Significance of the Battle of Midway

[GrauGeist]

And so I'll go out on a limb here and suppose that the U.S. allowed the leeward islands to be taken with little opposition all the way up to Hawaii.

Now the Japanese have Hawaii. Brilliant move by the Japanese. They have over exteneded their resources even further, having to provide men, material and maritime assets to hold these islands. Now what?

The bulk of U.S. Naval power at this point in time was nearing completion in Naval Shipyards on the East and West coast. The American war machine was no where near it's peak output and as it turned out, never committed it's full measure by war's end.

In order to stop the U.S., they would have to actually invade and hold stratetigic U.S. proper. Taking several dusty little Atolls and the Hawaiian island chain would not come close to forcing the U.S. to the negotiating table. It would actually backfire on the Japanese because now their assets have been stretched thinner than they Historically were prior to the Midway campaign.

Taking Hawaii would no more force the U.S. to the bargaining table than taking Iwo jima forced the Japanese to the bargaining table.

All of this falls deep into the realm of "what if" that has no bearing on the significance of the battle of Midway's outcome.

 

[Garyt]

Hawaii would have been 2,600 miles from any support, period, that would have caused serious concern state side without exception.

Hawaii was indeed 2,600 miles away from any support without the Japanese taking Midway.

Midway provided no "support", if anything it was something that had to be supported.

Midway in 1942 was not really any kind of a base, so it lent no real support to Hawaii.

 

[Garyt]

In order to stop the U.S., they would have to actually invade and hold stratetigic U.S. proper. Taking several dusty little Atolls and the Hawaiian island chain would not come close to forcing the U.S. to the negotiating table. It would actually backfire on the Japanese because now their assets have been stretched thinner than they Historically were prior to the Midway campaign.

Graugreist, I do indeed see the Japanese occupation of Hawaii as a "war changer". I would think the Japanese would want to make use of the facilities - and having such a base capable of supplying vessels and repairing them is a big plus for the Japanese. They can base their "Far Western" fleet here. If the US chooses to try to take it back (I would think they would feel compelled to), you have an early war Japanese Navy (speaking mostly of pilot quality and no Hellcats) which could also base a substantial airfleet on Hawaii. And a submarine base that could support a submarine picket of Hawaii. If the US chose to Invade, they would have to face a naval Japanese force that still has a lot of fight in it and confidence which would also be backed by a large land based force. A very difficult proposition.

One question I do have is what type of fuel reserves were available on Hawaii? Capturing these would be very important for the Japanese, much like the German's need to capture Allied fuel depots at the Battle of the Bulge.

 

[GrauGeist]

Taking and holding Hawaii could be looked at as a "war changer" for the favt that a successful invasion of Hawaii would require a consider amount of resources in the way of men and material. It would also force a showdown between U.S. land and naval assets versus the same in the way of Japanese assets. If the Japanese were succeed, at what cost? In otherwords, what did the Japanese sacrific in order to make the invasion happen?

One would assume that the Japanese brought battleships into play as well as carriers. How many would participate in the attack and invasion and how many were sunk during that action? Even if the U.S. lost all their carriers in the defense, there were more in the shipyards stateside under construction. How many Japanese pilots were lost in the invasion? How many aircraft and so on...

Like I mentioned before, the U.S. was still ramping up it's war footing and nowhere near peak capacity, that would happen in 1944 while Japan was already close to capacity in producing ships, aircraft and skilled men to operate them.

There would also have to be a shift in Japanese assets...so where do these come from? Removing occupation troops from one area in order to occupy Hawaii and additional spot garrisons across the Leeward islands will weaken that hold they currently have elsewhere. Keep in mind that Allied troops are not affected by Hawaii's loss and will continue to put pressure on Japanese held areas across the South Pacific and CBI.

As far as material seizure at Pearl, one can assume that the facilities, which are still being repaired from the 7 December attack, would not be just handed over to the Japanese intact.

 

[parsifal]

I was thinking more along the lines of a completely revised battle plan for the Japanese rather than ditering at the edge of the existing one. That of course has to assume a completely revised American response as well. what might have happened if the plan of battle for the IJN had been altered completely from the historical.....

 

[GrauGeist]

If Japan was in a position to successfully attack and take Hawaii after the battle of Midway, then they should have been able to refuse the U.S. invasion of Guadacanal which historically occurred just a few months after the battle of Midway. As it turns out, they didn't.

So in the far-fetched scenario where Japan seizes the Leeward islands and Hawaii (including the other main islands), how would they still be able to provide adequate protection for their current possesions?

Also, when people say "Hawaii", I assume they mean Pearl Harbor on the island of Oahu. There were also several Army bases and a Naval air station on Oahu outside of Pearl Harbor. They would also have to take Kauai, Molokai, Lanai, Maui and Hawaii itself in order to ensure possesion security.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

You are correct the attacks on Kido Butai weren't literally continuous, but they spanned the time from just prior to 0710 until about 0730 and from about 0750 until just after 0830. So there was about 20 minute break in the attacks from about 0730 until about 0750. The point being made was that at no time during this period did the Japanese cease fueling and arming their a/c. In fact, Nagumo apparently ordered his a/c rearmed during the height of the first torpedo attacks.

According to Shattered Sword, The Tone plane leaving a half hour earlier does not translate to an earlier sighting report of the USN CTGs (except in popular histories of the battle.). The Chikuma's no. 1 plane appears to have been the one whose path should have taken it directly over the americans at 0630 had he flown his planned route, but apparently cloud cover obscured his view. The Tone's later report was pretty much an accident of navigation. had he flown his own planned route it is unlikely he would have seen anything. As many sources have suggested, the real problem with the search plan was that it was too porous. flown by too few planes.

But lets say the pilot of Chikuma's no. 1 got lucky and saw a break in the clouds at just the right time to report back sighting an american carrier at 0630. Then Kido Burai launches its reserve half deck load from each carrier before the return of the Midway strike. This situation amounts to essentially a simultaneous launch of both navies carrier based forces as far as both having been launched by the time the other arrives. However let's examine the time line provided in SS on page 154 and 155. The Midway strike returns at about 0805 and immediately begins to land, landing is completed by 0845. Rearming and fueling immediately commences and with a superhuman effort, A/C are spotted on the flight deck by about 1030, 6 minutes after the USN has arrived and begun dropping its bombs on the now loaded flight decks. That's the best that can be imagined but not realistic. In actuality, the interval between launch of the first, previously readied, strike and the arming and spotting of the second took much longer. The first previously readied strike launched at 1058 and the second Hiryu strike was finally spotted and warming up on the flight deck beginning at 1300. The half hour's or even an hour advance of the time line doesn't appear to work in favor of the IJN. That's the way, I understand the time line from SS. Perhaps
I've missed some critical element in the sequence of events but it seems to me as long as Kido Butai is committed to a second follow up strike they will remain vulnerable. Perhaps a bit less so, because there will be roughly half the aircraft missing from the numbers that were historically adding fuel and ordnance to the carrier's conflagration.


As far as the Cap presence, SS has a detailed break down of fighter operations. I believe they had more than 40 fighters airborne during the USN VB attacks and of course others cycling thu the flight decks to refuel and rearm. AFAIK, IJN VF apportionment practice was something like 50% for strike escort and 50% for fleet coverage. With the ferocity of the USN attacks, I believe even a/c of the 21 Zeros slated for Midway were launched. If you dedicate 24 fighters to the first strike, and retain a dozen or so for the second strike, You have less than what were available at the time of the actual USN attack by about 36 A6Ms. Perhaps I am missing something, but I don't see how the CAP can be stronger if two dozen fighters are dedicated to escorting the first strike and so not available for CAP.

I had to smile (a bit sadly) at your comment:

"I think you are underestimating what damage having ordinance on deck does."

My class officer, a RIO in a VF squadron was a survivor of the 14 January 1969 Enterprise fire that killed 27 and injured 314. Ours was his first assignment after his recovery from severe burns. He was fortunate to have survived and also to have been wearing his helmet visor in the down position as he sat in his cockpit awaiting launch. How did we know his visor was down? it was clearly evident from the pattern of his scarring. He was a great guy and only lived because when he climbed out of his cockpit a quick-thinking CPO saw SV2 he was wearing and immediately realized it was the only chance either of them had for survival. His tackle carried them both off the ship's stern and down 80 feet to the water where the chief inflated the RIO's SV2. They were picked up by the plane guard.

Oriskany: October 26, 1966. 44 dead.

Forrestal: 29 July 1967: 134 dead

Forget the ordnance and fuel, when an aircrew walks out onto the flight deck he/she may be carrying (in the survival vest) two hand held day-night flares, a flare gun and a personal weapon with extra ammo. A walking incendiary depot.

I was the squadron's line division officer and spent lots of time on the flight deck during flight ops. It was a very dangerous place for many reasons beyond the ordnance being loaded and fuel being dispensed. The types of danger were only a little bit different in 1942 but still one of the most dangerous places on Earth. I have a pretty fair idea of what exploding ordnance can do to a flight deck or carrier. even an armored one.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

I was thinking more along the lines of a completely revised battle plan for the Japanese rather than ditering at the edge of the existing one. That of course has to assume a completely revised American response as well. what might have happened if the plan of battle for the IJN had been altered completely from the historical.....

That's a tough one… throws the door wide open.

 

[gjs238]

I was the squadron's line division officer and spent lots of time on the flight deck during flight ops. It was a very dangerous place for many reasons beyond the ordnance being loaded and fuel being dispensed. The types of danger were only a little bit different in 1942 but still one of the most dangerous places on Earth. I have a pretty fair idea of what exploding ordnance can do to a flight deck or carrier. even an armored one.

 

[parsifal]

That's a tough one… throws the door wide open.

Absolutely , but not impossible. The problems with the historical plan, from a japanese perspective were many. I think too much was being asked of CarDivs 1 and 2, and the fleet was too far forward to take advantage of what strengths the Japanese plan did possess. Having such complex plan as they did, might have been turned to their advantage, by confusing the USN in the approach, but there was far too much separation between the various TFs.

Your photos of deck accidents did bring back some memories as well for me. Aboard our carrier, late 70's. A flight deck is no place to be if you dont know what you are doing....


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7WdnpHcQn3Y

This another video of deck operations on the melbourne. These are deck quals by pilots of VF805. Not my video. It was originally by Peter greenwood, and I rememeber when he took it. Thats me in the superstructure...actually Im not visible...

Video has sound track from actual A4G engine sounds (mostly) made by Peter Greenfield ex-RAN A4G Skyhawk pilot. The first half of the video shows how the nosewheel steering problem affects A4G operations on deck on the catapult. Usually the very effective nosewheel steering makes taxiing on deck easy enough. The second half of this video shows A4G deck landings from a low angle at a point where the aircraft is most likely to stop if the target wire is caught. Sometimes the A4G gets 'hung up' after arrest and once again we see the value of the hard working deck crew coming to remedy the problem swiftly. These aircraft/pilots are doing deck qualifications.


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQT5yp8-bMs

 

[Garyt]

My class officer, a RIO in a VF squadron was a survivor of the 14 January 1969 Enterprise fire that killed 27 and injured 314. Ours was his first assignment after his recovery from severe burns. He was fortunate to have survived and also to have been wearing his helmet visor in the down position as he sat in his cockpit awaiting launch. How did we know his visor was down? it was clearly evident from the pattern of his scarring. He was a great guy and only lived because when he climbed out of his cockpit a quick-thinking CPO saw SV2 he was wearing and immediately realized it was the only chance either of them had for survival. His tackle carried them both off the ship's stern and down 80 feet to the water where the chief inflated the RIO's SV2. They were picked up by the plane guard.

Interesting, did not know!

My only point was refueling CAP is going to put the carrier in a lot less danger than having strike aircraft all being readied for a strike. And with CAP, they will be off the carrier again shortly after refueling, so you have a bit of a revolving door, which means you don't have 40 armed strike aircraft on the hangar deck with ordinance. Makes a huge difference in survivability. And at Coral Sea, the Shokaku may have been conducting at least CAP flight operations, I am not sure.

And none of these carriers had armored flight decks, So I'd rather have by planes on a flight deck than on the enclosed hangar decks. Of course, an armored flight deck would be nice, but Japan has to wait til the Taiho, the US never had an operational carrier with an armored flight deck in WW2.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Indeed. But the Midway planes were another matter - Having armed and fueled planes on the hangar deck - and a full 1/2 strike prepared (I think this is referred to a full deck strike - the Japanese would launch in two waves even if a total launch, which was the amount of planes that could be launched from 1 "deck load"). In addition to having this many planes and open avgas lines, they also had ordinance for all the Vals, and 2x the ordinance for the Kates. It is questionable how good the "housekeeping" was in the magazines for this ordinance, which would have made the situation even more volatile.

Compare this to merely having open AVGAS lines and no ordinance if the only air operations were to land and launch CAP. That is a huge difference.

Avgas Lines are a problem, but it's a limited amount of storage, as are the planes themselves when fueled.

Now, rupturing the AVGAS tanks is a different matter, but this were usually ruptured by concussion damage lower in the vessel, such as torpedo strikes.

Gary I admit I am having some trouble with your math here. I am assuming the reserve strike launched initially amounts to half the air group from each IJN carrier. In detail, it would be comprised of all the Hiryu and Soryu VB (amounting to 34 VALs) and portions of the Kaga and Akagi's VT units (amounting to about 30 KATES plus escort). The returning Midway Strike, once recovered and rearmed, constitutes the a/c for the second strike consisting of undamaged KATES from Hiryu and Soryu and undamaged VALs from Kaga and Akagi, presumably about 25 to 30 VALS and something like 40 KATES, with escort. the second wave would presumably be launched sometime in the late morning. Is this consistent with what you are envisioning?

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Absolutely , but not impossible. The problems with the historical plan, from a japanese perspective were many. I think too much was being asked of CarDivs 1 and 2, and the fleet was too far forward to take advantage of what strengths the Japanese plan did possess. Having such complex plan as they did, might have been turned to their advantage, by confusing the USN in the approach, but there was far too much separation between the various TFs.

Your photos of deck accidents did bring back some memories as well for me. Aboard our carrier, late 70's. A flight deck is no place to be if you dont know what you are doing....


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7WdnpHcQn3Y

This another video of deck operations on the melbourne. These are deck quals by pilots of VF805. Not my video. It was originally by Peter greenwood, and I rememeber when he took it. Thats me in the superstructure...actually Im not visible...

Video has sound track from actual A4G engine sounds (mostly) made by Peter Greenfield ex-RAN A4G Skyhawk pilot. The first half of the video shows how the nosewheel steering problem affects A4G operations on deck on the catapult. Usually the very effective nosewheel steering makes taxiing on deck easy enough. The second half of this video shows A4G deck landings from a low angle at a point where the aircraft is most likely to stop if the target wire is caught. Sometimes the A4G gets 'hung up' after arrest and once again we see the value of the hard working deck crew coming to remedy the problem swiftly. These aircraft/pilots are doing deck qualifications.


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQT5yp8-bMs

great video! I hope the pilot survived the ejection without injury. I recalled that you mentioned serving on the Melbourne. lots of great footage of some vintage classic a/c.

I concur with the flaws you list in the IJN's Midway plan. I expect you have heard the story of the pre-Midway battle war game staged by the IJN that resulted in the predicted loss of two carriers. A war game whose results were ignored.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Hey Pars, was that you up in pri-fly? (at 3:30 into the vid) or is it vultures row?

I ended up watching a third video with all the classic RAN a/c:


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2CpTQp9sI5c

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Interesting, did not know!

No worries..

My only point was refueling CAP is going to put the carrier in a lot less danger than having strike aircraft all being readied for a strike. And with CAP, they will be off the carrier again shortly after refueling, so you have a bit of a revolving door, which means you don't have 40 armed strike aircraft on the hangar deck with ordinance. Makes a huge difference in survivability. And at Coral Sea, the Shokaku may have been conducting at least CAP flight operations, I am not sure.

Wait! Dawn broke over marble head! I see what you are saying about the CAP numbers… There will be a couple lost in the mele with the Midway strike a/c but otherwise it looks like the numbers of CAP should be roughly the same in any case. the reduction only applies to the period before the returning Midway strike escorts are refueled and rearmed… "A revolving door" so to speak… Good point!

But still not sure we don't have a disconnect about the arming of the second strike unless you mean Nagumo decides to defer arming until later in the day after Kido Butai has absorbed a USN strike. I don't think there is evidence for that. AFAIK, the IJN was pretty much about staying on offense until an enemy was subdued.

And none of these carriers had armored flight decks, So I'd rather have by planes on a flight deck than on the enclosed hangar decks. Of course, an armored flight deck would be nice, but Japan has to wait til the Taiho, the US never had an operational carrier with an armored flight deck in WW2.

yes, the Midway class just missed the war with Midway CV-41 commissioned in September 10, 1945

 

[parsifal]

I saw that one too, was worried it was a little too jingistic for comfort.

Melbourne was a hard worked and working carrier. The A-4 jockeys were the best in the world, and even though i am biased, its a claim i can legitimately make. Ive seen them on excercise getting so low they were flying below deck level just inches above the wave crests. They pushed those A-4s really hard.

US pilots for a time operated on exchange but they discontinued it after a while because of the small size and unrelaiability of our steam catapult. Even though Melbourne had been modernised to take the streeses of operating this aircraft, her cata pults and deck sizes were really not up to the task. By the time I served on her, she was well past it, with severe deck corrugations and a steam catapult that was just aching to fail. Still, in excercise we managed to simulate sinking one US Carrier (with a bit of help), and she streamed a lot of miles for a conventional carrier.

we still dont have a replacement or capability that comes even close to what the old girl could do.

In 1960, the United States Navy offered an Essex class carrier to the Australian government, in the interest of improving relations between the two nations and their navies. The only cost to the RAN would have been the modifications required to make the carrier operationally compatible with the RAN's primarily British-designed fleet. In the late 1960s, the British made a similar offer, following a 1966 review indicating that HMS Hermes was a superfluous naval unit.In 1968, Hermes took part in a combined exercise with the RAN, during which the carrier was visited by RAN and Australian government officials, while RAN Skyhawks and Trackers practised landings on the larger carrier. Both offers were turned down due to operating and manpower costs.

The need to secure a replacement for Melbourne grew as the carrier's age caused the operating costs to increased. In June 1977, the Defence Force Development Committee approved an investigation into acquiring a STOVL/helicopter carrier. the possible replacements were reduced to three choices; a modified American Iwo Jima class amphibious assault ship, an Italian Giuseppe Garibaldi class carrier, and a Sea Control Ship design that later became the Spanish Navy's Principe de Asturias. By February 1981, the Iwo Jima class was the preferred option.

However, the British then offered the Invincible at a bargain basement price.

Plans to replace Melbourne changed in July 1981; the British 1981 Defence White Paper had marked the recently commissioned HMS Invincible as surplus to requirements, and she was offered to the RAN for the 'bargain' price of GB£175 million (A$285 million). The Invincible class had been considered and discarded during the investigation, mostly because of the costs of aircraft provisions (unit prices for Harriers is, shall we say, rather off the planet) but the decreased price and the fact the already-constructed carrier would be ready for RAN service in 1983 prompted the Australian government to announce its intention to purchase Invincible on 25 February 1982 and close the carrier acquisition program.The government also announced that the ship would be renamed HMAS Australia and operated as a helicopter carrier, and that a decision on the purchase of Sea Harriers would be made after acquisition.

The deal was put on hold in April 1982, following the outbreak of the Falklands War. The performance of Invincible and other Royal Navy aircraft carriers during the conflict showed that the report which suggested reductions in the size of Britain's carrier fleet—with the flow-on effect of making Invincible available for sale—was flawed, and both sides withdrew from the deal in July. The RAN was again offered HMS Hermes, and again declined due to the carrier's age and manpower requirements. The Australian government began to reconsider the previous contenders for replacement, as well as considering requesting the United Kingdom or United States to build a simple carrier capable of operating F/A-18 Hornet strike fighters, but the issue was suspended at the commencement of the 1983 Australian Federal Election. On 14 March, following the election of Bob Hawke's Labor Government, the announcement was made that Melbourne would not be replaced. Adding insult to an already open wound, the still operational skyhawks and trackers were supposed to remain fleet support units on land bases, but were each repsctively disposed of in a very short space of time. It was death of an air wing on a machiavellian scale.

Melbourne by then was decomissioning, but still she refused to die. She was sold to Chinese ship breakers, and towed to a chinese port, weathering a typhoon enroute. she was sold with the stipulation that she was to be scrapped immediately, but this did not transpire. the chinese had other ideas, they needed some basic ideas on carrier operation and catapult design. Even back then they had ambitions of developing their own carrier capability, but they were starting from a long way behind.

The ship was not scrapped immediately; instead she was studied by Chinese as part of the nation's top-secret carrier development program. Melbourne was the largest warship any of the Chinese experts had seen, and they were surprised by the amount of equipment which was still in place. The PLAN subsequently arranged for the ship's flight deck and all the equipment associated with flying operations to be removed so that they could be studied in depth, and reportedly extensively reverse engineered. Either a replica of the flight deck, or the deck itself, was used for training of People's Liberation Army Navy pilots in carrier flight operations> The chinese literally cut the flight deck off the hull, placed it on a land area and used it fleor deck landing training. Clever little Chinese eager beavers.....

Around 1987 the Royal Australian Navy received and "politely rejected" a request from the PLAN for blueprints of the ship's steam catapult. The carrier was not dismantled for many years; according to some rumours she was not completely broken up until 2002. A 2012 article in Jane's Navy International stated that the large quantity of equipment recovered from Melbourne "undoubtedly helped" Admiral Liu Hua-qing secure the Chinese Government's support for his proposal to initiate a program to develop aircraft carriers for the Navy. In some ways I am happy that Melbournes legacy has had such far reachig effects, but of course in other respects it alarms me that it is helping our most likely future enemies.

 

[RpR]

Hawaii was indeed 2,600 miles away from any support without the Japanese taking Midway.

Midway provided no "support", if anything it was something that had to be supported.

Midway in 1942 was not really any kind of a base, so it lent no real support to Hawaii.

Go read the U.S. Navy history of bases in the Pacific before you repeat other such statements that go against the actual situation whether or not Midway fell.

Midway kept the Hawaiian Islands from being the last U.S. holding in the Pacific, discounting Johnston.
As I said read the U.S. Navy report I have pasted repeatedly as it makes some repeated rhetoric of the status and importance of Midway, and Johnston, incorrect.

This is ALL prior to the start of the war.


'The Navy Department Library'

Building the Navy's Bases in World War II
History of the Bureau of Yards and Docks and the Civil Engineer Corps
1940-1946
Volume II

"...........When the Hepburn Board made its survey of the naval shore establishment in the fall of 1938, the United States had five island possessions west of Pearl Harbor that were of strategic value as potential patrol-plane bases. These were the islands of Midway, Wake, Johnston, Palmyra, and Canton. The board's recommendation for the development of each island were the basic criteria upon which their subsequent fortification was predicated.

From a strategic point of view, an air base at Midway was considered second in importance only to Pearl Harbor. At that time, Midway was in regular use as one of the stops on the air route to the Orient, and was also the site of a commercial cable station. The board recommended that Midway be developed as a secondary airbase with facilities for two permanently based patrol-plane squadrons. These facilities were to include a pier, a channel, and a turning basin, with the lagoon.......................

...............The development of Midway under the Pacific Naval Air Base contracts began on March 27, 1940. A dredge was towed in, and the contractors directed their efforts toward the enlargement of the existing basins and channels. A small-boat channel, 12,000 feet long, 50 feet wide, and 10 feet deep, was dredged between Sand and Eastern islands, and a mooring berth, protected by sheet-piling, was built on the latter. Approximately 3,000,000 cubic yards of material were removed in these dredging operations.

Three asphalt-paved runways were constructed on Eastern Island; each was 300 feet wide and 3250 feet, 4500 feet, and 5300 feet long, respectively. Two hangars were constructed, with parking areas and warm-up mats. Small industrial areas were erected, which included the various necessary shops and storage facilities.

A large seaplane hangar, a parking mat, and one concrete ramp were constructed, and an ordnance shop, radio shop, engine shop, and a storehouse and tool room were built around the seaplane hangar to facilitate major overhaul work.

Fighter, bomber, and patrol ready-rooms were constructed, and housing and messing facilities set up for operational personnel. Quonset huts were extensively used.

Approximately 2800 feet of sheet-piling bulkhead was installed on Sand Island. Dredged material was pumped behind this bulkhead, and upon this fill, a large seaplane parking-mat was constructed. Four, concrete, seaplane ramps were built, together with an additional emergency ramp and approach to the mat, and a large, steel, seaplane hangar was erected on the edge of the mat.

Construction was started on underground gasoline storage in twenty-two 2500-gallon steel tanks.

A naval hospital was built by the contractors, who utilized three of the four existing buildings owned by the commercial cable company. These buildings, located on Sand Island, were later augmented by a large underground structure of concrete.

Barracks for naval and Marine personnel were built, together with all necessary accessories such as messhalls, warehouses, administration buildings, commissaries, and cold-storage buildings. The power plant for Sand Island was housed in a bombproof structure of reinforced-concrete and steel.

Midway was subjected to surface shelling by the Japanese on December 7, 1941, which caused considerable material damage and many wounds to personnel.

The history is listed chronologically, with every thing that would follow the above last sentence being after the attack.
As it was the majority of work on Mdway, even with the break to put up defenses, was done by mid-1943.

Had the Japanese taken the island within a year they also probably would and could have made it mostly complete in a similar time frame as the U.S. would have been in no position to seriously challenge them as they would have been rebuilding for a massive assault to come.

 

[RpR]

As this is all conjecture, I am wondering if Japan had taken Midway and Johnston, with the U.S. in no position for some months anyway to mount an major assault, would the Allies possibly have made a truly major thrust in China-Burma to make the Japanese take their attention off of any idea of actualy attacking the Hawaiian Island proper.

I do not think the Japanese would have gone after Hawaii, although that is just my opinion but I do think the Allies would possibly have done something to get Japan's attention else where.

I do not know the state of the British forces but they might have been able to send some of their heavy bombers to India to make a point.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Pars, Thanks for the inside story of Melbourne and RAN carrier aviation… IMHO, its fate is to be lamented. I am happy JMSD carrier aviation is resurgent but I wish we had another ally in the pacific with similar capability. I think the decision to reject SCS design was wise, whereas GG is a pretty neat little package, small capacity but seems to be a real if pint-sized STOVL CV which would be less expensive to crew and would keep some important art and trade craft alive in Oz. Without anything to validate my opinion, I think almost any option built in the US will be ridiculously expensive to create, own and operate and require what amounts to an entire air force worth of expenditure in AC procurement.

One of the few attractive aspects of the film Battleship was its depiction of 'RAN Hornets' launching from the deck of a USN CVN. I expect that was more hollywood than RAAF F-18 capability. What's the scoop on that?

I love the big decks but they ARE just gawdawful expensive!

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Thanks, gjs, but the guys who deserve the salute are the young men who spent most days working on the Flight deck and the superb CPOs who directed them. Compared to them, I was an occasional tourist. I was always fortunate in my CPOs. They guided me, kept me alive and as much as humanly possible out of trouble, despite my best efforts to GET into deep too-doo.

My Line Division Chief was especially good. He gave me (a rookie JO) an indoctrination tour of the flight deck early on, explaining its many esoteric mysteries most of which I've long forgotten. The young men comprising the division just out of HS were also an excellent group… They saw some gruesome sights and remained working with reliable and professional quality. They took great pride in seeing their names affixed to the side of an aircraft when they qualified as its plane captain. I literally trusted them with my life.