Sept 1938, Changes the RAF can make after admitting they can't bomb Germany.

[Shortround6]

Another part of the post from the other thread I used to start this.

By the time the Blenheim was entering service about 818 Blenheims were on order from Bristol and the shadow factory scheme was kicking in.
Rootes got a contract for 250 Blenheims soon raised to 1000.
Austin motor company got a contract for 500 Battles, soon also raised to 1000.
Bristol got another contract for 450 Blenheims.
Fairy got a contract for 500 Battles over and above earlier contracts.
A.V. Roe got contract for 250 Blenheims and would built 1000 before building the Manchester.
Hawker Hinds were ordered as late as 31st of May 1937
100 Vickers Wellesley were on order
400 Hawker Henleys (later cut to 200)
The Vickers Wellington was going into production'
Orders for the Whitley are increased
100 HP Harrows
180 HP Hampdens
100 HP Herefords
486 Bothas were ordered a this time
400 Beauforts were also ordered, this last two would not fly for several years.

By the time the Blenheim was entering squadron service the RAF had over 5000 bombers on order but only about 1000 fighters, the 600 Hurricanes and 310 Spitfires and 210 undelivered Gladiators.

Some of these aircraft would take two years or more to show up.

As to the British ordering B-17s at this time?

I don't have order dates for the Stirling and the other big British bombers but the half sized version of the Stirling flew in Sept of 1938 so obviously work was well advanced in the design phase and the prototype of the Manchester was supposed to fly in Jan of 1939 (didn't make the deadline) and the Halifax was somewhere in the process of being redesigned form two Vultures to four Merlins while still on paper.

Need to spend money in the US on a large bomber seems to be vanishingly small at this time.
Considering that in 1938 the first turbo charged B-17 flew in April and the turbos had to removed from the top of the nacelle and shifted to the bottom and other changes made resulting in a first flight of the modified set up in Nov of 1938 the British would be ordering an unproven prototype for delivery when????

What the British got were B-17Cs in 1941. The first B-17B didn't fly until June of 1939 so the B-17 doesn't really so much promise of helping the British in 1939-40.

The RAF was certainly planning a strategic campaign, it is just that in late 1938 they couldn't pull it off with existing equipment and several thousand of the planes on order were ill suited to such work, several thousand of the planes on order were suited, they were just later in timing.

What do you do with the several thousand that aren't suited to the strategic campaign?

and again wholesale canceling isn't really an option as without the "interim" aircraft the RAF would have been flying hundreds if not thousands of Harts, Hinds, Heyfords and other totally obsolete aircraft in 1939.

 

[MikeMeech]

Another part of the post from the other thread I used to start this.

By the time the Blenheim was entering service about 818 Blenheims were on order from Bristol and the shadow factory scheme was kicking in.
Rootes got a contract for 250 Blenheims soon raised to 1000.
Austin motor company got a contract for 500 Battles, soon also raised to 1000.
Bristol got another contract for 450 Blenheims.
Fairy got a contract for 500 Battles over and above earlier contracts.
A.V. Roe got contract for 250 Blenheims and would built 1000 before building the Manchester.
Hawker Hinds were ordered as late as 31st of May 1937
100 Vickers Wellesley were on order
400 Hawker Henleys (later cut to 200)
The Vickers Wellington was going into production'
Orders for the Whitley are increased
100 HP Harrows
180 HP Hampdens
100 HP Herefords
486 Bothas were ordered a this time
400 Beauforts were also ordered, this last two would not fly for several years.

By the time the Blenheim was entering squadron service the RAF had over 5000 bombers on order but only about 1000 fighters, the 600 Hurricanes and 310 Spitfires and 210 undelivered Gladiators.

Some of these aircraft would take two years or more to show up.

As to the British ordering B-17s at this time?

I don't have order dates for the Stirling and the other big British bombers but the half sized version of the Stirling flew in Sept of 1938 so obviously work was well advanced in the design phase and the prototype of the Manchester was supposed to fly in Jan of 1939 (didn't make the deadline) and the Halifax was somewhere in the process of being redesigned form two Vultures to four Merlins while still on paper.

Need to spend money in the US on a large bomber seems to be vanishingly small at this time.
Considering that in 1938 the first turbo charged B-17 flew in April and the turbos had to removed from the top of the nacelle and shifted to the bottom and other changes made resulting in a first flight of the modified set up in Nov of 1938 the British would be ordering an unproven prototype for delivery when????

What the British got were B-17Cs in 1941. The first B-17B didn't fly until June of 1939 so the B-17 doesn't really so much promise of helping the British in 1939-40.

The RAF was certainly planning a strategic campaign, it is just that in late 1938 they couldn't pull it off with existing equipment and several thousand of the planes on order were ill suited to such work, several thousand of the planes on order were suited, they were just later in timing.

What do you do with the several thousand that aren't suited to the strategic campaign?

and again wholesale canceling isn't really an option as without the "interim" aircraft the RAF would have been flying hundreds if not thousands of Harts, Hinds, Heyfords and other totally obsolete aircraft in 1939.

Hi

I believe the Stirling, Halifax and Manchester were all ordered in 1937. One of the Stirling's 'competitors' was the AW B.12/36 heavy bomber powered by Merlins, drawing below (from 'RAF Bomber Command and its aircraft 1936-1940' by Goulding & Moyes, p.49):

The AW factory was then allocated to produce the Avro Manchester, due to the problems with that type it continued to produce Whitley's until the Lancaster was ready to be produced by them.
The British Government in the 1930's had to consider its re-armament process within the bounds of 'Politics' and 'finance'. They had signed up to various international agreements reference arms limitation and the fact the population did not want to go through another 1914-18 war. A large army for continental use was out of the question for much of the 1930s, indeed a new BEF was only decided on in Spring 1939, previously there was a relatively small expeditionary force that could be used 'world wide', this would be accompanied by an air-element. The 1929 basic air-element is listed below:

Depending on the 'enemy' the number of fighter and bomber squadrons would be increases to support this 'basic' element.
At the time of Munich the British Government were more concerned about air-defence rather than bombing Germany and the emphasis moved towards that role for expenditure, some details of current and planned fighter and bomber strengths are below (from OH 'Grand Strategy Volume 1' by N H Gibbs, p. 598):

Page 599 gives the compared air strengths of September 1939:

Air Defence worries included AA guns, there was a shortage of these for British air defence and also for any expeditionary force, more guns for the latter would have led to a severe weakening of the former until war production increased. That meant training work forces and building factories, any major diversion of industry prior to the outbreak of war would have led to a weakening of the economy.
The early B.17 was probably not going to arrive until after some of the already ordered larger bombers, indeed while the B.17 had range it lacked powered turrets which would have been a mark against it anyway.
The use of Gloster Gladiators for ground attack have been mentioned in this thread, this is a non-starter as they would be needed to send overseas to modernise air defences as monoplanes replaced them at home. Keeping the Gladiator in production at Glosters was also a non-starter, they built Gladiators from 1937-1940, this overlapped with the production of Hawker Henleys from 1938-1940 and the Hurricane production started in 1939. The production of 1,211 Hurricanes by Gloster in 1940 was much more important than producing more Gladiators or Henleys.

Mike

 

[tomo pauk]

Thank you for the exhaustive post
The last table shows that French AF is badly, very badly outnumbered. Combine that with LW having better aircraft on average, better tactics, some experience from the Spanish CW, a far bigger number of Flak to cover sensitive spots.... French were in very bad shape, and will need the best part of the RAF to bulk up the defences; even combined FAF and RAF are no match for LW in numbers.
The most ironic part is that Fleet air arm of the Luftwaffe is more numerous than the FAA of the UK (yes, British FAA is mostly carrier borne).

 

[Dimlee]

When the Wellingtons and Whitleys had power turrets in their noses and sterns, which other country had bombers with power turrets? None! The first US bombers with power-operated turrets had British ones.

If I'm not mistaken, TB-7 (later Pe-8) was equipped with a power turret in the front from the first flight in 1937.

 

[Dimlee]

Ok, so in keeping with the topic, but to expand on it - which Air Force in 1938 was capable of a strategic bombing strategy at that point in time?

It appears that few Air Forces had four-engined, long-range bombers in their inventory (of any significant number), most having a variety of two-engined types.

The one that was prepared to march forward "to liberate" other countries.
According to this article, there were 36 squadrons (12 a/c each) of TB-3 in 1935. Total production was over 800. In 1938 they are obsolete and not produced anymore, but the sheer number is impressive.

 

[nuuumannn]

If I'm not mistaken, TB-7 (later Pe-8) was equipped with a power turret in the front from the first flight in 1937.

It appears you could be right, Dimlee. It would be interesting to find out whether it was fully articulated in azimuth and elevation, like the British turrets, or just in azimuth like those German ones, where the gun wasn't powered but still manually operated within a powered cupola. The British introduced an opposite function in the Handley Page Harrow, where the guns were powered by Frazer Nash hydraulic motors, but the gun emplacement was a simple screened opening. This system was also to be fitted to the Handley Page Hampden, but it never did, for some reason.

 

[nuuumannn]

What do you do with the several thousand that aren't suited to the strategic campaign?

Do what everyone else did. The point behind all this is to demonstrate that no one had a particular march over anyone else in overall bomber design at the time. Technologies and designs incorporated novelties that others didn't but the main point is to illustrate that at the time, no one could do what was advertised. Look at the USA's Rainbow Plan, elements of which it went to war with in 1941, specifically War Plan Orange, the USAAF and USN were simply incapable of fulfilling the strategic objectives laid out within it.

 

[nuuumannn]

It's worth noting regarding B-17s that the first production variants don't really arrive in USAAC service until June 1939, these were B-17Bs, of which 39 were built, and it took ten months to deliver all 39 of them, the last being delivered in March 1940. There's no way the RAF are getting B-17s any sooner than what they did, receiving the first of 20 B-17Cs in June 1941 of a total production run of the type of 38 airframes. B-17C production was a bit hastier, with the lot of 38 delivered between July and November 1940.

What mystifies me about the B-17 was that when the British operated the type, it suffered terribly from icing issues because of the altitudes it was being operated at. This was quite serious, resulting in aircraft during operations having to turn back over the target area because of severe vibration on the very first combat sortie of the type. It also suffered maintenance issues that grounded airframes, being constantly undergoing work in operational conditions. I wonder if the USAAC had encountered the icing issues and if so, why was nothing done, and if not, why not? It was supposed to be a high-altitude bomber - if it could not operate at its maximum altitude effectively enough, what was the point? Why was this not tested earlier than before the British took it into operational service?

 

[yulzari]

Just read my way through all these posts. It seems to me that, for the non tactical bombing task, it matters not if you are sending a fully loaded Whitley or a Tiger Moth with a bag of hand grenades on the pilot's lap, if you can't find the target.

It may be of more use to look to raise the level of training and practice of navigators and look to radio based direction than simply still miss but with a bigger bomb at a great speed.

 

[nuuumannn]

It may be of more use to look to raise the level of training and practice of navigators and look to radio based direction than simply still miss but with a bigger bomb at a great speed.

Makes perfect sense, so why didn't they? Well, some did, C-in-C Bomber command Edgar Ludlow Hewitt complained about this very thing in numerous correspondence, but he was widely regarded as a pessimist and his complaints were ignored. Similarly he did so about the lack of escort fighter, which he stated that the Spanish Civil War demonstrated that bombers need escorting, but that, too was ignored, for a long time, through various heads of department... He also complained about gunnery accuracy, but that was acted on and a central gunnery school was established to tackle this.

Once the war came and Bomber Command demonstrated its singular failure to accurately navigate to a target, but let's be fair, virtually every other bombing force in the world was in the same boat except the Germans - the US, USSR, the Italians, the Japanese, the French, no one else had any other answers and would have been able to have done any better than the RAF at this time, became obvious and it took some time before British scientists began addressing the problem, the German solution was radio navaids that although the British worked out how to jam them proved a success and worked really well (it was the wholesale misunderstanding of the tactical situation that led to their misuse by the Germans). The Butt Report really highlighted the issues, but it took a change of leadership in Bomber Command before things got going to address them.

Harris gets criticised for many things, but his fundamental belief in his command meant that under him Bomber Command got the appropriate tools for the job - accuracy improved dramatically simply because he (finally) addressed the issue.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Harris got the right tool at the right time. In one sense the Lancaster was the first, primitive WMD, because if you put 500 of 'em on a target for a couple nights running, bad s**t is going to happen down below. Used in numbers and in the right conditions, it could erase a city.

 

[Shortround6]

I agree about the poor navigation. Everybody was in the same boat with minor variations, Night bombing was truly wandering around in the dark. Day bombing offered some hope of finding the right city, assuming suitable weather.
A few of BC other problems are a bit harder to excuse. The lack of development of bigger than 500lb bombs for one. There had a been a study (perhaps not thorough ) of British bomb damage in WW I on German targets. There had been a study or survey of damage German bombs did on English targets. There had been a survey/reports of bomb damage on tribesmen's hut in the mid-east of various size bombs. The decision in 1932 that nothing bigger than a 500lb bomb would be needed flew in the face of every study/report.
It did make it easier on the aircraft designers with all those wing bomb cells though. They changed their minds almost too late.

 

[nuuumannn]

Harris got the right tool at the right time. In one sense the Lancaster was the first, primitive WMD, because if you put 500 of 'em on a target for a couple nights running, bad s**t is going to happen down below. Used in numbers and in the right conditions, it could erase a city.

Agree, defintely, but a big part of the complete destruction of German industry was because of round the clock bombing by both the RAF and USAAF. Without either one vast amount of damage could be done but to produce the results that they did, and I'm of the opinion that the strategic bombing of Germany shortened the war, call me crazy, but the efforts of Bomber Command made a difference, sure, but combined with the USAAF there was a war shortening, if not a war winning strategy.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Agree, defintely, but a big part of the complete destruction of German industry was because of round the clock bombing by both the RAF and USAAF. Without either one vast amount of damage could be done but to produce the results that they did, and I'm of the opinion that the strategic bombing of Germany shortened the war, call me crazy, but the efforts of Bomber Command made a difference, sure, but combined with the USAAF there was a war shortening, if not a war winning strategy.

Agreed, not giving short-shrift to 8th and 15th AFs. Especially once the Oil Plan kicked in, the bombers of both forces had a great impact on Germany's ability to fight at all.