunter on 28th Aug (her arrival had been delayed by storm damage in the Bay of Biscay forcing her return to Britain for repairs).

These ships then had little sea time to allow the pilots to adjust to the much smaller flight decks before they sailed from Gibraltar on 31 Aug / 1 Sept to arrive at Malta on 5th Sept before sailing for Salerno on the evening of 8th September to begin operations the next morning.

Both Formidable & Illustrious forming part of Force H during Operation Avalanche also had small numbers of Seafires aboard but suffered no losses during the Operation according to Hugh Popham, later transferring some of their aircraft Force V.

So in those no/light wind conditions the deck size proved important.

Salerno is often used to criticise the Seafire but I don't think Martlets would have got away scott free and Corsair's would have been worse under the same conditions. The lack of training, small slow escort carriers with little wind over the deck is the perfect storm for landing accidents.

 

[nuuumannn]

I posted this a few months ago on another thread concerning the Martlets from the French order. Just one of many contracts taken over.

Yup, obviously more than required for the post I made, but my point was that the decision was made in Britain to go ahead with requisitioning these aircraft; someone in Britain, be it the Admiralty or Air Ministry said that the FAA needed them. That's the important part of the link, is the discussion behind how the BPC got to making the call to acquiring those French Wildcats. They didn't decide on their own and Grumman wasn't about to give them away to the BPC.

 

[nuuumannn]

One of the statements that keeps getting repeated when discussing the Seafire is that more were lost in nonoperational incidents than in combat. This is true for any carrier based aircraft.

Now, where's the fun in that? Certain people need the Seafire to be bad... The Spitfire couldn't possibly be good at everything!

 

[Shortround6]

Salerno is often used to criticise the Seafire but I don't think Martlets would have got away scott free and Corsair's would have been worse under the same conditions. The lack of training, small slow escort carriers with little wind over the deck is the perfect storm for landing accidents.

It is speed of the carrier that is harder to deal with than the size.

Depending on where the arresting gear on the deck there may not have been that much difference in the landing area. The amount of deck space forward of the wires only comes into play on landing after everything has gone pear shaped.

I don't know if they lost any Seafires taking off or if they did if a longer flight deck would have saved them ?

British training film.

 

[Shortround6]

Now, where's the fun in that? Certain people need the Seafire to be bad... The Spitfire couldn't possibly be good at everything!

Quite true, the Spitfire made a lousy transport

See Stirling thread................................

 

[SaparotRob]

Hanging on to the tail for dear life wasn't practical?

 

[Admiral Beez]

One of the statements that keeps getting repeated when discussing the Seafire is that more were lost in nonoperational incidents than in combat. This is true for any carrier based aircraft.

Absolutes are best avoided. I'd bet that the vast majority of A6M Zero losses at sea were due to combat rather than due to prangs. Of course a lot of Zeros were lost when their carriers were sunk beneath them.

 

[slaterat]

Just a few notes on the landing speeds of the Sea Hurricane ect.

Sea Hurricane 1 stall speed (flaps /under carriage down) 69 MPH IAS comfortable approach speed 76 MPH
Martlet 1 stall speed (flaps/under carriage down) 70 MPH IAS comfortable approach speed 90 MPH
Hellcat stall speed (flaps/under carriage down) 67 MPH IAS comfortable approach speed 90 MPH
Seafire L IIc stall speed (condition not specified ) 66 Knots (76 mph) comfortable approach speed ( not stated)

 

[EwenS]

The Admiralty view of its fighter position on 27 June 1942.

Note at this point deliveries of Martlets from the first Lend Lease batch of 220 had just begun in the USA and they wouldn't begin to arrive in Britain until late Aug / early Sept. And the first Seafires had arrived with 807 squadron just 4 days before.


Minute from Fifth Sea Lord1 to First Sea Lord & First Lord of Admiralty
[ADM 205/ 24] 27 June 1942
Delays in fighter production

I regret to report that an accident took place with the prototype Firefly yesterday, the 26th June, in which the pilot was killed and the aircraft itself is reduced to a mass of tangled wreckage.
2. The matter is being investigated by the Accident Investigation Department of M.A.P. but it is unlikely that the cause of this accident will be fully given for some weeks.
3. In the meantime suspicion must fall on the Firefly as a production aircraft and as a result of this accident we are likely to incur further severe delay in bringing this very essential aircraft into service.
4. With this in mind I feel it my duty to put before you the situation as regards the Fleet Fighters at the present.
(i) The Firefly – (2 seater). is in trouble. Already very late and now may be later as a result of this accident.
(ii) The Firebrand – (single seater) is still a very unknown quantity. Final design is far from being clear and apart from the design we still have doubts as regards the Sabre engine. The aircraft itself is now late and likely to be later.
(iii) American Fighters. The situation here is rather obscure. The United States are well behindhand with their promises and I am not sure that even now we can rely on the promised deliveries, despite recent contacts and assurances. We think the aircraft themselves are quite good, but this has to be established. We know for certain that the Martlet is not really fast enough to deal with the Junkers 88 (as is also the case with the Hurricane I).
5. It appears to me that if we are to have up to date fighters in the Fleet and in the Auxiliary Carriers in the shortest possible time the only remedy is to provide Seafires or Hurricane II's.
6. Although a Hurricane II has been hooked and operated by INDOMITABLE I do not consider it to be as good as the Seafire. It has neither the hitting power nor the speed. It has, however, a better take off and could be used with advantage in the Auxiliary Carriers whose decks are too short for the Seafire.
7. The Seafire, we know, is capable of being deck-landed, it is man enough for the job as it is armed with cannons and the experiment of the folding wings is well advanced; it has been hooked and spooled for Carrier operation.
8. I would therefore suggest that authority be obtained for a further allocation of Spitfire VC's for the Royal Navy.
9. Seafires are being produced by Supermarines at the rate of 24 a month, but this output could be accelerated at the expense of R.A.F. requirements. I understand that Supermarines will make another 250 Spitfires between the end of 1942 and the middle of 1943 when that production will turn over to marks of Spitfires designed for high altitude work.
10. I consider the position as regards Fleet fighters at the present moment is so grave that authority should be sought on the highest plane to allocate another 500 Seafires to the Royal Navy, making 750 in all.
11. I press that this decision may be sought immediately, that is within a week, so that we may get a continuity of production in the Supermarine factory, as any delay in placing the order will result in introducing a bubble in the production line which will take months to eradicate.
12. Should this allocation be approved I request that authority may be obtained for the design work on the folding Seafire to be given highest priority.
13. We also require a number of fighters better than the Fulmar for the Auxiliary Carriers particularly if they are to be employed with the P.Q./ Q.P. convoys and in other convoys in range of German aircraft.
14. We are sending a matter of 200 Hurricane II's to Russia each month and shall be escorting them there with Sea Hurricanes (Mark I Hurricanes) which is rather "Gilbertian".
15. I propose that we be allocated 25 Hurricane IIC's per month for use in the Auxiliary Carriers up to a total of 250.

 

[EwenS]

After the experience with the Seafire off Salerno only a couple of the Atlantic ASW carriers retained Seafires until Dec 1943 / Mar 1944. For the remainder the fighter used was either the Martlet (Wildcat from Jan 1944) or the Sea Hurricane.

Sea Hurricanes lingered on with 825 and 835 squadrons on Vindex and Nairana until Sept 1944 when they were replaced by Wildcat VI (aka the FM-2).

 

[Shortround6]

from the website "Armoured Aircraft Carriers"

"The fighter force had flown 713 sorties resulting in 32 deck-landing crashes which wrote-off the machine. Undercarriage failure claimed 17 aircraft while a further 24 were found to have sustained distortion of the rear fuselage. Four Seafires were lost to engine failure.

Many Seafires needed repairs after the propeller clipped the fight deck after catching an arrester wire. Spares were soon depleted. A quick "field modification" was applied through the trimming of the propeller by 2in which drastically reduced landing damage without any noticeable loss in performance."

 

[Admiral Beez]

Was HMS Furious given a load of Sea Hurricanes? One year into the war she's the only fast carrier capable of stowing non-folding aircraft on both hangar decks via both lifts. Had HMS Courageous and Glorious survived into 1941 they could have fielded the Sea Hurricane in good numbers over the MTO.

Though space will be an issue with either non-folding Seafires or Hurricanes. Here's HMS Argus with Sea Hurricanes in her 48–68 feet wide hangar. Wikipedia tells us that the Courageous class' hangar was only 50 feet wide.

Here's the same hangar when stuffed with TSRs.

 

[EwenS]

A detachment of 4 Sea Hurricane Ib from 880 squadron operated from Furious for two months between 21 July and mid-Sept 1941 while she was running ferry trips to Malta and before she went for refit at Philadelphia.

On her return to the Home Fleet in July 1942, 804 which had been briefly on Argus and shore based at Gibraltar, returned to Britain on Furious between 13 & 28 Aug 1942 after carrying out Operation Baritone to deliver Spitfires to Malta. Probably only 6 or so aircraft involved.

She then re-equipped with Seafires ahead of Operation Torch.

880 was the first squadron to receive carrier capable Sea Hurricane Ib in July 1941. It became part of Indomitable's air group in Oct before she sailed to work up in the Caribbean.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Quite true, the Spitfire made a lousy transport

See Stirling thread................................

They could tow gliders

Spits towing gliders

Does anyone have a picture of Spitfires towing general Aircraft Hotspur gliders starting at the end of Oct 43 until Mar 44 . The plan was concieved as one of Hobarts Funnies whereby the Spits would tow gliders that would carry their groundcrew to forward operating areas . The squadrons used were...

ww2aircraft.net

 

[Howard Gibson]

As late as 1945, if you got into a knock 'em down drag 'em out fight below 9,000ft, you wanted to be flying a Seafire_LFIIIC. You will just have to learn to land the thing.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Absolutes are best avoided. I'd bet that the vast majority of A6M Zero losses at sea were due to combat rather than due to prangs. Of course a lot of Zeros were lost when their carriers were sunk beneath them.

That is a bet I would readily take up. The perception of the Zero as one of the worst all time fighters is greatly distorted by the Battle of the Philippine Sea. Before that its record is actually quite good as my previous posts based on Lundstroms data have shown.

In 1942 the record of the Zero was very good with very few actually lost in combat. According to Lundstrom in the First Team and Guadalcanal from 1 February to 4 June 1942 16 Zeros were lost in combat. This included Coral Sea and Midway. At Coral Sea 3 Zeros were lost in air to air combat, 7 ditched, 3 were pushed over the Zuikaku's side and 4 sank with the Shoho. They also lost at least two in accidents on the way to battle.

At Midway the IJN brought 105 Zeros. Lundstrom tallies 13 shot down (he awards one Zero to a TBD or perhaps an SBD) with the rest either lost on deck or ditched with nowhere to land. Thus far more were lost outside of combat.

Carrier vs carrier battles were actually a very rare occurrence with only 4 in 1942 and 2 in 1944, including Cape Engano which I don't think qualifies as a major battle when the Japanese carriers acted as bait.

The other thing to note is there would have been substantial training losses. Unfortunately, I cannot find any data for the Zero but they are substantial for any aircraft. I do note that the IJN carrier did not engage in any battles during 1943 but they did conduct training voyages would have resulted in non combat losses

Non combat losses were a problem even for land based aircraft. I extracted the fighter loss data from the USSAF Statistical Digest and the surprising (and appalling) fact is that the USAAF lost as many aircraft in accidents in the continental USA as they did in combat overseas.

The USAAF lost 10,949 fighters in combat overseas and 10,779 to accidents in the USA. They also sustained a further 8,837 non combat losses overseas. The combat losses can be further broken down to 3,949 to enemy aircraft, 3,779 to anti aircraft and 3,222 to other. The totals losses add up to 30,365

As you can see combat losses are about 1/3 of the total losses and air to air combat is little over 1/3 of combat loses. Your changes of having an accident were far greater than getting shot down.

The reason I started looking into actual Zero losses in the first was the puzzle they pose. If you take USN claims at face value you will see that they are heavily skewed towards fighters, claiming more than twice as many fighters as bomber, yet if you read books such as Lundstroms you quickly realize bombers suffered a lot more than fighters and that they out numbered fighters by quite a margin. As I noted in previous posts the USN was over claiming in general in 1942 and they also tended to claim everything they shot down was a Zero. My favorite example was the attempted Japanese night attack before the main event at Coral Sea. From Lundstrom "About 30 miles out, Ramsey noticed a formation of nine Japanese aircraft cruising at about a thousand feet. Leading was a Vee of five followed by two sections each with two planes…..To his surprise the target was reluctant to make violent evasive maneuvers once his red tracers zipped past." They weren't making the expected maneuvers because they were Kates not Zeros. Nonetheless the USN credited the F4Fs with 5 Zeros shot down.

It would very surprising if the Zero turned the loss ratio on its head and lost more aircraft in combat than non combat and the available evidence points to that not being true. If you believe the Zero had more combat losses that other losses that puts an odd light on the Japanese pilots in that they were the best pilots in the world because that didn't have any accidents but were the worst pilots in the world because they were so easy to shoot down.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

I've been reading First Team on and off since the beginning of the summer and it seems that many of the claims (or overclaims) by F4Fs were actually Kates and I believe this is mentioned several times. Although the Kate's wingspan is almost 10 feet longer than the Zero, it's just a few feet longer in length so I am not surprised this occurred, especially in the early stages of the war.

Training attrition on both sides does not surprise me and Lundstrom documents all the F4Fs lost in the days preceding Pearl Harbor, most if not all during training. Another thing to add was the poor serviceability of the Zero due to the lack of logistic support and the poor interchangeability of components.

Yep - the IJN may have had the best combat pilots in the world when Pearl Harbor was attacked, but they weren't immune to the hazards of carrier operations.

 

[PAT303]

I've been reading First Team on and off since the beginning of the summer and it seems that many of the claims (or overclaims) by F4Fs were actually Kates

Reminds me of the first time RAF pilots encountered the FW190, the old guard thought they were ex French Hawks