Sept 1938, Changes the RAF can make after admitting they can't bomb Germany.

[buffnut453]

Your argument depends on the time warp theory.

I have been stating that the RAF could not bomb Germany effectively in 1938.
" when Hampdens and Whitleys flew to Berlin in 1940"
Great, now use the time machine to get those Hampdens and Whitleys into service in Sept of 1938.

The problem is that your entire thesis is based on a flawed assumption that Britain expected to bomb Germany from British bases. That was NOT defence policy in the late-30s. Britain had France as its major ally, and planned that operations against Germany would be conducted from French airfields.

You can't apply the retrospectroscope and expect the RAF to foresee the 1940 fall of France two years before it happened.

Also, strategic bombing does not necessarily mean hitting the adversary's capital. It means delivering strategic effect. There were lots of such industrial targets in southern Germany that were easily within reach of the RAF when based in France.

Finally, for all the advances that Germany made in terms of bombs and navigation, they couldn't hit London from bases inside Germany...so, again, in 1938, how is Britain supposed to foresee the chain of events that brought German bombers so close to Britain?

 

[Shortround6]

We might have to come to an understanding of what constitutes the "army co-operation role".

Quite a number of the aircraft you named 7th paragraph were often called "General Purpose" aircraft. Some tended to bounce back and forth, one version was a day bomber, another version or mark was "general purpose" aircraft and yet another version or mark was an army co-operation aircraft. The Hawker Hardy for instance was pretty much a Audax with the radio removed and a tent, bedding, food and water carried in it's place. Range was 380 miles?

Army co-operation covered a multitude of roles from artillery spotting/battlefield reconnaissance to the ever popular message pick up using a hook (also used by many other air forces to a greater or lesser extent) and the bombing of tribesmen in the colonial policing role which is where the RAF started to compete with the army for funding. A few squadrons of aircraft were cheaper than battalions of ground troops and could cover a much wider area. But army co-operation in the Mid east was not what army co-operation in a continental war would be. Many other air forces did try to build multi role "army co-operation" aircraft. Success was elusive.

attack aircraft are somewhat different. The Breda 65 may be somewhat under rated. Granted it was an old design, like the Battle, but it was intended not for the rather nebulous role of "day bomber" but to bomb and strafe enemy troops in support of combat operations.

From wiki " 23 Ba.65s sent to Spain, 12 were lost in the course of the civil war. They flew 1,921 sorties, including 368 ground-strafing and 59 dive bombing attacks. " there was an internal bay and outside racks, there was also a 12.7mm and 7.7mm machine gun in each wing for strafing.
American Attack planes had standardized on four .30 cal guns for strafing back with the Curtiss A-8 Shrike before they even decided to go with air cooled engines for less vulnerability to ground fire. Bomb loads increased but the four .30 cal strafing guns remained though the competition that lead to the Martin 167 and the Douglas DB-7 (A-20). Range for the Breda 65 and the Single engine American attack planes was well short of the Battles range. Even the early A-20s couldn't match the Battle's range.
The Japanese Ki-51 was a bit later in timing and while it could be called a single engine day bomber it's intended role was rather different than the Ki-30 and Ki-32 which could also be called single engine day bombers.
The Russian SU-2 was also a bit later in timing although, like the Ki-51, it was planned before the war started. The Su-2 had four 7.62 guns in the wings for ground strafing and the internal bomb bay could hold a quantity of small bombs.

The Ba 65, Single engine American attack planes (Northrop A-17s at the end) Ki-51s and the Su-2 were NOT intended to pick up messages using hooks or land and pick up personnel for liaison duties or even to perform artillery spotting missions.

So what is "army co-operation"?

 

[K5083]

Army co-op is an RE8. Not a DH4.

 

[Shortround6]

The problem is that your entire thesis is based on a flawed assumption that Britain expected to bomb Germany from British bases. That was NOT defence policy in the late-30s. Britain had France as its major ally, and planned that operations against Germany would be conducted from French airfields.

You can't apply the retrospectroscope and expect the RAF to foresee the 1940 fall of France two years before it happened.

The policy may have been a bit wonky.
Using the trusty retrospectroscope we can see that in famous raid by Whitleys on Turin there was supposed to be a contingent of Wellingtons but with their shorter range they could not make the trip from the Channel Islands and had to use a French Base to refuel. They arrived and got refueled but a constant series of phone calls/messages delayed take-off as the British high command wished to continue to carry out the raid while the French high command wanted the raid canceled fearing Italian reprisal raids. Base commander wound up parking trucks on the runway/s to prevent the Wellingtons from taking off. Wellingtons returned to British base/s the next day.
Also using the retrospectroscope, the British Advanced Air Striking Force consisted of a 1st echelon (based in France) of 10 Battle squadrons, 2 Blenheim squadrons and 2 Hurricane squadrons (increased to 3 on May 11th), while the 2nd echelon of 4 Blenheim squadrons and 2 Whitley squadrons stayed in England. It is claimed that moving the 2nd echelon to France after the Germans struck (which had been the plan?) would have congested the existing bases too much and/or the bases weren't big enough to house/support the additional squadrons. It took a while to get the French bases fixed up enough for the British squadrons that were there.

Without using the retrospectroscope it is claimed by some websites that between 1920 and 1940 the average French government lasted about 7 months. Planning to use French bases 2, 3 or 4 years down the road when the planes being developed/requested made it into production seems a bit dicey. It might very well have been official policy, It just doesn't seem to be a very good one.

Also, strategic bombing does not necessarily mean hitting the adversary's capital. It means delivering strategic effect. There were lots of such industrial targets in southern Germany that were easily within reach of the RAF when based in France.

I believe I covered that in a much earlier post. I used the Ruhr instead of southern Germany but the point was the same. Germany had an advantage in that Berlin was so far from the Western border.

inally, for all the advances that Germany made in terms of bombs and navigation, they couldn't hit London from bases inside Germany...so, again, in 1938, how is Britain supposed to foresee the chain of events that brought German bombers so close to Britain?

Germans had a reverse situation, The He 111 could hit some targets in Britain from German soil but since it is around 95 miles from the mouth of the Humber to Manchester as an example, They really weren't going to affect the means of production much. About 290 miles from Emden to the mouth of the Humber. Bombing the coastal towns wasn't really going to get the Germans very far.
However, without using the retrospectroscope once could go back to 1917-18 and Raids by Gotha bombers (and others) on London and eastern England from bases in Belgium.
Expecting the Germans not to invade Belgium a 2nd time might be seen as nieve? The French and British certainly had plans to send troops into Belgium to pre-determined defensive lines should the Germans violate Belgian neutrality.
What was planned in closed rooms vs what was put out in newspapers might be different things.
That is a problem with being the "good guys", you have to plan around some other countries neutrality rather than invade just because it is convenient.

 

[MikeMeech]

We might have to come to an understanding of what constitutes the "army co-operation role".

Quite a number of the aircraft you named 7th paragraph were often called "General Purpose" aircraft. Some tended to bounce back and forth, one version was a day bomber, another version or mark was "general purpose" aircraft and yet another version or mark was an army co-operation aircraft. The Hawker Hardy for instance was pretty much a Audax with the radio removed and a tent, bedding, food and water carried in it's place. Range was 380 miles?

Army co-operation covered a multitude of roles from artillery spotting/battlefield reconnaissance to the ever popular message pick up using a hook (also used by many other air forces to a greater or lesser extent) and the bombing of tribesmen in the colonial policing role which is where the RAF started to compete with the army for funding. A few squadrons of aircraft were cheaper than battalions of ground troops and could cover a much wider area. But army co-operation in the Mid east was not what army co-operation in a continental war would be. Many other air forces did try to build multi role "army co-operation" aircraft. Success was elusive.

attack aircraft are somewhat different. The Breda 65 may be somewhat under rated. Granted it was an old design, like the Battle, but it was intended not for the rather nebulous role of "day bomber" but to bomb and strafe enemy troops in support of combat operations.

From wiki " 23 Ba.65s sent to Spain, 12 were lost in the course of the civil war. They flew 1,921 sorties, including 368 ground-strafing and 59 dive bombing attacks. " there was an internal bay and outside racks, there was also a 12.7mm and 7.7mm machine gun in each wing for strafing.
American Attack planes had standardized on four .30 cal guns for strafing back with the Curtiss A-8 Shrike before they even decided to go with air cooled engines for less vulnerability to ground fire. Bomb loads increased but the four .30 cal strafing guns remained though the competition that lead to the Martin 167 and the Douglas DB-7 (A-20). Range for the Breda 65 and the Single engine American attack planes was well short of the Battles range. Even the early A-20s couldn't match the Battle's range.
The Japanese Ki-51 was a bit later in timing and while it could be called a single engine day bomber it's intended role was rather different than the Ki-30 and Ki-32 which could also be called single engine day bombers.
The Russian SU-2 was also a bit later in timing although, like the Ki-51, it was planned before the war started. The Su-2 had four 7.62 guns in the wings for ground strafing and the internal bomb bay could hold a quantity of small bombs.

The Ba 65, Single engine American attack planes (Northrop A-17s at the end) Ki-51s and the Su-2 were NOT intended to pick up messages using hooks or land and pick up personnel for liaison duties or even to perform artillery spotting missions.

So what is "army co-operation"?

Hi
The Hawker Hardy was equipped with wireless and even had an aerial to erect if it came down in the remote areas it was designed to operate over, as can be seen in this Flight' drawing:

Army Co-operation and General Purpose aircraft had to have wireless systems to do their particular role.
The RAF Historical Society Journal 54 contains a series of 'articles' from a Seminar on 4 April 2012 'The RAF and the Army Co-operation Roles Inherited from the Early RFC' (this should be available on-line for those interested). For the inter-war period the piece by Clive Richards is useful, this includes the roles of AC aircraft as laid down in AP1176 'Royal Air Force Manual of Army Co-operation', 2nd edition 1932:

Ground attack to support the ground forces would have been undertaken by fighters and light bombers ('Army' aircraft rather than 'Corps' aircraft in WW1 terms), this actually did happen in 1940 as we know, Hurricanes also undertook strafing missions. It was considered that near the front line artillery fire would be much more effective than MG fire or light bombs from aircraft (which it was). The aircraft would be more effective being used behind the front line of troops, the AC aircraft were too valuable to the army in their own roles.
The AC squadrons in September 1938 are also in the article:

It is of interest to note that in may 1940 four of the AC squadrons were commanded by Army officers who were seconded to the RAF (the RAF taught them to fly and they had both army and RAF ranks). In May 1940 they were on their second or even third secondment, they were:
Wg Cdr Andrew Wray Geddes (RA) No. 2 Sqn., Sqn Ldr Ronald Clive MacKenzie Ferrers (Cameronians) No. 26 Sqn., Sqn Ldr Alan Ford Anderson (Royal Warwickshire Regiment) No. 613 Sqn., Sqn Ldr Anthony Arthur Malan (RTR) No. 614 Sqn.

The main books relevant to the interwar and early war development of British Tactical Air Power are:
'Strategy for Victory - The Development of British Tactical Air Power, 1919-1943' by David Ian Hall.
'The Development of British Tactical Air Power, 1940-1943 - A History of Army Co-operation Command' by Matthew Powell.

Mike

 

[Shortround6]

Thank you I will stand corrected on the radio and thank you also for the listing of duties and the sources.

I will note that according to this there were 7 (?) army co-operation squadrons in Sept 1938?

 

[MikeMeech]

Hi
The 'bomber strength' available to the RAF at 1 January 1938 (from 'The British Bomber since 1914' by F K Mason, is below:

Many types would have been regarded as 'interim' types to build up strength and train personnel before the 'new' designs came on stream. The same applies to the fighter strength, which in September 1938 (from 'The Growth of Fighter Command 1936-1940' by T C G James) is revealed in the two tables below:

So if the RAF is to give up the idea of bombing German with the type it had on strength in 1938 then obviously it should also give up on a fighter defence of the UK.
1938 was a year of rebuilding the air arm as the factories increased their capacity and numbers as well as training a workforce to be skilled enough to build the new types on order. That year of course also had the RDF (radar) system start to come on line and prepare for operational use, also at the time of Munich the civilian population was issued with gas masks for the 'expected' gas attacks (which is why many pets were put down in 1939).
Coastal Command was equipped mainly with bi-plane flying boats, Vildebeest torpedo bombers and Avro Anson GR aircraft, the latter being relatively cheap alternative to flying boats for expansion purposes and a lead in the the various 'new' types on order. The RAF had ordered the Bristol Beaufort (this replaced the idea of the Blenheim based GR design, the original Bolingbroke, which was considered too 'small' for GR purposes) in August 1936. The Blackburn Botha was ordered, 'straight off the drawing board' in December 1936, the Short Sunderland flying boat in March 1936 along with the Saro Lerwick during that year. The Lockheed Hudson was ordered in June 1938 (Lockheed was very pleased due to their financial problems at the time, the British not only paid for the aircraft but also ended up paying to expand factories in the USA). On paper in 1938 Coastal Command was looking in a fairly good position for the future, especially if we remember that the U-Boats could only operate from Northern Germany in 1938. The fall of Norway and France during 1940 was the main reason that there was a much increased need of longer range aircraft.

Mike

 

[Shortround6]

Thank you for scanning and posting those tables.
I will take issue with this sentence.

So if the RAF is to give up the idea of bombing German with the type it had on strength in 1938 then obviously it should also give up on a fighter defence of the UK.

One does not necessarily follow the other. The German bombers will be totally unescorted and will be He 111s for the most part, 570 He 111s being on strength as of Sept 18th 1938.
of which 272 were He 111bs, 171 He 111Es, 39 He 111Fs and 88 He 111Js.
The He 111B was good for about 214mph max cruise and could carry eight 220lb bombs about 1030 miles.

At the time the Blenheim I was entering squadron service (5/6 squadrons in jan 1938) the RAF had around 4000 bombers on order. They also had about 600 Hurricanes 310 Spitfires and around 200 (?) undelivered Gladiators on order for around 1100 fighter (may need correction).

The original position of this thread was that, having found out the RAF was, shall we say, stretching the truth about what it could actually do with it's existing equipment. It would be ordered to find some other use for some (not all) of the planes on order.
The RAF can still plan to use Wellingtons, Hampdens, and Whitleys for the Strategic role. The early Versions as planned in 1938 could hit the Ruhr and other targets from British bases
(or, they at least could fly the needed distance with a worthwhile amount of bombs, we will ignore the ability to hit for this discussion as the proven performance in 1940-41 does need the retrospectroscope)
Since canceling the lower performing aircraft (bomb load and range) in late 1938 or most of 1939 won't get you more of the higher performing planes and should the war start sooner than Sept 1939 the British would be stuck with more squadrons with Hinds, Harrows, Heyfords, etc that option should be taken off the table.
I don't want to pick on the Battle but that is what I have the production numbers for.
380 were built in 1938, 131 of those in Oct-Dec. and 1,037 were built in 1939.
Now if they can't be used for attacking Germany directly (without being based in a Foreign country) what could they be used for, and what modifications could be made that would either not disrupt production very much or be retro-fitted to already existing aircraft? This does mean altering BC (or the RAFs) stance/doctrine of the proper use of aircraft in war (but does not mean totally eliminating it.)
What other planes do the British have on order that could be repurposed to the advantage of the war effort.


You have given a nice summation of the U-Boat situation but I would add that the Germans only had about 54 (?) U-boats in commission in Sept 1939 and 26 of the them were the Type IIs with only 3 torpedo tubes, 2 reloads and a max range of about 3600-3800 miles so their ability to operate much beyond British coastal waters was rather limited regardless of where the base was. British might have been able to make a fair guess as to what the Type II could do as they were considerably smaller than the British U class subs.

 

[roundball]

Opening posts.
The "ah ha" moment is Sept 1938 When the British Prime Minister is confronted with the fact that, despite all of the pounds Stirling spent on the RAF up until then, He cannot threaten Hitler with any sort of bombing campaign.
Even one of 1936-38 standards and he won't be able to for several years.
What could have been done to get better value for the money already spent/ allocated?

LOOKING INTO BUYING AMERICAN EARLY B-17S

 

[buffnut453]

LOOKING INTO BUYING AMERICAN EARLY B-17S

In 1938? Also, why? As it was, the early B-17s were proven unfit for operational service. What's the point of getting more of them?

 

[SaparotRob]

In 1938 it had yet to be disproven. It must have appeared competitive. And I really like shark tails.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

In 1938 it had yet to be disproven. It must have appeared competitive. And I really like shark tails.

As expensive as the plane was, would the Britons really want to go all-in on an unproven airframe?

 

[GrauGeist]

LOOKING INTO BUYING AMERICAN EARLY B-17S

I know where a B-17E is and it's for sale.

9 million USD, no low-balling, they know what they have.

 

[SaparotRob]

As expensive as the plane was, would the Britons really want to go all-in on an unproven airframe?

Dude, they're shark tails. Too cool not to get. Like they'd even be able to get any at all in '38.

 

[SaparotRob]

I know where a B-17E is and it's for sale.

9 million USD, no low-balling, they know what they have.

Low hours too. It was owned a a little old lady who only flew it on Sunday to buzz her church.

 

[SaparotRob]

Is there a link regarding that B-17? A flight worthy B-17E would be a sight to see.

 

[GrauGeist]

Is there a link regarding that B-17? A flight worthy B-17E would be a sight to see.

It's in Seattle and 80% restored, needs to be finished.
Here's a good link for info:
For Sale: A Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress Project Plane: $9 Million USD

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Dude, they're shark tails. Too cool not to get. Like they'd even be able to get any at all in '38.

I definitely prefer the whale-tails, but more for gunsgunsguns than the tail itself. It's really hard for me to not like 13 .50s, dingbat as I am.

 

[SaparotRob]

It's in Seattle and 80% restored, needs to be finished.
Here's a good link for info:
For Sale: A Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress Project Plane: $9 Million USD

Great link. Thanks. I watched the "imbedded" History Channel video on the B-17. I never realized how much the Digby looks like a Martin B-10. 5:30 mark, give or take a second.

 

[GrauGeist]

Great link. Thanks. I watched the "imbedded" History Channel video on the B-17. I never realized how much the Digby looks like a Martin B-10. 5:30 mark, give or take a second.

Martin's B-10 influenced an entire generation of twin aircraft design.