I disagree.
FEAF was devastated 8 Dec 1941 (Philippine time) by Gen. Brereton's incompetence. Incoming IJN air raid was tracked on radar yet he was unable to coordinate aerial interception. By noon he gave up and ordered his pilots to land en masse so they could eat lunch. To make matters worse the aircraft weren't properly dispersed after landing. While his pilots were eating lunch IJN 11th Air Fleet arrived and cleaned house.
It seems to me, your description of events on December 8th is inaccurate in some essentials and your assignment of accountability appears misplaced.
FEAF was hurt but not totally devastated at Clark field on December 8th. The events are more complicated and owed much to the savvy of the Japanese
veteran leadership and experienced, skilled airmen. The
bombers got thru to knock out most of the 20th PS's P-40Bs, one of only two of the four squadrons of P-40s (3rd, 17th, 20th, 21st PS) that landed for '
lunch' (an unfair slight because they had been airborne for ~2.5 hours, awaiting the arrival of the first attack). The P-40E could not have stopped the raiders even if '
Brereton' had run a perfect intercept. Moreover, Brereton didn't run intercepts. That was done from a lower operational level. assigment of defensive priorities seems to have been one of the problems and besides Group CO Major Grover, it isn't clear who is to blame, if anyone. The P-40E could barely make it to the enemy aircraft's altitude, That was well established before December 8, from practice intercepts. The P-40Bs had a bit better capability but were among those A/C caught on the ground by high level bombing that was so accurate that I read somewhere there were questions about whether the Japanese had acquired the Norden Bombsight. The 20th pursuit's planes were nearly wiped out by high flying IJN bombers.
The 17th and 20th were assigned to patrol at 15,000' North of Clark AB and intercept raiders before they reached the base. The 34th was assigned to a backstop position over Clark. The 17th 20th PSs were in position at
~8:45 AM. At
~11 AM the two squadrons landed at Clark to refuel. At
11:47 AM a warning was received at Clark ops that Iba Radar had picked up raiders headed South at ~70 miles
West of Lingayan Gulf. That flight appeared to Maj. Grover to be headed for Manila. Grover issued orders to launch the 3rd PS at Iba to orbit Iba at 15k' (which would have been wise if the P-40E could have actually protected the RADAR there). He also ordered the 21st (at Nichols field near Manila) and 34th PS (at Del Carmen south of Clark) to launch and cover Clark AB. So far so good. Except orders to actually launch the P-35As at del Carmen were never received and apparently never issued.
Shortly after t/o, during their climb, the planes of the 17th PS are redirected to cover Manila. At
11:45 AM The 21st is also launched and unlike the other squadron COs, Dyess takes his P-40Es to 24k', an altitude which is about as high as he can go and still retain some decent forward speed to get where he needs to go to effect an intercept. Dyess also receives the order to orbit Manila Bay and cover the western approach to the city. Apparently Grover, Group CO, Believed the 3rd PS couldn't intercept the japanese aircraft over Iba and decided their target was Manila.
At
12:15 PM,
Grover orders the 17th into the air from Clark, but he wants them to patrol Manila Bay and protect the city. What in the world was he thinking? Finally at
12:20 PM at Nielson field (near Manila) Air Warning HQ, Harold George and his Ops Officer Bud Sprague intercede and orders via the teletype to intercept enemy a/c headed for Clark. The only untasked A/C available to respond are the 20th PS, the pilots of which are sitting in their P-40B cockpits ready to launch, awaiting orders. Yet, Grover holds the 20th back from immediate launch. At about that time, 8 P-40Es of the 3rd PS on patrol at ~15k' over Manila bay had heard radio traffic alerting them of a threat to Clark field. At about the same time, 4 P-40Es of the 21st PS apparently at 24k' also arrive almost by accident over Clark. For a brief moment, Clark is actually covered by 12 P-40Es which would have been woefully inadequate but at least something to interpose ineffectually between Clark field and a relentless enemy bent on destroying it. This was the first combat intercept of the war for the USAAF and its not hard to imagine them botching it.
Seeing nothing happening over Clark all 12 P-40Es head for Iba. At
12:30 PM, Iba reports a large group of A/C headed for
Iba Field, NOT Clark. The first direct warning of an attack at Clark is by a 20th PS crew chief on the ground who sees them coming at
12:35 PM.
Yes, there was radar tracking but for some reason, there was a problem in figuring out where the track was headed. Clark AB as the target apparently had only about 10-15 minutes of warning, at best.
The first three of the 20th PS P-40Bs T/O and then the bombs hit damaging or destroying most of the remaining 9 P-40Bs of the 20th A, B, and C Flights killing 4 pilots and seriously wounding 3 others. They weren't having lunch, they were following orders to take off which is what they had been waiting to do since their a/c had been serviced. Sandwiches had been brought out to them to eat while they sat in their cockpits at the ready. Brereton didn't issue the order to land before the attack, the squadron CO's did, out of necessity, not for lunch. Not having to worry about interceptors, the A6Ms were soon down among the P-40s wreaking havoc among the 3rd PS. Observers reported the bombers hitting Iba were at ~25k', well above the highest of the P-40s which were no higher there than about 15k'. 3rd PS CO Thorne approached burning Iba at 15k', saw retiring IJN bombers at 23k' he was unable to climb past 21k' to intercept due to a variety of factors. That was the closest to a revenge intercept made that day.
During the 8th of December, the 6 airborne flights of the 17th and 21st PS orbit ineffectually over Manila Bay and never engage the enemy.
On subsequent days and in other campaigns, the inability of the P-40E to intercept Japanese raids became well known and equally well documented.
I too looked for a scapegoat on whom to hang the FEAF disaster and have come to the conclusion the leaders and men fought about as well as could be expected for that stage of the war. I don't see Brereton or even Big Mac as culprits any more. Compared to the military disasters befalling other nations in other southeast asian sectors, they did fairly well in the long run. Perfection seems a bit much to hope for at this early stage of the war especially when it was elusive even in more mature or experienced times.
This post owes much to renrich. MHRIP