Significance of the Battle of Midway

[gjs238]

Melbourne by then was decomissioning, but still she refused to die. She was sold to Chinese ship breakers, and towed to a chinese port,

Oh boy.....
Can see where this is going.....

weathering a typhoon enroute. she was sold with the stipulation that she was to be scrapped immediately, but this did not transpire. the chinese had other ideas, they needed some basic ideas on carrier operation and catapult design. Even back then they had ambitions of developing their own carrier capability, but they were starting from a long way behind.

The ship was not scrapped immediately; instead she was studied by Chinese as part of the nation's top-secret carrier development program. Melbourne was the largest warship any of the Chinese experts had seen, and they were surprised by the amount of equipment which was still in place. The PLAN subsequently arranged for the ship's flight deck and all the equipment associated with flying operations to be removed so that they could be studied in depth, and reportedly extensively reverse engineered. Either a replica of the flight deck, or the deck itself, was used for training of People's Liberation Army Navy pilots in carrier flight operations> The chinese literally cut the flight deck off the hull, placed it on a land area and used it fleor deck landing training. Clever little Chinese eager beavers.....

Around 1987 the Royal Australian Navy received and "politely rejected" a request from the PLAN for blueprints of the ship's steam catapult. The carrier was not dismantled for many years; according to some rumours she was not completely broken up until 2002. A 2012 article in Jane's Navy International stated that the large quantity of equipment recovered from Melbourne "undoubtedly helped" Admiral Liu Hua-qing secure the Chinese Government's support for his proposal to initiate a program to develop aircraft carriers for the Navy. In some ways I am happy that Melbournes legacy has had such far reachig effects, but of course in other respects it alarms me that it is helping our most likely future enemies.

Surprise surprise.

 

[parsifal]

Pars, Thanks for the inside story of Melbourne and RAN carrier aviation… IMHO, its fate is to be lamented. I am happy JMSD carrier aviation is resurgent but I wish we had another ally in the pacific with similar capability. I think the decision to reject SCS design was wise, whereas GG is a pretty neat little package, small capacity but seems to be a real if pint-sized STOVL CV which would be less expensive to crew and would keep some important art and trade craft alive in Oz. Without anything to validate my opinion, I think almost any option built in the US will be ridiculously expensive to create, own and operate and require what amounts to an entire air force worth of expenditure in AC procurement.

One of the few attractive aspects of the film Battleship was its depiction of 'RAN Hornets' launching from the deck of a USN CVN. I expect that was more hollywood than RAAF F-18 capability. What's the scoop on that?

I love the big decks but they ARE just gawdawful expensive!

If your okay to talk OT for a bit, im happy to talk a bit. Have a look at whats happening across Asia, and everyone is quietly getting ready to accommodate the emerging Chinese challenges. Doesnt mean we still dont rely heavily on US alliances. They have the heavy strike capability that we can just mimic really.

To give you a bit of a heads up, starting with India, The Indian Navy presently has two aircraft carriers in active service, the INS Viraat and INS Vikramaditya. INS Viraat is planned for decommissioning after the induction of the first domestically built Vikrant class aircraft carrier, which from what ive read are quite good ships. The Indian Navy has about 250 aircraft, making it the thirds largest FAA in the world I think. In 2004, India bought the Russian aircraft carrier, Admiral Gorshkov for the equivalent of US$1.5 billion. It cost an additional US$1.5 billion to overhaul the vessel and refit it entirely with new electronic, weapon systems and sensors. INS Vikramaditya as it is called sailed to India after her commissioning on 15 November 2013. It joined active service by December 2013 with a complement of 50 a/c, including 50 fixed wing aircraft of Russian manufacture


The Royal Thai Navy has an interesting VStol carrier, but has been badly let down by its choice of the matador, a 1st generation harrier. HTMS Chakri Naruebet as it is called, is based on the Spanish Navy's Principe de Asturias design (we were considering the same design 20 years earlier) and constructed by Spanish shipbuilder Bazán, Chakri Naruebet was ordered in 1992, launched in 1996, and commissioned into the RTN in 1997. For a long time the thais did not have any fixed wing aircraft, being the last to use 1st gen Harriers (and these were all grounded within a year of purchase, but finally some moves are afoot to re-equip the Thai air wing. The ship is 11400 tons, and carriers 10 fixed wing aircraft and up to 14 choppers. Thats a lot for a small package

The Koreans have the Dokdo Class LPHS ships (amphibious assault ships similar to your Iwo Jima class. Rated for Vstol aircraft with the decks strengthened and heat treated to accommodate the F-35, the Koreans are considering the purchase of the navalised FD-35, and the construction of a second amphibious carrier.

Australia, after more than 30 years without a carrier, has decided now to build two LPHs , which are 25000 ton amphibious command ships with a significant aviation component. Has a ski jump, and designed to accommodate the F-35B, but we still say we arent buying the navalised version of the JSF.

Asian Carriers By the Numbers | USNI News

Nuship Canberra

And what to make of all this. Perhaps best summed up by Shakespeare....."Once more unto the breach, dear friends, once more"

 

[Garyt]

Had the Japanese taken the island within a year they also probably would and could have made it mostly complete in a similar time frame as the U.S. would have been in no position to seriously challenge them as they would have been rebuilding for a massive assault to come.

Again, as I mentioned earlier in this thread, we need to look at the ability of both Japan and the US to "build" for lack of a better word bases. Japan's lack of ability to build/rebuild as quickly as the americans were able to. In "The Rising Sun" by Toland, frequent comments are made by Japanese about how astounded they are regarding the american's industrial advantages.

I think we have to be very careful to compare the ability and timeframe of the US to build a base during peacetime vs. the ability of the Japanese to do the same with wartime strains upon their shipping and industrial engine, as well as potential US interdiction of said build up.

Would you not think that this is not an apples to apples comparison?

And as of 6/1942, Midway was merely an atoll with an airfield or the most part. Not a base who's support of Pearl Harbor was paramount for the survival of Pearl.

 

[gjs238]

And what to make of all this. Perhaps best summed up by Shakespeare....."Once more unto the breach, dear friends, once more"

All paid for by shifting our (US) manufacturing to China and India.

 

[VBF-13]

If Japan was in a position to successfully attack and take Hawaii after the battle of Midway, then they should have been able to refuse the U.S. invasion of Guadacanal which historically occurred just a few months after the battle of Midway. As it turns out, they didn't.

So in the far-fetched scenario where Japan seizes the Leeward islands and Hawaii (including the other main islands), how would they still be able to provide adequate protection for their current possesions?

Also, when people say "Hawaii", I assume they mean Pearl Harbor on the island of Oahu. There were also several Army bases and a Naval air station on Oahu outside of Pearl Harbor. They would also have to take Kauai, Molokai, Lanai, Maui and Hawaii itself in order to ensure possesion security.

Let's think this out. Parsifal introduced a very interesting proposition, I think. What if they took Midway, and we just stayed at Pearl? I'm asking, what's their next move?

I'm not saying try to occupy the Hawaiian Islands. That's as crazy a proposition as it's unnecessary, I think. Hawaii, without Pearl, that's no threat to them. The fleet, starting with the big carriers, that's the threat.

They wait us out. Besides tying up fleet, they're starving, and need to supply it. And, we're sitting pretty, and getting stronger. We're dealing the cards, now. Maybe we go get them, but not before we're good and ready. On the other hand, they're running out of rice, and soybean soup, and pickles, and sake. Among other things. Let's consider their coming after us. The big carriers. The fleet. They're all in the same place. Pearl. If they're not, if they're at sea, Pearl is still strategic, as it's their sanctuary.

Give it a go. Reinforce, first, if they have to. But, don't lollygag around. Time is of the essence. I'm saying, I've still yet to hear anything that takes that move, an all-out assault on Pearl, off the table. And, I think it makes some sense.

 

[GrauGeist]

Well, having the Japanese in possesion of Midway won't stop the industrial capacity of the U.S. and it certainly won't stop the U.S. Navy from operating in and around the vicinity. No more than the loss of Wake Island did.

With the taking of Midway Island, the Japanese would either have to take the Hawaiian chain or risk attrition by sub pickets and hazarding attacks. Wake Island was far enough to the east, that the U.S. pretty much left it to it's own until a time that they could commit resources to retake it, since it was not of strategic importance.

During the course of the war, the U.S. adopted an "island hopping campaign" that proved that non strategic islands could be bypassed and in doing so, cut off the island defenders from reliable resupply and saved Allied resources for assualting valuable targets.

 

[Aozora]

Well, having the Japanese in possesion of Midway won't stop the industrial capacity of the U.S. and it certainly won't stop the U.S. Navy from operating in and around the vicinity. No more than the loss of Wake Island did.

With the taking of Midway Island, the Japanese would either have to take the Hawaiian chain or risk attrition by sub pickets and hazarding attacks. Wake Island was far enough to the east, that the U.S. pretty much left it to it's own until a time that they could commit resources to retake it, since it was not of strategic importance.

During the course of the war, the U.S. adopted an "island hopping campaign" that proved that non strategic islands could be bypassed and in doing so, cut off the island defenders from reliable resupply and saved Allied resources for assualting valuable targets.

From Tully's website Nihon Kaigun; he did a brief analysis of Japan vs U.S production capacity, which shows how foolish the Japanese were to start a war they couldn't win. Had Midway been taken the biggest disadvantage to the US would have been the loss of an intermediate submarine base between Pearl Harbor and Japan.

 

[VBF-13]

Well, having the Japanese in possesion of Midway won't stop the industrial capacity of the U.S. and it certainly won't stop the U.S. Navy from operating in and around the vicinity. No more than the loss of Wake Island did.

With the taking of Midway Island, the Japanese would either have to take the Hawaiian chain or risk attrition by sub pickets and hazarding attacks. Wake Island was far enough to the east, that the U.S. pretty much left it to it's own until a time that they could commit resources to retake it, since it was not of strategic importance.

During the course of the war, the U.S. adopted an "island hopping campaign" that proved that non strategic islands could be bypassed and in doing so, cut off the island defenders from reliable resupply and saved Allied resources for assualting valuable targets.

They were facing attrition. Get Pearl, while they still had the upper-hand. I think Yamamoto, had he had the autonomy, would have gone at it.

 

[VBF-13]

From Tully's website Nihon Kaigun; he did a brief analysis of Japan vs U.S production capacity, which shows how foolish the Japanese were to start a war they couldn't win.

I think Yamamoto would have agreed with that.

 

[GrauGeist]

At the time of the battle, Midway hadn't been developed to it's full potential as a forward base. Development commenced after the battle, reaching it's peak towards war's end.

At the time of the battle, the primary submarine base was located at Oahu. Even my Uncle's subs (Gato class) operated from Oahu with a secondary call at bases in Australia.

Here is Midway Island, 24 November 1941:

Here's Midway Island about 6 months later, seen just before the battle, 3 June 1942:

As you can see in the photos, Midway was not fully developed by the time of the battle, like some seem to think. As it stands, the U.S. put forth a large effort to develop Midway into a forward base. They had the luxury of working under secure conditions, as well as the materials, equipment and manpower to do so.

The Japanese would have been hard pressed to create a facility like this in a forward area, under combat conditions. (as has been mentioned before)

Midway, Sand Island development by 29 September 1943:

Midway, Sand Island development by 29 January 1944:

Midway, Sand Island April 1945:

Midway, Sand Island April 1945:

 

[Garyt]

Nice job on the Pics, Graugreist!

 

[GrauGeist]

Nice job on the Pics, Graugreist!

Thanks!

 

[buffnut453]

Interesting pics. It looks like the western end of Eastern Island was excavated while the eastern end had stuff added to it. Pretty cool engineering project...but I agree it would be tough to do under any kind of enemy military action.

 

[parsifal]

It really did not hit home just how tiny the atoll is until i saw those photos. With eight major surface units assigned to the bombardment forces, there rreally would not be much left of the place after a day or so. This would not be another guadacanal. nowhere to run, nowhere to hide, overwhelming japanese firepower. in my opinion, there is no doubt how the invasion would have panned out

 

[Aozora]

Midway then:

Midway now...Midway Atoll birdwatching holidays: Pacific Nature and History Refuge.

 

[GrauGeist]

The Midway complex was really a cluster of little postage stamps and it's amazing to see how the U.S. Navy expanded the land-mass over the span of 3 years, Sand Island in particular.

Earlier in the thread, when I mentioned that it would take an effort to not only secure and supply the island, but it would take a tremendous effort of men, equipment and materials to transform Midway into the base it became, I wasn't making that point based on opinion
The Japanese would have been hard pressed to create such a facility, like the U.S. made, because the base expansion (as seen in the photos) was done in a secure environment.

If we look across the Pacific theater, at Japanese bases, look at how they had to constantly rebuild and resupply as the Allied forces bombed them, like the base at Rabaul, for example. How many Japanese transports and supply ships lay on the bottom, still full of supplies, equipment and even men?

It even took the U.S. Marines and Army quite a while to secure and build up Henderson field beyond a muddy spot in the jungle, surrounded by soggy tents and exposed stacks of supplies.

 

[Juha]

It would have been more like Betio, Roi-Namur or Tanambogo and Gavutu off Florida Is if one wants chronologically nearest case. In fact properly contructed coastal defence fortresses could take amazing amount of pounding without being silenced as shown in cases of Finnish ones during the Winter War,

 

[oldcrowcv63]

It really did not hit home just how tiny the atoll is until i saw those photos. With eight major surface units assigned to the bombardment forces, there rreally would not be much left of the place after a day or so. This would not be another guadacanal. nowhere to run, nowhere to hide, overwhelming japanese firepower. in my opinion, there is no doubt how the invasion would have panned out

Quantifying:

Land Area:

Wake Island: 4.063 sq. mi.
Midway Island: 2.4 sq. mi. (not sure if this is before or after the extensive construction program of WW2… which I assume increased land area considerably.)
Estimate of occupied area of Guadalcanal: ~30 sq. miles. (probably a bit underestimated) I couldn't find a better value.

hmmmm… Doesn't look good for the defenders of Midway having to face the big guns of Yamamoto's battle line.

Apparently, Yamamoto, who had been a mover and shaker in bringing naval aviation to its ultimate expression, was loathe to expose his heavy ships to the combined fire power of the one surviving USN CV and what ever could be staged out of Midway's own airfield which he believed hadn't been neutralized… Or perhaps he was just anticipating that no matter how successful the IJN might be in subsequent days, he couldn't foresee being able to hang on in the face of whatever reinforcements the USN might be able to muster. It would be interesting to know whether spies in either Oahu or the Canal Zone were providing the IJN any current intelligence regarding units coming in to PH (SARA) or entering the PTO (WASP).

If Yamamoto had employed a different plan, something more as Pars said, mutually supporting flight decks, along the lines of Guderian's "fist not fingers…," the outcome might likely have been very different, even in the event of a bloody mutually-damaging carrier battle where the USN retained the element of surprise and did serious damage on its first (morning) strike.

 

[Juha]

IIRC the fire support of Midway invasion force was limited to 4 CAs, one CL and 11DDs.

 

[syscom3]

Midway then:

I think thats a diorama that Life magazine created.