Significance of the Battle of Midway

[oldcrowcv63]

Given the total Japanese resources if they do invade Hawaii on Dec 7/8 what else does not get attacked?

Malaysia? The Philippines?

How many troops and transports would be needed for a Dec 7th attack?

More than they could afford. Yamamoto was in favour of a direct attack from before the war, but he was constantly overruled. Finally, in the planning stages for Midway, it was the army who gave the Japanese one of the few reality checks in their high command. They calculated, that they would need 45000 troops for the invasion (a gross underestimate) and 70 trtansports per month just to keep the garrison supplied. This goes far beyond any logistic capability ever possessed.

As the midway operation progressed, the Japanese came to see the blockade and starvation of Hawaii as possible bargaining chip at the expected peace talks. We have this notion that the Japanese were not prepared to use their submarines and ships in anti shipping roles. this is incorrect. They were quite prepared to use them, but they gave them other priorities as well. In the aftermath of midway, once the USN had been removed from the equation, the Japanese intended to apply a tight blockade of the HI. Faced with starvation for a sizable chink of their population, the Japanese expected the US to sue for peace fairly quickly.

I think these appraisals are totally unrealistic. I dont think the US would give up nearly so easily. If Midway had gone the Japanese way it would have taken longer for the US, but the result can hardly be in doubt.

OK, I'll throw this out... Delay the attack on the PI/Big Mac, those 34 B-17s don't pose a real threat at this stage of the US Build up and half are historically wiped out by the Tainan airgroup in any case on the first day, as well as a significant fraction of the defending fighter force. Small scale operations in preparation for the ultimate PI invasion, like seizing the northern small island airstrip on Batan Island could proceed. Yes, PI would be a thorn in the side of IJ during the time it took to reorganize for the PI invasion. But I expect, the USA's overall PI defensive capability is unlikely to have improved significantly during that time.

Organize and use the forces ~70 transports and associated troops to invade Oahu. The USN CVs don't yet represent a real significant threat to the operation and are likely to be eliminated piecemeal during the operation. The three USN CVs wouldn't be able to execute coordinated attacks and the sought-for decisive sea battle would have occurred in the waters around Oahu at the very start of WW2. IMHO, early loss of Lex, Sara and Enterprise would be highly probable (during their attempt to find and engage Kido Butai) and severely cripple subsequent US operations.

The question in my mind is whether a commando-style raid (with a significant force) with the purpose of destroying local military support infrastructure (harbors power plants, fuel depots, ammo supplies) would have been better than an all-out occupation of the island.

Pars to your knowledge has anyone every tried to game such a scenario?

 

[GrauGeist]

If the Japanese conducted a multiple-point landing operation while the first/second attack waves were hitting Pearl, this would allow them to get ashore unchallenged. Instead of Nagumo cancelling the third attack wave, continue the attacks (perhaps alternate approach patterns) until the landing forces report a secure foothold.

Then continue air support operations as ground forces need while searching for the U.S. carrier element.

I would imagine that the U.S. carrier force has two options at this point:
1) try and close in and defend Oahu in the face of a considerable Japanese force (battle of Midway rules would not apply here)

2) head for California at best possible speed to preserve the integrity of the carrier force, preserving these assets for a later day and more favorable conditions.

 

[drgondog]

Dave - IMO Nagumo would have been better served targeting the Sub Pens rather than going after Midway.. He had no idea where the US carriers were and to try to land at Midway and stay engaged until it was taken would raise the question "Why"

 

[parsifal]

OK, I'll throw this out... Delay the attack on the PI/Big Mac, those 34 B-17s don't pose a real threat at this stage of the US Build up and half are historically wiped out by the Tainan airgroup in any case on the first day, as well as a significant fraction of the defending fighter force. Small scale operations in preparation for the ultimate PI invasion, like seizing the northern small island airstrip on Batan Island could proceed. Yes, PI would be a thorn in the side of IJ during the time it took to reorganize for the PI invasion. But I expect, the USA's overall PI defensive capability is unlikely to have improved significantly during that time.

Containment of the PI was achieved fairly easily, and Macs insistence on a forward defence flew in the face of US military planning that stretched back at least 20 years. The Americans always planned to retreat to their fortress hideouts and await relief from the US fleet as it fought its way across the central Pacific with relief. The B-17s, the forward defences, even the arming of the filipino army were all really froth and bubble advocated by Mac and his supporters that in thge end came to nothing. The intent was to fight a decisive battle against japan, somewhere in the vicinity of Guam, win that battle and then press on to break the PI blockade.

All this was known or surmised by the IJN. What really alarmed them was the relocation of the Pacific Fleet to Pearl Harbour in 1940. If the US had remained centred around San Diego, as pre-war planners had wanted, Pearl Harbour would never have happened. as part of the administrations "big stick" policy toward Japanese aggression, the insistence in pushing the fleet forward prevailed. But the USN in particular remained jittery about this dangerous deployment....from January 1940 to the actual attack there were, from memory no less than 17 false alarms as to Japanese attacks. The Japanese were known and expected for surprise attacks, though inexplicably thye USN high command seem genuinely surpised that Pearl was, in the finish the focus of that main effort.

The Japanese traditional planning was also somewhat deviated by Yamamotos plan. the Japanese planned to attrition the US battlefleet as it advanced across the pacific, using a mix of submarines (which were designed for this very purpose....a surface speed of 24 knots compared to the US battlefleets best speed of 21 knots), and then commit their own battlefeelt also in the vicinity of guam, but a reduced strenfgth USN would lose because of the attrition it suffered....according to the Japanese.

Pearl harbour was promoted by Yamamoto because he wanted to strike preemptively at the USN, but the focus of Japanese operation was always to get control of the strategic resources quickly and a big part of that was securing the PI. diverting troops away from the PI was possible but was counter to the fundamental Japanese strategy. moreover, it was not enough effort. 1.7 divs were committed to the capture of the PI, with a further 2 sivs, earmarked for the conquest of the NEI held back in reserve at okinawa and Palau under the control of 16A. 16A was held back for two reasons, lack of shipping, and also because the level of resisitance in the PI was not fully known. Diverting all thye shipping and all the troops for the right flank attacks south....the NEI and the PI operations, would have delivered about 4 divs in total, and about half the required transpoirts. still not enough to have a crack at the PI. And they knew it . Not only would japan be abandoning their strategic priorities, they would also be likley to fail, even by their own standards of narrow margins.

A better optioon for the Jpanese might have been not to attack at Pearl at all. If the Pacific fleet had been allowed to gather its strength andf advanace across the pacific, it is likley, in my opinion that it would have suffered a huge defeat anyway. It wasnt ready to tackle the japanese in December 1941, and would have sallied forth for combat and gotten itself destroyed at sea, for little loss to the Japanese. this includes their carriers IMO, which in December were just to lightly equipped to be able to mix it with the KB at all really.

Organize and use the forces ~70 transports and associated troops to invade Oahu. The USN CVs don't yet represent a real significant threat to the operation and are likely to be eliminated piecemeal during the operation. The three USN CVs wouldn't be able to execute coordinated attacks and the sought-for decisive sea battle would have occurred in the waters around Oahu at the very start of WW2. IMHO, early loss of Lex, Sara and Enterprise would be highly probable (during their attempt to find and engage Kido Butai) and severely cripple subsequent US operations.

As indicated above, even with the entire right wing of the Japanese attack abandoned, there still was not enough transport available to tackle this attack.

The question in my mind is whether a commando-style raid (with a significant force) with the purpose of destroying local military support infrastructure (harbors power plants, fuel depots, ammo supplies) would have been better than an all-out occupation of the island.

Hard to see how any surface fleet of any size could approach the PI without giving away their position. give the US forces even a half days alert time and the situation changes completely in my opinion.

Pars to your knowledge has anyone every tried to game such a scenario?

I did once or 5 times with the WITP system. We gave the Japanese surpise advantages, even stripped out the japanese economy by raping its shipping reserves . We could not crack the PI landward ddefences except for one attempt, which ended as a bloodbath for both sides. US reinforcements were rushed to the islands, and eventually the Japanese attacks were defeated.

just a game i guess.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Containment of the PI was achieved fairly easily, and Macs insistence on a forward defence flew in the face of US military planning that stretched back at least 20 years. The Americans always planned to retreat to their fortress hideouts and await relief from the US fleet as it fought its way across the central Pacific with relief. The B-17s, the forward defences, even the arming of the filipino army were all really froth and bubble advocated by Mac and his supporters that in thge end came to nothing. The intent was to fight a decisive battle against japan, somewhere in the vicinity of Guam, win that battle and then press on to break the PI blockade.

All this was known or surmised by the IJN. What really alarmed them was the relocation of the Pacific Fleet to Pearl Harbour in 1940. If the US had remained centred around San Diego, as pre-war planners had wanted, Pearl Harbour would never have happened. as part of the administrations "big stick" policy toward Japanese aggression, the insistence in pushing the fleet forward prevailed. But the USN in particular remained jittery about this dangerous deployment....from January 1940 to the actual attack there were, from memory no less than 17 false alarms as to Japanese attacks. The Japanese were known and expected for surprise attacks, though inexplicably thye USN high command seem genuinely surpised that Pearl was, in the finish the focus of that main effort.

The Japanese traditional planning was also somewhat deviated by Yamamotos plan. the Japanese planned to attrition the US battlefleet as it advanced across the pacific, using a mix of submarines (which were designed for this very purpose....a surface speed of 24 knots compared to the US battlefleets best speed of 21 knots), and then commit their own battlefeelt also in the vicinity of guam, but a reduced strenfgth USN would lose because of the attrition it suffered....according to the Japanese.

Pearl harbour was promoted by Yamamoto because he wanted to strike preemptively at the USN, but the focus of Japanese operation was always to get control of the strategic resources quickly and a big part of that was securing the PI. diverting troops away from the PI was possible but was counter to the fundamental Japanese strategy. moreover, it was not enough effort. 1.7 divs were committed to the capture of the PI, with a further 2 sivs, earmarked for the conquest of the NEI held back in reserve at okinawa and Palau under the control of 16A. 16A was held back for two reasons, lack of shipping, and also because the level of resisitance in the PI was not fully known. Diverting all thye shipping and all the troops for the right flank attacks south....the NEI and the PI operations, would have delivered about 4 divs in total, and about half the required transpoirts. still not enough to have a crack at the PI. And they knew it . Not only would japan be abandoning their strategic priorities, they would also be likley to fail, even by their own standards of narrow margins.

A better optioon for the Jpanese might have been not to attack at Pearl at all. If the Pacific fleet had been allowed to gather its strength andf advanace across the pacific, it is likley, in my opinion that it would have suffered a huge defeat anyway. It wasnt ready to tackle the japanese in December 1941, and would have sallied forth for combat and gotten itself destroyed at sea, for little loss to the Japanese. this includes their carriers IMO, which in December were just to lightly equipped to be able to mix it with the KB at all really.




As indicated above, even with the entire right wing of the Japanese attack abandoned, there still was not enough transport available to tackle this attack.



Hard to see how any surface fleet of any size could approach the PI without giving away their position. give the US forces even a half days alert time and the situation changes completely in my opinion.



I did once or 5 times with the WITP system. We gave the Japanese surpise advantages, even stripped out the japanese economy by raping its shipping reserves . We could not crack the PI landward ddefences except for one attempt, which ended as a bloodbath for both sides. US reinforcements were rushed to the islands, and eventually the Japanese attacks were defeated.

just a game i guess.

Pars, I concur with your historical summary and judgement that the USN was in no position to successfully confront the IJN in a decisive battle in late 41 or early 1942. Although AFAIK, if there had been no Pearl Harbor attack, any attempt by the US Battle fleet to sortie from PH would have been handicapped by a lack of fleet oilers until perhaps up to a year after the start of hostilities. Nevertheless, I suspect the political pressure to mount such a sortie would have been immense if only to rescue US forces in the PI… No PH attack would be an interesting scenario in that it would test a set of prewar doctrines that actual war experience seems to suggest was made obsolescent by the very IJN operations that sought to bring about the decisive battle.

I am assuming your use of "PI" was a typo or perhaps a misunderstanding of what I was actually suggesting (or maybe you were just rescuing me from warranted embarrassment at my rather unrealistic suggestion). I was not suggesting abandoning the SEA operations but rather delaying only the ops focused on a PI invasion. I had assumed the 70 or so transports used in the PI invasion would not detract or diminish the SEA ops but forgot that the main Luzon invasion took place three weeks after the SEA ops were underway on December 22. I concluded that a delay in the PI invasion would have allowed a major amphibious operation directed at occupying, or at least raiding Oahu. In other words, precipitating the decisive clash after the battle fleet had been disabled and only the USN carriers and light forces remained. In retrospect, transports used in the invasion of Luzon may well have included some or many that became available after the SEA amphib operations were completed while others would have been used to continue the advance southward to capture the NEI. In retrospect, not attacking PH seems a far better strategy for IJ capitalizing on the combination of unpreparedness and the general ignorance-based contempt of the US military for IJ capability.

 

[davparlr]

If the Japanese conducted a multiple-point landing operation while the first/second attack waves were hitting Pearl, this would allow them to get ashore unchallenged. Instead of Nagumo cancelling the third attack wave, continue the attacks (perhaps alternate approach patterns) until the landing forces report a secure foothold.

A surprise simultaneous air/land attack would be mandatory for this to be successful. The US had about 43000 Army troops and an unknown Navy and Marine forces available for combat, 99 P-40s, and 53 P-36/P-26s, a strong force, if alerted. Add to that a small island with some very tough terrain features and Hawaii would be a formidable target. To closely approach Hawaii with an invasion fleet would have dangerously exposed the attack to early detection with considerable ramifications, making this option very risky.

 

[parsifal]

it was a typo, sorry about that. i meant the hawaiian islands, not the Philipinne islands

 

[GrauGeist]

A surprise simultaneous air/land attack would be mandatory for this to be successful. The US had about 43000 Army troops and an unknown Navy and Marine forces available for combat, 99 P-40s, and 53 P-36/P-26s, a strong force, if alerted. Add to that a small island with some very tough terrain features and Hawaii would be a formidable target. To closely approach Hawaii with an invasion fleet would have dangerously exposed the attack to early detection with considerable ramifications, making this option very risky.

The element of surprise is absolutely key in this situation, however, as historically happened, the Japanese were able to close their taskforce within striking range unchallenged and delivered a series of attacks while everyone on Oahu were enjoying the start of a relaxed Sunday.
With this in mind, assault forces closing under the cover of the night/dawn to coincide their approach during the air attacks (on or before 7:00 a.m. as originally occurred) would certainly offer positive results. The bulk of U.S. forces were in and around the vicinity of Pearl with a few auxillary fields and air stations about the island. These smaller fields did not have a large amount of first line aircraft that would have been able to muster more than token resistance.
The Japanese multiple landing zones would most likely be along the western, northern and eastern shorelines and the IJA was no strangers to rough tropical terrain.
If Nagumo follows through with the three attack waves that were planned, then carry on with follow up strikes while the battleship/cruiser force closes to offer close support while the U.S. fleet was being neutralized, the situation would be very difficult for the U.S. forces.
As poor as communications actually were, it seems to me that trying to muster defenses against Japanese landing forces to the north, east and west would have been nearly impossible, especially while everyone was keeping their heads down during the initial air attacks.

It's certainly interesting to think about.

 

[VBF-13]

Given the total Japanese resources if they do invade Hawaii on Dec 7/8 what else does not get attacked?

Malaysia? The Philippines?

How many troops and transports would be needed for a Dec 7th attack?

But one might say that only underscores the theory they didn't appreciate its true significance, at the time, not until much later.

 

[GrauGeist]

The way I am looking at it, is that taking Hawaii creates a buffer in a way.

All the leeward islands (Midway, Wake, etc) and Guam, the Phillipines all are now behind a Japanese "noose".

With the securing of the Hawaiian islands, Oahu and Pearl Harbor's facilities in particular, this gives them a serious base to operate from. As for the U.S., Naval operations are forced back to San Diego, San Pedro, San Francisco and bases in Washington state. Also the U.S. has to operate from Australian bases...
As far as the Phillipines, Wake and Midway are concerned, the Japanese can approach these after a pause to rearm, reinforce, retrain, etc.

But taking Pearl may not win the war, I seriously doubt that. However, it sure would be a major setback as well as a serious blow to moral.

 

[VBF-13]

The Phillipines rather than Hawaii would make the more sense for the Japanese to immediately take over (or as soon as they could) for the overall objective they had in that area of the South West Pacific and South East Asia. Hawaii fit in as just dealing the US a big setback, is the way I'm kind of seeing that. It's not that Hawaii wasn't significant. It's rather that its significance rested in how it immediately advanced that overall objective in the South West Pacific and South East Asia.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

The element of surprise is absolutely key in this situation, however, as historically happened, the Japanese were able to close their taskforce within striking range unchallenged and delivered a series of attacks while everyone on Oahu were enjoying the start of a relaxed Sunday.
With this in mind, assault forces closing under the cover of the night/dawn to coincide their approach during the air attacks (on or before 7:00 a.m. as originally occurred) would certainly offer positive results. The bulk of U.S. forces were in and around the vicinity of Pearl with a few auxillary fields and air stations about the island. These smaller fields did not have a large amount of first line aircraft that would have been able to muster more than token resistance.
The Japanese multiple landing zones would most likely be along the western, northern and eastern shorelines and the IJA was no strangers to rough tropical terrain.
If Nagumo follows through with the three attack waves that were planned, then carry on with follow up strikes while the battleship/cruiser force closes to offer close support while the U.S. fleet was being neutralized, the situation would be very difficult for the U.S. forces.
As poor as communications actually were, it seems to me that trying to muster defenses against Japanese landing forces to the north, east and west would have been nearly impossible, especially while everyone was keeping their heads down during the initial air attacks.

It's certainly interesting to think about.

GG, that's very much what I had in mind but also caveated by a poor appreciation of the inadequacy of the IJN IJA to support more than about one and a half such major ampib ops at a time. Given that their prime objectives were to seize the natural resources of the NEI, a PH op must have looked to be distracting at best and a potential disaster at worst recognizing the apparent strength of the PH defenses defined above by davparlr. Only in retrospect, with the advantage of hindsight can we see that the US defenses were a relatively hollow shell against the skill and might of Kido Butai. A comparison with the PI campaign provides a hint of the ultimate outcome. defending the PI were some 90 P-40 fighters and 34 B-17 bombers (ineffective in a tactical role) with roughly 30 thousand ground troops (12,000 US Philipine Scouts ~20,000 PA). Against the larger number of US troops and A/C on Oahu was the absence of a pre-planned natural redoubt like the Bataan peninsula and Corregidor. Against the concentration of US airpower on Oahu was the large number of aircraft on Kido Butai carriers (>400 A/C). The wild card in this scenario were the three USN carriers in the general HI area. While not yet formidable individually or collectively in either skill or a/c type allotment, the large number of SBDs aboard the three might mean that luck could still play a role in the outcome.

 

[GrauGeist]

Sure, there's a large number of possible outcomes, based on one or two events in the timeline.

The Phillipines certainly had a formidable compliment of manpower as well as defenses...however, there was no way for them to go anywhere. In otherwords, if Japan did execute an assault on Oahu and adjacent islands and establish a zone around U.S. held regions, the manpower based in the Philippines could only sit by and hear about it. This would be much like the later island-hopping campaign performed by the Allies, where garrisoned islands were passed over during the Allied advance.

As far as the fighters and bombers stationed in the Phillipines, due to a series of mishaps, many were destroyed on the ground: 12 of 17 B-17s alone, at Clark Field. The P-40s at Iba fared little better. The FEAF lost most of it's force from 8 December on through the next few days. So strength in numbers means little if they cannot perform when needed.

 

[parsifal]

The PI re4presented a major threat to japanese lines of communication to the south. the chief threat were the 29 submarines they had stationed there. as luck would have it, an air raid early on on the Cavite Navy yard destroyed the Tordeo stocks being held there, but that cannot be relied upon as a certainty . the japanese needed to get ashore early and capture these forward bases in order to deal with the threat that they posed. All this talk of containment, bypassing whgat was the major strongpoint for the US in the far east, is just trying to take advantage of perfect hindsight after the event

 

[GrauGeist]

Well sure, hindsight can offer a good view of events, but it's interesting to consider the alternatives once in a while.

Nagumo cancelled the third strike at Pearl because he did not know where the U.S. carriers were. But then again, the attack at Pearl was successful because no one knew the Japanese were on their way.

Alot of operations or otherwise significent events never happened because of the lack of intel or acting on the side of caution when we can look back and say "what was he thinking?"

But, like I mentioned, it's an entertaining diversion to look at the big picture and consider how things would have changed had one or another events happened differently.

 

[VBF-13]

The PI re4presented a major threat to japanese lines of communication to the south. the chief threat were the 29 submarines they had stationed there. as luck would have it, an air raid early on on the Cavite Navy yard destroyed the Tordeo stocks being held there, but that cannot be relied upon as a certainty . the japanese needed to get ashore early and capture these forward bases in order to deal with the threat that they posed. All this talk of containment, bypassing whgat was the major strongpoint for the US in the far east, is just trying to take advantage of perfect hindsight after the event

Well, certainly, but not entirely unforeseen. Pearl had all our shipbuilding capability. Look at how quickly we were able to patch up the Yorktown. We're otherwise going to San Diego for that.

I'm a little dark on the actual campaign in the Philippines. I do understand why the Japanese needed that, though, given their plans in that area. Hawaii would have taken a lot out of them, too, I don't think anybody is doubting that.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Well, certainly, but not entirely unforeseen. Pearl had all our shipbuilding capability. Look at how quickly we were able to patch up the Yorktown. We're otherwise going to San Diego for that.

I'm a little dark on the actual campaign in the Philippines. I do understand why the Japanese needed that, though, given their plans in that area. Hawaii would have taken a lot out of them, too, I don't think anybody is doubting that.

You probably mean ship repair capability vice building. I think anything major whether building or repair took place in stateside ports. All the BBs that would eventually become operational again were ultimately made sea worthy and sent back to the states for major repair.

AFAIK, the need to take the PI was due to the US military presence there and the air and naval bases from which it could act to sever the lines of communication and marine transport between the NEI and the home islands.

The forward basing of the Pac Fleet in PH moved it closer to the PI bases which already possessed a USN presence in the form of a heavy and a light cruiser a ~dozen DDs and a fair number of submarines. Moreover, the progressive B-17 buildup in the PI was perceived to present a similar threat to both interdict the sea lines of comm and IJ Taiwanese bases.

Good books on the PI campaign and well worth reading are Bartsch's books: Doomed at the Start which I've read and December 8, 1941 Macarthur's Pearl Harbor which I haven't. Also Days of Infamy by Costello. I recently purchased Fortnight of Infamy by Burton about the collapse of allied air power in the Pacific in just the first two weeks of the war. But haven't had a chance to read it yet.

late edit: changed 'sea-safe' to 'sea worthy'… what am I a fr*cken land lubber?

 

[parsifal]

Well sure, hindsight can offer a good view of events, but it's interesting to consider the alternatives once in a while.

Nagumo cancelled the third strike at Pearl because he did not know where the U.S. carriers were. But then again, the attack at Pearl was successful because no one knew the Japanese were on their way.

Alot of operations or otherwise significent events never happened because of the lack of intel or acting on the side of caution when we can look back and say "what was he thinking?"

But, like I mentioned, it's an entertaining diversion to look at the big picture and consider how things would have changed had one or another events happened differently.

Yeah I get what you are saying, and as a dedicated grognard (someone who plays and designs historically based simulations) on a part time basis, I think i appreciate more than most, the idea of alternative history ...what would happen if this variable were change, that kind of thing.

in most of the dedicated, serious (if, admittedly commercial) simulations of the pacific war, schemes to invade the HI hardly ever work. the chief problem is the element of surpise and the numbers. ive already alluded to the absolute gutting in terms of logistics the diversion of shipping and manpower would have on more essential japanese operations. its not that i dont say that it wasnt possible. i think it was. Japan did have additional reserves of shipping that it could call upon temporarily for emergency usage. They could have, for example, have curtailed all movement operations in China to save fuel and ammunition. Comes at a cost, later on, but its do-able. just not consistent with their war aims at the time.

So, putting aside the more strategic imperatives like being inconsistent with immediate war aims and placing japans medium to long term survival at risk, why do i still think the HI option is likely to fail?

If the japanese could get their 4 divs ashore in a matter of hours , having arrived off the beaches undetected, and then advance 40-60 miles in the next day or so on foot with little or no artillery support through mountainous terrain, with some built up urban areas mixed in, then the plan might have a chance. By comparison, at normandy it took the allies, with upwards of 2000 heavy transports about 16 hours to land 3 divs and then another day to advance something like 20 miles, maximum, against limited opposition (in that first 48 hours). Allied armies were fully motorised with mobile artillery, amphibious armoured assets and landing craft capability and capacities that the japanese never possessed. It is useful at this point to detour for a bit and look at the landings at Khota Baru, to determine roughly how long an operation of the kind envisaged might have taken the Japanese to complete.

Firstly, the invasion fleet was first spotted December 4, alerting the British of the impending invasion. they decided to adopt a wait an see policy with disastrous results.

Shortly after midnight on 7th/8th December (thats 00.01 hours) , a group of Indian guards at Kota Bharu spotted 13 large shadows, the IJN transport ships, including the Awagisan Maru, the Ayatosan Maru and the Sakura Maru, dropping anchor approximately 3 km's off the coast of Kota Bharu. The ships were carrying approximately 5,200 troops of the Takumi Detachment, commanded by Major-General Hiroshi Takumi, who was on board IJN transport Awajisan Maru. The majority of them were already battle hardened veterans who were unique in that they had undergone intensive jungle training and were also trained for amphibious assault. They were nearest equivalent to the US marines the japanese ever possessed.

The force consisted of the 56th Infantry Regiment (Colonel Yoshio Nasu, on board IJN transport Sakura Maru), one mountain artillery battery of the 18th Mountain Artillery Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel Katsutoshi Takasu), the 12th Engineer Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel Ichie Fujii), the 18th Division Signal Unit, one company of the 12th Transport Regiment, one company of the 18th Division Medical Unit and No. 2 Field Hospital of the 18th Division Medical Unit. They were escorted by a powerful escort fleet (Kota Bharu Invasion Force) under the command of Rear-Admiral Shintaro Hashimoto, consisting of a light cruiser Sendai, destroyers Ayanami, Isonami, Shikinami and Uranami, minesweepers No. 2 and No. 3, and subchaser No. 9. Seconds later the guards heard shells passing over their heads. . The loading of landing craft began almost as soon as the transports dropped anchor, but were still shuttling troops from ship to shore more than 18 hours later. Rough seas and strong winds hampered the operation and a number of smaller craft capsized. Several Japanese soldiers drowned. Despite these difficulties by 12.45 hours (12 hours after initial heave to) , the first wave of landing craft carrying troops under the command of Colonel Masu were heading for the beach in four lines. Brigadier B.W. Key's 8th Indian Infantry Brigade of the 9th British-Indian Infantry Division were the main defending force at Kota Bharu, supported by the 21st Mountain Battery - four 3.7in howitzers (Major J.B. Soper). The 3/17th Dogras in battalion strength had responsibility for a ten mile stretch of beach Panti Dasar Sabak front which included the Japanese landing sight. The troops had mined and wired the beach and built a number of pillboxes. They were supported by the 73rd Field Battery of the 5th Field Regiment, deployed adjacent to the airfield. its been described as a light defence, perhaps so, compared to later assaults like Iwo, but in 1941 it was a heavily defended target and a major amphibious operation.

By morning of the second day Major-General H. Takumi had been able to land three full infantry battalions. Brigadier Key attempted a counter attack in force and when this failed he began to fall back. As it became clear during the day that the local airfields could not be held, Key, who had been ordered to fight a battle of denial rather than annihilation, asked for and recieved permission to withdraw.

Once the beachead was secure, it should be acknowledged that the Japanese could follow up their initial assault groups with fresh troops fairly quickly. The Japanese, now backed by freshly landed troops, forced the British-Indian troops to retreat to the Kuala Lipis area and advanced south to capture Kota Bahru (township) by 2 p.m. on the 9th.

Both sides sustained substantial casualties during the battle. There are no reliable records of British losses, but they certainly were high. Accounts of Japanese casualties vary wildly. Louis Allen, quoting Japanese sources, put the number at 500. Of these, 150 were suffered by troops still on board the transports and the remaining 350 were inflicted during the short journey to the shores or on the beach. On the other hand, Colonel Tsuji put in his book the Japanese losses at 320 killed in action and 538 wounded and calls Kota Bharu "one the most violent actions of the Malaya Campaign".

So, a rapid advance might be possible, but not in a context of advancing in amatter of hours. Just couldnt happen, by any of the protegonists at any time during the war. it takes time to get your assault teams organised and ashore, organised again and then to press on to any inland objectives that you may designate. For a four division assault, the japanese are going to be severely hampered by a lack of specised transport, and this, will inevitably slow down their beach front deployment .

The other issue that places this whole issue in doubt is the very high risk of detection. A four division assault, operating some thousands of miles from home ports is going to need roughly 8 transports per battalion (to cover extra supplies and spares and the like). Four divisions is about 75 battalions , give or take, and thats about 600 trasnports, minimum. Thats an armada that stretches to beyond the horizon. Put simply, its a force the Americans are not going to fail to detect. They are goiong to be ready, alerted with their fleet ready to go, their aircraft primed and armed for attack, their troops at their stations, weapons loaded and ready to go . These are some cold hard realities to think about in any invasion discussion of Hawaii.

 

[tyrodtom]

Do you realize if they advanced even 40 miles in the first day ( depending on where they landed) on Oahu, they'd be back in the water.

If they landed on the most likely northwest coast, it was only about 6 miles to Schofield Barracks down the central valley.

If this fictional invasion caught them unaware as the actual air attack did, just how effective a defense would they have mounted ?

 

[VBF-13]

You probably mean ship repair capability vice building. I think anything major whether building or repair took place in stateside ports. All the BBs that would eventually become operational again were ultimately made sea worthy and sent back to the states for major repair.

AFAIK, the need to take the PI was due to the US military presence there and the air and naval bases from which it could act to sever the lines of communication and marine transport between the NEI and the home islands.

The forward basing of the Pac Fleet in PH moved it closer to the PI bases which already possessed a USN presence in the form of a heavy and a light cruiser a ~dozen DDs and a fair number of submarines. Moreover, the progressive B-17 buildup in the PI was perceived to present a similar threat to both interdict the sea lines of comm and IJ Taiwanese bases.

Good books on the PI campaign and well worth reading are Bartsch's books: Doomed at the Start which I've read and December 8, 1941 Macarthur's Pearl Harbor which I haven't. Also Days of Infamy by Costello. I recently purchased Fortnight of Infamy by Burton about the collapse of allied air power in the Pacific in just the first two weeks of the war. But haven't had a chance to read it yet.

late edit: changed 'sea-safe' to 'sea worthy'… what am I a fr*cken land lubber?

That's right, Crow, the repair yards. My point is though that alone made Hawaii more integral to the maintenance of our presence there than the Philippines. The Philippines was strategic to what the Japanese needed to get done in that South West Pacific region. That's why they took their eyes off Pearl, after the plundering. Pearl more than anything kept the US in the fight. They'd have taken out that sanctuary, we'd have been in trouble. We're maybe not throwing in the towel, but they got our attention. Because they never fully grasped that, that bought us time. Take out Pearl, we're seven or eight days away from that South West Pacific region, and by the time we get there, we're out of gas, and that's all provided we get by an occupied Hawaii, first. That's a lot to ask, even of a big nation. We can recruit and train and build and dress up until we're dizzy. Get it to the dance floor. How are we going to do that? There's nothing there. Giving the US time, that's what leaving Pearl meant. In short, it's what did the Japanese in.

Look at it this way. We were as far away from the action in the South West Pacific as were Britain and France. Why is it we were the main player in that region, and not them? Sure, they were stretched. But Pearl, that was the kicker. Could we have retaken it? Without a doubt, I think we could have, but it would have taken a D-Day type armada, and while the Japanese were going after the Canal and our West Coast, next. I'm playing a video-game in my head, now, but it's an entirely different dynamic, and that's one not implausible way it plays out.