Significance of the Battle of Midway

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Hi Oldcrow

Japan already had land based radar by the middle of '42, so, provided there was an installation carried out on midway, its likely to expect it.

In the absence of a radar station, the Japanese are likley to do what they normally did in similar situations, set up a floating observation picket of some description. Not nearly as effective, but unlikely to catch the Japanese fighters on the deck either.


I would think there would be some delay in getting heavy bombers into action over Midway. is it not too far for B-17s (there were no B-24s that Im aware of in mid 1942 in the PTO) to fly continuously from the main islands of hawaii to midway in a bombed up condition?


This source

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/B-17/B-17G_Standard_Aircraft_Characteristics.pdf

gives a radius of 2684 miles, cruising at 10000 feet, no bombs or guns and not exceeding 150 mph. with any sort of bomb load it seems to have had an effective combat radius of about 800 miles. roughly the same effective range of the Zeke incidentally
 

You are right on both counts Pars! I didn't know about the IJN Type 1 Model 1 RADAR discovered at Guadalcanal in early August. and the units apparently slated for Midway and the Aleutians. They seem to have performed fairly well.

The Pacific War Online Encyclopedia: Type 11 Early Warning Radar

Apparently, the first Japanese EW pulse radar was deployed in Japan in November, 1941!

Also, the B-17's range is as limited as you've described. (should have checked, but I just assumed the army had it under control ) The performance table in the cited reference do not seem helpful in determining a load out for the maximum cited range. (it seems to assume the same load at all ranges) On the other hand, Range from Hickam field is over 1,300 miles and from Barking Sands about 1,200 miles (I wonder whether BS field could handle a B-17?). There may have been two options to mitigate the range limitation for the B-17. However both are subject to subject to Japanese interdiction. The first is Johnston Island lying about 950 miles to the South West of Oahu. I 'd expect bomb load and defensive ammo carried to be extremely limited. The second is French Frigate Shoals about 750 miles from Midway Island, which did not have an operational airfield until some time after Midway.

Late edit correction. Looks like the chart on the fifth page does allow a smaller bomb load to be carried the required distance under certain flight regimes. 10,000 feet which seems bad if fighters are given even minimal warning.
 
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With failure at Midway, the Alaskan campaign became pointless, although they stil stayed til mid-1943. It succeeded in keeping a large Allied force fighting there , in gawd awful conditions, so it was far from a total failure.
You and Parsifal keep stating in your opinion x, y or g which seems to be based on naval history AFTER Midway was successfully defended.

Had Japan won that all means diddly-squat.

Rather than opinion, which is what you repeatedly base your scenario on here is some more history of Midway from official Navy files:

The development of Midway under the Pacific Naval Air Base contracts began on March 27, 1940. A dredge was towed in, and the contractors directed their efforts toward the enlargement of the existing basins and channels. A small-boat channel, 12,000 feet long, 50 feet wide, and 10 feet deep, was dredged between Sand and Eastern islands, and a mooring berth, protected by sheet-piling, was built on the latter. Approximately 3,000,000 cubic yards of material were removed in these dredging operations.

Three asphalt-paved runways were constructed on Eastern Island; each was 300 feet wide and 3250 feet, 4500 feet, and 5300 feet long, respectively. Two hangars were constructed, with parking areas and warm-up mats. Small industrial areas were erected, which included the various necessary shops and storage facilities.

A large seaplane hangar, a parking mat, and one concrete ramp were constructed, and an ordnance shop, radio shop, engine shop, and a storehouse and tool room were built around the seaplane hangar to facilitate major overhaul work.

Fighter, bomber, and patrol ready-rooms were constructed, and housing and messing facilities set up for operational personnel. Quonset huts were extensively used.

Approximately 2800 feet of sheet-piling bulkhead was installed on Sand Island. Dredged material was pumped behind this bulkhead, and upon this fill, a large seaplane parking-mat was constructed. Four, concrete, seaplane ramps were built, together with an additional emergency ramp and approach to the mat, and a large, steel, seaplane hangar was erected on the edge of the mat.

Construction was started on underground gasoline storage in twenty-two 2500-gallon steel tanks.

A naval hospital was built by the contractors, who utilized three of the four existing buildings owned by the commercial cable company. These buildings, located on Sand Island, were later augmented by a large underground structure of concrete.

Barracks for naval and Marine personnel were built, together with all necessary accessories such as messhalls, warehouses, administration buildings, commissaries, and cold-storage buildings. The power plant for Sand Island was housed in a bombproof structure of reinforced-concrete and steel.

Midway was subjected to surface shelling by the Japanese on December 7, 1941, which caused considerable material damage and many wounds to personnel...... April 4, 1943, to relieve the Fifth, which returned to Pearl Harbor. The 50th and the 10th Battalions, acting as a unit, lengthened and paved the Sand Island airfield, two strips to 7,500 feet and one to 8,600 feet; erected four 13,500-barrel underground welded-steel tanks for diesel oil and four 27,000-barrel tanks for fuel oil, complete with piping, and underground pumphouses; constructed six timber finger-piers, complete with electrical, oil, air, and water services; and installed 2,900 feet of cellular steel-sheet piling. They also operated the Navy dredge YD-69.

Late in April 1943, the contractors' men again returned to begin work on an enlarged dredging program. The existing ship channel was widened from 300 feet to 400 feet and deepened to 35 feet. The anchorage area was expanded to a mooring capacity of six cruisers, five destroyers or submarines, and one repair ship.

Three areas were dredged, and 5,000,000 cubic yards of material removed.

CBMU 524 arrived in October 1943 to take over maintenance duties, complete the large underground hospital, and set up a recreation and recuperation center at the submarine base. The 10th Battalion which departed for Pearl Harbor in November 1943, was replaced by CBMU 531. The two maintenance units were then combined and continued to carry on their duties as a unit.

Had the Japanese taken the Island they could have just as easily done similar work post Midway Battle as without Midway Wake would not have been blockaded and it could, probably would have been a shuttle point as it was only 1,180 miles from Midway which is hundreds of miles closer to Midway than Hawaii is. (That work listed was FINISHED by mid-1943, not started as it was continuation of work started before the war.)
As the submarines you say are so important would have had to operate out of Hawaii and not Midway as they actually did, your scenario is void.
They would have been as over extended as you say the Japanese would have been.

Hawaii would not have been the next target, Johnston Atoll would have been
 
You don't want to hear my opinion, Bob...you wouldn't like it.

I am basing my replies on FACT, not opinion.

Yep, big enough to safe-harbor battleships, aircraft carriers, oilers and sever hundred other ships, just like a cozy Truk Lagoon, right?

I am going to assume that you've looked at a map of the atoll and seen the layout of the channel. that channel is a big, fat, tempting treat for submarines, who would most likely wait until a large ship tries to squeeze into your hypothetical harbor and then sink it right there, blocking the entire access, trapping all the other ships inside.

In this reference, "A" means one...single, solitary...not a much to work with there, Bob...

I suppose now would be a good time to point out all that was done on Midway after the battle was done so un-challenged?

In otherwords, if the Japanese had taken the island, do you suppose the U.S. was just going to roll over and cry and run home, or do you suppose that Midway would now become the focus of it's operations?

ComSubPac operated out of Pearl, as I mentioned before...well within short operating distance to Midway. I have no idea where you came up with the idea that subs operated from Midway.

My argument is certainly not void...the Japanese taking Midway so close to Pearl means a number of things:
One: we know where they are.
Two: we can easliy strangle the Japanese operation there with submarine attrition.
Three: The Japanese will have to divert resources away from other south pacific operations to protect Midway from constant harrassment.

As far as the comment about the Japanese taking the microscopic Johnston Atoll, well...hey, at least it was important enough for a Japanese submarine to attack it a few times.
 
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Thanks. Im not saying that Midway could or should have been held, but its isolation made it similar to wake in some ways.

The Japanese were wont to taking islands that could not support an airsrtrip or that didnt have an airstrip when taken, and which they didnt develop for the puprose. Midway had an airstrip, a jetty and a flying boat basin, but it was a badly exposed atoll, as the japanese strike themselves showed. Even though a second strike was deemed necessary by the Japanese air leader, the first strike in the morning seems to have done a lot of damage just the same. Despite the claims of our friend, the Marines were not that well dug in and the Japanese might have had difficulties in improving on that given the supply difficulties they could encounter, and the terrain of the atoll.

But getting back to the heavy bombers over Midway question, i am intrigued. okay, so Hawaii was too far away, but there are intervening islands. Could these be developed for an airstrip. A bomber strip is a different proposition to your standard garden variety. What are the islands between Oahu and Midway like....I believe the ones close to oahu are mountainish crags, but the ones further out are flatter. Anybody seen them? Or know what they are like?
 
---- One would imagine you are laughing at you ignorance so lets take you microscopic atoll and see what it meant and during WWII.
Actually try reading it before you flatulate through your keyboard.



Further development of Johnston Island was undertaken in 1939 with the purpose of providing facilities to support the operation of one squadron

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of patrol planes with tender support. Civilian forces, under the PNAB contract, began work on November 9, 1939, at Sand Island, for which the initial development was planned.

During January 1940, a barge equipped with a crane and a 6-foot clamshell was brought in and put to work widening and deepening the shallow entrance channel. After the barge had worked its way into the lagoon and had excavated a small turning basin, it was dismantled and moved ashore. A 12-foot clamshell dredge arrived on May 5, and continued the dredging. Within the lagoon, a turning basin, 1,000 feet square, was dredged and a narrow channel projected in the direction of Sand Island. Excavated material was used to make a plane parking area, 800 feet long and 300 feet wide, adjacent to the ship channel and connected to Sand Island by a 2,000-foot causeway. This parking area was equipped with a 60-foot bulkhead, a concrete seaplane ramp, 50 feet wide, supported on steel piles, and two 25,000-gallon steel tanks for gasoline. The buildings on Sand Island included barracks for 400 men, a messhall, an underground hospital, a radio station, two water tanks with evaporating equipment, an electric power and boiler house, a laundry, and several storehouses. A 100-foot steel tower served as a combination standpipe for the fresh-water system and control tower for plane operation.

Dredging meanwhile was continued in the lagoon to provide safe water for seaplane runways. Three such runways were developed, the major one, 11,000 feet long and 1,000 feet wide, with two cross-runways, each 7,000 feet long and 800 feet wide. These were cleared to a depth of 8 feet at low tide.

In September 1941, work was begun enlarging the land mass of Johnston Island to provide an airstrip. The initial plan called for a filled-in area, 200 feet wide and 2,500 feet long, to be developed along the south shore of the island, but when this area had been completed, the operation was continued to extend the landing mat to a length of 4,000 feet and a width of 500 feet. Material was obtained from the lagoon dredging. With all operations concentrated on Johnston, the contractor vacated the buildings on Sand Island to the naval personnel who moved in to operate the seaplane facilities.

Under the contract, the building program which progressed simultaneously with dredging and runway construction, accomplished the erection of two 400-man barracks, two large mess halls, a 30,000-cubic-foot cold-storage building, a powerhouse, a 50-bed underground hospital, a fresh-water evaporating plant, several shop buildings, three 8-room cottages, 16,000 barrels of fuel storage, and the installation of five 25,000-gallon gasoline tanks. These features were all usably complete by December 7, 1941.

When the news of the attack on Pearl Harbor reached Johnston Island, construction work was temporarily abandoned and all personnel were used for immediate defense preparations. On December 15, 1941, the island was shelled form an enemy submarine firing from beyond the reef. Several buildings were damaged, but none of the personnel were injured.

Land-plane facilities on Johnston Island now became a strategic imperative in the defense plans for the Hawaiian Islands. A large hydraulic dredge was brought to the island to speed the work. The dredge remained until January 1943, and completed the main seaplane runway to a length of 5,200 feet and a width of 500 feet, and extended the north shore of the island to accommodate an auxiliary runway, 3,400 feet long by 200 feet wide, and a large seaplane parking area.

All civilian personnel, with the exception of the dredge crew, were replaced during July 1942 by a force of 500 men drawn from the 5th and 10th Seabees, who took up construction where the contractors left off and carried the current program, except for the dredging, to completion. The 5th Battalion departed during January 1943; but 250 men of the 10th remained until the following December.

Seabee construction included two 13,500-barrel diesel tanks, two 17,000-barrel fuel-oil tanks, and thirteen 25,000-gallon tanks, with associated pumping, filtering, and issuing equipment; a pier, 460 feet long and 30 feet wide, supported on steel piles; a small-boat pier; a float for seaplanes; a concrete power house; a recreation building; an aviation repair shop; 90 quonset huts for housing; a radio station; and 50 concrete magazines, in addition to the installation of new evaporating equipment which brought the total daily fresh-water production to 30,000 gallons.

During the summer of 1943, air traffic increased steadily as our war effort gained momentum. Johnston Island was, in addition to being a base for patrol planes and a submarine fueling stop, rapidly

--159--

becoming an important stop along the westward air-transport route.

As a result, it became necessary to increase the length of the main land-plane runway to enable it to accommodate heavy long-range bombers and transports, and a detachment from the 99th Seabees arrived during December 1943 to do this work. By use of a hydraulic dredge, the island was lengthened 800 feet to provide a 6,000-foot runway. Ten acres of parking area were also added adjacent to the seaplane operating area.



As I said, your rhetoric is void.
 
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And in spite of all of your rabid, bold red text, you fail to see the point.

ALL OF THAT EXPANSION WAS DONE AFTER THE BATTLE, IN SECURE CONDITIONS WHERE THE NAVY HAD THE LUXURY OF ENHANCING THE FACILITIES AS A REAR AREA.

The Japanese would have had no such luxury.

Your entire argument is invalid.
 
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With respect to the USN being a smaller navy: In the most likely hypothesized scenario which adheres to the historical events, Nagumo takes the opportunity to launch a strike at the first sign of USN units at 0728 after the USN had launched three deckloads of strike aircraft at Kido Butai. His undelayed response might have netted him two and perhaps even all three US Carriers sunk while losing the immediate use of at least three IJN flight decks for at least 6 months due to damage and aircraft and air crew losses. Crew losses are likely to be greater than historic due to the battle over the USN CVs. Surface forces retreat to PH leaving the island to its fate. Two USN carriers (Sara and Wasp) arrive in the PTO within one week and by the end of June respectively, with a third, the Ranger transiting the Panama Canal within another month. Total capacity is just over 200 aircraft. The Long Island might be brought forward in such desperate circumstances.

Two regiments of the first Marine Division, are preparing to go to war. The fifth appears to have left for the South Pacific (New Zealand) in late May while the first departs San Francisco at the end of June. There are forces in Theater to stage an impromptu invasion which is pretty much what happened at Guadalcanal.

Arrayed against an invasion attempt at the end of July to recover Midway, the IJN has Hiryu, Zuikaku, Zuiho, Junyo and Ryujo. Total embarked are approximately 230 A/C. With significant naval aircrew and airframe losses, on both sides, I don't know which side might have an edge but for a brief period there would appear to be rough parity in embarked naval air forces. Shokaku and perhaps a repaired Akagi becomes available toward the end of August, and tips the balance heavily in Japan's favor. A delay until late 42 or early 43, assuming Torch proceeds historically, the USN can (and historically does, bring forward the four large escort carriers of the Sangamon class of CVEs (~120 total a/c capacity), while the IJN adds Hiyo (~40 A/C) and some smaller escort carriers of similar to capacity as the USN. Japan's industrial capacity and aircrew training and replacement limitations would appear to be a critical factor during the post Midway period, and has already been discussed. With poor quality torpedoes and bomber crew training requirements, as well as B-17 range and payload limitations, I am not sure how effective would be the US campaign to limit resupply of the island until the advent of sufficient B-24s which may provide a marginal improvement in payload/range performance. There might be a significant program to bring ASV equipped PBYs reinforcements from the east coast or to accelerate the equipping of those already assigned to the PTO. Without knowledge of ASV production issues, its tough to make a call on how effective such measures would be. PTO Black Cat operations began to become more effective in early 1943.

I expect loss of Midway would have caused major political and logistical changes including some kind of torpedo improvement program which might have meant adopting proven foreign aircraft and weapons, all of which would take time.

At the very least a USN loss at Midway would seem to create big problems for staging an immediate response. Not to say one wouldn't be mounted but it would appear to be a very problematic situation.

Late edit added: "...to recover Midway…" to first sentence second paragraph.
 
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One other observation may be worth making on the topic of a strike launch by Admiral Nagumo against the USN units based upon the 0728 observation by the Tone search plane. The assumption has been that the launch of the strike group and subsequent recovery of the Midway strike would make the IJN carriers less vulnerable to the damage inflicted by the SBDs. However, I don't believe the historical evidence or time line favors this assumption. From about 0710 forward, IJN aircraft were being readied for a second strike or were already prepared and either being rearmed or awaiting the possibility of USN surface units being spotted (depending on the time). Yet, during this same period, Kido Butai was under nearly continuous attack by army and navy a/c from Midway. At no time during the morning's events, did there seem to be any interest or intent to make the carriers safer by suspending the potentially hazardous operations. Had, Nagumo launched the strike by about 0745-0800 based on the first report, he would then have been faced with recovering and rearming the Midway strike aircraft, culminating in the time of attacks by the USN VT and VB squadrons. It is quite probable, given the diminished IJN CAP that these units would have done essentially the same or greater damage to the three carriers. It seems to me that the best (from an IJN viewpoint) that can come out of this scenario is an even trade of three carriers each, sunk or scuttled.
 
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Given the above scenario perhaps an equally valid question to ask is, "At what point does the IJN call off the invasion?" Historically, there were 4 lost IJN carriers vs two reported lost by the USN. That was historically sufficient to call a halt. What about three for three carriers? Sara is a mere couple of days away from the scene of battle. Fletcher makes rendezvous with the Sara carrier group, TG-11.2, on June 8. She is carrying 47 VF, 45 VB and 15 VT (10 TBFs and 5 TBDs). In the absence of a need to replenish lost carrier air wings, these numbers are adequate to provide a/c to Midway for both Sara's operational efficiency and to stiffen the island's defense. In order to preserve the precious carrier she might then have been simply approached from the Southeast and been used as merely an aircraft ferry to replenish Midway A/C (the unsinkable carrier) making it more dangerous for Hiryu to sustain an invasion. the IJN had already concluded that Midway's air power was not yet subdued (although in truth it was on the morning of the 4th) so there may have been some hesitation to staging an invasion without adequate air cover with the battle field in a state of contested air control. Just thoughts..
 
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That is your opinion.
No one knows how secure or non-secure it would have been but with the U.S. Navy regrouping from a defeat your rhetoric is void.
 
Bob, in all honesty, how do you draw a conclusion that it's my opinion when I say that the U.S. Navy would have opposed the Japanese presense on Midway?

I am having great difficulty in seeing how the Japanese occupation of Midway would have brought the United States to it's knees.

The attack on Pearl Harbor didn't do it, the setbacks at the loss of the Phillipines didn't do it, the setbacks at the Battle of Coral Sea didn't do it and the loss of Wake Island sure didn't do it.

So how was the Midway Atoll so almighty powerful, that it's loss would strike a staggering blow to the U.S. above all other setbacks already inflicted up to that point?

I am also curious how the United States Navy and Army can tear the possesion of Guadalcanal from the Japanese thousands of miles from Pearl and yet they would be totally helpless to stop a small garrison of Japanese from holding the Midway complex.
 
One other observation may be worth making on the topic of a strike launch by Admiral Nagumo against the USN units based upon the 0728 observation by the Tone search plane.
Click to expand...

I think there are a few issues here. One, what if the Tone plane was not delayed and reported the sighting 1/2 hour earlier. I would think that would have definitely precipitated a strike from the 4 carriers reserve. This should have been launched by 730am if there was no delay in the Tone's spotting craft.


The US attacks were not constant - records show the Japanese were able to recover and launch CAP during the attacks. And they seemed to indeed not stop flight operations during the bombing. This IMO was either over confidence, or the thought that we need to get our strike launched ASAP - thinking that the best defense is a good offense. And with Japanese carrier task forces, this was probably correct. Or perhaps even they did not realize how truly vulnerable they were to dive bombers by conducting flight operations. They knew they were more vulnerable yes, but again, how vulnerable. They could not examine the records of the battle of Midway to see how truly vulnerable they were.


My thoughts as to what happened depend on the exact time it is. It appears the returning Midway strike was spotted and landed between 0830-0930, so it's very possible the entire strike force would have landed by the time the Dive bombers attacked. Now the question is what would be the priority? Launching another strike on the American carriers or maximising CAP? I'm not sure what Japanese Doctrine would say at this point, though I think if their goal was to maximize CAP they could well have more CAP up than what happened historically.

If they had only focused on refueling/re-arming CAP, I think they would have been far less vulnerable. And without having in essence two sets of ordinance out they would have been in a much safer situation. The hurried re-arming from ground attack to shipping attack put them in a worse situation than if they merely had been re-arming.

And again, one of the problems with closed hangared carriers was that it took far more time to take ordinance back to the magazines (which was not even done) then it would have taken an open hangared carrier to jettison ordinance off the carrier if they were under attack.

It is quite probable, given the diminished IJN CAP that these units would have done essentially the same or greater damage to the three carriers.
Click to expand...

I think you are underestimating what damage having ordinance on deck does. Here are some results, first from the Shokaku which was NOT conducting flight operations when hit - then the Midway Carriers.

Shokaku Coral Sea - 3 1,000 bomb hits - Flight deck out of comission
Shokaku Santa Cruz - 3-6 1,000 bomb hits - Flight deck out of comission

Akagi - Midway - 1 1,000 bomb, one 1,000 pound near miss
Kaga - 1x 1000, 3x 500 bombs - sunk
Soryu - 3x 1000 Bombs - sunk

As you can see, the Shokaku took MORE bombs than the Midway carriers, and lived to fight another say.

I'd guess 2-3 Carriers would have to suspend flight operations, perhaps one could get up and running. This could be problematic, many planes though not flight crew may be lost. And there would now be one to two Japanese carriers vs. What I would think would be one US carrier. Based on the results a 1/2 strike from the Hiryu was able to accomplish, I'd bet at least 2 US carriers would be sunk or out of action.
 

At Santa Cruz, Shokaku had radar warning of the impending attack and suspended fueling, purged lines and ceased arming. It's my understanding that's why she survived.

More later...
 
At Santa Cruz, Shokaku had radar warning of the impending attack and suspended fueling, purged lines and ceased arming. It's my understanding that's why she survived.
Click to expand...

Indeed. But the Midway planes were another matter - Having armed and fueled planes on the hangar deck - and a full 1/2 strike prepared (I think this is referred to a full deck strike - the Japanese would launch in two waves even if a total launch, which was the amount of planes that could be launched from 1 "deck load"). In addition to having this many planes and open avgas lines, they also had ordinance for all the Vals, and 2x the ordinance for the Kates. It is questionable how good the "housekeeping" was in the magazines for this ordinance, which would have made the situation even more volatile.

Compare this to merely having open AVGAS lines and no ordinance if the only air operations were to land and launch CAP. That is a huge difference.

Avgas Lines are a problem, but it's a limited amount of storage, as are the planes themselves when fueled.

Now, rupturing the AVGAS tanks is a different matter, but this were usually ruptured by concussion damage lower in the vessel, such as torpedo strikes.
 
No one has said it would have brought the U.S. to its knees; it would have, partly due to political war that would have started in the U.S. caused the the U.S. to think twice before losing any more men or vehicles.

Had the U.S. lost Midway, the Japanese in all probability would have taking Johnston next giving them another base only 500 miles from Midway and 900 miles from Hawaii.

Hawaii would have been 2,600 miles from any support, period, that would have caused serious concern state side without exception.

Guadalcanal was only 1.100 miles from Cairn, Australia so Hawaii was of little importance down there as Midway was 3,000 miles away and Hawaii was 3,600 even Johnston atoll was 2,700 miles away, but Australia was of major importance.
Of course that would have left to close to 5,000 miles of enemy space between Australia and Hawaii if Midway had fallen.
That is a long, long, long way so it is unlikely Guadalcanal would have been retaken any where near the time it actually was during WWII.
 
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