Significance of the Battle of Midway

[Shortround6]

Channel is/was a heck of a lot wider than one destroyer.

The number of viable beaches is limited.

May I suggest the following web site. Chapter VI: The Reinforcement of Oahu

The Army had been planning for decades to defend Pearl Harbor from over land assault. Perhaps budgets had not given them what they desired but the idea that the Japanese could miraculously discover undefended beaches suitable for landing large numbers of troops and march overland to Pearl Harbor while several divisions of US troops stumbled about in total confusion needs a serious re-think.

For instance" In any event, because of the increasing threat of war with Japan, the Army from 1935 until the autumn of 1939 accorded the Hawaiian Department top priority in the supply of equipment, and it increased the strength of the garrison by more than 50 percent, from 14,821 to 21,289 between the summers of 1935 and 1938"

with more increases between 1938 and 1941. The defense of Oahu and the Hawaiian Islands was constantly studied and updated as threats changed.

Perhaps the Japanese could have taken Oahu in Dec of 1941 but the loss of resources would have delayed taken the Philippines, Malaysia and the Dutch East Indies for months. Since the Japanese were going to war due to a shortage of oil and other resources, delays in taking the regions with those resources would have done Japan little good in the long run.

 

[VBF-13]

Channel is/was a heck of a lot wider than one destroyer.

That's even better. Side-by-side, they're sitting ducks. Getting the subs in for the shots is the trick.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

That's even better. Side-by-side, they're sitting ducks. Getting the subs in for the shots is the trick.

VB, have you been hitting the kikkapoo juice? (again?)

 

[parsifal]

IMo Shortround has summed up the strategic imperatives from the japanese perspective perfectly

 

[GrauGeist]

I can see the point being made about the Oahu defensive drills....but...

If Oahu was so awesome in their skills, then perhaps they should have been deployed to Singapore, Hong Kong and Java and stopped the war before it began...

 

[VBF-13]

VB, have you been hitting the kikkapoo juice? (again?)

And furthermore...

Actually, I think, they got spy subs in there. I know they say Hawaii was just crawling with spies. Case-in-point, on the morning of the attack, just before they launched, they got information radioed to the carriers that enabled them to pencil-in a map of the exact locations of the targets in the Harbor. And GrauGeist is right about the Nevada, and that's why they beached it, just in nick of time, it was trying to get away from battleship row.

 

[parsifal]

There is some evidence of Midget subs penetrating all the way to Battleship row as the following grab shows


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5rhbN9NOSag

However i would say the majority view remains that they did not penetrate that far and did inflict any significant damage. Submarines were detected and sank outside the harbour, one is known to have made it to the main channel before being sunk. my personal view is that was no mideget sub attack delivered to the battleships on that day. its a bit of wishful thinking.

Japanese Navy Ship Types--Type A, B C Midget Submarines

An overall view of midget submarine operations off Oahu is contained here

Japanese Submarines

The remains of the 5th "missing midget sub may well have been swept up in the mystery surrounding the so called "second Pearl Harbour disaster, when 6 LSTs were sunk by an accidental explosion, which was quietly cleaned up and remained a secret until 1960.

 

[VBF-13]

There is some evidence of Midget subs penetrating all the way to Battleship row as the following grab shows


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5rhbN9NOSag

However i would say the majority view remains that they did not penetrate that far and did inflict any significant damage. Submarines were detected and sank outside the harbour, one is known to have made it to the main channel before being sunk. my personal view is that was no mideget sub attack delivered to the battleships on that day. its a bit of wishful thinking.

Japanese Navy Ship Types--Type A, B C Midget Submarines

An overall view of midget submarine operations off Oahu is contained here

Japanese Submarines

The remains of the 5th "missing midget sub may well have been swept up in the mystery surrounding the so called "second Pearl Harbour disaster, when 6 LSTs were sunk by an accidental explosion, which was quietly cleaned up and remained a secret until 1960.

Pretty interesting. In an invasion they're bringing in more subs as they aren't just looking to hit and beat it, so to speak. That video analysis is interesting, too. It's pretty much accepted torpedos did most of the damage to the fleet. Subs at least at the mouth of the channel would be a part of the invasion, there's little question about that, I'd think. Whether the net would be open, as it was, that's the wild card. It would, were anything coming out. If not, the subs are striking at the tenders. Either way, the net keeps the fleet boxed in, or the subs do it. Coordinated with multiple air attacks, they're wrecking what's there of this fleet, seems to me.

 

[Shortround6]

I can see the point being made about the Oahu defensive drills....but...

If Oahu was so awesome in their skills, then perhaps they should have been deployed to Singapore, Hong Kong and Java and stopped the war before it began...

It is not so much drills or "awesome skills" but the fact that the Army had had decades to survey possible landing sites and mount guns (like the already mentioned 240mm howitzers) to cover the the possible landing sites in surveyed positions. Other defensive measures or positions were also pre-planned and pre-built. Alternate gun positions were already prepared to move guns to if movement was needed.

Coastal defense was a science dating back hundreds of years. Coastal defense gunners were usually shocked in the modern era ( 1880s and smokeless powder) at the close ranges needed by naval ships to get hits. Coastal gunners had been using rangefinders and mathematics for quite some time ( coastal gunners could use the height of the range finder above sea level as the base distance of the range finder rather than the distance between lenses). Their guns and fire control equipment were not rolling and pitching either. Out flanking coastal batteries by shore landings had been going on for centuries as had the study of how to add field fortifications to stop the flanking

Moving the US troops to Singapore, Hong Kong and Java with only a few weeks or months to prepare would have thrown a large measure of the US advantage away. Also splitting up the force on Oahu into 5-10,000 man units on different land masses hundreds of miles apart would just invite destruction in detail.

Japanese attacking Hawaii in Dec 1941 is a bit like the US attacking Guadalcanal in 1942, even if you get a number of troops ashore the supporting fleet is going to pull a disappearing act at some point if Pearl Harbor is not in Japanese hands soon. The carrier group had already refueled at sea just to get into launch position. How many days can the "fleet" stay on station before having to turn for home and fuel? Can the Japanese troops take the oil farms and docks before the "fleet" runs out of fuel?

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Pretty interesting. In an invasion they're bringing in more subs as they aren't just looking to hit and beat it, so to speak. That video analysis is interesting, too. It's pretty much accepted torpedos did most of the damage to the fleet. Subs at least at the mouth of the channel would be a part of the invasion, there's little question about that, I'd think. Whether the net would be open, as it was, that's the wild card. It would, were anything coming out. If not, the subs are striking at the tenders. Either way, the net keeps the fleet boxed in, or the subs do it. Coordinated with multiple air attacks, they're wrecking what's there of this fleet, seems to me.

Major difference if there is early warning and air cover over PH is available and nominally effective. I believe every likely Oahu invasion beach, even those near the Northeastern Kahuku Point is within range of the 14 and 16 inch guns (~20 miles) of the battle fleet. Even if the BB is sitting in the mud with decks awash the BBs might be dangerous to an enemy during an invasion. Spotters in the highlands can probably walk salvos onto the invasion beaches if the directors are damaged. I don''t know whether the north eastern ridge line would have shielded such a bombardment...

Nimitz famous post war quote: Consequences of the attack on Pearl Harbor - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia is perhaps somewhat applicable even in the event of an invasion.

"It was God's mercy that our fleet was in Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941." Nimitz believed if Kimmel had discovered the Japanese approach to Pearl Harbor, he would have sortied to meet them. With the American carriers absent and Kimmel's battleships at a severe disadvantage to the Japanese carriers, the likely result would have been the sinking of the American battleships at sea in deep water, where they would have been lost forever with tremendous casualties (up to twenty thousand dead), instead of in Pearl Harbor, where the crews could easily be rescued, and six battleships ultimately restored to duty.[38] This was also the reaction of Joseph Rochefort, head of HYPO, when he remarked the attack was cheap at the price."

 

[oldcrowcv63]

If my math is correct, looks like a beach at about 18 miles would be hit by a shell launched from Ford Island at about 30 degrees elevation (the max gun-barrel elevation of the older, but not oldest, BBs) and comfortably clear the ridgeline taken to be a half mile high and with the northeastern invasion Beach 3 miles beyond the highest elevation. The northwestern shoreline' is I believe a bit beyond the big guns range but AFAIK unsuitable for landing.

Late entry: About half the battle line in port on December 7, were old boats that had a maximum elevation of 15 degrees. That includes Oklahoma and Arizona (both destroyed) and Pennsylvania (in dry dock) and Nevada with a limited range relative to the newer vessels:

Tennesee, Maryland, California, West Virginia

 

[parsifal]

Pretty interesting. In an invasion they're bringing in more subs as they aren't just looking to hit and beat it, so to speak. That video analysis is interesting, too. It's pretty much accepted torpedos did most of the damage to the fleet. Subs at least at the mouth of the channel would be a part of the invasion, there's little question about that, I'd think. Whether the net would be open, as it was, that's the wild card. It would, were anything coming out. If not, the subs are striking at the tenders. Either way, the net keeps the fleet boxed in, or the subs do it. Coordinated with multiple air attacks, they're wrecking what's there of this fleet, seems to me.

Ive got a book at home that deals with Japanese submarine operations in some detail. in 1941-2, the performance of japanese submarine forces fluctuated wildly, the examples of their outstanding successes would proabably have to be the sinking of the Wasp, but in many ways this loss was as much about poor Us handling of such a valuable ship as the outstanding performance of the IJN sub fleet.

In the opening rounds of the battle, Japanese Subs lived up to this patchy performance. In the far east they sank in less than a month nearly 250000 tons of allied shipping, nearly a quarter of the 1 million tons they managed to sink in 1942. A significant number of minor warships were sunk, but no major ones, which was a cause for a major disspointment to the Japanese Submarine Arm.

The Japanese submarine , contrary to nearly all our post war western accounts was designed for multiple capabilities, including direct fleet support, but also as very effective anti-shipping weapons. Japanese submariners did not consider a merchant ship an unworthy target, but attacking shipping was a long war strategy and the Japanese needed this to be a short sharp war, and consequently the majority of theirt efforts in the opening year of the war was to try and utlise their subs to attack the US fleet directly. This proved to be a disastrous policy. Japanese subs were large, slow divers and relatively shallow divers. they were not particualalry fast crash divers. They possessed no radar and only the most rudiementary TDC compauters (predictors for torpedo settings).

The submarine arm was designed for deep penetrations, with ranges of nearly 10000 miles. Some of the subs were equipped with aircraft for spotting, the idea being these "command subs" being able to direct other subs onto located targets. The whole idea was predicated on a US fleet speed of about 20 knots...Japanese subs with a surfaced speed of 24 knots would attack, clear the area, surface steam ahead of the target, attack again and so on. Unfortunately this opportunity never really presented itself. The slow BBs never really put to sea until later in the war, amd the carriers, with a fleet speed of nearly 30 knots were simply to quick. The aircraft took too long to get ready for launch.

Conspicously the Japanese deployed Twelve I-type submarines of the Imperial Japanese Navy's 1st Submarine Squadron had taken up position in Hawaiian waters by the evening of December 6, 1941, anticipating an attack on U.S. Pacific Fleet ships if they broke out of Pearl Harbor the next day. They achieved no significant observable result for the first 3 days of their deplayment.

On December 10, the Japanese learned that an American Lexington-class aircraft carrier was heading for the U.S. mainland. Nine of the 12 subs were ordered to pursue and sink the enemy carrier, then take up positions at designated sites off the Pacific coast and begin attacking American merchant ships. There was no discernible result, though to be fair, early in the war, the Saratoga was hit by a torpedo and suffered extensive damage.

If the right flank attack on the PI and NEI was postponed, there would be an additional six I boats available for operations. There were three more boats in the entral pacifi and 2 off Pago Pago . there might be a couple more here or there, but its unrealistic to expect any more than about 20 I-boats to be available. thats a significant number, and if the US battle fleet were to sallied forth, one can reqasonably expect some results, however even the Japanese would not have expected it submarines to be able to bottle up the USN. they, like all submarines were an attritional weapon.....not a sea control weapon

For the USN to effectively disrupt a landing, they dont need to win a battle, and whilst heavy losses may result, all they need to do is get some forces in amongst the invasion barges, and the landings are basically busted. An alerted and undamaged US fleet is going to throw everything at the Japanese invasion fleet, and they are more than likley to stop it with heavy losses to both sides in my opinion. this was precisely one of the reasons the Japanese backed down in the pre-war planning , or discussion of this option. They were not stupid. They knew that an operation like this, was more than likley to be costly, and they could not afford to get into an attritional battle with the US.

 

[VBF-13]

Ive got a book at home that deals with Japanese submarine operations in some detail. in 1941-2, the performance of japanese submarine forces fluctuated wildly, the examples of their outstanding successes would proabably have to be the sinking of the Wasp, but in many ways this loss was as much about poor Us handling of such a valuable ship as the outstanding performance of the IJN sub fleet.

In the opening rounds of the battle, Japanese Subs lived up to this patchy performance. In the far east they sank in less than a month nearly 250000 tons of allied shipping, nearly a quarter of the 1 million tons they managed to sink in 1942. A significant number of minor warships were sunk, but no major ones, which was a cause for a major disspointment to the Japanese Submarine Arm.

The Japanese submarine , contrary to nearly all our post war western accounts was designed for multiple capabilities, including direct fleet support, but also as very effective anti-shipping weapons. Japanese submariners did not consider a merchant ship an unworthy target, but attacking shipping was a long war strategy and the Japanese needed this to be a short sharp war, and consequently the majority of theirt efforts in the opening year of the war was to try and utlise their subs to attack the US fleet directly. This proved to be a disastrous policy. Japanese subs were large, slow divers and relatively shallow divers. they were not particualalry fast crash divers. They possessed no radar and only the most rudiementary TDC compauters (predictors for torpedo settings).

The submarine arm was designed for deep penetrations, with ranges of nearly 10000 miles. Some of the subs were equipped with aircraft for spotting, the idea being these "command subs" being able to direct other subs onto located targets. The whole idea was predicated on a US fleet speed of about 20 knots...Japanese subs with a surfaced speed of 24 knots would attack, clear the area, surface steam ahead of the target, attack again and so on. Unfortunately this opportunity never really presented itself. The slow BBs never really put to sea until later in the war, amd the carriers, with a fleet speed of nearly 30 knots were simply to quick. The aircraft took too long to get ready for launch.

Conspicously the Japanese deployed Twelve I-type submarines of the Imperial Japanese Navy's 1st Submarine Squadron had taken up position in Hawaiian waters by the evening of December 6, 1941, anticipating an attack on U.S. Pacific Fleet ships if they broke out of Pearl Harbor the next day. They achieved no significant observable result for the first 3 days of their deplayment.

On December 10, the Japanese learned that an American Lexington-class aircraft carrier was heading for the U.S. mainland. Nine of the 12 subs were ordered to pursue and sink the enemy carrier, then take up positions at designated sites off the Pacific coast and begin attacking American merchant ships. There was no discernible result, though to be fair, early in the war, the Saratoga was hit by a torpedo and suffered extensive damage.

If the right flank attack on the PI and NEI was postponed, there would be an additional six I boats available for operations. There were three more boats in the entral pacifi and 2 off Pago Pago . there might be a couple more here or there, but its unrealistic to expect any more than about 20 I-boats to be available. thats a significant number, and if the US battle fleet were to sallied forth, one can reqasonably expect some results, however even the Japanese would not have expected it submarines to be able to bottle up the USN. they, like all submarines were an attritional weapon.....not a sea control weapon

For the USN to effectively disrupt a landing, they dont need to win a battle, and whilst heavy losses may result, all they need to do is get some forces in amongst the invasion barges, and the landings are basically busted. An alerted and undamaged US fleet is going to throw everything at the Japanese invasion fleet, and they are more than likley to stop it with heavy losses to both sides in my opinion. this was precisely one of the reasons the Japanese backed down in the pre-war planning , or discussion of this option. They were not stupid. They knew that an operation like this, was more than likley to be costly, and they could not afford to get into an attritional battle with the US.

Pasifal, when are you going to do a nice build for us of the Hellcat? I'm going to put the odds against that at 19:1.

 

[parsifal]

I would very much like to do a hellcat attached to the BPF in 1945. These guys achieved some really good results with amount almost the equal of the Seafire...hehe...

 

[VBF-13]

I would very much like to do a hellcat attached to the BPF in 1945. These guys achieved some really good results with amount almost the equal of the Seafire...hehe...

Moving on, lol...

For the USN to effectively disrupt a landing, they dont need to win a battle, and whilst heavy losses may result, all they need to do is get some forces in amongst the invasion barges, and the landings are basically busted. An alerted and undamaged US fleet is going to throw everything at the Japanese invasion fleet, and they are more than likley to stop it with heavy losses to both sides in my opinion. this was precisely one of the reasons the Japanese backed down in the pre-war planning , or discussion of this option. They were not stupid. They knew that an operation like this, was more than likley to be costly, and they could not afford to get into an attritional battle with the US.

OK, this is my issue with this. I think the Japanese had a good plan. I'll just summarize it, thusly. Get that Western Pacific and Eastern Asia region under such control as to require a miracle to undo it. I'm not going to go into natural resources imperatives and national defense and such and why they needed that region under control. I'm just going to say the fact is splitting-off half their forces to go on a wild goose chase hoping to knock off a few of our carriers was indeed plumb stupid. I think so, anyway. We're still trying to figure out where they were going to go from there. Do you know why? I don't think they even knew. But one thing was open, and that was Pearl. And the window wasn't going to stay open. They succeeded at Midway, this was the time to reconsider Pearl. Let those natural resources wait. They're right there, at the doorstep. They changed their plan, already, on impulse. They're resilient. And, they succeeded. They're thinking of Pearl.

Sure, it's a hard decision. When it's all or nothing, it always is. That's just the nature of it. But, they saw the last six months. Where were they going, having neglected Pearl? Think of the prize. Had Eisenhower been thinking only of the sacrifice, D-Day would never have happened. Some of you folks seem to be getting the Hawaiian beaches confused with the European beaches. There's no way we could have put up the defense the Germans did on those beaches. The Japanese take Midway, they're going to figure in Pearl, next, somehow. I don't know exactly how, but they're going to. I don't see how they're not. The oil and the rubber plants and that business elsewhere will just have to wait until they're finished.

 

[Shortround6]

Some of you folks seem to be getting the Hawaiian beaches confused with the European beaches. There's no way we could have put up the defense the Germans did on those beaches.

Some folks seem to be getting the Japanese amphibious capability of 1941/42 confused with the American/allied amphibious capability of 1944.

The Japanese had what for amphibious tanks?
Or amphibious tractors?
Or DUKW trucks?
Or large landing craft (something that can get artillery, vehicles, ammo in pallet loads, etc to the beach) in 1941/42?

The Japanese simply didn't have the capacity for a D-Day type assault in June of 1942 let alone Dec of 1941.

Japanese have got how many hundred airplanes on the carriers compared to the thousands of aircraft supporting the D-Day invasion (not including the parachute drops)

and so on.

While the Japanese did have the Shinshu Maru it was only one ship, just about all other Japanese landing ships larger than about 17 meters were completed after 1942. Granted some converted freighters could have been used but compared to the hundreds of large ships and the hundreds of medium LCI and LSTs used at D-Day.

The American defenses can't hold a candle to the German defenses but then the Japanese cannot put more than a small fraction of troops in each assault wave either. They need to get thousands of troops ashore quickly, not hundreds.

 

[GrauGeist]

Well, this is where I am a little confused, then.

Perhaps I was having the wrong idea that the Japanese were a capable force.

Since they didn't have any amphibious capabilities, or even the ability to motorize their troops, how on earth were they able to occupy any South Pacific territories...and no wonder the attack on midway failed!! They didn't know how to get the troops ashore!

 

[Shortround6]

The question is the scale of the operation needed.

The Japanese were quite skillful and capable, the above mentioned Shinshu Maru was the only ship of it's kind in the world in the late 1930s. And there is the Japanese problem, it remained the only ship of it's kind for a number of years.

The Japanese invasion of the Philippines was massive, it also took at least 12 days for the initial landings, with some of the initial landing being 150 miles from the closest Allied forces. Not quite opposed landings. There were also hundreds of land based aircraft from Formosa supporting the attack including over 150 twin engine bombers. The distances were much smaller for many of the ships to cover too.
Ships that could top off fuel tanks (or coal bunkers) at bases on Formosa have a much better ability to support landings in the Philippines than ships (cargo ships and transports) that had to sail from Japan or try to stage from Japanese held Islands in the Marshals to attack Hawaii. Please remember that a number of ships in the carrier attack group had to refuel while under way just to make the Pearl Harbor strike. Did the Japanese have the shipping resources to get ALL the transports needed to the windward Islands with fuel and supplies for the time needed?
BTW Oahu could not feed itself and had to import food from the other Islands. Japanese can hope to capture the oil fuel tanks at Pearl instead of bomb them but if the Invasion looks like it is succeeding and the Americans fire the tanks where does that leave the Japanese ships? How much coal is available for any coal fired Japanese freighters used in the invasion forces?

The Americans never tried an invasion over such a distance without much closer staging areas.

 

[Shortround6]

An interesting book on Japanese merchant ships, it is war time so total accuracy is not to be expected. The Japanese certainly had a number of ships that could reach Hawaii and return, they also had a number that were lucky they could make it one way.

Japanese Merchant Ships Recognition Manual

 

[parsifal]

Its also two different issues. provided the invasion was relatively small scale, the japanese had the expertise and the equipment to undertake some difficult operations. The maximum lift capacity they possessed was about 1.5 to 2 divisions. i think it possible that they could lift more by using just general shipping, but this would have been inherently innefficient.

As it was, japanese LCs were cutting edge in 1941, but were dated and overtaken by 1944.

Its true that the US would be unlikely to be as efficient in 1941 as the germans were in 1944 in normandy. however they didnt need to be. Japanese capability both in terms of lift capability and in terms of overall efficiency was not comparable to the allies in 1944. overall, its probably fair to say that the lack of efficiency in the japanese amphibious technique was equalled or cancelled by the US lack of capability in its general miliatary preparedness on the isalnd.

However what isnt cancelled out are the raw numbers. The Japanese estimated they needed 45000 troops to assault oahu directly, and they never attempted anything even approaching that size of operation. But they under-estimated what the needs for a sucessful invasion would actually be. There were something like 70000 military personnel on the island, of which about 40000 were military personnel. Typically the rule of thumb is that you need about 3:1 odds to undertake an offensive operation successfully, of which an amphibious assault is a particaualalry difficult example. To successfully assault island, they would have needed around 80-100000 troops in the assault. To give some comparative example, at Saipan, the Allies invaded with 71000 men, to defeat 24000 defeanders. At iwo, the odds were 70000 Marines to defeat about 18000 defenders. At Peleliu it was 28000atacking about 11000 defenders. These are odds ratios of 2.9:1, 3.9:1 and 2.5:1, and some of these operations came close to failure. Dupuy assesses the relative efficiency of the US Marine Coprs troops in 1944 to be in the order of 1.5:1, and Naval Gunfire and airpower has been estimated as shifting or adding about 50% to the efficiency of the ground assault. Conversely Japanese fortifications are thought to adda about 50% to their unit efficiency in defence

If you wanted to reduce the relative strengths to a basic comparable figure, then you have modified or adjusted ratios of 4.44:1 (for Saipan), 5.8:1 (for iwo) and (3.8:1 for Peleliu