Significance of the Battle of Midway

[parsifal]

IIRC the fire support of Midway invasion force was limited to 4 CAs, one CL and 11DDs.

In terms of direct support, yes this was the force attached firectly to the invasion fleet. But from the Kaigun website, the actual bombardment forces were considerably grater than that




Battleship Division 3, Section 1

RAdm. Mikawa Gunichi
BB-1 Kongō, BB-2 Hiei

Cruiser Division 4, Section 1
CA-9 Atago, CA-11 Chōkai

Cruiser Division 5
CA-5 Myōkō,CA-7 Haguro


Destroyer Squadron 4
CL-11 Yura,
DD-69 Yūdachi, DD-68 Murasame, DD-70 Samidare, DD-71 Harusame

Destroyer Division 9
DD-80 Natsugumo, DD-82 Minegumo, DD-83 Asagumo

Carrier Group
CVL Zuihō
VF: 6 A6M2, 6 A5M4
VT: 12 B5N2

DD-32 Mikazuki,

Close Support Group (direct Attachment)
Cruiser Division 7

CA-16 Kumano, CA-13 Mogami, CA-14 Mikuma, CA-15 Suzuya

Destroyer Division 8
DD-76 Asashio, DD-79 Arashio,


Seaplane Tender Group

AV Chitose
VS: 16 [12] F1M2
4 [4] E13A1

AV 上川丸 Kamikawa Maru
VS: 8 [8] F1M2
4 [4] E13A1

DD-21 Hayashio
APD 35 Momi

Destroyer Squadron 2

CL-16 Jintsū
Destroyer Division 15

DD-19 Kuroshio, DD-20 Oyashio,DD-23 Hatsukaze, DD-24 Yukikaze, DD-25 Amatsukaze, DD-26 Tokitsukaze, DD-17 Kagero, DD-18 Shiranuhi, DD-84 Arare, DD-85 Kasumi,


Combined Landing Force
2nd Combined SNLF,1,250 men

28th Regiment's detach. 1,200 men

11th Construction Btn (actually pioneers) .
1,250 men

12th Construction Btn.
1,250 men

APD Minekaze x 2 , 1 x Momi

All these units should be considered as provbiding support for the landing forces

 

[parsifal]

Quantifying:

Land Area:

Wake Island: 4.063 sq. mi.
Midway Island: 2.4 sq. mi. (not sure if this is before or after the extensive construction program of WW2… which I assume increased land area considerably.)
Estimate of occupied area of Guadalcanal: ~30 sq. miles. (probably a bit underestimated) I couldn't find a better value.

hmmmm… Doesn't look good for the defenders of Midway having to face the big guns of Yamamoto's battle line.

Apparently, Yamamoto, who had been a mover and shaker in bringing naval aviation to its ultimate expression, was loathe to expose his heavy ships to the combined fire power of the one surviving USN CV and what ever could be staged out of Midway's own airfield which he believed hadn't been neutralized… Or perhaps he was just anticipating that no matter how successful the IJN might be in subsequent days, he couldn't foresee being able to hang on in the face of whatever reinforcements the USN might be able to muster. It would be interesting to know whether spies in either Oahu or the Canal Zone were providing the IJN any current intelligence regarding units coming in to PH (SARA) or entering the PTO (WASP).

If Yamamoto had employed a different plan, something more as Pars said, mutually supporting flight decks, along the lines of Guderian's "fist not fingers…," the outcome might likely have been very different, even in the event of a bloody mutually-damaging carrier battle where the USN retained the element of surprise and did serious damage on its first (morning) strike.

Half the size of Wake, wow. guadacanal, the island was much bigger than 30 square miles, and even the perimeter as at October 1942 measured about 6 miles by 3 miles. At the time of Kawaguchis counterattack, 26 october 1942, the active front was about 1-2 miles.

it is, however, not valid to compare what transpired on Guadacanal, to what might happen if an assault was to occur on Midway. Japanese operations on Guadacanal were never adequately supported and suffered from chronic supply shortages. The terrain greatly favoured the defences, and at times, sheeer dub luck worked against the Japanese.

I think Yammamoto abandoned Midway, because the basic premise on which it had been devised, to lure the American fleet out to batrtle, and then destroy it, had not happened in anything like the way it was designed. I dont agree that Yammamoto was loathe to ri sk his battleships, but neither was he prepred to squander them pointlessly. in 1942 they were still considered necessary for the final showdown with the US battlefleet.....the decisive battle.....and for a short while after the catastrophe he entertained the idea of closing for a night battle . he soon reversed that decision

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Half the size of Wake, wow. guadacanal, the island was much bigger than 30 square miles, and even the perimeter as at October 1942 measured about 6 miles by 3 miles. At the time of Kawaguchis counterattack, 26 october 1942, the active front was about 1-2 miles.

it is, however, not valid to compare what transpired on Guadacanal, to what might happen if an assault was to occur on Midway.

My Guadalcanal area estimate was based on gridding the map on page 230 of Frank's Guadalcanal, The map depicts the situation on the night of September 12 and 13 during the battle of Edson's Ridge. The value represents an estimate of the area between Aliigator Creek and the Lunga River, capped in the South by the defensive line on Edson's Ridge.

I was simply working from your suggestion that the barrage concentration (presumably measured in pounds/tons of ordnance dropped on Midway per square yard would be greater than that dropped on Henderson field and surroundings simply due to the larger occupied area. In retrospect, the fact that the target was pretty much Henderson Field itself suggests, the analogy is indeed a poor one. Presumably the targeted area would actually be roughly the same size. Of course, the bombardment at Midway would presumably be made to soften the island defenses in preparation for an invasion, while at Guadalcanal I believe the naval gunfire was mainly to destroy the airfield itself and support facilities. On the other hand, there are the reports by survivors of observing shells marching across the occupied portion of Guadalcanal's coastal plain that suggest the target may have been more broadly defined than just the airfield.

 

[parsifal]

The whole plan was compromised by the cryptoanalysis of japanese codes. ive always held the belief that the Japanese placed their carriers too far forward, and should have placed them behind the other forces advancing on Midway. What im not sure of is the extent that the codebreakers could read actual battle dispositions. They knew for example, the target, the timing, the force compositions of the plan, but did they know the tactical dispositions. if for example, the Main Body was pushed forward of carriers, would the USN have known about that?

I expect that they would, but surely it was a better basic plan to approach from the southwest, where 24th Air Flotilla could offer some LR recon assistance, advancing the carriers behind the main body rather than sticking its neck out asking to have it knocked off. Approaching from the Northwest meant the KB was left exposed, with no land based support and no ability to undertake any deceptions as to what they were.

The whole plan, from an operational pov just defies logic in certain respects. it smacks of over confidence. the Japanese should have advanced on the island cautiously. They didnt need to take the risks they did, unless they believed the USN would not come out if presented with a "safe" japanese plan. Placing the carriers behind the amphibious groups was a safe plan, but it would rob the IJN of the surpise element they were looking for.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

The whole plan was compromised by the cryptoanalysis of japanese codes. ive always held the belief that the Japanese placed their carriers too far forward, and should have placed them behind the other forces advancing on Midway. What im not sure of is the extent that the codebreakers could read actual battle dispositions. They knew for example, the target, the timing, the force compositions of the plan, but did they know the tactical dispositions. if for example, the Main Body was pushed forward of carriers, would the USN have known about that?

I expect that they would, but surely it was a better basic plan to approach from the southwest, where 24th Air Flotilla could offer some LR recon assistance, advancing the carriers behind the main body rather than sticking its neck out asking to have it knocked off. Approaching from the Northwest meant the KB was left exposed, with no land based support and no ability to undertake any deceptions as to what they were.

The whole plan, from an operational pov just defies logic in certain respects. it smacks of over confidence. the Japanese should have advanced on the island cautiously. They didnt need to take the risks they did, unless they believed the USN would not come out if presented with a "safe" japanese plan. Placing the carriers behind the amphibious groups was a safe plan, but it would rob the IJN of the surpise element they were looking for.

Two instances, one of an IJN scouting report and the other of the first US sighting of IIN units are relevant to your questions.

The first is the scouting report of I-168 made on June 1, 1942, which indicated "incessant air activity" at the island's airfield, which might have been interpreted as preparations being made for an anticipated attack.

From SS, Glorious Day... (Cressman ed.) Japanese submarine I-168 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.

According to SS, there were many IJN radio intelligence clues indicating an enhanced state of readiness of the US to receive an attack.

The Japanese described this "over confidence" to a combination of fatigue and "Victory Disease" although I'd characterize it as more like "Victory Blindness"

Despite this, Nagumo chose to mount a fairly relaxed reconnaissance on the day of the attack. SS suggests communications limitations prevented Nagumo from being made aware of the US state of preparedness.

The second is the ~0930, June 3rd report by Ensign Jack Reid, who, upon spotting the transports of the Midway invasion or occupation formations reported incorrectly, "Main Body." These units were approaching from the SW, from the vicinity of Wake Island. On monitoring the report, Nimitz's transmitted response was the now famous:

"The force sighted is not, repeat not, the Main Body."

This suggests to me that (assuming the USN formation names for the IJN components were the same as those of the IJN) that the intel was very detailed both as to force composition, location and projected track. Although actual force deployment was apparently a mystery. Did the 4 IJN CVs operate together or were they operating, like the USN, as independent divisions?

 

[VBF-13]

Did the 4 IJN CVs operate together or were they operating, like the USN, as independent divisions?

I believe they were operating together. That's another thing that's often ignored. The Japanese well-versed in carrier operations, the U.S. wasn't.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

I believe they were operating together. That's another thing that's often ignored. The Japanese well-versed in carrier operations, the U.S. wasn't.

Hi VBF-13, Sorry, that was meant to be a rhetorical question. In other words, the US intel had revealed a lot of info regarding force disposition but there were blank spots that created problems for the USN. yes, you are right, the USN was doing well to get just one carrier's air group to execute a coordinated strike, while the IJN was able to (and did on December 7, '41) execute coordinated strikes from elements of up to six different carriers. The USN just wasn't in the same league beyond the squadron level and some specific CVs such as the Yorktown. Prior to Coral Sea, TF-17 was coming along (with a very long way to go) when Lexington was lost at Coral Sea, followed by the loss of the Yorktown at Midway. There was a fair amount of experience in that task force that was ultimately dispersed to season other organizations.

 

[VBF-13]

Hi VBF-13, Sorry, that was meant to be a rhetorical question.

But of course, Crow. I guess I eat crow for not catching that, lol.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

But of course, Crow. I guess I eat crow for not catching that, lol.

Not that! Man! you'd choke on the hide.

 

[vikingBerserker]

 

[Juha]

Hello Parsifal
the Kaigun's Midway link didn't work for me but the older understanding was that Kondo's Second Fleet's Strike Force, Support Force, Main Body was to screen the southern side of the battle area and the shore bombardment was the job of Kurita's Close Support Group.

 

[gjs238]

Goodbye to a great thread

 

[oldcrowcv63]

The Midway complex was really a cluster of little postage stamps and it's amazing to see how the U.S. Navy expanded the land-mass over the span of 3 years, Sand Island in particular.

Earlier in the thread, when I mentioned that it would take an effort to not only secure and supply the island, but it would take a tremendous effort of men, equipment and materials to transform Midway into the base it became, I wasn't making that point based on opinion
The Japanese would have been hard pressed to create such a facility, like the U.S. made, because the base expansion (as seen in the photos) was done in a secure environment.

If we look across the Pacific theater, at Japanese bases, look at how they had to constantly rebuild and resupply as the Allied forces bombed them, like the base at Rabaul, for example. How many Japanese transports and supply ships lay on the bottom, still full of supplies, equipment and even men?

It even took the U.S. Marines and Army quite a while to secure and build up Henderson field beyond a muddy spot in the jungle, surrounded by soggy tents and exposed stacks of supplies.

And this where apparently much of the early heavy earth moving had already been accomplished by the Japanese pioneers. From Richard Frank's comprehensive Guadalcanal:

May 18, Lunga Point reported to be suitable for airfield construction by IJN Capt. Miyazaki. (Only a few such areas were suitable for air fields in the Solomons.)
May 27, Inspection Party examines site and concurs with Miyazaki
JUne 8, Pioneers landed at Lunga to prepare a base.
June 13, decision is made by IJN General Staff to build airfield on Guadalcanal.
June 20 Construction of wharf and airfield commence.
July 6, Twelve ship convoy lands additional workers (two construction battalions, total 2,571 men) and their heavy equipment.
August 7, USMC lands First Division on Guadalcanal and takes possession of uncompleted airfield and uses IJN equipment to continue construction.
August 12, Less than a week after the landings, the first a/c, a PBY-5A, lands at newly established Henderson Field, A/F declared operational, despite no a/c revetments, taxiways, or drainage

August 20, ACV-1, USS Long Island delivers MAG-23 consisting of 19 F4F and 12 SBDs to Henderson.

Long Island's arrival off Guadalcanal was delayed due to a stopover in Efate to exchange the green pilots of VMF-223 for the more experienced pilots of VMF-212.

Henderson remained a muddy poorly prepared air strip for some time afterward. By Mid September, Fighter One air strip had been constructed but its operation remained subject to rain inundation.

By the end of October, 1942, three fields had been built, Henderson, now 5,400' in length of which only 3,500' feet was metal matting and two dirt/grass strips of Fighter One and Two.

Of course, Midway's airfield was already prepared and would need only be repaired for an occupying force to use.

Late addition, added comments about progress on developing Henderson and the two fighter fields.

 

[drgondog]

The Japanese capability and capacity to build airfields was very poor compared to American standards - and proved to be a critically weak link in Japan's ability to project force in the Solomon's. In addition, their ability to deliver spare parts and repair aircraft with little battle damage but lacking critical parts continued to be a major factor in their defeat.

That the entire area north of Australia was such a cesspool of jungle rot, dysentery, malaria, impenetrable jungle, rain and dangerous weather made it the toughest place in the war to mount and maintain offensive actions.

"Little" details like building Service hangars, revetments, ramps and taxiways seemed to be beyond the ability of IJA Pioneer construction battalions and equipment in a timely fashion, and caused crucial delays in their advance to take Port Moresby and the rest of New Guinea in May - or secure Guadalcanal as an airbase before the US arrived in August. Both of those were crucial failures of initiative and execution.

In addition, as primitive as our medical facilities were in contrast to US, Australia and Europe, we were far better off than the Japanese as far as returning our pilots back to flyable duty (but never really defeating disease and illness). I believe this also was a major factor in the ability of the US and RAAF to wrest air superiority away from the Japanese while we were building fleet capacity in the US for the next year after Midway.

 

[GrauGeist]

Also, if we go back and look at the photos of Midway Island's transformation, we'll see that the initial airstrip (pre battle) was situated on Eastern Island.

Following the battle, attention turned to Sand Island where a massive buildup of facilities and a new, larger airfield and port complex were constructed. Extensive reef demolition and dredging contributed to Sand Island's land area increase by a considerable amount while at the same time creating a large harbor access and interior anchorage.

 

[parsifal]

There is no comparison to japanese construction capability to the US, principally due to a poorer standard of planning, materials and manpower shortages, and most importantly due to a much lower standard of mechanisation. Still, US capabilities in 1942 were far more limited than those that occurred later in the war, and unfortunately our view of American capabilities in 1942 assumes that they had the same capabilities early in the war, as they clearly possessed later in the war. Clearly this is a bit of propaganda.


A good example of the thin deployments that hampered the japanese at this early stage is to take a quick look at the guadacanal construction forces. initially designated Tulagi invasion force. It consisted of a part detachment of the Sasebo SNLF and a part of the 17th Construction (or support) squadron, about 35 specialist construction troops. Total force strength was about 450 men, they were faced by 25 Australian commandoes which i believe were evacuated along with some RAAF personnal. The R$AAF had based a half squadron of Catalina at Tuagi from January. On evacuation, some four PBYs were burnt I believe, to avoid capture.

At this stage Tulagi was the target of the invasion, because it was the seat of the British administration, already had some seaplane facilities (a jetty or slipway I think). It had several buildings worth capturing and a reasonable supply of food on which the garrison could rely. Because of the lack of medical support, the Japanese felt they needed healthy environments for their troops, and this meant getting good bivouacs to avoid the typical jungle diseases that they knew would decimate their formation strengths. Anyway 17th army signaled or advised very early (or perhaps even before the operation began) that it was unable to spare the transports needed to transport large quantities of supply to the new outpost, and the local force would need to rely on local availability for food and water. No capacity existed at that time for the shipment of construction materials. There were no plans to build an airfield at that stage, it was intended merely to establish and maintain a forward seaplane base from which surveillance of Noumea, there eventual target of the operation.

After the failure to capture Port Moresby, 17th Area Army recognised this position was now badly exposed. I get the feeling from the signal traffic that we do have, that they wanted to evacuate the position. I wonder what they might have said had they been informed of the Midway disaster. IGHQ refused their request. Further, as a sign of the fantasy world that the IGHQ lived, it issued orders to develop a land based airstrip at Lunga, on nearby Guadacanal. GHQ instructed that the construction unit that had been assigned to the Midway operation, was to be transferred to 17 Area Army command for the airfield construction. It appears that IGHQ intended to continue their offensive operations to isolate Australi, and to facilitate this by land based air rather than carrier forces. A direct benfit of the midway operation, but more importantly, a clear sign of the neurosis that still gripped the Japanese leadership

Known as 'Runga Point' to the Japanese, and code named RXI, Lunga Point was surveyed by the Japanese when they arrived in the area in early May, after the capture of Tulagi. The strip would allow Japanese aircraft to patrol the southern Solomons, shipping lanes to Australia, and the eastern flank of New Guinea.

The major construction units involved 1,145 in another, arriving on July 6, 1942. This team was originally scheduled to work on Midway once it was in captured. Work commenced after July 9th. Construction was observed and reported by coastwatcher and this airfield's presence spawned American plans to capture Guadalcanal.

About the middle of July, 250 additional civilians of the 'Hama Construction Unit' arrived known as the under the command of Inouree Hama, who had had 50 men on Gavutu previously. Also specialists from the 14th Encampment Corps that established the radio stations on Tulagi, Gavutu and at RXI plus the C. O. installing a radar set. Local labor was also used in the construction.

Airfield construction proceeded rapidly, ahead of schedule, despite being very short of mechanisation. At the end of the second week, the unit received 6 trucks and 1 bulldozer, which it used day and night to good effect.

On the night of August 5, 1942 just prior to the American landing, the construction troops were given an extra sakai ration for completing construction ahead of schedule. The next day, the Americans arrived and capture the airstrip. this began the pivatal campaign of the Pacific.

There were at least three TOEs and a multiplicity of roles for the Japanese engineers. The most numerous, and typical I think, was the "general Purpose engineer, or Dokuritsu Kohei Rentai , Its TOE was widely variable, but typically such units consisted of about 1100 men and had 14 vehicles attached. Heavy earth moving gear was the exception to the rule.

by comparison, even in 1942, a US General service Regiment, the nearest equivalent of the above, even in 1942 913 enlisted men and 31 officers. and 134 vehicles of a bewildering array attached. These TOEs could be greatly modified, depending on need and situation, but it is clear there is no comparison in the mechanisation levels of the two opposing formations.

 

[drgondog]

Nicely summarized Parsifal. The key subtlety that I agree and would expand on is that the US didn't have the Seabee's organized and equipped, as such, at Guadalcanal, but the pool of extremely skilled heavy construction tradespersons and heavy equipment was literally infinite in comparison to that of Japan... and in process of being organized and deployed as Guadalcanal campaign was underway.

The other fact worth noting is that when the US deployed the construction units, they were already staffed with 100% skilled folks whereas the Japanese drew heavily on slave or native impressed labor and pitiful equipment TO&E in comparison. The key issue was always 'time to complete' the same task in comparison to US.

 

[parsifal]

Japanese engineers were generally well trained. They did try to substitute their lack of heavy machinery using local (usually forced) labour, but the engineers themselves were actually pretty good at what they did. the burma railway, much as it was a human rights nightmare, was an engineering marvel, completed in record time. Contrary to the movie, British expertise was not needed to complete the bridges, or any other element of the line. And when completed, it provided some assistance to the Japanese in Burma. the fact that it cost nearly 60000 lives, many of them completely unnecessarily has nothing to do with the engineering aspect of the Japanese army, and everything to do with the sadistic magnet that was their Kempetei.

The other great achievement of the Japanese engineers during the war was their high standard of field fortifications. often completed with nothing but local supplies, they were generally a major headache for the allied invasion forces. in terms of more permanent field fortifications, the Japanese defences at mutanchiang were good enough to make the Soviets in 1945 noyt even attempt an assault against them. instead they went around them......

There was nothing wrong with Japanese engineering know how. what they lacked was numbers, supplies and mechanization ,

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Goodbye to a great thread

Or maybe not...

 

[zoomar]

The battle of Midway was a disastrous and unexpected defeat for the IJN that signaled the beginnning of the end for the IJN, but let's get one thing straight. Even if the IJN had completely destroyed the entire US force arrayed them with no carriers lost themselves (unlikley, but possible I suppose), they still intended to take the islands and the Japanese record at Wake would indicate this might not have been easy. Only a light naval force was detailed to support the invasion fleet and - even with complete air superiority - the invasion might not suceed. Midway was well defended.

Even if the invasion did suceed, Japan was still going to lose the war. The US still had two capable fleet carriers (Saaratoga and Wasp), and within one year, US production capacity would have made good the losses, and then some. Within two years - even assuming that Japan somehow managed not to lose any of its fleet carriers to submarines or in some other schemes in the Solomons, Australia, or the Indian Ocean, the US would have many more and many better fleet carriers at its disposal, while Japan would have at most one new fleet carrier (I'm not counting the wartime tender and liner conversions). Also, US aircraft (F6F, F4U, TBF, etc) would outclass and ournumber their Japanese opponents by a long shot. There is only so much a small cadre of highly trained and dedicated Japanese naval aviators coould achieve against a far greater number of almost-as-well-trained pilots flying better planes.

The Pacific War would play out differently, but Japan would still lose.