Midway is two islands. Well, almost.
Significance of the Battle of Midway
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Parsifal, besides what they brought to Midway, what else would they be bringing to the invasion? I have a vague notion. Supposing they just wanted to finish off Pearl. The landings would take more planning, just suppose. What else are they bringing?
parsifal
Colonel
Thats a hard question. There were assets that were commissioned ships in the IJN, and then there were transports requisitioned and generally placed under the administrative contyrol of the various baseforce commands. using the very dated AJ Watts ('Japanese Warships Of WWII'), the order of battle it gives is as follows
Southern Force (invasion of Siam and Malaya)
3rd Blockade and Transport Fleet:Consisting of the 1st and 2nd baseforces there were 46 requisitioned transports attached.
4th Mandated fleet, consisting of the 3-6 baseforce commands; 41 requisitioned transports attached
5th Northern Fleet, with 7th Baseforce under command: 11 transports attached (not sure if these were naval units or requisitioned merchantmen)
South Seas Detachment: 7 transports attached
As far as dedicated permantly commissioned ships in the IJN, these are the ships that i know of in existence as at 7/12/41. there were no LSTs, although by the time of Midway 11 had been commissioned. These were rather small at 948 tons and were rated to carry 4 tanks, 4 trucks and 200 men. The Japanese found these craft to be very useful and built slightly larger and improved versions through to the end of 1944.
in 1941, the ocean going amphibious fleet consisted of the Shinsu Maru (could carry up to 20 LCs), 2 x Akitsu Maru (slightly larger at 11800 tons), 2 x Mayasan Maru (7000 GRT). alol these craft had bow doors, and LC davitds, beaching and unbeaching gear . they were very capable amphibious lift ships, but limiterd in number. Up to midway the Japanese had added a further 4 such units and in 1943 they added a further 7 such units. There also 8 merchant conversions taken in hand and given a rapid partial conversion. These conversions did not have the bow doors or the beaching gear, but they were fast (15 knots) and carried extensive cargo handling gear. generally they were aboiut 6-8000 tons
There were 14 Armewd Merchant cruisers that might be co0nsidered suitable for conversion instead to amphibious transport.
there were roughly 80 other merchant conversions in the Navy doing various things like Sub tender,, netlaying and salvage work
in 1941, the japanese merchant fleet consisted in total of 2337 vessels of 500 tons or above totalling 5,629,845 gross tonnage
Southern Force (invasion of Siam and Malaya)
3rd Blockade and Transport Fleet:Consisting of the 1st and 2nd baseforces there were 46 requisitioned transports attached.
4th Mandated fleet, consisting of the 3-6 baseforce commands; 41 requisitioned transports attached
5th Northern Fleet, with 7th Baseforce under command: 11 transports attached (not sure if these were naval units or requisitioned merchantmen)
South Seas Detachment: 7 transports attached
As far as dedicated permantly commissioned ships in the IJN, these are the ships that i know of in existence as at 7/12/41. there were no LSTs, although by the time of Midway 11 had been commissioned. These were rather small at 948 tons and were rated to carry 4 tanks, 4 trucks and 200 men. The Japanese found these craft to be very useful and built slightly larger and improved versions through to the end of 1944.
in 1941, the ocean going amphibious fleet consisted of the Shinsu Maru (could carry up to 20 LCs), 2 x Akitsu Maru (slightly larger at 11800 tons), 2 x Mayasan Maru (7000 GRT). alol these craft had bow doors, and LC davitds, beaching and unbeaching gear . they were very capable amphibious lift ships, but limiterd in number. Up to midway the Japanese had added a further 4 such units and in 1943 they added a further 7 such units. There also 8 merchant conversions taken in hand and given a rapid partial conversion. These conversions did not have the bow doors or the beaching gear, but they were fast (15 knots) and carried extensive cargo handling gear. generally they were aboiut 6-8000 tons
There were 14 Armewd Merchant cruisers that might be co0nsidered suitable for conversion instead to amphibious transport.
there were roughly 80 other merchant conversions in the Navy doing various things like Sub tender,, netlaying and salvage work
in 1941, the japanese merchant fleet consisted in total of 2337 vessels of 500 tons or above totalling 5,629,845 gross tonnage
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syscom3
Pacific Historian
And get supplies ashore too. The Japanese infantryman was a good fighter, but not supermen. They needed food, water and ammo just like everyone else.
Shortround6
Major General
Seems to be some confusion. Some people are talking about invading Oahu Dec 7 1941. The thread drifted a bit.
Midway would be much easier to "take" from a size standpoint. However timing gets a little weird. Take Midway in Dec of 1941? Or are you asking what was needed in June of 1942?
For amphibious operations the air support for either Midway or Oahu is the carrier based air which is of somewhat limited duration, the carriers only carry so much aviation ordnance and fuel. I don't know what the Japanese carriers had but the US Lexington and Saratoga had about 137,000 gals of av-gas in 1942. 60 aircraft at 150 gallons each is 9,000 gallons. If you have 60 planes each one can go about 15 times and you are out of fuel. Granted they can refuel from a tanker but......
Some British carriers had much less fuel, where the Japanese fell I have no idea. Even modern 60,000 ton carriers are only good for about 5 days worth of air operations though. Granted the jets suck up a lot more fuel.
But this is the problem with trying to compare or use different campaigns or battles as examples. Opposed vs unopposed landings. Bringing every thing over beaches vs capturing even minor port facilities. Beaches themselves (sand, volcanic ash, rock or coral) and weather (size of waves). There are a lot of variables that can have a large impact on the actual situation.
D
Deleted member 63714
Guest
My opinion of the Battle of Midway has always been influenced by other historians and their analysis. If the Japanese HAD taken it, I don't think it would have made much difference in a grand scale of the Pacific War. The Japanese had already occupied most of the islands between Hawaii and Japan. It would have been but one more... The U.S. would still have had the same battles ahead of it. It would have most likely been another moral blow, but the U.S. had suffered those already when the Philippines fell and when Pearl Harbor was attacked.
The exact same hard fighting would await, regardless. The U.S. had to wrest island after island from Japanese hands as they traversed the Pacific. If Midway had been deemed important, the U.S. would have eventually invaded it again and retook it as it did later with the other islands. It would have been just another small island to retake just like any of the others. I adhere to the view that Japan was doomed from the start. They could not hope to match U.S. output, troop numbers, food, medicine, and medical care. Midway's loss would have made little difference to the ultimate outcome. One of the few things that I believe could have altered the outcome was the bloody losses they inflicted. The high casualties MIGHT have weakened public support for continuing. However, I don't think so. The American public was ENRAGED at the death and damage at Pearl Harbor, and also disliked Japan's awesome cruelty. I think that the U.S. public would have continued to support the defeat of Japan no matter what the casualties were with the possible exception of a Japanese invasion. I think that public support might (note I said MIGHT) have waned once all those islands were returned and Japan was pushed back across the ocean and weakened as a military power. These are just my own thoughts and opinions (influenced by many historians and commentators). Hope I didn't derail the discussion.
The exact same hard fighting would await, regardless. The U.S. had to wrest island after island from Japanese hands as they traversed the Pacific. If Midway had been deemed important, the U.S. would have eventually invaded it again and retook it as it did later with the other islands. It would have been just another small island to retake just like any of the others. I adhere to the view that Japan was doomed from the start. They could not hope to match U.S. output, troop numbers, food, medicine, and medical care. Midway's loss would have made little difference to the ultimate outcome. One of the few things that I believe could have altered the outcome was the bloody losses they inflicted. The high casualties MIGHT have weakened public support for continuing. However, I don't think so. The American public was ENRAGED at the death and damage at Pearl Harbor, and also disliked Japan's awesome cruelty. I think that the U.S. public would have continued to support the defeat of Japan no matter what the casualties were with the possible exception of a Japanese invasion. I think that public support might (note I said MIGHT) have waned once all those islands were returned and Japan was pushed back across the ocean and weakened as a military power. These are just my own thoughts and opinions (influenced by many historians and commentators). Hope I didn't derail the discussion.
I can't imagine the number of casulaties that could be inflicted in an invasion of Midway would be anything like enough to weaken US resolve. There simply weren't enough troops on and around the islands. The whole idea of US resolve being weakened enough for them to negotiate I find somewhat starnge. Prior to WW2 can anyone give any examples of the US not being willing to fight because of the butchers bill. They were late in WW1 but once in didn't shy from accepting casulaties.
The US was certainly enraged by the attack on Pearl Harbour but when did the puplic first start hearing of the cruelty towards POWs and native populations. Was it similiar to Germany in that the true measure of the horrors only came out with the liberartion of the camps, individual massacres were known about but the allied general puplic didn't know the full extent until 44/45? How long after the death march were the puplic awear and enraged by it?
The US was certainly enraged by the attack on Pearl Harbour but when did the puplic first start hearing of the cruelty towards POWs and native populations. Was it similiar to Germany in that the true measure of the horrors only came out with the liberartion of the camps, individual massacres were known about but the allied general puplic didn't know the full extent until 44/45? How long after the death march were the puplic awear and enraged by it?
Is Midway not feasible for heavier support-aircraft for the invasion? Is it too far away to figure in for anything like that? They of course would be making round-trips, that's why I ask.
On my drift, I'm drifting to considering downsizing the invasion. Smash up Pearl real good, then get back to the rubber plants business, etc. It would certainly buy them more time, a serious blow like that to the heart of our fleet and overhaul-capability (i.e., capability to "bounce back").
I see. Midway, though, think about it. It wasn't "in the book" on 7 December 1941, but was rather, largely, a drive on impulse. There was no pre-war planning figuring it in. It was nothing, until six months later, when they looked back, and saw how the cards fell. Consider, now that they're there. Are they reconsidering Pearl? They know, by then, Pearl is what keeps us on their backs. Smash it up, get it out of the way, rewrite the book. This is their big opportunity.
I see. We hardly think of these let's call them "administrative challenges" they'd have to get by. I'm thinking largely of their other carriers and aircraft to reinforce the invasion. Let's call it just another run at Pearl. Certainly to put together a landing operation that quickly would be problematic. Think of a window of opportunity, closing fast. Are their other carriers and aircraft ready to meet that challenge? Give the window, maybe, a month, no more. The longer they delay, the better for the defense, the worse for the prosecution.
Shortround6
Major General
Midway to Honolulu is just over 1300 miles one way so neither the Japanese or Americans could really bomb each other without an intermediate airfield.
Well, that was the original Japanese intention, 3 if not 4 air strikes in one day against Pearl Harbor. However the plan was changed when NO US carriers were found and resistance was stiffer than expected on 2nd strike. Japanese needed to conserve strength and keep planes ready in case they found the American carriers ( or American carriers found them). A constant internet argument over if it was the right decision.
Please remember that the US had 17 active Battleships at the time of Pearl Harbor counting both Atlantic and Pacific Fleets and that 3 of the South Dakota class had been launched but not completed in 1941. The Massive US ship building program was starting in 1941 with many cruisers, destroyers and carriers ordered and a number laid down before Pearl Harbor. The loss of 5-6 old battleships is not really crippling to the US.
The Japanese have a very fine line between sticking around to cause more damage and suffering losses that they cannot make up once the New US ships start showing up. Loosing a score of airplanes in a 3rd attack in one thing. Loosing a carrier or two to a US carrier return strike is another. The US had laid down CV 10 11 on Dec 1 1941. They won't be ready until the summer of 1943 but the Japanese have to be very careful with their assets. The US building program was not secret.
On Dec 7th they don't know that they will sink Prince of Wales and Repulse, They don't know how well the Philippine Malay and DEI campaigns will go. They don't know how well the Indian Ocean raid will go (using many of the carriers used at both Pearl Harbor and Midway). However the US is gathering steam. The Operation that will lead to Guadalcanal is set in motion in May of 1942, before Midway. Granted it is nicknamed "Operation Shoestring" by the troops.
A collision is coming, is just a matter of where and when. Midway may be a good objective in the summer of 1942 (or not) but Oahu is going to be an awful lot tougher in June of 1942 than Dec 1941 ( commanders won't ignore radar warnings) with more defensive guns and aircraft and troops. And the Japanese face the same problem in June that they did in Dec. They have to destroy Pearl Harbor not just damage it or it can still function as a base (reduced capacity) while their closest real base is thousands of miles away.
Japanese also have no way of knowing just how bad US torpedoes are so all plans have to factor in American submarines as a higher danger than they really were.
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Balljoint
Senior Airman
The US was expecting poor results in the Pacific. The 8th Air force was on standby on the Pacific coast. Aft3er Midway –and no doubt Coral Sea- they were released to England.
parsifal
Colonel
Not sure what you are getting at here, but you can only get so far by improvisation, and a complex and difficult invasion like Oahu it really couldnt be improvised. tring to get ashore Gallipoli style using ships boats isnt going to cut it. The Japanese could lift considerable numbers of troops, but the limiting factor is how many they can get across the beach. A major proble for Hawaii is the height of the surf...Japanese LCs, or anyone for that matter, would have a hard time of it IMO. The assault capability in 1941 for the Japanese, that is the number of troops they can put ashore in a single wave, is about 3-5000. by the time of Midway that appears to have increased somewhat, plus the japanese appear to have acquired a limited capability to include tanks in their assault waves...maybe 50 tanks at maximum in a single wave. Like all early war assaults, the Japanese would be relying on landing and unloading, then getting the amphibious craft off the beaches, to go and pick up more troops from the anchored transpports, which typically could be anchored off the coast, somewhrere between 5 and 20 km. In heavy conditions there are bound to be some comsiderable numbers of LCs damaged, or made US by the surf conditions. ive no idea what the rate of wastage might be, but probably reasonable to assume 10% per assault wave. That doesnt include losses to enemy fire, just purely natural wastage.
Necessary to make some assumptions here based on my own experience in training. Im going to assaume the following:
10% attrition rate in LCs per wave
an initial assault capacity of 5000 troops
Distance to waiting merchant tranport , and the average transport being 10km (6miles, 5 nm) offshore
speed of the LCs 10knots (12mph)
Loading time 1 hour
After the 1st wave, 50% of lift capacity needed for re-supply
The first wave arrives with 5000 troops at say 4am, disembarkation should take about 3 hours, LCs are back in the water heading back out to the anchored transports by 7am. Reloading to 8am returning with 2750 reinforces, unloading of that wave and the supply by 12 noon, returning, less 10% arriving at the transports 1pm, recommence loading returning with 2500 troops complete dismbarkation 7pm, LC crews now exhausted. In the first day, the Japanese have managed to land about 10200 and about 100 tons of supply. thats a fairly limited capacity in my book
The weakness in this argument is the aircrews. the japanese easily had the carrying capcity to field more than 650 aircraft at sea at any time. That rivals the carrying capcity of the fast carriers in '44. What they lacked were the crews to fill the carriers. They didnt have enough aviators to properly man the 6 big fleet carriers, let alone the others they had. They had combed out the training schools prewar, to bring the air groups up to strength, but these comb outs had wrecjked their wartime replacements, for the first six months of the war. These hasitly put together air groups lacked the cohesion and training to be considered effective. After Coral Sea, the Zuikaku had very nearly a full complement, but the CAG had to be used to retrain the air group for the shattered The KB
A few people have commented that they are confused. You can include me in that now. Are you suggesting if the Japanese won at Midway, they should attempt an assault Oahu, or undertake some sort of operation involving all the troops and lift capacity they could muster in June 1942? if so, highly unlikely. The army refused to release more troops than they did. already Japan was straining from shipping shortages, by June there were two divisions plus support dug in and ready for such an attack, probably in excess of 80000 combat troops. Its totally unrealistic to surmise an invasion of Oahu in June, with the forces the IJN could reasonably call upon in the Pacific.
its arguable in December 1941. in June 1942, what you are proposing would be tantamount to a suicide mission for the entire japanese fleet. You really cant be serious in trying to advocate this as a viable possibility for the japanese
syscom3
Pacific Historian
The Japanese avgas bunkerage was 134,000 gallons for Hiryu and Soryu. 150,000 for Kaga and Akagi.
D
Deleted member 63714
Guest
Was this directed at me? Perhaps my posting wandered a bit. I did not mean just the invasion of Midway. I am aware of Midway's relative smallness as noted in my post. I was talking generally about the Pacific campaign and the increasing casualties as it went on. I was particularly referring to the potentially catastrophic invasion of Japan. The astronomical casualties I said *MIGHT* have caused a weakening of resolve during an invasion of Japan would not have been experienced before. No one will ever know what the public or military officials would have thought because it didn't happen. Thinking of what 1,000,000 potential casualties would have done to U.S. resolve is not "strange" at all...
The public and military was aware of Japanese conduct in China and other places they invaded prior to U.S. involvement. The treatment of Chinese at Nanking was well known. The Japanese had made a name for themselves for cruelty prior to Pearl Harbor.
parsifal
Colonel
My sources show Implacable carried about 115000 US gallons versus about 230,000 for Essex, as designed. But the Essex class capacity was reduced to about 209,000 gallons after safety mandated redesigns. British carriers were limited mostly because of the very safe stowage worked into the design, to reduce the risk of fire as far as possible. even in the 70's US officers that inspected the melbourne were amazed at the multipe layers of safety worked onto the fuel handling systems, far beyond that in US carriers even those built in the 50's.
The ships of the RN that fell down hopelessly were the old WWI conversions. ive read somewhere the Glorious had something less than 30000 gallons of Avgas stowage, which would have severely limit the effectiveness of this otherwise valuable ship.
OK, you're misunderstanding where I'm going. I'm saying putting together a landing operation would require too much planning, and they didn't have that time. Their window of opportunity was closing too fast. That opportunity, again, was finishing the job at Pearl. For further clarity, anybody who thinks 7 December 1941 was a Navy imperative is sorely mistaken. The same goes, here, as regards Midway, and a second strike at Pearl. These were Army imperatives to get us off the backs of their Army and its big land conquest campaign. Their Navy was in an adjunct role, there, serving and supporting that Army imperative, from the get go. Had their Navy been calling the shots, they'd have had their sights trained on Alaska, Hawaii, and probably Panama. They'd have cut off our supply lines, while they were at it. It would have been a vastly, vastly different campaign. In that context, I implore you to rethink what Midway was. It was buying their Army time. Nothing more, nothing less. Had their Navy succeeded, Pearl, you better believe it, was next in their thinking. They knew what was coming down the pike out of our shipbuilding yards. They saw that handwriting on the wall. Propelled off a successful Navy operation at Midway, they're thinking of going in for the kill. They're not just thinking of scampering back this time to do their Army's bidding in the Western Pacific, leaving an intact Pearl, minus a couple or three carriers any myopic fool could see were quickly being made up for. It's still an Army campaign. This time, however, they're getting it right. I think so.
Shortround6
Major General
There is only so far they can go. Panama is pretty much out of reach on Dec 8th 1941. It is over 5000 miles from Hawaii to the Panama canal. Reachable by large long range subs (at any time?) and a few merchant ships before Dec 7th.
No Japanese Merchant ship is going to be let near the canal after Dec 7th and while a few subs might reach it, staying on station is a bit harder. It is 7800 miles from the Marshals to Panama. Japanese had 4 subs (?) That could make the round trip in Dec 1941. Not many more in June 1942. and at 16 kts surface cruise speed it is 18 days one way. At 10kts it is 28 days (assuming they never have to submerge).
Both sides saw the Alaska route as important but both sides let it fizzle out. Trying to build and maintain the needed infrastructure was too much. And the weather was too lousy to permit the desired air operations.
Taking out Pearl Harbor in June of 1942 after a successful Midway it a whole new battle. More troops and more defensive guns and more aircraft defending The Base. Even if the Japanese win the Navel battle off Midway and invade the Island they may not have enough fuel/ordnance left for a good strike at Oahu. And nothing short of boots on the ground is going to take Pearl Harbor out of action for more than a few months.
The Japanese operated under a constant oil shortage. Sometimes were better than others but strikes had to be planned to get the most results for oil expended.
No Japanese Merchant ship is going to be let near the canal after Dec 7th and while a few subs might reach it, staying on station is a bit harder. It is 7800 miles from the Marshals to Panama. Japanese had 4 subs (?) That could make the round trip in Dec 1941. Not many more in June 1942. and at 16 kts surface cruise speed it is 18 days one way. At 10kts it is 28 days (assuming they never have to submerge).
Both sides saw the Alaska route as important but both sides let it fizzle out. Trying to build and maintain the needed infrastructure was too much. And the weather was too lousy to permit the desired air operations.
Taking out Pearl Harbor in June of 1942 after a successful Midway it a whole new battle. More troops and more defensive guns and more aircraft defending The Base. Even if the Japanese win the Navel battle off Midway and invade the Island they may not have enough fuel/ordnance left for a good strike at Oahu. And nothing short of boots on the ground is going to take Pearl Harbor out of action for more than a few months.
The Japanese operated under a constant oil shortage. Sometimes were better than others but strikes had to be planned to get the most results for oil expended.
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
The reason why I ventured into the "Oahu invasion" what-if, was looking at the early (pre) war value of Midway versus Oahu.
Midway, Wake and other seaplane outposts had a basic military value prior to the war, of course, once the war began, Midway's value increased exponentially as it was improved over the course of the war.
There was a school of thought that a decisive first-strike at the U.S. would knock them off balance and perhaps force a negotiation. As we all know, this didn't happen.
However the airstrike at Pearl Harbor did not yield desirable results and was, from my point of view, a failure. It was a failure in the sense that the carriers were not taken out. It failed in the fact that the Pearl Harbor complex was not incapacitated and it concluded with a certain number of battleships/cruisers and other fleet support vessels damaged or sunk and as a whole, did not disable the U.S. Pacific fleet, but only gave it a setback. It also failed in the respect that it did not force the U.S. to negotiate anything except a firm resolve, a declaration of war and an eventual ass-kicking. This can been seen reflected in the battle of Midway only 6 months later, where the U.S. was able to engage, challenge and drive the Japanese Navy off, inflicting more damage than was received.
So this is where the thought process of the taking of the Hawaiian chain entered into consideration.
What would it have taken, for the Japanese to severely limit the U.S. Pacific Fleet from challenging the Japanese Navy. The element of surprise was on the Japanese side, but only for a short time. Prior to 7 December, the U.S. forces in the Pacific and Far East were not enough to challenge the Japanese, both in experienced manpower and modern equipment.
If they had only one chance at a successful strike, that would take the U.S. out of the game, or force it to the table, what would it be then? From what I see, Oahu keeps coming to the front of the line.Yes, it would have been a difficult operation/logistics problem, but with proper planning, timing and support, it would certainly be worth the risk. Taking the Phillipines would not (and did not) have that much impact on the course of the war. Taking Wake Island didn't and even taking Midway would end up being more expensive than it was worth (if only to keep the U.S. from creating a forward staging area).
If they could successfully manage to take Oahu, then expand their hold to the other islands (Hawaii, Maui, Kaui, etc) then they would create sort of a barrier between the U.S. west coast and the eastern fringe of their Empire. Is they could also incapacitate the Panama canal, that would force the U.S.N. to reinforce their fleet from two directions: the "Horn" or from the Indian Ocean.
If the argument that it was "too much of a risk" is tossed out there, then consider this: invading Korea, China and surrounding territories was a risk, too. Starting the war in the first place was a risk. How far are you willing to roll the dice to ensure that your conquest is secured?
*NOTE* The observation of the Phillippines' impact on the war was minimal is in reference to the U.S. to maount decisive strikes from there at the onset. The Island's capture consumed a great deal of Japanese manpower and material to hold it, but if it had been bypassed at the onset, the U.S. would have little in the way of man and materials to mount a challenge to the Japanese at that time. Of course, it proved to be VERY valuable later in the war as the Allies advanced on Japan's home islands.
Midway, Wake and other seaplane outposts had a basic military value prior to the war, of course, once the war began, Midway's value increased exponentially as it was improved over the course of the war.
There was a school of thought that a decisive first-strike at the U.S. would knock them off balance and perhaps force a negotiation. As we all know, this didn't happen.
However the airstrike at Pearl Harbor did not yield desirable results and was, from my point of view, a failure. It was a failure in the sense that the carriers were not taken out. It failed in the fact that the Pearl Harbor complex was not incapacitated and it concluded with a certain number of battleships/cruisers and other fleet support vessels damaged or sunk and as a whole, did not disable the U.S. Pacific fleet, but only gave it a setback. It also failed in the respect that it did not force the U.S. to negotiate anything except a firm resolve, a declaration of war and an eventual ass-kicking. This can been seen reflected in the battle of Midway only 6 months later, where the U.S. was able to engage, challenge and drive the Japanese Navy off, inflicting more damage than was received.
So this is where the thought process of the taking of the Hawaiian chain entered into consideration.
What would it have taken, for the Japanese to severely limit the U.S. Pacific Fleet from challenging the Japanese Navy. The element of surprise was on the Japanese side, but only for a short time. Prior to 7 December, the U.S. forces in the Pacific and Far East were not enough to challenge the Japanese, both in experienced manpower and modern equipment.
If they had only one chance at a successful strike, that would take the U.S. out of the game, or force it to the table, what would it be then? From what I see, Oahu keeps coming to the front of the line.Yes, it would have been a difficult operation/logistics problem, but with proper planning, timing and support, it would certainly be worth the risk. Taking the Phillipines would not (and did not) have that much impact on the course of the war. Taking Wake Island didn't and even taking Midway would end up being more expensive than it was worth (if only to keep the U.S. from creating a forward staging area).
If they could successfully manage to take Oahu, then expand their hold to the other islands (Hawaii, Maui, Kaui, etc) then they would create sort of a barrier between the U.S. west coast and the eastern fringe of their Empire. Is they could also incapacitate the Panama canal, that would force the U.S.N. to reinforce their fleet from two directions: the "Horn" or from the Indian Ocean.
If the argument that it was "too much of a risk" is tossed out there, then consider this: invading Korea, China and surrounding territories was a risk, too. Starting the war in the first place was a risk. How far are you willing to roll the dice to ensure that your conquest is secured?
*NOTE* The observation of the Phillippines' impact on the war was minimal is in reference to the U.S. to maount decisive strikes from there at the onset. The Island's capture consumed a great deal of Japanese manpower and material to hold it, but if it had been bypassed at the onset, the U.S. would have little in the way of man and materials to mount a challenge to the Japanese at that time. Of course, it proved to be VERY valuable later in the war as the Allies advanced on Japan's home islands.
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Very interesting. I guess the next step would be to determine the fuel consumption of the planes (I'd think the Japanese planes, being lighter would consume less fuel), and from there come up with an idea as too how many sorties and CAP a carrier would support.
As to the invasion of Pearl - Pearl is not the beaches of Normandy as far as levels of defense, and of course 1941 Japan is not 1944 US when it comes to support of amphibious landings. But there would be an advantage the Allies did not have at Normandy - surprise. I think this would certainly have an effect. And even if the US is alerted by the bombings, going from peacetime to defending against an invasion is a far bigger step than being at war, expecting an invasion and just not knowing when and where (1944 Germany).
At first I scoffed at the idea of invading Pearl Harbor - but after thinking about it and reading posts, it's not a terrible idea. I'd think that it would have to be done in 1941 though, after that it would not be successful. And not saying it would be successful 12/7/1941 - but it has a reasonable chance of success IMO. I'd think you would need a good re-supply fleet of vessels as well, but these could follow well after the main body. Heck, the Japanese used many of their destroyers as supply and transport vessels in Guadacanal - this would be necessary IMO for an invasion of Pearl. Even using the 4 Kongo class as supply for the carriers would help a lot, though we have the advantage of after sight knowing that these fast battleships risked little from seaborne attack if they refused combat, and that the real threat was enemy aircraft.
It's a gamble for sure but perhaps Japan's best chance at a negotiated peace or at least to make attacking the Japanese empire more of a challenge for the US.
But you just can't get away from Japan's pilot attrition issues. Taking Pearl is not going to change Japan's fuel shortage issues, they won't have an over abundance of fuel for training. Taking Pearl won't change Japan's pilot training infrastructure.
