Sept 1938, Changes the RAF can make after admitting they can't bomb Germany.

[The Basket]

Bombing of Guernica.

That showed the power of the bomber and the idea of bombing. So based on that the idea of not buying bombers is not happening.

Problem is why have an RAF in the first place. Hugh Trenchard saw that bombing was that role. So bombing of Iraq in the 20s was not simply a mission but a role the RAF could fulfill.

We see this time and time again in all military great and small.

The RAF was independent. If it chased battleships then it's a glorified Naval air arm and if it bombed tanks then it's a glorified army support air arm.

The RAF must earn it's top table status by being able to do something unique and powerful.

Blowing up cities and winning wars singlehandedly is a good trick.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Grant, just a quick note, here.
Martin developed a native power turret for their B-10, their YB-10 first flying in 1932, a year before Boulton-Paul's Overstrand.

Martin went on to produce native power turrets for their designs and other aircraft manufacturers (like NAA's B-25) and still manufactures them today as Lockheed-Martin.

The Martin mid upper turret developed for the B-26 was an excellent design that was also used on the B-24 (not the B-25 which was a Bendix design). The British thought very highly of it and replaced the FN mid upper on late model Lancasters (Most Mk VIIs and Mk Xs) and all Lincoln Mk Is with it.

The Martin B-10 turret was manually operated. The Bolton Paul turret introduced a year later on the Overstand was powered.
The attached paper is an excellent history of US design and development of turrets.

 

[tomo pauk]

Expecting from RAF - where Bomber Command was the 1st violin - to just give away it's Blenheims and/or Battles to do the job of Army support is as real as the scenario where the IJN says 'well, the Decisive Battle concept is actually faulty, we better prepare for a long war with the USA'. Ie. a food for a what-if, but well divorced from what was going on in late 1930s.

But since this is what if sub-forum:
Battle as an army-support A/C is a dream come true for enemy AA gunners - big, slow, lacking armor and was unmaneuverable. Germans were fielding 20mm Flak by thousands already by 1938, a far cry what British and French had back then. RAF pilots flying bombed-up Gladiators will stand better chance.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Bombing of Guernica.

That showed the power of the bomber and the idea of bombing. So based on that the idea of not buying bombers is not happening.

Problem is why have an RAF in the first place. Hugh Trenchard saw that bombing was that role. So bombing of Iraq in the 20s was not simply a mission but a role the RAF could fulfill.

We see this time and time again in all military great and small.

The RAF was independent. If it chased battleships then it's a glorified Naval air arm and if it bombed tanks then it's a glorified army support air arm.

The RAF must earn it's top table status by being able to do something unique and powerful.

Blowing up cities and winning wars singlehandedly is a good trick.

Unfortunately one of the lessons that the RAF refused to learn from the Spanish civil war is that bombers need escorts.

 

[Shortround6]

Expecting from RAF - where Bomber Command was the 1st violin - to just give away it's Blenheims and/or Battles to do the job of Army support is as real as the scenario where the IJN says 'well, the Decisive Battle concept is actually faulty, we better prepare for a long war with the USA'. Ie. a food for a what-if, but well divorced from what was going on in late 1930s.

But since this is what if sub-forum:
Battle as an army-support A/C is a dream come true for enemy AA gunners - big, slow, lacking armor and was unmaneuverable. Germans were fielding 20mm Flak by thousands already by 1938, a far cry what British and French had back then. RAF pilots flying bombed-up Gladiators will stand better chance.

Then propose bombed up Gladiators.

Yes, Battles as built lacked armor, they also lacked self sealing fuel tanks and had an engine that was good for 880hp at sea level, assuming you could open the throttle fully at under 200mph with the two pitch prop in high pitch (course).
It also carried 212 imp gallons of fuel which is totally un-needed for close range missions. Reducing the fuel tank size by 60 gallons gives you 450lbs to put into better protection without exceeding gross weight. Or pick even less fuel.

The Book shown above claims the Battle was more maneuverable than the Blenheim but gives no numbers or conditions. Rolling better than a Blenheim is certainly believable (still may not be true?) but horsing a Battle around in even a 60 degree 2 G bank turn is not going to last long without bleeding off speed. The Battle has a lower power to weight ratio than the Blenheim as built. Maintaining speed at low level with the Melrin III and a two pitch prop is certainly going to limit the Battles actual options for maneuvers.

Germans in 1940 were using a lot of twin MG 34s AA mounts and even single MG 34 mounts. Italians in the Desert didn't have a lot of 20mm guns (they had some) and their armored vehicles mounted a single 8mm machine gun for AA that used a 24 round box magazine. Japanese had what for AA in Burma?

Some people have claimed (that book might even claim it?) that the Battle could have been the western IL-2. I wouldn't go anywhere near that far but it certainly could have been massaged into something better without actually doing a lot of re-work, like asking for new wings or fuselages. 3rd crewman might very well have been left home for low level strikes freeing up another few hundred pounds.

Likewise the Blenheim saw very little modification until rather late.
If you are going to use planes for ground support (or maritime patrol) put medium altitude or low altitude engines in them, not engines with FTHs of 14,000-16,000ft. Set the props up for low altitude flight or break down, admit that constant speed props are NOT an abomination from Beelzebub.

 

[tomo pauk]

Then propose bombed up Gladiators.

Yes, Battles as built lacked armor, they also lacked self sealing fuel tanks and had an engine that was good for 880hp at sea level, assuming you could open the throttle fully at under 200mph with the two pitch prop in high pitch (course).
It also carried 212 imp gallons of fuel which is totally un-needed for close range missions. Reducing the fuel tank size by 60 gallons gives you 450lbs to put into better protection without exceeding gross weight. Or pick even less fuel.

The bombed-up Gladiator - even more so with an low-altitude Mercury version - is akin to the Hs 123, that some people believe it was next best thing after the canned beer (I don't believe that mantra, though). I'd suggest it anyway.

The Book shown above claims the Battle was more maneuverable than the Blenheim but gives no numbers or conditions. Rolling better than a Blenheim is certainly believable (still may not be true?) but horsing a Battle around in even a 60 degree 2 G bank turn is not going to last long without bleeding off speed. The Battle has a lower power to weight ratio than the Blenheim as built. Maintaining speed at low level with the Melrin III and a two pitch prop is certainly going to limit the Battles actual options for maneuvers.

Battle will probably need Hercules in the nose for 1939-40, the low-altitude versions were 1st produced. Gives ~50% more power than Merlin III down low right from the bat. Not a wonder A/C, but surely beats Saro Lerwick in usability. Yes, far less fuel for duties in the continent are needed, that buys a lot of weight allowance needed for protection, extra MGs and ammo. Better defensive firepower is needed, in form of at least 2 MGs, if not the turret from Defiant.
Now about the Defiant - it is smaller than Battle, turret can be replaced with something that is less heavy & draggy, Merlin VIII in the nose, 4 .303s in the wing, bomb racks; not quite a full-blown fighter-bomber, but close enough.

Germans in 1940 were using a lot of twin MG 34s AA mounts and even single MG 34 mounts. Italians in the Desert didn't have a lot of 20mm guns (they had some) and their armored vehicles mounted a single 8mm machine gun for AA that used a 24 round box magazine. Japanese had what for AA in Burma?

The war against Germans is looming at horizon, not against Italians, let alone against Japan. German air defences are formidable against low-flying aircraft; eg. 6700 of 20 and 37mm light Flak pieces were available in Sept 1939.

Some people have claimed (that book might even claim it?) that the Battle could have been the western IL-2. I wouldn't go anywhere near that far but it certainly could have been massaged into something better without actually doing a lot of re-work, like asking for new wings or fuselages. 3rd crewman might very well have been left home for low level strikes freeing up another few hundred pounds.

1500+ HP engine in the nose is the 1st task, when talking about Battle becoming an armoured attacker. OTOH, a 1500+ HP engine on a Hurricane or Spitfire might be a better investment.

 

[The Basket]

Ok let's be a bomber in 1938.
Day flying only coz night flying is just not happening. No navigation and hitting anything is zero.

Before radar no fighter interception or fighter control. So will get through. Bit of cloud will be lovely job.

I am also pretty speedy and actually on a par with the majority of fighters I am facing. Either on a par or the fighters are only marginal faster making interception very difficult. Talking He 51 or early Me 109.

Fly high enough so the low caliber flak is of no bother.

I like the concept of dive bombing though. So I propose we cancel all level bombing bomber projects and really focus on dive bombing. I really see that as the future. Especially if we are getting out of strategic bombing.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Fly high enough so the low caliber flak is of no bother.

Given the problems Bomber Command had with accuracy as late as 1942, I think this will be an issue. Plus, 15-16,000' AGL will not get above the 88s, of which there were already a couple of thousand by 1938.

So I propose we cancel all level bombing bomber projects and really focus on dive bombing. I really see that as the future. Especially if we are getting out of strategic bombing.

Maybe we can pull an Udet and make a dive-bombing Halifax.

 

[nuuumannn]

A lot of people who ignored the lessons of WW I. That didn't require hindsight.

Virtually every country's military did, this is the point I'm making, so why single out Britain? all I see is motivated bias.

But which lessons of WW1 do you recognize and which ones do you ignore? The whole reason Germany succeeded against France in 1940 is because the Allies were expecting a repeat of 1914 on the ground which didn't happen. You're applying hindsight in expecting someone in the late-1930s to selectively apply the RIGHT lessons from the First World War.

Exactly.

The Martin mid upper turret developed for the B-26 was an excellent design that was also used on the B-24 (not the B-25 which was a Bendix design). The British thought very highly of it and replaced the FN mid upper on late model Lancasters (Most Mk VIIs and Mk Xs) and all Lincoln Mk Is.

Interesting document and gives a good history from the US perspective, and displays the use of British turret technology and design in US turrets - Boulton Paul in particular, whose working gear and controls were used by Martin in its turrets. The document doesn't mention that Bristol manufactured its own turrets and these were by-and-large simpler and weighed less than Nash & Thompson and Boulton Paul turrets. The first BP turret on the Overstrand was driven by compressed air and it was Frazer-Nash (the car manufacturer, who combined efforts to form Nash & Thompson as part of Parnall) who developed hydraulic working gear for gun installations for bombers such as the Handley Page Harrow, which was fitted with these installations, but the turrets themselves were not powered. The Hampden was also designed to be fitted with powered gun installations, but these were never fitted. Vickers developed their own systems that were installed in early model Wellingtons until Nash & Thompson turrets became available in 1938/1939 and retrofitting of those turrets in Wellingtons and Whitleys began.

Unfortunately one of the lessons that the RAF refused to learn from the Spanish civil war is that bombers need escorts.

True, C-in-C Bomber Command Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt wrote letters to the Air ministry recommending that the RAF acquire escort fighters, stating at one stage something to the effect of the Spanish Civil War demonstrating that a modern bomber fleet should have fighter escort. Once Portal entered the scene as Chief of Air Staff, resolve against escort fighters hardened, despite opposition from senior air staff. It's a mystery why Portal was so vehemently against escort fighters.

 

[nuuumannn]

By the way, the Germans did plan for and execute at least some semblance of a strategic bombing plan in 1940-41. They at least had bombs more suitable for destroying industrial buildings and they did have working electronic navigation systems, even if primitive. These navigation systems were not built in the time between the fall of France and the start of the BoB.

Yes, based on pre-war objectives, but their leadership and concentration on medium bombers in large numbers was proven to be short of what was required for a drawn-out conflict. The Germans' miscast preconception of lightning strike invasions worked against less capable forces, but in a prolonged war of attrition, the failure of its strategy was revealed in 1940 - the country had neither the aircraft or the industry to maintain a sustained campaign. Let's also not forget that Germany could not have achieved it's objectives against Britain without invading Western Europe. British bombers could at least attack Germany from Britain.

Not saying American B-18s would have done any better.

And this is the point I'm making, you are singling out of Britain is at the exclusion of every other air force and strategic plan that existed at the time, which would not have been able to have done any better. The B-18A demonstrated poorer performance than the Whitley V, it had a smaller bomb load and it was poorly defended. By the time WW2 breaks out in 1939 the USAAC is only just receiving the B-17B and only after a year of WW2 the B-17C introduced, with around 34 B-17Bs in service. The USAAC was in no position to be able to launch the kind of campaign that Bomber Command found itself dealing with.

Yes, the British use of the Fortress I was certainly not demonstrative of an effective bomber force, but the paltry numbers were not by choice, the aircraft demonstrated poor serviceability, hence the small numbers available. Issues like guns and control surfaces freezing at the bomber's operational altitudes are kind of serious, whichever way you look at it and were not due to anything the British did, except operate the aircraft at the altitudes they were designed for. The question has to be asked, what kind of training did the USAAC carry out with the B-17? Did it not know this was going to happen? If not, why not? It kind of puts your argument about the preparedness of the RAF for war in 1939 into perspective and verifies my point that forces across the board, not just British ones were simply not ready for war based on their pre-war planning.

The Battle and Blenheim could not make credible attacks and yet Bomber command (and the RAF) did not allow them to be used on missions where they would be of some use to war effort even if not the effort to make the RAF the supreme service which seems to have been a higher priority of some RAF officers than defeating the Germans.

The Battle and Blenheim could make credible attacks, the problem was the means by which they were used and the environments they were used in and reading their histories should tell you this. During the Spanish Civil War, similar aircraft types in similar roles were used to effect, but the difference was the resistance that German forces put up against the aircraft. The concept of the single-engined day bomber was not unique to Britain, the USAAC had its own in the Curtiss Shrike, which would have suffered the same losses if used in the same fashion. The Japanese and the Italians also had the same types in service and the Breda 65 suffered the same fate against British forces in North Africa.

Again, what this highlights is that nothing the British were doing was unusual and that the Germans were tactically very smart and highly unusual in their practices. We forget this so readily and our assessments of combat are loaded with the kind of hindsight that comes with knowing it, but at the time, no one could have predicted nor defended adequately against what the Germans did.

Your entire argument is based on hindsight and knowing what you know so far removed from the situation as it unfolded before the war and in those first years. Again, you go to war with what you know and when that proves inadequate you change, which is exactly what the British did. By 1945, was the Battle still in frontline service? Was the Blenheim replaced by the de Havilland Mosquito by that time? Mistakes were made and the ability to learn from them is paramount. If the British refused to introduce new types and plans and personnel, then you might have a point, but as the war evolved, so the British response did.

 

[Shortround6]

The bombed-up Gladiator - even more so with an low-altitude Mercury version - is akin to the Hs 123, that some people believe it was next best thing after the canned beer (I don't believe that mantra, though). I'd suggest it anyway.

Well, the Hs 123 was metal covered at least so it was less flammable
But a fighter bomber Gladiator does have some potential.

Battle will probably need Hercules in the nose for 1939-40, the low-altitude versions were 1st produced. Gives ~50% more power than Merlin III down low right from the bat. Not a wonder A/C, but surely beats Saro Lerwick in usability. Yes, far less fuel for duties in the continent are needed, that buys a lot of weight allowance needed for protection, extra MGs and ammo. Better defensive firepower is needed, in form of at least 2 MGs, if not the turret from Defiant.
Now about the Defiant - it is smaller than Battle, turret can be replaced with something that is less heavy & draggy, Merlin VIII in the nose, 4 .303s in the wing, bomb racks; not quite a full-blown fighter-bomber, but close enough.

Problems here are that the Defiant only shows up in very small numbers in the Spring of 1940, one or two squadrons. Futz about with very many changes and you won't even get those.
You want to put guns in the wing you may have to move/modify fuel tanks.
Take the Battle as is, stick a gun in the wing that doesn't have one, or if you have enough guns, stick two in each wing. You already have the bomb cells and or bomb racks for light bombs? at least racks were added later. Forget the Hercules, it shows up too late. The last Lerwick (of 21) was finished in May of 1941.


There was a proposed or tested Merlin with 7.32 supercharger gears, otherwise pretty much a Merlin III, Take off power was 1000hp using 6lbs boost and 1085hp at 9750ft. This is on 87 octane fuel. The Merlin VIII used in the Fulmar still used a full size impeller but dropped to a set of 6.313 supercharger gears. Take-off power went to 1080hp using 87 octane fuel.
Main problem is still turning the available power into actual thrust. Some British aircraft with two pitch props took off in fine pitch and changed to course pitch at around 120mph and they stayed in course pitch the rest of the flight. There was a danger of over speeding the engine if the prop was in fine pitch and speed exceeded 120mph. This depended on the exact pitch setting of the Prop but the prop in course pitch was not ideal for climbing or accelerating. Of course the Battle might have it's prop blades adjusted to knock off a few mph on the top end for better climb/acceleration at around 180-200mph near ground level.

Starting work on this conversion/variant in 1938 may mean some features (like self sealing tanks) aren't available in April of 1940 but better crew protection should be. Either armor or extra thick skin over the oil cooler/radiator and bottoms of fuel tanks might help. A summer/fall of 1940 version might have a few more improvements.

The war against Germans is looming at horizon, not against Italians, let alone against Japan. German air defences are formidable against low-flying aircraft; eg. 6700 of 20 and 37mm light Flak pieces were available in Sept 1939.

True the Germans had the Best army AA of anybody in 1938-39 but it was a fraction of what it would be later. Germans also had 106 divisions to spread those AA guns over (plus fixed locations) and while not all divisions got the same outfit of guns (which were sometimes actually operated by Luftwaffe units attached to the Army division) the vast majority of the 20mm guns were the Flak 30 version which fired at around 280rpm cycle rate. The faster firing Flak 38 was just being introduced in 1939.
Yes bringing in the Italians and Japanese is using hindsight but points out that the ground attack Battle could have gone on to other theaters (which were still using Wildebeests and other antiques) and provided a significant upgrade to the RAF's capabilities in those areas for a minimum of investment.

1500+ HP engine in the nose is the 1st task, when talking about Battle becoming an armoured attacker. OTOH, a 1500+ HP engine on a Hurricane or Spitfire might be a better investment.

Trying to turn the Battle into an IL-2 requires a bit too much rework. Of course if we take out the nose armor and shift the IFF radio then the addition of 600-1000lbs of armor fuselage becomes rather easy

 

[Admiral Beez]

Sept 1938, Changes the RAF can make…

Return the FAA to Admiralty control now instead of waiting until May 1939. This may, just may stop Specification O.8/38, navalised observation/fighter that became the Fulmar, first flying in Jan 1940. This is the best chance for an early Sea Hurricane.

 

[nuuumannn]

Likewise the Blenheim saw very little modification until rather late.

Let's also not forget that Blenheims were available in numbers so why leave them on the ground? Why not use them? Once aircraft like the Mosquito and availability of US types appear in numbers it could be replaced and it was. Let's not forget that when the Blenheim first appeared it was the fastest bomber in the world and it was faster than the frontline German fighter the He 51. In the mid 1930s, why would you not put it into service? Are you suggesting that the Air Ministry at the time should have not ordered Blenheims into production?

Given the problems Bomber Command had with accuracy as late as 1942, I think this will be an issue.

Again, accuracy is a relative term. The most accurate bombing force in the world was the Luftwaffe with its bombing aids, Knickebein, which was first used in the Polish campaign in 1939 and later X and Y Gerat. No other bombing force anywhere in the world could have done any better, not the USAAC, not the Japanese navy or air force, not the French nor the Soviet Union, nor the Italians. The reason we focus so much on the RAF and its inadequacies is because the RAF was at war at that time for all the world to see and the crucible of war makes examples of shortcomings.

The Butt Report highlighted the deficiencies of British bombing accuracy and navigation, but what other bombing force, equipped with what was in service at the time could have done any better? That was the standard of the day, with the exception of the Luftwaffe. No other force had navaids that enabled their bombers to find their targets at night, and during the day, British bombers in 1939 to 1941 were equipped with the best defensive armament of any bombers in the world, bar none, yet they still got shot down.

Again, this is not justifying the RAF's performance, merely putting it into perspective. It's all very well criticising the RAF for these things and yes, they should have been dealt with sooner; even before the war Ludlow-Hewitt complained about it, but the reality was, the RAF's performance was no worse than any other bombing force, with the exception of the Luftwaffe Kampfgeshwader.

 

[Shortround6]

Virtually every country's military did, this is the point I'm making, so why single out Britain? all I see is motivated bias.

You see what you wish to see.

Yes, based on pre-war objectives, but their leadership and concentration on medium bombers in large numbers was proven to be short of what was required for a drawn-out conflict. The Germans' miscast preconception of lightning strike invasions worked against less capable forces, but in a prolonged war of attrition, the failure of its strategy was revealed in 1940 - the country had neither the aircraft or the industry to maintain a sustained campaign. Let's also not forget that Germany could not have achieved it's objectives against Britain without invading Western Europe. British bombers could at least attack Germany from Britain.

Point here is that at least the Germans recognized the navigation and bomb aiming problem and did something about it. So ALL air forces were not doing the same thing as the British. British capability changed enormously in 3 1/2 to 4 years. Original statement still stands. In Sept of 1938 the British COULD NOT effectively attack Germany from English bases.
In May of 1942 they staged the first 1000 bomber raid so obviously capabilities changed.

And this is the point I'm making, you are singling out of Britain is at the exclusion of every other air force and strategic plan that existed at the time, which would not have been able to have done any better. The B-18A demonstrated poorer performance than the Whitley V, it had a smaller bomb load and it was poorly defended. By the time WW2 breaks out in 1939 the USAAC is only just receiving the B-17B and only after a year of WW2 the B-17C introduced, with around 34 B-17Bs in service. The USAAC was in no position to be able to launch the kind of campaign that Bomber Command found itself dealing with.

The difference I am trying to point out is that other countries air forces, however good or bad they may have been, at least tried to support the army and navy while the RAF insisted it was not their job while (in 1938) being incapable of doing the job they claimed was their primary mission.

he Battle and Blenheim could make credible attacks, the problem was the means by which they were used and the environments they were used in and reading their histories should tell you this. During the Spanish Civil War, similar aircraft types in similar roles were used to effect, but the difference was the resistance that German forces put up against the aircraft. The concept of the single-engined day bomber was not unique to Britain, the USAAC had its own in the Curtiss Shrike, which would have suffered the same losses if used in the same fashion. The Japanese and the Italians also had the same types in service and the Breda 65 suffered the same fate against British forces in North Africa.

I seem to detect a bit of bias here myself. What I have been trying to say is that the Battle and Blenheim could not make credible 'strategic" attacks in 1938/39. They were thrown into making tactical attacks at the last minute in France and Blenheims were used later in the Mid East and Far East for tactical attacks.
You are also confusing a single engine day strategic bomber with attack aircraft or tactical bombers (chose your name) Yes the Curtiss Shrike would have failed miserably in France if flown the same way as the Battles, Blenheim's and Lysanders were. Of course since the last one left the factory in 1934 it's place on any 1939-40 battlefield would be questionable.

Differences from the Battle include four fixed .30 cal guns for strafing. ten 30lb bombs were carried internally and four 100lb bombs could be carried externally under the fuselage.
It was intended to take part in the army land battle. It might have failed in spectacular fashion. The Battle was not intended for tactical strikes.

Your entire argument is based on hindsight and knowing what you know so far removed from the situation as it unfolded before the war and in those first years.

I believe a lot of my argument is based on what was known at the time in regards to the need for better aircraft for CC and/or the proper use of aircraft for anti-sub work. The data/information was there from WW I. The RAF had conducted quite a number of tactical bombing/strafing operations in WW I and built up a body of knowledge. It was quite dangerous and losses were high. But few WW I planes could make deep penetration raids. However the idea that trench strafing or raids 20-30 miles behind the lines could be done by unescorted bombers seems to have slipped by the WW I pilots/commanders. Escorts were pretty standard.
as for the situation in the first few years I don't believe I have made any statements as to Bomber Commands (or the RAF in general) ability to use the Hamden, Whitley or Wellingtons for strategic raids one way or another except to point out they didn't exist in numbers in late 1938 or early 1939. Please correct that if I am wrong.

Let's also not forget that Blenheims were available in numbers so why leave them on the ground? Why not use them? Once aircraft like the Mosquito and availability of US types appear in numbers it could be replaced and it was. Let's not forget that when the Blenheim first appeared it was the fastest bomber in the world and it was faster than the frontline German fighter the He 51. In the mid 1930s, why would you not put it into service? Are you suggesting that the Air Ministry at the time should have not ordered Blenheims into production?

I don't believe I have ever suggested leaving the Blenheim's on the Ground. Please tell me the post that says so.
What I believe I have said about the Blenheim is that the MK I with a range of 1000 miles would have extreme difficulty bombing the Ruhr with Belgium and Holland Neutral.
Please show how this would be incorrect.
The Blenheim IV with the extra wing tanks does have the range to do so but by the time it is showing up in numbers you do have the Hampdens and Wellingtons showing up in around the same numbers. The Blenheim's 1000lb payload, wonderful as it may have been in 1937-38 is a bit lacking in late 1939. Such is progress.

I have made reference it the RAFs habit of using aircraft in penny packets. But you can't have it both ways. You can't depend on mass defensive fire from a formation of bombers if the formation consists of 3-6 planes. This should have been known from WW I.

Many of the losses (for little) gain in France in 1940 were due to poor tactics from target selection (not done by the individual squadrons) to timing, to lack of escorts, and include lack of training for the mission (squadron commanders did try), lack of equipment (no working bomb sight under 3000ft) and even less than ideal bombs. Using Battles and Blenheims to strafe with a single fixed machine gun just points out how far divorced from reality somebody in the high command was. The high losses suffered in France by the Battles, Blenheims and Lysanders were actually used to justify the RAFs position of not supporting the army. The Fact that the planes used did not have self-sealing tanks or even decent armor (no bullet proof windscreens for example) was over looked.

The Blenheim was a very good plane in it's day and might well have had a much better reputation if given a fraction of the development some other aircraft got, or at least got it in a timely manner. Or if it was used for roles a bit more suited for it. Despite it's widespread use as a tactical aircraft in the dessert there seems to have been very little effort put into up gunning the plane. There are a few photos of a MK IV with the normally rearward firing chin mount turned around to face forward giving 3 forward firing guns but it's squadron mate still has the guns pointed rearward. I have no idea if this was a one off or if a number of Blenheim's were modified to have more forward firing guns. One plane was used to test a pair of Hispano guns mounted under the fuselage with the ammo feeds in the bomb bay but once you have enough Beaufighters this becomes redundant.

If the RAF wasn't going to provide support for the Army it might have been nice for the army to know this so they could have gone to war with something besides WW I relics for heavy artillery.

 

[nuuumannn]

Point here is that at least the Germans recognized the navigation and bomb aiming problem and did something about it. So ALL air forces were not doing the same thing as the British. British capability changed enormously in 3 1/2 to 4 years. Original statement still stands. In Sept of 1938 the British COULD NOT effectively attack Germany from English bases.
In May of 1942 they staged the first 1000 bomber raid so obviously capabilities changed.

Speaking of seeing what you want to see, again, I have repeatedly said "except the Luftwaffe". So, when Hampdens and Whitleys flew to Berlin in 1940 and bombed the city, was that not bombing Germany? During the first few months of the war, beginning in September 1939 (the very first night of the war, in fact), Whitleys carried out long-range flights over German territory, admittedly they were carrying leaflets, but the type managed flights as far afield as Poland, so the type certainly had the range, so why could they not attack Germany, in your opinion? It should also be noted that German resistance to these flights was minimal and loss-rates were due to many things, but certainy not because of intensive German opposition, so again, I ask you, why could the RAF not bomb Germany?

The difference I am trying to point out is that other countries air forces, however good or bad they may have been, at least tried to support the army and navy while the RAF insisted it was not their job while (in 1938) being incapable of doing the job they claimed was their primary mission.

Evidence please? Which air forces in which countries? Who within the RAF insisted it wasn't their job? The FAA was a branch of the RAF before 1938.

It seems a mystery to me that you repeatedly state the RAF had no interest in supporting the army since the specification A.39/34 released in 1934 requested an "Army Co-operation Aircraft" which was to fulfil an "Artillery Spotting and Reconnaissance role", which was designed to replace the Hawker Audax and Hector biplanes. So, how does the RAF not support the army by calling one of its service types an "Army Co-operation" aircraft, a role that had been in RAF service since the Great War? Your logic is baffling.

They were thrown into making tactical attacks at the last minute in France and Blenheims were used later in the Mid East and Far East for tactical attacks.

Exactly, so why the criticisms?

You are also confusing a single engine day strategic bomber with attack aircraft or tactical bombers

The Battle was a "Single-Engine Day Bombing Aircraft", which is wording direct from its specification. Its role was the same as any day bomber role. The single-engined day bomber had been in service since the Great War, DH.4s, DH.9s, Hawker Harts and Hawker Hinds all served in the single-engined day bomber role. These aircraft were used in tactical and strategic roles.

don't believe I have ever suggested leaving the Blenheim's on the Ground. Please tell me the post that says so.
What I believe I have said about the Blenheim is that the MK I with a range of 1000 miles would have extreme difficulty bombing the Ruhr with Belgium and Holland Neutral.

Your accusatory tone regarding the use of Blenheims suggests otherwise, I simply asked the rhetorical question of what would you have them do with what they had. Did you expect them not to use what they had, even known the flaws they had?

If the RAF wasn't going to provide support for the Army it might have been nice for the army to know this so they could have gone to war with something besides WW I relics for heavy artillery.

Again, your perspective is skewed by your own particular views based on hindsight. Which WW1 relics are you specifically talking about? Were they using Sopwith Salamanders? How about Airco DH.4s? Maybe Sopwith Comic Trench Strafers? Please elaborate on what you are specifically referring to.

 

[The Basket]

The British Empire and her Commonwealth faced threats of a truly evil nature from dictatorships such as Japan, Italy, USSR, Germany, France.

It is not time for timidity. It's not time to retreat.

Don't pump the brakes when it's time to push the throttle thought the firewall. If our strategic bombing campaign is not up to snuff then push harder. Try harder.

Britannia didn't rule the waves from hiding under the bed. Not one step back!

 

[tomo pauk]

Problems here are that the Defiant only shows up in very small numbers in the Spring of 1940, one or two squadrons. Futz about with very many changes and you won't even get those.
You want to put guns in the wing you may have to move/modify fuel tanks.
Take the Battle as is, stick a gun in the wing that doesn't have one, or if you have enough guns, stick two in each wing. You already have the bomb cells and or bomb racks for light bombs? at least racks were added later. Forget the Hercules, it shows up too late. The last Lerwick (of 21) was finished in May of 1941.

Wing guns on the Defiant (4 of them in total?) can go to the place where additional fuel tanks were installed onn the Defiant II, ie. outboard of the wing tanks on the Daffy 1.
I will still loathe to put the Battle in the GA role - British pilots need something faster and much smaller in order to improve their chances against the wall of AA fire the Germans will be throwing at them. Even the Hurricane is 50% bigger target than Bf 109, Battle being more than twice as big a target. Henley is in-between the Hurricane and Battle.
Then we have LW fighters to worry about, LW will have a field day with Battles.

I'd also suggest skipping the Henley (200 were made) so more Hurricanes can be made. They are already excellent strafers.

True the Germans had the Best army AA of anybody in 1938-39 but it was a fraction of what it would be later. Germans also had 106 divisions to spread those AA guns over (plus fixed locations) and while not all divisions got the same outfit of guns (which were sometimes actually operated by Luftwaffe units attached to the Army division) the vast majority of the 20mm guns were the Flak 30 version which fired at around 280rpm cycle rate. The faster firing Flak 38 was just being introduced in 1939.

German light Flak force was covering far less of a territory in 1939-40 than it was the case in 1941-43, so the actual density is greater early in the war. Flak 30 might get 3 hits on a target that Flak 38 will get 5; greater RoF is not a replacement for bad gun aimer.

 

[Shortround6]

Speaking of seeing what you want to see, again, I have repeatedly said "except the Luftwaffe". So, when Hampdens and Whitleys flew to Berlin in 1940 and bombed the city, was that not bombing Germany? During the first few months of the war, beginning in September 1939 (the very first night of the war, in fact), Whitleys carried out long-range flights over German territory, admittedly they were carrying leaflets, but the type managed flights as far afield as Poland, so the type certainly had the range, so why could they not attack Germany, in your opinion? It should also be noted that German resistance to these flights was minimal and loss-rates were due to many things, but certainy not because of intensive German opposition, so again, I ask you, why could the RAF not bomb Germany?

Your argument depends on the time warp theory.

I have been stating that the RAF could not bomb Germany effectively in 1938.
" when Hampdens and Whitleys flew to Berlin in 1940"
Great, now use the time machine to get those Hampdens and Whitleys into service in Sept of 1938.

another key point is the word "effectively", a few dozen aircraft is a propaganda raid. Useful for generating headlines, not knocking out major industries or stopping means of production, which is what the RAF was claiming was it's primary mission.

The Battle was a "Single-Engine Day Bombing Aircraft", which is wording direct from its specification. Its role was the same as any day bomber role. The single-engined day bomber had been in service since the Great War, DH.4s, DH.9s, Hawker Harts and Hawker Hinds all served in the single-engined day bomber role. These aircraft were used in tactical and strategic roles.

And yet, strangely enough, the successors to the Battle had roughly half the range. Fairey P4/34 and Hawker Henley, The RAF changed theri minds and didn't use either but the "requirement" changed.
Many air forces used planes of similar performance to the DH.4s, DH.9s, Hawker Harts and Hawker Hinds because that is what the technology of the day would allow.
The Idea that a single engine day bomber needed a range of 1000 miles was far fetched. The Vickers Wellesley was being shipped of to the mid-east pretty quick.

Your accusatory tone regarding the use of Blenheims suggests otherwise, I simply asked the rhetorical question of what would you have them do with what they had. Did you expect them not to use what they had, even known the flaws they had?

That rather depends on the mission, doesn't it. Sending them on near suicidal missions has to be balanced against possible benefits. Dropping a bridge to prevent a river crossing might be a worthy goal to save thousands of troops. Running planes out of fuel and loosing crews because you are operating on the fringe of your range and have no allowance for a wind change just so you can claim you can bomb a certain city is pretty poor planning. Please look at a map and check some of the distances I have given. In 1938 it was just about 400 miles from England to the Ruhr. The edges of the Ruhr. The two main bombers (Battle and Blenheim I) had book ranges of 1000 miles. You have a one hour reserve to deal with use of higher than cruise power use in combat areas/engagements, head winds on trip back and navigation errors. Been over this several times now.

As 1939 went on there were more and more Hampdens and Wellingtons but look at post 9 again. Sept 1939 has roughly 400 medium bombers available to the RAF. Most of them did not exist in Sept 1938.

Again, your perspective is skewed by your own particular views based on hindsight. Which WW1 relics are you specifically talking about? Were they using Sopwith Salamanders? How about Airco DH.4s? Maybe Sopwith Comic Trench Strafers? Please elaborate on what you are specifically referring to.

Talk about skewed views. what part of the word "artillery" didn't you understand?
BEF in France had no heavy artillery newer than 1918 except for old carriages equipped with pneumatic tires and brakes for towing by motor vehicles. Their field artillery wasn't the greatest either.
Last time I checked Sopwith Salamanders and DH 4s were NOT artillery.

But why spend money on artillery when bombers can carry bombs so much further than guns can shoot?

 

[nuuumannn]

I have been stating that the RAF could not bomb Germany effectively in 1938.

Again, it's all relative, which completely picks holes in your entire argument. So what if they couldn't? To what end is the point you are making? Just to rubbish the RAF? Why? The RAF couldn't reach Germany with bombers designed to specifications released as early as 1932 and earlier, which were the predominant age of the types in RAF service? I'm also pretty certain that if the RAF had to do it would have tried with what it had, so again, your emphatic denial that it could is devoid of context.

Let's put it into perspective. In 1938, again, the world is changing and the RAF has to use what equipment it has available and operate within the doctrine it had laid down beforehand. Germany has become a threat quite quickly, within a period of a few years, so when Whitleys and Wellingtons are being designed, they are to the specs at the time, all around 1932 to 1934, before the Luftwaffe even exists and Germany is a military threat. In the early 1930s it's pretty hard to determine exactly what kind of military threat is gonna arise, so again, you're applying foresight that these guys just didn't have because of what you know.

Also, these aircraft the RAF are introducing into service are being progressively modified, AW knew the Tiger gave the Whitley insufficient performance as the first Merlin engined Whitley flew in 1938 and the RAF received the first Mk. IVs a year later. At that point in time, the British military system was a shadow of what it had been at the end of the Great War because of budget cuts and a squabbling for finances during peacetime. In the year of the Munich Crisis the RAF placed orders for large numbers of fighters and bombers to enhance its military capabilities. Your argument might carry some weight if the Prime Minister did nothing, but on the back of 'Peace in our Time' was a massive increase in defence spending and hardware procurement. As you know, the British strenuously avoided any kind of war footing in between the wars. The men who made the decisions had seen their sons marching to war and not returning. That was a huge motivation to not want to invest in the armed forces.

I have been stating that the RAF could not bomb Germany effectively in 1938.

See above, so what?! what's your point?! Neither could the Germans bomb Britain! Neither could the Italians bomb Britain! Neither could the US bomb anyone except Mexico! All of these countries had expectations and doctrine their forces operated by that were greater than their armed forces' actual capabilities!

Let's look at the French air force in the 1930s, a bit of a disaster in planning and policy, what about the Italian air force, or the Soviet air force, are you gonna pick holes in them as well to balance your argument and at least attempt to put the RAF into some form of global context or are you just going to stick to your guns and insist the pre-war RAF was rubbish and that's it? You do tend to repeat the same arguments. In a few instances you've stated the Ju 88 was not so fast as a bomber, but again, compared to what (yes, I know it's not a British bomber, I used it because you repeat this often)? Your arguments, whilst accurate in detail lack context and are almost uniformly biased when it comes to Britain and her equipment going into the war.

Many air forces used planes of similar performance to the DH.4s, DH.9s, Hawker Harts and Hawker Hinds because that is what the technology of the day would allow.

Exactly, so why so harsh on the RAF? You've also said the RAF did nothing for army support, so is that true? Yes, Trenchard didn't approve of the Army Co-operation role, or the diversion of funds to fulfill that role, neither did Newall, nor in fact, did Portal, but let's see what the RAF did apply to the Army Co-operation role.

Between 1930 and 1940, the RAF operated some 500 Westland Wapities in the Army Co-operation role, and let me be emphatic in that these aircraft were designed to carry out army support duties in RAF service and were not just day bombers, also, these figures are not just production numbers for these types, which were naturally higher, over 100 Westland Wallaces, around 500 Hawker Audaxes and Hardys, as well as a host of day bomber types that could be tasked with tactical roles. So the army co-op aircraft in RAF service in the decade of the 1930s number to more than 1,000+ aircraft. That figure does not include Lysander numbers, the first of which entered RAF service in 1938. For not wanting to devote many resources to a task, that's a lot of aeroplanes. I'd wager that that's more than most air forces had in terms of army support aircraft available to them within the same time period.

I also think it's futile discussing the fallacies of the Blenheim and Battle and their use in France and RAF policy at the time in your context, because again, in what universe do you foresee any other air force equipped with what they had in 1940 doing any better against the Germans?

Oh, and you say you've read a book about the Battle, yet you've singularly failed to identify that the aircraft was designed and built to a specification for a single-engined day bomber to replace previous single-engined day bombers; it's even in the aircraft specification's name, yet you missed it in the book?

Talk about skewed views. what part of the word "artillery" didn't you understand?

True, I misread that, but so much of your argument is skewed by your own dislike for the British way of doing things, SR. This is common throughout the forum that you've had a dislike of British stuff, you've openly stated in the past that British 1930s twin-engined bombers were obsolete by wartime, yet the Whitley and Wellington ranked among the best of the pre-war bombers produced by all countries, you hate the Defiant, you think all British aircraft are merely warmed up target tugs (which, granted I'm actually in agreement with in more than a few cases! ), you criticise RAF policy at the expense of almost every other armed force in the world who had the same if not other shortcomings at the same time, thus negating any real disadvantage the RAF might have had that you highlight in your argument, so this is why I counter your argument so vehemently, it's simply based on undue bias, it lacks context and is informed by huge doses of hindsight.

We all know the RAF was a weak force in 1938, whose air forces weren't except the Germans? Theirs was because they wanted to go to war. The British certainly didn't, and that explains a lot.

 

[GrauGeist]

Ok, so in keeping with the topic, but to expand on it - which Air Force in 1938 was capable of a strategic bombing strategy at that point in time?

It appears that few Air Forces had four-engined, long-range bombers in their inventory (of any significant number), most having a variety of two-engined types.